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The system of industrial conciliation and arbitration was, for most of the 
20th century, a distinctive feature of the Australian economy and society. 
It was hailed by some as a source of equity and a mechanism of economic 
management; by others, it was condemned as a market friction and a brake 
on economic progress. In the 1990s, the system was relegated to a diminished 
role, partly because of a shift of opinion toward the latter perception and partly 
because the trade union movement, frustrated by restraints on the exercise of 
its power, withdrew its support for the traditional system. Though no one can 
foresee with certainty future industrial relations arrangements, the revival of a 
system of centralised regulation seems improbable.
Australian society is, nevertheless, a product of its history, and is better 
understood if we do not lose sight of that history. This study describes a small 
part of it. It is confined to the period between the inception of conciliation 
and arbitration and World War II. If, as I believe, the history of the system is 
worth telling, the study needs to be carried forward for the remainder of the 
20th century. I hope that there are scholars who will take on that task.
In addition to the time limitation, there is one of scope. My focus is the 
regulation of the terms of employment, the attitudes and goals underlying it, 
the economic settings in which it occurred and the economic consequences. 
Except when they bear directly on my central inquiry, I do not deal with 
industrial disputes, or with constitutional and other legal issues that surrounded 
the operation of the arbitration system, or with the politics of arbitration. 
There is some literature in these areas, but the book is not closed.
In this book, there are many citations of cases published in the 
Commonwealth Arbitration Reports (CAR). I have elected not to refer to these 
foreword
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cases in the conventional legal manner (Amalgamated Engineering Union v 
Alderdice) but to use titles which give some indication of the contents of the 
decision (Main Hours case). It was the practice of the Judges, in their decisions, 
to refer to previous cases in this way. In some cases, the reports themselves use 
descriptive titles (Basic Wage and Wage Reduction Inquiry) and I have adopted 
these. I have also used short titles which appeared in later numbers of the CAR 
(Judgment—Saddlery Industry (Tanning Section)).
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State Library of Victoria.
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Adelaide and Flinders University for conferring honorary appointments on me 
and providing access to facilities for my work; the Directors of the National 
Institute of Labour Studies for their encouragement and support; the South 
Australian Industrial Court and Commission for accommodating me in their 
library while I worked on limited-circulation documents; Joe Isaac and Stuart 
Macintyre for reading my manuscript and making many helpful suggestions; 
Sheila Cameron, my proficient and helpful copyeditor; and the University of 
Adelaide Press—especially John Emerson and Zoë Stokes—for publishing this 
book.
My wife, Sue Richardson, and my four children—Jim, Kate, Bill and 
Ben—have given me every encouragement and shown much forbearance as I 
have worked on the project.
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The advent of industrial regulation by tribunal came close to the turn of the 
century. Wages boards began in Victoria in 1896 and courts of arbitration 
in 1900. The first day of the new century was also the first day of the 
Commonwealth of Australia, endowed with a parliament that was empowered 
to institute its chosen models of conciliation and arbitration for the prevention 
and settlement of interstate industrial disputes. This book is a study of the 
operation of conciliation and arbitration, especially by the Commonwealth 
Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, from the inception of the system 
until World War II. It is not, however, a general history of conciliation and 
arbitration. It does not, for example, deal with the successes and failures of the 
tribunals in preventing strikes and lockouts; or with the manifold legal issues 
to which the system gave rise, unless they affected significantly the tribunals’ 
exercise of their power to fix wages and conditions.1 Rather, it is about fixing 
the terms of employment; and it attempts to set the tribunals’ performance 
in an economic context. It is about ‘wage policy’, if the term is interpreted 
broadly enough to include both prescribed wages and other factors that affect 
the cost of labour, including working hours and leave.
1  For an historical account of arbitration and industrial disputation, see Harley (2004). For 
an account of the legal issues, see Kirby and Creighton (2004).
Inception and setting
1
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1.1 the orIgIns of wage fIxatIon2
In the late 19th century, in Australia as in some other countries, the presumption 
that wages (like other prices) were best left to the interplay of market forces 
was confronted by a growing body of opinion that market outcomes were 
intolerable.3 If Australia, with New Zealand, moved ahead of other countries 
in responding to this perception, a reason may be that policy-making was more 
pragmatic and less cognisant of the prescriptions of orthodox economics. As 
we shall see in Chapter 13, formal economics was virtually non-existent. An 
educated reformer was likely to be either a lawyer or a clergyman, little affected 
by economic doctrine.4 Within the colonial parliaments, there were politicians 
prepared to judge proposals for state intervention with fewer and less strongly 
held preconceptions against them. Australia did not have a strong laissez-
faire tradition. Governments had ‘intervened’ in various ways, including the 
establishment of state-owned enterprises and encouragement of immigration. 
Because this is a study of wage fixation, the issues of strike prevention and 
dispute resolution receive less attention than would be appropriate in a general 
history of arbitration. But it is certainly not my intention to underplay the 
impact of either the strikes of the 1890s or the desire of the labour movement 
to redress by legislation the industrial impotence of unions.5 Both were of great 
importance in creating a climate for state intervention, partially displacing ‘the 
market’, to find a place on the political agenda.
2  This topic is more extensively discussed in Macintyre and Mitchell (1989).
3  A useful summary of the kinds of labour market regulation practised before the advent of 
arbitration is provided by Shanahan (1999, especially pp. 221–226).
4  Jenny Lee writes of the Victorian legislation of 1896—establishing wages boards—that ‘the 
measure was less the brainchild of the labour movement than of the liberal Christian small-
bourgeois and professionals of the Anti-Sweating League. The liberal anti-sweaters … sought 
particularist, moralistic explanations for the misery engulfing the working class in the 1890s, 
and fashioned their legislation accordingly’ (Lee 1987, p. 352).
5  Macintyre and Mitchell (1989, pp. 15–17) argue that a major reason for the adoption of 
compulsory arbitration was the opportunity for unions to gain assured recognition. Without 
disputing this, I would contend that the necessary support for arbitration of people not 
aligned with the unions was largely a result of their concerns about inadequate wages and 
unacceptable conditions of work.
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Tolerance of active government was a permissive factor for interference 
with the labour market. The first actual intervention was the result of a specific 
concern—‘sweating’—soon to be overtaken by the drive for the living wage 
(discussed in Chapter 3). The notion of sweating was fluid. Evelyn M Burns, 
writing in 1926, noted the vagueness of the idea:
The exact meaning of the term ‘sweating’ is difficult to determine, 
partly because it has changed considerably since its first use, and partly 
because it is now a complex of vague ideas very generally held. As used 
today, it is roughly synonymous with the payment of ‘very’ or ‘unduly’ 
low wages, while some couple with it the idea of employment under 
unhealthy conditions, and often for very long hours. The crucial terms, 
‘unduly’ or ‘very low’, are most generally taken to mean less than a very 
low living wage, in itself a none too precise concept, which … expands 
and contracts with changing economic circumstances, but they are 
sometimes used to imply wages ‘very much lower than the normal rates 
prevailing throughout the country.’ [Fifth Report of the Select Committee 
of the House of Lords on the Sweating System (1890)] (Burns 1926, p. 9)
A Committee of Inquiry in South Australia in 1904 identified sweating 
with the payment of an ‘unduly low wage’. This meaning, said Burns, ‘was 
becoming increasingly popular, possibly because it is the definition of one 
unknown in terms of another’.
Sweating is by no means the only concept that lacks precision but may 
yet be an ingredient of intelligent conversation and even policy. ‘Poverty’, 
‘fairness’, ‘reasonableness’, ‘equality’ and ‘equity’ are but a few others. In the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries there were people working under conditions 
so offensive to many observers as to leave no room for semantic nicety. The 
concern was widespread. Differences of opinion emerged when the discussion 
focused on the extent of the problem. Was it narrowly confined to pockets of 
industry where, for one reason or another, employers were unable or unwilling 
to comply with bare minimum standards of adequacy; or did it embrace much 
larger proportions of the working class?
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T A Coghlan, the author of the first major history of labour conditions 
in Australia (published in 1918), was scathing about the use of the term 
‘sweating’ in the Australian context. He saw it as an attempt to translate what 
was an essentially British problem to a society in which it was virtually non-
existent—a translation espoused mainly by trade unionists wishing to capitalise 
on recent British inquiries and exposures. He ascribed to ‘sweating’ a specific 
meaning: ‘taking work to give it out again at lower rates and living off the 
difference’ (Coghlan 1969, vol. III, p. 1485; see also vol. IV, pp. 1835–1836 
and pp. 2096–2097). It did not, to Coghlan, mean the same thing as ‘outwork’, 
still less the low wages and harsh conditions that might be associated with 
some factory work. Coghlan may have been right about the original meaning; 
but, if so, the familiar process of language corruption had taken its course, 
even in England, and the word came to be applied to work—both within the 
employer’s establishment and in the worker’s home—that offended prevailing 
standards of decency.
The Select Committee of the House of Lords that reported in 1890 
on ‘the sweating system’ may have emphasised the narrower meaning of the 
concept. But by the early years of the 20th century, the broader meaning 
prevailed. The Trade Boards, introduced in 1909 for the specific purpose of 
eradicating sweated wages and conditions, were modelled on the wage boards 
of the Australian States, especially Victoria. To many, this was but a small 
step towards the amelioration of the intolerable hardships that characterised 
many working lives. Not least among the expressions of outrage were those of 
religious leaders, exemplified by this plea:
What, if you look at it sincerely, are the conditions of casual and 
underpaid labour but slavery without its safeguards? The acknowledged 
slave was often well-treated, clothed and fed and even maintained in 
his old age. It was the owner’s interest on the whole to keep his human 
chattels in good condition and in good temper. The free workers, slaves 
of penury, have not even the value of a chattel; they are absolutely 
dependent on employers, who too often cannot afford to treat them 
well, being themselves in bondage to the tyrant competition. They 
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cannot leave their miserable work, and if they do wander away, it is only 
to find elsewhere conditions equally cruel and degrading; they have 
no claim on their masters beyond a minimum for tasks actually done, 
and when they fall, weary and worn out, only destitution awaits them. 
Even the last and vilest reproach of the slave system is not done away: 
virtue, honour, purity are as hard to keep for thousands of free-women 
as they were for the veriest slave. (Reverend J M Lloyd Thomas in The 
Industrial Unrest and the Living Wage, 1914)
Burns records that inquiries into sweating were conducted in Chicago, 
Massachusetts, and New York. In the last decade of the 19th century, ‘there was 
an almost universal attempt to investigate and remedy the evils denoted by the 
term “sweating”’. But the opposition to action was formidable. ‘Australia’, says 
Burns, ‘is a notable exception’ (Burns 1926, pp. 11–12).
The Australian concerns can be traced back at least as far as 1880, 
when the Melbourne Age began to assert that some classes of labourers were 
exploited (Hammond 1914–15, p. 101). A Royal Commission, appointed in 
Victoria in 1882, was directed to inquire into conditions of work in shops and 
the operation of the Factories Act. Reporting in 1884, the Commission found 
that the practice in the boot and clothing trades of giving out work to be done 
in the home had resulted in low wages, long hours, and unsanitary dwellings 
(Hammond 1914–15, p. 102). Phelps Brown (1959, pp. 206–207) records 
that in Britain a driving force behind the movement against sweated wages was 
Sir Charles Dilke, a parliamentarian and friend of J S Mill (who had softened 
his earlier and well-known antipathy to wage regulation). In 1887, Dilke met 
Alfred Deakin, then Chief Secretary in Victoria, who was attending the Jubilee 
of Queen Victoria.6 According to Phelps Brown, Deakin ‘discussed with Dilke 
a proposal for trade boards which was being advanced by the uncrowned king 
of Victoria, David Syme’. Phelps Brown continues: ‘When Deakin got home, 
he drew up a Bill for trade boards, which he sent to Dilke, and in 1896 the first 
boards were set up in Victoria.’
6  Dilke had visited Australia in 1867.
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The Age, in 1890, returned to the attack on sweating; and the Chief 
Inspector of Factories issued a report confirming stories coming from unofficial 
investigators of low wages and long hours. A Factories Act Inquiry Board of 
1893–94 offered suggestions about ways of dealing with the sweating problem 
(Hammond 1914–15, p. 107).
Victorian legislation to counter sweating provided for the creation 
of wages boards. A board would comprise equal numbers of employer and 
employee representatives presided over by a neutral chairman. The responsible 
Minister was Alexander Peacock. M B Hammond, an American economist 
who visited Australia to investigate the operation of wages boards, provides an 
account of his interview with Peacock:
The author of the wages boards plan which was incorporated in the 
Factories Act of 1896 was Mr (now Sir) Alexander Peacock, who had 
recently become Chief Secretary in the Turner ministry. The agitation 
against sweating was at its height, and Mr Peacock interested himself in 
the matter and personally visited the homes of many of the out-workers. 
‘I found’, he says, ‘that these people were working excessive hours at 
grossly sweated rates of pay in poor and cheerless homes and generally 
under wretched conditions’. Sir Alexander has told me that he and the 
Chief Inspector of Factories, Mr Harrison Ord, held many conferences 
in which they endeavoured to find a practicable solution for the sweating 
evil. … The plan which was adopted was suggested to Mr Peacock by 
his own experience when, as a youth, he had been a clerk in a mining 
company’s office near Ballarat. The owner of the mining property, a 
rough man who had himself been a miner, had announced a reduction 
of 3s a week in the wages of his men, who offered bitter opposition and 
asked for a conference with their employer. At this conference young 
Peacock acted as secretary. The employer argued that as there had been 
a decline in the prosperity of the business, the men ought to be willing 
to share in the reduction of profits. The men replied to this by pointing 
out the way in which they were obliged to live and successfully appealed 
to the employer’s knowledge, as an old time comrade, of what effect 
a reduction of 3s a week would have on their standard of living. The 
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recollection of this crude experiment in collective bargaining led Mr 
Peacock to think that what had been done in mining might be done in 
other industries by compelling employers to meet with their employees 
to arrange wage scales. (Hammond 1914–15, pp. 108–109)
The Bill that Peacock introduced, however, would have limited the 
scope of wage board regulation to women and young people, ‘except so far 
as the Chinese are concerned, in order to limit their power to contract for 
what wages and hours they please’ (Second Reading Speech, quoted by Davey 
1975, p. 44). A combination of Labor and Liberal protectionist members (the 
latter including Alfred Deakin and H B Higgins) secured amendments that 
extended the boards’ coverage to adult males. Initially, five boards were set up, 
for the baking, boot and shoe, clothing, shirts, and underclothing trades; and a 
sixth board, for furniture, was appointed soon afterwards (Davey 1975, p. 58). 
By uneven steps, the coverage of board regulation expanded. This process was 
accompanied by an expansion of the accepted meaning of sweating. Davey, 
the author of the largest study of Victorian wages boards, says:
Over time the meaning [of sweating] changed considerably, such changes 
generally reflecting alterations in the public’s attitude towards state 
wage regulation. Thus as the public’s attitude towards state regulation 
of wages became more favourable, so the term ‘sweating’ was given 
wider meaning. In the late nineteenth century the term was applied to 
a system of outwork and subcontract in certain industries in which the 
employer paid excessively low wages. In 1904 a wider meaning was given 
to the term as a result of a Committee of Inquiry Report made in South 
Australia, which identified sweating with the payment of an unduly 
low wage. From that time, opponents of sweating maintained that the 
term applied to almost any method of work under which workers were 
extremely ill-paid or overworked. (Davey 1975, p. 1)
By 1920, three-quarters of the workers in Victorian manufacturing were 
covered by wages boards. Coverage would have been still wider had some boards 
not been displaced by awards of the Commonwealth Court (Davey 1975, p. 
xviii). In 1910, the Victorian Parliament legislated to permit the Governor-
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in-Council ‘to … appoint wages boards for any process, trade, business or 
occupation, define the area or locality within which the determination of each 
board should be operative, and adjust the powers which such boards or any 
[sic] may lawfully exercise.’ This enabled the government, for the first time, to 
create boards for agricultural industries. The Legislative Council’s objections 
to wages boards for agricultural callings were increasingly overshadowed by 
its fear of Commonwealth Arbitration Court interference in state industrial 
matters (Davey 1975, pp. 87–88). Within the first decade of the 20th century, 
the idea that the boards’ role was to eliminate sweating gave way to an 
acceptance of their having a more general function of regulation.
South Australia was the other colony wherein sweating emerged as a 
significant, albeit less effective, pressure in the drive toward wage prescription. 
A Shops and Factories Commission was appointed in 1892 to inquire into 
sweating in certain trades; the first Factories Act was passed in 1894 (coming 
into effect in 1895), requiring the appointment of two Inspectors—one male 
and one female; and from 1896 onward the Reports of Chief Inspector of 
Factories located sweating in various trades, especially clothing. Not until 
1900, however, did South Australia follow Victoria in making legislative 
provision for wages boards, and boards were not actually appointed until 
1905, because of the refusal of the Legislative Council to allow the necessary 
regulations (Burns 1926, p. 11; Dabscheck 1983, p. 79; Finnimore 1995, 
p. 27). By 1905, sweating was probably a less important ‘driver’ than it had 
been in Victoria in the 1890s. Ernest Aves, an observer sent to Australia by 
the British Government to report on wages boards, reported of his visit to 
Adelaide:
There were no signs of ‘sweating’ as a basis upon which industry could 
be said to rest, but many to show that there was a good deal of pressure 
in the factories. This, indeed, appears to be the form that ‘sweating’ 
assumed, and I was myself more impressed by a certain intensity of 
application here in the few factories I visited than elsewhere. Perhaps the 
impression was strengthened by the contrast presented by this ‘Garden 
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City of the South’, with its parklands and beautiful hills, its exquisite 
climate, its fruit and its flowers—and inside the factories some touch in 
the middle of all this beauty of what is regarded as old world pressure. 
(Aves 1908, p. 80)
Elsewhere, anti-sweating movements were less prominent. Coghlan, 
who surveyed all colonies, mentions them only for Victoria, South Australia, 
and (very briefly) New South Wales. Victoria was the colony where the need 
to combat sweating had the most concrete effect in the establishment of wage-
fixing machinery. The gradual corruption of the term, moving it from specific 
evils such as uncontrolled outworking, with a concomitant exploitation 
of female and juvenile labour, to low pay, long hours, and tough working 
conditions in general, entailed its absorption into a broader assault on the 
operation of the market. Of this, the movement for a living wage was a major 
component.
The Victorian wages boards inaugurated wage regulation in Australia. 
Subsequently, boards were introduced in every State except Western Australia. 
But wages boards did not lend themselves to the application of wide-ranging 
concepts. Their composition emphasised the working-out of solutions 
acceptable within specific and narrowly defined trades. The neutral chairman 
(typically a magistrate), who might exercise a casting vote, could be expected 
to operate within bounds set by employer and employee members. This 
limitation of focus was, at times, strengthened by statutory requirements 
that boards apply the standards set by ‘reputable employers’. Davey sees the 
continuing importance of boards in Victoria as symptomatic of the political 
weakness of labour. As Labor Parties in New South Wales, South Australia, 
and Queensland became more powerful, industrial labour gained the political 
capacity to implement its policy of compulsory arbitration (Davey 1975, p. 
336).
Two models of conciliation and arbitration—the court and the wages 
board—jostled with each other for acceptance in the formative years of the 
Australian system. The Commonwealth’s choice of the former was a decisive 
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step.7 A court or like tribunal afforded greater scope than did boards for 
the development and application of concepts such as the living wage. This 
was probably a reason why labour and interventionist legislators preferred 
the adjudicatory tribunal; and why employers’ associations and political 
conservatives might, if driven, accept boards as the lesser evil.8 It was, of 
course, possible for systems of regulation to be so constituted that boards 
operated within policy frameworks defined by overarching authorities. Courts 
of Industrial Appeals did, to some degree, provide such frameworks, as did 
the Board of Trade established in New South Wales in 1918. The court model 
was, however, to be the instrument of more adventurous and comprehensive 
policies.9
1.2 the australIan economy
1.2.1 The population
Within three months of federation, the State Statisticians conducted a 
census. They had previously met to agree on uniform methods of collection 
and compilation. In the words of the yet-to-be-appointed Commonwealth 
Statistician, the 1901 census was carried out ‘on a fairly uniform plan’.10 It 
indicated a population of 3.774 million (excluding Aborigines). Thirty-five per 
cent of these people lived in the six capital cities. Melbourne was the largest, 
with 494,000 inhabitants. Sydney had 488,000; Adelaide 162,000; Brisbane 
119,000; Perth 36,000; and Hobart 32,000. Sixty-one per cent of the people 
were aged 15 to 64, with 35 per cent being younger than 15 and only 4 per 
cent 65 or older. Those born in Australia constituted 77 per cent of the total; 
7  The historical literature throws little light on the reasons for the choice or the reasons 
for constituting the Court with a judge of the High Court. There is, however, some related 
discussion in Macintyre (2004, pp. 57–61).
8  The attitudes of employers to the emerging methods of regulation are thoroughly explored 
by Plowman (1989).
9  H B Higgins (1922, pp. 32–33) argued that employee representatives on wages boards were 
exposed to intimidation by employers.
10  Data provided by the 1901 census are from Commonwealth Bureau of Census and 
Statistics (1908), Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia, No. I.
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10 per cent had been born in England or Wales, 5 per cent in Ireland, and 3 
per cent in Scotland. Asia accounted for less than 1 per cent.11 The number 
of people described as ‘occupied’ was 1.617 million. Seventy-eight per cent 
of these were males; and the number of occupied males (including aged and 
juvenile workers) exceeded the male population aged 15–65. The composition 
of the occupied population is shown in Table 1.1.
These bare statistics attest to a small, young, and racially homogeneous 
population, somewhat urbanised, but with a substantial rural base, and 
geographically dispersed. Apart from the heavy concentration of females in 
domestic service, those who worked for their living were spread over a range 
of occupations and industries. The working population was moderately 
industrialised, but only moderately. The census showed that 3.5 per cent of 
males worked in the industrial category ‘metals and minerals’; 5.4 per cent 
were in ‘art and mechanic’; 2.6 per cent in food, drink, etc; and 2.2 per cent in 
textiles and related trades. For females, the only significant secondary industry 
11  The great majority of Asians were Chinese males.
Table 1.1: 1901 Census: the occupied population
Note: Numbers may not sum to 100 because of rounding.
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was textiles and related trades, which accounted for 19.4 per cent of occupied 
women and girls.
Censuses were conducted in 1911, 1921, 1933, and 1947. The 





There was no census close in time to the beginning of World War II. 
By the time of the 1947 census, the population was 7.579 million—double 
the 1901 level.12 The proportion living in the six State capitals had risen 
to 50.7 per cent. Sydney now had 1.484 million people; Melbourne 1.226 
million, Brisbane 402,000, Adelaide 382,000, Perth 272,000, and Hobart 
77,000. Eighteen per cent of the population was categorised as ‘provincial’ 
(a designation that took in the 10,000 inhabitants of Canberra), and 31 per 
cent as ‘rural’. The 15 to 64 age group now accounted for 67 per cent of the 
population. There had been a marked reduction in the relative size of the 
under-15 cohort—down to 25.1 per cent; the people aged 65 or more now 
constituted 8.1 per cent of the total. The proportion born in Australia was 
90.2 per cent, with 7.9 per cent born in the British Isles. There were only 
24,000 ‘Asiatics’—about 0.3 per cent of the population.
Table 1.2 shows the changes in the occupational composition of the 
labour force which were revealed by the censuses conducted between 1911 
and 1947. (The classifications used in the 1911 and later censuses differed 
from those of 1901.) Although the 1933 figures indicate seemingly temporary 
changes that may have been due to the Depression, some long-term trends are 
reasonably clear—notably the relative decline in farming and the growth of 
clerical work. In short, proportionally fewer people worked ‘on the land’ and 
proportionally more ‘in the office’. The proportion in mining declined.
12  The 1947 census data are from the Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia, No. 38 
(1951) and No. 39 (1953).
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1.2.2 Productive performance
Maddock and McLean (1987) have summarised the processes of development 
that produced the economic and population structures observable early in the 
20th century:
It may be helpful to characterise Australian economic development 
in the nineteenth century as having been shaped essentially by the 
interaction of two very broad sets of forces. From the supply side, 
the influences were the progressive expansion of the natural resource 
base as a result of the discovery of land suitable for farming and of 
mineral deposits; the expansion of the workforce as a result not only 
of the natural rate of increase in the initially small resident population 
but also by immigration; and the augmentation of domestic savings 
and investment through foreign borrowing. Other things being 
equal, the growth of the economy was closely and positively related 
Table 1.2: Occupations of the labour force 1911–1947 (%)
*Includes graziers
**Includes proprietors
Note: Numbers may not sum to 100 because of rounding.
Data derived from a table in Withers (1987), p. 261.
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to the rate at which these factors of production were accumulated. 
From the demand side, a high rate of population growth stimulated 
certain types of production, especially the provision of foodstuffs, 
building and construction activity, and the supply of other non-
tradable goods and services. In addition, Australia exported large (in 
per capita terms) quantities of natural resource-intensive commodities 
in strong international demand, exploiting a comparative advantage, 
and importing those commodities that either could not be produced 
domestically or could be produced only at very great cost. The level 
of aggregate demand in the economy was therefore subject to both 
domestic and foreign influences. (Maddock and McLean 1987, p. 9)
Meredith and Dyster (1999, p. 5) refer to the ‘dual economy’ that 
existed at the turn of the century: one part rural and export-oriented and the 
other urban. The counterpart of the large export sector was a high dependence 
on imported consumer goods—a dependence accentuated by the funds 
emanating from capital inflow. Reliance on imports was both a cause and an 
effect of the limited development of manufactures.
Australians, on average, had enjoyed a standard of living that was high by 
international standards. It had come back to the field somewhat in the 1890s, 
but at the beginning of the new century, Australia remained one of the more 
affluent countries of the world. Critics of Australia’s economic performance 
in the 20th century often assert that there was a relative decline, and some 
attribute this to the country’s industrial relations arrangements. In assessing 
that contention, we must remember that the principal sources of high per 
capita incomes in the late 19th and early 20th centuries were productive primary 
industries (including mining) favoured by natural endowments, favourable 
terms of trade, and a low population. There was no good reason to expect that 
if the population grew and the country became more self-reliant, Australia’s 
relative advantage would necessarily endure. Whether or not the industrial 
relations system added to or subtracted from the relative decline is another 
question.
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The last decade of the 19th century had, in fact, been a bad period for 
many Australians. Beginning with a depression that was imported, but was 
exacerbated by domestic speculation, financial immaturity, and industrial 
disputation, the deterioration in economic outcomes was prolonged by 
drought. Recovery was slow. N G Butlin (1962) estimated that the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) per head fell, in real terms (1910–11 prices), from 
£66 in 1889 to £48 in 1897 and that the earlier peak was not regained until 
1907 (Meredith and Dyster 1999, p. 60). Bryan Haig has criticised Butlin’s 
estimates and provided his own. Haig’s numbers suggest a shallower depression 
in the 1890s (Haig 2001). Whatever the truth of the disagreement, Australia, 
at the advent of the new century, was far from being a place of confidence 
and optimism. The environment was conducive to social conflict and to 
an increased concern about the role of the state in furthering or protecting 
the interests of embattled groups. This was the economic context wherein 
regulation of the terms of employment came onto the agenda.
There is a widely held view that the half-century before World War II 
was a period of little growth in productivity and per capita income. This view 
owes much to the work of Butlin, who wrote that between 1891 and 1939
a drastic retardation occurred. It is important to note that this was 
much less marked in terms of population, work force and labour 
inputs. Indeed, these grew much faster in Australia than elsewhere 
in the West; it is of some significance that, in these terms, Australian 
expansion was relatively better sustained, and this raises the question 
whether Australian policy, pursuing expansion and increased scale of the 
economy, should not properly be judged on its own terms of aggregate 
rather than per capita real product (over the whole period 1890–1939, 
the compound growth rate was perhaps between 0.3 and 0.6 per cent 
per annum). If the figures are to be treated literally, output per worker 
and per unit of labour input may even have fallen in the interwar period 
but, at best, appears to have risen very slowly. The figures should not, 
of course, be taken too literally. Nevertheless, it would appear probable 
that adjustments for very large errors indeed would still allow only a 
very slow rise in these measures during the whole fifty years. This is in 
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marked contrast with, at all events, several significant Western countries, 
including Britain and the United States, where per capita and per worker 
growth rates tend to follow reasonably closely along the long-term trend 
(subject only to major fluctuations). In the Australian case this simple 
tabulation conceals some brief spurts of relatively rapid growth. These 
were not sustained, and in considerable measure, represented recovery 
from preceding down-swings of activity. (Butlin 1970, pp. 284–285)
As noted above, Butlin’s estimates of the real GDP have been criticised 
by Haig (2001), who has calculated an alternative set. To adjudicate between 
the rival estimates, even if I could do so, would take me too far from focus 
of this book.13 Figure 1.1 reproduces both Butlin’s and Haig’s estimates of 
the real GDP in the first four decades of the 20th century. Perhaps the main 
differences between the Butlin and Haig series are that:
•	 Butlin shows a stronger growth in the pre-World War I period 
than does Haig;
•	 Haig indicates a lesser slackening of growth in the later 1920s 
than Butlin’s numbers imply; and
•	 Haig’s estimates suggest a stronger recovery from depression 
in the 1930s.
Over the long term, the difference between the rival estimates is not 
large. The trend rate of growth of the GDP was around 2 per cent per annum 
(1.98 per cent on the Butlin estimates and 2.09 per cent on Haig’s).14 We also 
see in Figure 1.1 the growth of the population aged from 15 to 64. The trend 
rate of growth of the ‘working-age’ population was 2.00 per cent—similar to 
that of the GDP. This lends support to the view that the performance of the 
economy was poor. A more refined analysis would take into account changes 
13  Haig criticises both Butlin’s estimates of the nominal GDP and his conversion of those 
estimates into real values. Whereas Butlin deflated nominal values of value added in sectors 
of the economy by selected price indices, Haig’s basic technique was to ascertain the real 
quantities of various products and attach (constant) prices to them. Neither technique is 
inherently superior to the other. Both Butlin and Haig had to resort to simplifications and 
assumptions to allow for missing data. Haig argues that the economic history of Australia 
cannot be interpreted on the basis of Butlin’s estimates.
14  The trends are calculated by fitting lines of best fit to the logarithms of the actual values.
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in the proportion of the population in the work force and in working time. 
Certainly, as we see below, working hours fell; and there were increases in 
paid leave. Hence, there is likely to have been some improvement in the real 
product generated by an hour’s labour; but if the GDP figures (either set) are 
correct, the increase was modest.
Butlin also argued that the period was one of slight change in the 
structure of economic activity. Table 1.2 above lends some support to this in 
respect of a broad occupational dissection of the workforce. Table 1.3 relies 
on Butlin’s computations of the real GDP, in which production is valued at 
1910–11 prices. What is striking about this table is the stability of the shares 
of most of the sectors. The only dramatic change in the sectoral structure of 
the economy was a decline in the relative importance of mining. The relative 
Figure 1.1
Sources: For GDP, Butlin (1962), p. 461 and Haig (2001), pp. 28–30; for population, ABS, 
Historical Population Statistics, 2008, cat. 3105.0.65.001.
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contribution of rural production was no smaller in the 1930s than it had been 
30 years earlier. There was modest growth in the relative role of manufacturing. 
In Butlin’s view, manufacturing contributed little to productivity growth 
and may actually have impeded it. Butlin adds, however, that in this respect 
Table 1.3: Composition of real GDP 1901–02 to 1938–39 (Butlin estimates) (percentage 
shares)
Note: Numbers may not sum to 100 because of rounding.
Source: Butlin (1964), p. 461.
Table 1.3A: Composition of real GDP 1901–02 to 1938–39 (Haig estimates) (percentage 
shares)
Note: Numbers may not sum to 100 because of rounding.
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manufacturing was not exceptional: there was ‘a remarkable lack of leadership 
in productivity in every area of the economy …’ (Butlin 1970, p. 304). 
Distribution increased somewhat in importance. Services became slightly less 
important. Overall, however, the table suggests that the economy underwent 
no pronounced structural change.
Table 1.3A presents a compositional analysis of the GDP based on Haig’s 
estimates.15 The major differences between the two sets of estimates are the 
higher share for manufacturing and the greater increase in the manufacturing 
share between the first two periods suggested by Haig.
Colin Forster, relying on Butlin’s research, wrote in 1987:
In the period from the end of the 1880s to the end of the 1930s, 
Australian real Gross Domestic Product grew at roughly the same rate 
as population and work force. It would be an overstatement to say that 
output per head was stationary, and indeed the quantitative estimates of 
national income must be treated cautiously, but any growth in output 
per head was small. The Australian experience contrasted with many 
Western countries, and also contrasted with the preceding and following 
periods in Australia. (Forster 1987, p. 4)
Forster also comments on the limited structural change in the economy, 
though pointing out that within the manufacturing sector there was significant 
compositional change.
The view of the economy’s performance suggested in the preceding 
discussion is puzzling in two respects. One is that it seems at odds with what 
we know about changes occurring in these decades that could be expected to 
have caused substantial increases in productivity—for example, the increasing 
mechanisation of production and transport, the advent of electric power, and 
15  We should note that there is a discontinuity in Haig’s statistics because of a change in the 
prices applied to his real estimates. For years before 1911, Haig used the prices of 1910–11; 
but for later years he used the prices of 1938–39. This change affects the relative values of 
commodities. Hence the differences between the numbers in the first column of Table 1.3A 
and those in the subsequent columns may be due in part to alterations in relative prices. 
Similarly, differences between the percentage shares based on Haig’s numbers and those based 
on Butlin’s for the last three periods may be due in part to different relative prices.
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the growing adoption of techniques of mass production. The other is that it also 
seems inconsistent with the growth in real wages (accompanied by reductions 
in working time) discussed in the next section, modest though it was. One 
does not need to have a mechanistic view of the link between productivity and 
real wages to find surprising an increase in real wages in excess of 20 per cent 
(more for females) in the period 1914–1939, when production—if Butlin 
and Haig are approximately correct—grew no faster than the working-age 
population.
In 1946, the Commonwealth Statistician, Roland Wilson, presented 
to ANZAAS a paper on Facts and Fancies of Productivity (Wilson 1947).16 
He discussed various methods of productivity measurement from both a 
conceptual and a practical standpoint. One possibility was to measure the 
estimated value of production in terms of some selected constant—‘to postulate 
some article or group of articles whose absolute utility we are prepared to 
accept as constant’. Wilson explained:
Given such a (necessarily hypothetical) standard we can, by pricing 
the standard from time to time, secure comparative measurements of 
any other aggregation of commodities and services by reference only 
to their total values at the corresponding times. The very considerable 
advantage of this method is that it enables us to dispense with the 
rarely procurable data as to the quantities of all the commodities in the 
aggregation with which we are concerned. If such a method is to be 
used I can think of no more suitable a standard than the basic necessities 
of life, whose total utility to the consumer is probably as constant as 
anything else. Professor L F Giblin may then be commended for the 
perspicacity which led him to introduce for the first time into an official 
statistical publication a general measure of productivity calculated by 
dividing an index of all material production by an index of retail prices 
and rents. (p. 17)
Wilson alludes here to a decision that Giblin had taken as Acting Commonwealth 
Statistician. The Labour Report for 1930 (No. 21, p. 67) records it:
16  Wilson had previously discussed this and related issues in 1937 (Wilson 1937).
21Keith Hancock
In previous issues an attempt has been made to measure the quantity 
of material production by means of production price index-numbers. 
These index numbers have never been regarded as satisfactory over a 
long period, and there is danger in continuing them further in respect 
to manufacturing production. In the absence of a satisfactory measure 
of the quantity of production, all that is offered here is a measure of 
‘real’ production, i.e., the value of production measured in the same 
retail purchasing power, which was used to find ‘real’ wages.
From a modern viewpoint, deflating the nominal GDP by the consumer 
price index seems a crude method of computing the real GDP. Wilson noted 
the argument of convenience arising from data limitations, but also suggested 
a more respectable rationale for the technique. What it provides is a measure 
of the purchasing power of the income generated by production. It is, of 
course, a problem that not all of that income is expended on consumption. 
The seriousness of that problem is reduced if prices of non-consumption 
Roland Wilson
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goods and services vary in a manner similar to that of consumer items; or 
if the share of consumption in total expenditure is roughly constant. We do 
not know whether either possibility holds good. The real-purchasing-power 
approach must be treated with great caution. It is, nevertheless, of interest to 
notice the perspective that Wilson’s analysis provided. His data of per capita 
output underlie Figure 1.2. The ‘all industries’ series indicates an increase of 
42.3 per cent, or almost 2 per cent per year. This implies a degree of success 
in generating ‘real purchasing power’ that contrasts with the more dismal 
assessments of economic performance of Butlin and Haig.
The sombre view suggested by Butlin’s estimates was also challenged 
by McLean and Pincus (1983), who believed that the standard of living had 
increased between 1890 and 1939 to a significantly greater extent than Butlin’s 
numbers had suggested. They argued for an alternative method of price 
adjustment that raised the trend rate of growth of real income per person from 
0.61 per cent per year to 0.82 per cent. Further, they argued that the standard of 
living had benefited from an accumulation of capital, particularly government-
owned infrastructure, which enhanced the consumption opportunities of 
Australians over and above the increase made possible by the growth of current 
income. McLean and Pincus invoked, too, a range of partial indicators of living 
standards—quality of housing, education, access to cars, telephones, radios 
and household appliances, life expectancy, age of retirement, and working 
hours—which suggest that well-being was considerably higher on the eve of 
World War II than it had been a half-century earlier. They proposed valuations 
of the increased life expectancy, earlier retirement, and shorter working hours, 
the cumulative effect being to raise the per capita growth rate from 0.8 per cent 
to 1.5 or 1.7 per cent. They did not attach values to the increased enjoyment 
of the capital stock and specific consumer goods. Presumably, these ought to 
have been included in the underlying growth rate of 0.8 per cent, but they 
may be a reason for suspecting that the underlying rate is too low.
McLean and Pincus’s analysis relates to the average standard of living 
of the population and not specifically to real wages. Obviously, the two are 
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related but different. We may assume that a given growth rate of real wages 
would have been consistent with a faster rise in living standards of employees 
and their households because of a long-term fall in family size. Real weekly 
wage estimates would not take in the rise in life expectancy or the reduction of 
working hours. Hence McLean and Pincus’s calculations are consistent with a 
low growth rate of real weekly wages. Wilson’s much earlier estimates seem to 
suggest a significantly better performance.17
We can only conclude that there is much uncertainty about Australia’s 
long-term economic performance in the period of this study. Contemporary 
17  The time periods of the two sets of calculations differ. It is unclear how far this difference 
influences the results.
Figure 1.2
Notes: The data used for this figure are net of depreciation. The estimated numbers of workers 
are male equivalents.
Source: Wilson (1947), p. 45.
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discussion of wage policy tended, as we shall see, toward a pessimistic 
assessment.
1.2.3 Unemployment
The only continuous statistics of unemployment before World War II 
were derived from trade union returns. Union secretaries supplied to the 
Commonwealth Statistician information about the numbers of members of 
their unions and the numbers known to be unemployed. There are obvious 
possibilities for bias in such statistics, even if the union secretaries were both 
honest and competent.18 For example, the experiences of non-members 
of unions may well have differed from those of unionists; and the unions 
that recorded their members’ unemployment may have had characteristics 
different from those of unions without such records. Moreover, the numbers 
of members of reporting unions were initially quite small. In 1908, for 
example, 68 reporting unions had 18,685 members, of whom 1,117 (6.0 per 
cent) were unemployed (Labour Report, No. 8, 1917, p. 18). The coverage 
increased significantly in 1912, and in 1913, 464 unions with 251,716 
members reported that 13,430 (5.3 per cent) were unemployed. (Figure 1.4 
below begins with the year 1913.) In the Labour Report for 1923 (No. 14, pp. 
21–22), the Commonwealth Statistician wrote:
The particulars in the following tables are based upon information 
furnished by the secretaries of trade unions in the several States, and 
the membership of unions regularly reporting has now reached nearly 
400,000. Unemployment returns are not collected from unions whose 
18  J L K Gifford (1928), drawing on the Minutes of Evidence of the Royal Commission 
on National Insurance of 1926, gave two reasons for regarding the unemployment statistics 
as unreliable: ‘First, because the secretaries of many of the unions have no unemployment 
registers and are obliged to guess the number unemployed, and second, that it is against the 
interest of the unions to make correct returns, it being sometimes in the interest of some 
members to conceal unemployment if they are anxious to obtain an increase in wages from an 
arbitration court, and sometimes in their interest to exaggerate the amount of unemployment 
if they wish to close their books to new members or restrict the number of apprentices. It 
seems clear that if a secretary wished to supply wrong information the Census and Statistics 
Bureau in present circumstances would not be able to check it. Mr Sutcliffe admitted as much 
in his evidence’ (p. 5).
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members are in permanent employment, such as railway and tramway 
employees or from unions whose members are casually employed 
(wharf labourers, etc). Very few unions pay unemployment benefit, but 
the majority of the larger organisations have permanent secretaries and 
organisers who are in close touch with the members and with the state 
of trade within their particular industries. In many cases unemployment 
registers are kept, and provision is made in the rules for members out of 
work to pay reduced subscriptions. It may, therefore, be affirmed that 
percentage results based on trade union information fairly show the 
general trend of unemployment.19
During the period covered by Figure 1.3, there were two censuses which 
afford some check on the reliability of the union data. On April 4, 1921, 9.6 
per cent of wage and salary earners were unemployed (Year Book Australia 1923, 
p. 952). The Year Book commented: ‘The number returned as unemployed in 
19  Similar statements appeared in other numbers of the Labour Report.
Figure 1.3
Source: Labour Report, various numbers.
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1921 was nearly three times as great as in 1911, and it is of interest to note that 
these results are substantially confirmed by the Labour and Industrial Branch 
of this Bureau’ (p. 951). In fact, the union-based percentages for the first and 
second quarters of 1921 were 11.4 and 12.5, respectively (Labour Report, No. 
12, 1921, p. 18)—rather higher than the census suggested. At the census of 
30 June 1933, the unemployment percentage was 22.4 (Year Book Australia 
1935, p. 552). The union percentages for the second and third quarters of 
1933 were 25.7 and 25.1 (Labour Report, No. 25, 1935, p. 103). Thus the 
relativity of the union-based unemployment percentages to the census result 
was the reverse of that of 1921. But the comparisons with the census data do 
not suggest that the union-based series is seriously misleading as an indicator 
of changes in the state of the labour market.
The impact of the Depression on unemployment is sufficiently evident 
in Figure 1.3 and requires no further comment at this stage. In earlier years, 
except for 1921, unemployment varied between 5 and 10 per cent. After 
the recession of 1921, it failed to return to the levels that had been reached 
between 1916 and 1920. This accords with contemporary dissatisfaction about 
economic performance in the 1920s to which later chapters further refer.
1.3 wages, prIces, and hours of work to world war II: 
a conspectus
1.3.1 Nominal wages
For the period before 1914, there are no comprehensive wage data. From 
that year, however, there are estimates of nominal weekly wage rates. These 
data were compiled by the Commonwealth Statistician, who provided the 
following explanation:
The collection of data respecting the nominal rates of wages payable 
in different callings and in occupations in various industries was first 
undertaken by this Bureau in the early part of the year 1913. Owing 
to the difficulty of obtaining reliable particulars of the numbers of 
apprentices, improvers and other juvenile workers to whom progressive 
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rates of wages fixed according to increasing age or experience were 
payable from year to year, the inquiry was confined to the rates of wages 
payable to adult workers only, and was further limited generally to those 
industries in operation within the metropolitan area of each State. In 
order to make the inquiry comprehensive, however, certain industries 
were included which were not carried on in the capital cities, e.g. 
mining, shipping, agriculture, and pastoral. The particulars acquired 
were obtained primarily from awards, determinations and industrial 
agreements under Commonwealth and State Acts, and related to the 
minimum wage prescribed. In cases where no award, determination 
or agreement was in force, the ruling union or predominant rate of 
wage was ascertained from employers and secretaries of trade unions. 
For convenience of comparison weekly rates of wages were adopted. 
In many instances, however, the wages were based on daily or hourly 
rates, since in many industries and occupations in which employment 
is casual or intermittent wages are so fixed … The information thus 
obtained referred to the weekly rate of wage in upwards of 400 specific 
occupations. Rates of wage were not of course available for each of these 
occupations in every State but the aggregate collection for the six States 
amounted to 1,569 male occupations or callings. (Labour Report, No. 
28, 1937, p. 55)
The occupations were assigned to industry groups. For each industry 
group within a State, an unweighted average of the occupational rates was 
calculated. In aggregating these separate averages, weighting formulae were 
applied to reflect the numbers of workers in the industries and the States. Thus 
the overall averages are a hybrid of weighted an unweighted data.
As the Statistician made clear, nominal wages were, for the most part, 
wages prescribed in industrial instruments. (No data of actual earnings 
for a full-time week, exclusive of overtime, are available.) This means that 
comparisons of nominal wages over time do not register the effects on actual 
wages of changes in the composition of the work force. (In this respect, the 
nominal wage series is akin to the modern Labour Price Index rather than the 
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series for Average Weekly Earnings.) The nominal wages data do not reflect 
either over-award or below-award payments.
1.3.2 Retail prices
The Commonwealth Statistician began publication of quarterly retail price 
index numbers in 1912.20 The construction of these numbers is described in 
detail in the Labour Report for 1912 (No. 3). The initial index, which became 
known as the ‘A series’, measured the weighted average prices of 46 items of 
food and groceries plus house rents. The items included were dictated to some 
extent by the problems of assembling reliable data and to some extent by a 
‘cost of living’ survey, covering 999 people, which had been conducted in 
1910–11. The data were obtained from retailers—not by direct purchase of 
commodities, but by asking the retailers to supply the information. They were 
collected from 30 towns—five in each State (including the capital cities). At 
the inception of the A series index, the Statistician asked retailers to provide 
data for the years 1901–1911. This retrospective information was collected on 
an annual basis only and its reliability obviously depended on the accuracy of 
the retailers’ records and recollections.21
In 1925, following the advice of a conference of statisticians, the 
Commonwealth Bureau published an alternative version—the B series 
index—which differed from the A series by confining rent to four and five-
roomed houses.22 The B series index incorporated the rent component of the 
A series up to the time of the change.
20  During the hearing on the 1933 application for restoration of the 10 per cent wage 
reduction, the union advocate H C Gibson said: ‘Mr King O’Malley claims to have been 
the originator of the Commonwealth Bank and also the originator of these index figures. I 
have had several chats with that gentleman as to what was behind his mind, and what was his 
intention in requesting the Commonwealth Statistician to undertake this investigation, but 
he is the haziest individual I have ever met’ (transcript, p. 142).
21  In the 1930–31 basic wage case, Gibson disputed the index number for 1907—a matter 
of some consequence because it affected the wage level necessary to maintain the Harvester 
standard (see Chapter 9, Subsection 9.2.8).
22  Because the Commonwealth Arbitration Court preferred the old index for wage adjustment, 
the Statistician continued to provide the A series data (commonly described as the ‘All Houses’ 
index). Movements of the two indices differed very little.
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An obvious limitation of the A and B series indices was their failure to 
cover clothing and many items of miscellaneous expenditure. The Statistician 
repeatedly said that food, groceries, and house rents represented about 60 per 
cent of household expenditure. He also asserted, until the 1930s, that the 
index numbers for food, groceries, and housing gave an accurate picture of 
the overall behaviour of retail prices. The Royal Commission on the Basic 
Wage, which reported in 1920, constructed a regimen of commodities which 
included clothing and miscellaneous items.23 Subsequently, the Statistician 
began publication of the C series (or ‘All Items’) index. This added clothing 
and miscellaneous items to the items in the A series (later the B series) index. 
The C series index is available on a quarterly basis from the second quarter of 
1922. Annual values were provided for November of each year from 1914 to 
1921.
Because of their relevance to wage setting, the price indices were the 
subject of controversy. I discuss some of the criticisms in later chapters. For a 
broad perspective, however, I rely on the C series index because of its greater 
comprehensiveness.24
1.3.3 Wages, prices, and real wages
Figure 1.4 describes (subject to data limitations) the behaviour of adult male 
wages, consumer prices, and real wages over the period 1907–1939. The most 
notable features of this story are:
•	 a high rate of inflation, reflected in both the price and the 
wage data, between 1914 and 1920: over the six-year period, 
prices rose by 68 per cent and wages by 51 per cent;
•	 severe deflation between 1929 and 1933, with prices and 
wages falling by 20 per cent and 18 per cent, respectively;
23  The Royal Commission and its report are discussed in Chapter 3.
24  Because the C series index begins in November 1914, I use the A series index to measure 
the price level in the previous three quarters. For the years 1915–21, quarterly values of the C 
series index are estimated by interpolation between the November numbers.
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•	 subsequent increases in both prices and wages, but leaving 
1939 prices still 5 per cent below and wages 6 per cent below 
their 1929 levels;
•	 a fall of 14 per cent in real wages between 1914 and 1919, as 
the rise in nominal wages lagged behind that of prices;
•	 a 30 per cent rise in real wages between 1919 and 1922, taking 
real wages in that year to a level 11 per cent higher than in 
1914, the increase being linked to a continuing rise in money 
wages after prices had begun to fall;
•	 a modest further increase (3 per cent) in real wages between 
1922 and 1929;
•	 virtual constancy of real wages during the 1930s, with a 1939 
level 21 per cent above that of 1914; and
Figure 1.4
Source: Labour Report, various numbers.
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•	 over the whole period, a rise in real wages of just under 1 per 
cent per year. For the years 1922–39, the average increase was 
0.5 per cent per year.
All of these aspects of the period will, of course, be more fully discussed 
in later chapters.
1.3.4 Real wages and well-being
The sluggish growth in real wages, as in productivity, is—if the statistics are 
reliable—a significant characteristic of the period. Wilson in his 1946 lecture 
commented on this perplexing fact:
We have no doubt all been struck … by a feeling of slight wonder that 
real wages in Australia, as measured by the nominal wage index divided 
by the index of retail prices, should have risen so little in the last thirty 
or forty years. The annual rate of increase between 1907 and the three 
years ending in June 1940 was only 0.61 per cent. As there is not much 
evidence to suggest that the distribution of incomes over that period has 
changed greatly to the detriment of the wage-earner, real wages must be 
accepted as a not altogether unreasonable indication of the long-term 
trend of productivity, at any rate as measured in the composite units of 
the retail price index. On the other hand, the impressions of many of 
those who have lived through this period record an improvement in the 
well-being of the average worker out of all proportion to the measured 
rise in real wages. (Wilson 1947, p. 17)
‘The real question to be answered’, said Wilson, ‘is whether well-being can 
change without a corresponding change in productivity as measured by 
currently accepted methods.’ He suggested several reasons why well-being 
might have grown faster than the data of real wages and productivity suggested.
First, there was a growing supply of ‘free goods’. An important example 
was ‘the gradual increase in the community’s stock of owner-occupied houses, 
the imputed rentals of which sometimes find a place in estimated money-
values of the national income, but never to my knowledge in a directly costed 
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index of productivity. Owner-enjoyed property of other kinds, such as books, 
pictures, furniture and so on may also be mentioned as items which may 
appear in a productivity index as new products but which do not affect it in 
their capacity of continuous producers of current satisfactions.’ The market, 
and measures of production, failed to capture ‘satisfactions arising from 
the enjoyment of property such as museums, public gardens, schools and 
universities, bequeathed to the people by governments and public benefactors 
of earlier days’ (p. 18).
Second, there was greater access to free goods, ‘partly as the result of 
increasing economies in the cost and time of travel, partly because of the general 
trend to greater leisure’. The Lancashire millhand of a century earlier had little 
or no opportunity to enjoy the Scottish Highlands, or even Blackpool. Now 
a visit to Palm Beach or the Blue Mountains was ‘only an incident to the 
industrial worker of Sydney’ (p. 19).
Third, there was a ‘growing tendency for work to become play, and thus 
to fall outside the Statistician’s measurement of productivity’. Greater leisure 
afforded to people the opportunity to ‘produce’ for their own benefit by such 
means as ‘household repairs, gardening, and simple manufacture’.
Finally, estimates of productivity growth were biased downward because 
of the statisticians’ inability to allow adequately for the emergence of new 
products and the disappearance of old ones. The standard technique to adjust 
indices of real output for changes in the composition of production was chain-
indexing. But this was an imperfect technique. Wilson illustrated the problem:
Suppose, for instance, that buggies disappeared entirely at the end of 
1910 and were replaced by cars as from the beginning of 1911. We 
should then compare the whole product of 1910 with the whole product 
of 1909, the product of 1911 (excluding cars) with the product of 1910 
(excluding buggies), the whole product of 1912 with the whole product 
of 1911, and chain the results together to form an index.
The important omission, for the present purpose, is that at no time 
have we compared buggies directly with cars. We have allowed for any 
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increase or decrease in the ‘productivity’ of car manufacturers after car 
manufacture started, and any decrease or increase in the productivity of 
buggy manufacturers before buggy manufacture ceased. But this does 
not get us out of the basic difficulty that, in effect, we have assumed 
that the contribution to well-being of the man making the last buggy is 
exactly equal to the contribution of the man making the first car. This 
leaves out of account the improvement in well-being made possible by 
the substitution of car-travel for buggy-travel. (p. 19–20)
The buggy-car substitution does not, of course, have to be instantaneous 
for the point to hold: if, year by year, there are more cars and fewer buggies 
produced, the measure of total production may be flawed. An objection to the 
argument is that the relative prices of cars and buggies may reflect the benefit 
that users derive from them. If the price of a car is twice that of a buggy, the 
nominal GDP will register this. The problem then shifts to the deflator for the 
GDP: we wish to adjust the nominal GDP for pure price increases but not 
for enhanced quality. It may, however, be difficult or impossible to disentangle 
them. A chained price index entails the same difficulty as Wilson noted for 
chained quantity measures. It is a familiar difficulty of price indices that they 
may not capture fully increases in quality and may therefore treat as price 
increases what are in truth improvements of quality.
That problem is very likely to have applied to the retail price indices 
of our period. There was little or no allowance for the changing content of 
consumption or for changes in quality. Hence the indices are likely to have 
overestimated the rise in prices (or underestimated the falls). There is no way 
of quantifying the error. But we may reasonably suppose that the employed 
wage-earner did fare somewhat better than Figure 1.4 implies.
1.3.5 The basic wage
Much will be said in this study about the basic wage. Although the federal 
basic wage had its origin in the Harvester case of 1907, no meaningful statistics 
of the basic wage can be provided for years before 1922. The reason is that 
in those early years the basic wage was set award-by-award, usually when the 
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award fell due for renewal but sometimes upon application for variation. 
Moreover, the practices of the judges in fixing the basic wage varied. As a 
result, there was not one basic wage, but a range of them.25 In 1922, however, 
the Commonwealth Court adopted the practice of prescribing a general basic 
wage (subject to geographical differences and some departures from general 
practice in particular awards). From this time, it is meaningful to speak of the 
basic wage.
From 1922 onwards, the federal basic wage was subject to automatic 
quarterly adjustment with reference to a price index. In addition, discretionary 
changes were imposed by the Arbitration Court in 1931, 1933, 1934, and 
1937. Figure 1.5 shows the levels of the (federal) basic wage over the period 
1922–39.26 These are weighted averages for the six capital cities. The figure 
also shows the real basic wage and the relativity of the basic wage to nominal 
adult male wages. (All three curves are constructed from index numbers, with 
the values for the second quarter of 1922 set at 100.) The federal basic wage 
increased during the 1920s, and in 1929 was 15 per cent higher than in mid-
1922. Between 1929 and 1933, it fell by 29 per cent. Although it increased 
thereafter, in 1939 it was still barely at the 1922 level. In real terms, it was above 
the 1922 level, but below that of the later 1920s. The relativity of the basic 
wage to total nominal wages was lower in 1939 than at any time in the 1920s. 
One reason for the differences between the movements of the basic wage and 
of nominal rates is the fact that the latter encompass components of wages 
additional to the basic wage, mainly margins for skill. Another is the adoption 
by State tribunals of policies different from those of the Commonwealth 
Court. An important example of divergent policy was the failure of some State 
tribunals to follow the federal ‘lead’ when the Court cut wages by 10 per cent 
in 1931.
25  The setting of the basic wage in this earlier period will be discussed in chapters 3 and 6.
26  I thank Rachel Franklin, formerly Librarian of Fair Work Australia, for providing data 
showing the basic wage obtaining in each of the six capital cities and the weighted average for 
all six cities. During the 1920s, the wage adjustment times were the beginning of February, 
May, August, and November. I have constructed data for quarters ended in March, June, 
September, and December by calculating averages. The March quarter number, for example, 
comprises one-third of the November number and two-thirds of the February number.
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Basic or living wages were also set by State tribunals in four of the States: 
New South Wales, Queensland (from 1921), South Australia, and Western 
Australia (from 1926). Figure 1.6 shows the relativities of the basic or living 
wage to the corresponding federal wage in each of four capital cities in the 
years 1923–1939.27 It is plain that there were significant differences between 
the State and the federal wage policies. This was particularly evident in 
Depression years, when the States (whether by legislation or tribunal decision) 
acted independently of the Commonwealth Court and resisted the Court’s 
policy of wage reduction.28
27  I should acknowledge that the data on which Figure 1.6 is based have been in my possession 
for many years and are of uncertain provenance.
28  The prescription of a living wage in New South Wales was complicated by the adoption 
of child endowment, which at various times was associated with a reduced living wage and 
Figure 1.5
Source note: Basic wage levels calculated from data supplied by the Librarian of
Fair Work Australia; other data are from various numbers of the Labour Report.
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1.3.6 Female wages
Nominal wage data were compiled for adult females in a similar manner 
to those for males, though the female series covered a narrower range of 
occupations. Figure 1.7 shows real female wages and the ratio of female rates 
to those for males. Although the time-pattern of changes in female real wages 
was much the same as for male wages, women’s relative position improved 
somewhat. In 1914, the average female wage was 49 per cent of the male wage; 
by 1939 it reached 55 per cent.





Like the wage data, those of working hours are derived from legal instruments 
such as awards.29 There are no statistics of actual working time. The best 
interpretation of the published statistics is that they represent the maximum 
hours that employers could legally demand of their workers without paying 
overtime. Of course, the maxima varied from instrument to instrument and 
the numbers published are averages.30 The hours prescribed for adult males 
and females are shown in Figure 1.8.
29  In the case of some State awards, hours were at times controlled by statute.
30  As averages, they are subject to similar limitations as those of the nominal wage data. In 
some industries, there were no prescribed maximum hours. These industries were excluded 
from the Statistician’s calculations.
Figure 1.7
Source: Labour Report, various numbers.
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Over the quarter-century covered by Figure 1.8, average weekly hours 
fell from 48.9 to 44.3 for adult males and from 49.1 to 44.4 for adult females. 
More than half of the reduction occurred between 1914 and 1921. As the 
figure shows, females initially worked slightly longer hours than did males. 
This was reversed between 1918 and 1921. It appears that the reduction of 
hours that gathered strength after 1937 affected men more than women; and 
by the end of 1939 the average hours of males and females were virtually 
equal. The reduction of 9.4 per cent in male working time, combined with 
an increase of about 27.6 per cent in real weekly wage rates, implies a rise 
of about 41 per cent in hourly real wages. A similar calculation for females 
indicates an increase of about 50 per cent.
Figure 1.8
Note: The observations plotted in the chart pertain to the end of the year.
Source: Labour Report, various numbers.
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Ideally, statistics of weekly working hours would be supplemented by 
data of paid leave, giving a comprehensive picture of the division between 
working and other time. There are no such data. In the course of this study, 
references will be made to tribunal decisions about leave; but this is qualitative 
evidence, which falls far short of the requirements of a data series. In brief, 
the qualitative evidence is of an early movement toward the awarding of paid 
public holidays (8 to 10 per year) and sick leave. Annual leave came later. By 
World War II, one week’s leave was common for manual workers and in white-
collar work longer periods were general.

THe HIggINs eRa 1907–1921

2.1 the court
The original Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 provided 
for a specialist Court—the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and 
Arbitration—comprising a single Judge (designated as President), who would 
be one of the Judges of the High Court, appointed for a term of seven years. 
One of the initial three appointees to the High Court, R E O’Connor, was 
appointed to the Arbitration Court in 1905 and served until 1907, when 
he resigned. O’Connor’s contributions were limited, his main decision being 
the making of an award for merchant seamen (Macintyre 2004, pp. 55, 59). 
He was succeeded by Henry Bournes Higgins, who served almost two terms 
(resigning in June 1921, shortly before the end of his second term).1 Higgins 
was the sole member of the Court for six years. An amendment of the Act then 
allowed for the appointment (also from the High Court) of Deputy Presidents, 
and Charles Powers was so appointed in 1913. From then until 1921 Higgins 
and Powers shared the great bulk of the Court’s workload, with some help 
from Isaac Isaacs and Hayden Starke in 1917 and 1920–21 respectively.
Initially, the workload of the Court was modest. In its first five years, it 
made only five awards: three related to merchant shipping, one for employees 
of the BHP Company at Broken Hill and Port Pirie, and one for the boot 
1  The best biography of Higgins is Rickard (1984).
The setting
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trades. The pace began to quicken about 1912, probably because unions 
judged that they could get better results from the Commonwealth Court 
than from some of the State tribunals.2 At the end of 1913, there were 17 
Commonwealth awards in force; at the end of 1921, there were 99 (Labour 
Report, No. 13, 1922). In 1920, Powers observed that ‘so many Federal unions 
are knocking at the door for awards that the two Judges of the Court cannot 
possibly get within reasonable distance of dealing with the many applications 
filed in the Court’ (14 CAR vii). Apart from the Harvester case, which did not 
involve an award, it was in the making and occasional variation of the awards 
that the Court’s policies were fashioned.
Higgins’s departure from the Court was the culmination of an intense 
dispute between him and Prime Minister Hughes about the correct response 
to industrial disputation. Higgins adhered staunchly to the policy of refusing 
to arbitrate while unions were on strike, contending that any concessions 
made would only cause more future resort to direct action. Hughes, on the 
other hand, was more concerned to settle particular disputes with a view to 
resumption of work. His strategies included personal intervention to meet the 
demands of strikers and the creation of special tribunals which would displace 
the Court (Hancock 1979a, pp. 17–18; Rimmer 2004, pp. 283–284).
2.2 the economIc settIng
At the time of inception of federal arbitration, Australia was reasonably 
prosperous, having recovered from the depression of the 1890s and a severe 
drought. Butlin’s estimates indicate that between 1900–01 and 1910–11, the 
real GDP increased by 62 per cent or 4.9 per cent per year (Butlin 1962, p. 
461). Haig’s estimates suggest a less exuberant growth, with the real GDP 
rising by 30 per cent (2.6 per cent per year) between 1901 and 1911 (Haig 
2001, p. 30). In the intercensal period from 1901 to 1911, the growth of the 
workforce was about 19 per cent (1.8 per cent per year) (Year Book Australia, 
No. 1, 1908; No. 7, 1914). The improvement in productivity—substantial 
2  The coverage of unions also increased. According to the Labour Report (No. 8, 1917, p. 
10; No. 13, 1922, p. 11), there were 433,000 union members in 1912 and 703,000 in 1921.
45Keith Hancock
on Butlin’s GDP estimates, more modest on Haig’s—may have been due in 
considerable degree to improved seasonal conditions. Whether the process of 
recovery from the depression or the end of drought was the more potent driver 
of growth in this period is a debatable issue.
Figure 2.1 shows the movement of the real GDP from 1907–08 
to 1920–21 according to the Butlin and Haig estimates. Butlin’s estimates 
are more volatile than Haig’s, but both indicate a peak in 1913–14 and a 
downturn thereafter. Through the war years, production was below the pre-
war peak. Both sets of estimates show strong growth in 1920–21.
Figure 2.1
Note: As indicated in Subsection 1.2.2 of Chapter 1, the Haig series combines two separate 
sets of estimates: one (to 1911) based on 1891 prices and computed for calendar years; 
the other (from 1911–12) based on 1938–39 prices and computed for July to June. The 
adjustments necessary to combine the two series are likely to have imported minor errors into 
the composite series.
Sources: Butlin (1962, p. 461), Haig (2001, pp. 28–30).
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Figure 2.2, based on Butlin’s estimates, shows the movements of the 
components of the real GDP over the period. It suggests that the GDP 
fluctuations of the period were dominated by the experience of the rural sector. 
A second feature of the figure is the relative growth in the size of ‘distribution’. 
In this sector, fluctuations mirrored to some extent those of agriculture, but 
were more muted. Third, manufacturing and construction both peaked in 
1913–14, and neither sector had regained its 1913–14 product by the end 
of the period. There is little sign of a manufacturing ‘take-off ’ in these years. 
Fourth, there was a falling trend in the gross product of mining.
Figure 2.2A shows Haig’s estimates. Because of the changes in the price 
deflator used by Haig—separating the period to 1911 and the period from 
Figure 2.2 
Note: ‘Agriculture’ includes pastoral and dairying. Water transport (1.6% of the GDP in 
1907–08) and finance (2.0%) are included in ‘other services’.
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1911–12 onward—we cannot use his figures to analyse the composition of the 
GDP over the entire period from 1907–08 to 1920–21. Hence Figure 2.2A 
is confined to the period from 1911–12 to 1920–21. It suggests much less 
volatility in the component segments of the GDP than is indicated by Butlin’s 
figures. Both sets of estimates show a declining trend in mining; and both 
show falls in several components of the real GDP in 1914–15. Haig’s figures 
confirm that there was no overall growth in manufacturing. The differences 
between the estimates reduce the confidence that we can have in the GDP data 
to indicate the compositional changes in the GDP in this period.
Data specific to the labour market are scarce. The only continuing 
measures of unemployment at this time were the returns, provided by trade 
union secretaries, of unemployment among union members (see Chapter 1, 
Subsection 1.2.3). The Labour Report (No. 13, 1922, p. 23) shows that at 
the end of 1907 there were returns from 51 unions with 13,179 members, of 
Figure 2.2A
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whom 757 (5.7 per cent) were unemployed. Clearly, this small non-random 
sample of the labour force is a slender basis for any inferences about the true 
level of unemployment. At the end of 1910, the returns from 109 unions with 
67, 961 members showed that 1,857 (5.6 per cent) were unemployed. The 
coverage of the returns increased markedly in 1912 and continued to rise over 
the next decade, reaching 361,744 in 1921. From 1913, the unemployment 
data derived from these returns are available on a quarterly basis. Figure 
2.3 shows the unemployment percentages from the first quarter of 1913 to 
the second quarter of 1921. In Chapter 1, we noted that the union-based 
unemployment percentages in 1921 were somewhat higher than the census 
of April 1921 indicated. The comparison suggests that the union returns may 
have overstated ‘true’ unemployment. The impact of the 1914–15 slump is 
clear, but otherwise it is difficult to relate the unemployment percentages to 
the variations in the real GDP. The poor ‘fit’ is particularly evident in 1920–
21. Contemporary reports and commentary, including that of the tribunals, 
point unambiguously to an economic crisis at that time; they accord with 
the unemployment percentages, but not with the real GDP estimates. 
Notwithstanding the possible conflict between the measures of performance, 
there is little doubt that the period from 1914 to 1921 was (with a possible 
respite in 1920) less ‘comfortable’ than the early Higgins years.
So far as I can discover, there is no published analysis of the short-term 
economic effects of World War I. To investigate those effects thoroughly would 
be a separate research project. According to Butlin, between 1913–14 and 
1914–15 gross private capital formation (in 1910–11 prices) fell from £35 
million to £19 million, and in 1917–18 was only £13 million. Thereafter there 
was some recovery, with the level of private investment rising to £20 million 
in 1918–19 and £24 million in both 1919–20 and 1920–21 (Butlin 1962, 
p. 463). These estimates point to a wartime slump in business confidence, 
accentuated perhaps by the difficulty of obtaining imported supplies. Whether 
the slump was caused by the war is a question that I cannot answer. It may be 
that the relatively low levels of unemployment between 1916 and 1920 were 
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due in some measure to the absorption of men into the forces and that the 
increase thereafter owed something to their discharge.
2.3 wages and prIces
Statistics of wages and prices, compiled by the office of the Commonwealth 
Statistician, began to emerge in the second decade of the 20th century. By 
today’s standards, these data were rudimentary. They do, nevertheless, throw 
some light on the realities of a troubled period. Quarterly data of nominal 
wages are available from 1914.3 (The manner of construction of these data is 
described in Chapter 1, Subsection 1.3.1.) The Commonwealth Statistician 
also estimated nominal wages for the year 1911. It is possible, therefore, to 
3  There are data for 30 April 1914. Thereafter, the data are for the end of June, September, 
December and March.
Figure 2.3
Source: Labour Report, various numbers.
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calculate the changes that occurred between that year and the various dates in 
the quarterly series. The extent of deviations of actual wages from those that 
underlie the nominal wage data is unknown. Figure 2.4 shows, for the States 
and the whole of Australia, the movements of adult male wages over the period 
from April 1914 to May 1921.4
At the beginning of 1914, average nominal wages (for the whole of 
Australia) were 7.5 per cent higher than in 1911; in mid-1921, they were 81.9 
per cent higher. It is evident that the increase was concentrated in the latter 
4  The observation for quarter 1 of 1914 relates to 30 April.
Figure 2.4
Note: The wage data are for adult males.
Source: Labour Report, various numbers.
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part of the period. The figure permits comparisons across the States: Western 
Australia was for some time a high-wage State, but by the end of the period 
was no longer so. South Australia and Tasmania were low-wage States.
In Subsection 1.3.2 of Chapter 1, I explained that the A series index was 
confined to food, groceries, and rent. The more comprehensive C series index 
is not available in quarterly form until 1922. Annual data show that between 
the end of 1914 and the end of 1921 the C series index increased by 47 per 
cent, while the A series grew by 44 per cent.5 The A series shows a reduction 
of 3 per cent between 1901 and 1907 and an increase of 13 per cent between 
1907 and 1911. Figure 2.5 makes use of the quarterly numbers which begin in 
5  There were, however, wider divergences during the 1914–21 period.
Figure 2.5
Source: Labour Report, various numbers.
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1912 and shows how the index moved until the second quarter of 1921.6 There 
were three episodes of inflation: one during 1912; a second, from the fourth 
quarter of 1914 to the fourth quarter of 1915; and the third, from the third 
quarter of 1918 to the third quarter of 1920. By the end of the period, prices 
were falling. Sydney was generally the most expensive capital and Brisbane 
usually the cheapest (though prices were sometimes lower in Perth).
Combining the wage and price data to compute real wages, we get the 
estimates represented in Figure 2.6.7 In April 1914 real wages for Australia as 
a whole were 3.8 per cent below their 1911 level; and only in June 1921 (the 
last observation in Figure 2.6) did they regain the 1911 level. In September 
1915, real wages were 19.7 per cent below the level of 1911; in September 
1920, the shortfall was 12.2 per cent. It is little wonder that complaints of low 
wages (noted more fully in later chapters) were rife. Queensland and Western 
Australia were generally States with high real wages, with Queensland moving 
dramatically ahead in 1920–21.
Nominal wage data are also available for 14 industrial groups. It is 
not practical to depict in one graph the movements over time of wages in 
so many groups. Table 2.1, however, shows the relative wages prevailing in 
1914 and 1921. As we see later, the tribunals in this period tended to raise 
the basic wage in response to increased prices, but to leave margins for skill 
constant in money terms. This policy might be expected to have caused some 
compression of inter-industry differentials. A casual inspection of the table 
seems to bear out that expectation. A more formal analysis, involving the 
fitting of an equation to the logarithms of average wages, confirms it.8 The 
equation indicates, for example, that if industry A in 1914 had wages that 
6  The base of the index numbers, both for the separate capital cities and for the average of 
them, is the six-capitals index number for 1911. For example, the Melbourne index number 
for the third quarter of 1917 is 1300. This shows that the items in the index cost 30 per cent 
more in Melbourne in that quarter than the average cost of the same items in the six capitals 
in 1911.
7  Having regard to the range of occupations covered by the nominal wage data, I think it 
more appropriate to deflate them by the capital cities price indices than to use the five-towns 
numbers.




 + 2.014; r2 = 0.80.
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exceeded the wages of industry B by 10 per cent, the difference would have 
been reduced by 1921 to 5.5 per cent. (This is, of course, an average tendency 
and does not necessarily apply to any two specific industries.) The ‘squeeze’ 
on inter-industry relativities was much severer in this period than in any other 
period before World War II. We later provide similar data for other periods 
and find that in those periods the relationships between the end-of-period 
and beginning-of-period industry relativities were tighter than in 1914–21. It 
would seem that the economic turbulence of the war and post-war periods had 
the effect of disturbing relativities. The largest change was in shipping, where 
wages rose from 89 per cent of the average in 1914 to 102 per cent in 1921.
Figure 2.6
Source: Labour Report, various numbers.
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2.4 conclusIon
Making due allowance for the imperfections of the data, we can see that the 
Higgins era—at any rate, after 1911—was a difficult one for a tribunal that was 
in its infancy and had both a limited comprehension of what was happening 
and only rudimentary techniques for responding to a changing environment. 
In the next two chapters, we see how it responded to the challenges.
Table 2.1: Relative wages in industry groups, 1914 and 1921 (percentage of average 
wage)
Note: The 1914 numbers are for the first quarter of that year; the 1921 numbers are for the 
second quarter. In some cases the industry titles shown are abbreviations of fuller titles.
Source: Labour Report, various numbers.
The idea of a minimum wage, payable to unskilled adult male workers but 
also serving as the foundation element of the total wage structure, emerged, 
but was not completely articulated, during the Higgins era. The process is 
described in this chapter.
3.1 the lIvIng wage
The doctrine of the living wage had a central position in discussions of wage 
policy for the first quarter of the 20th century and, to a lesser extent, beyond. 
The underlying idea was that the employer had a responsibility to provide 
for the worker some minimum standard of living—one that permitted the 
worker to maintain himself and his family at a level consistent with prevailing 
concepts of adequacy. In this definition, there are obvious areas of vagueness. 
Imprecision of meaning gave rise to differences of opinion about policies.
The concept of a living wage was not invented in Australia, even if the 
Australian wage-fixers were to contribute significantly to its development as 
a policy goal and to give it a local flavour. Classical economics—from Adam 
Smith onward—contained a notion of a natural wage that would suffice to 
ensure the maintenance and reproduction of the working population. Smith 
himself regarded a rate ‘sufficient to maintain the labourer and to enable him 
to bring up a family’ as the ‘lowest rate which is consistent with common 
humanity’ (quoted by Sawkins 1933, p. 11). In classical economics, the 
The basic wage 1907–1921
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natural wage was not biologically determined, but would adjust to moveable 
standards of subsistence. David Ricardo wrote:
Labour, like all other things which are bought and sold, and which may 
be increased or diminished in quantity, has its natural and its market 
price. The natural price of labour is that which is necessary to enable 
the labourers, one with another, to subsist and perpetuate their race, 
without either increase or diminution … The market price is the price 
which is really paid for it, from the natural operation of the proportion 
of the supply to the demand. However much the market price of labour 
may deviate from its natural price, it has, like commodities, a tendency 
to conform to it. … It is not to be understood that the natural price 
of labour, estimated even in food and necessaries, is absolutely fixed 
and constant. It varies at different times in the same country, and very 
materially differs in different countries. It essentially depends on the 
habits and customs of the people … Many of the conveniences now 
employed in an English cottage would have been thought luxuries at 
an earlier period of our history. The friends of humanity cannot but 
wish that in all countries the labouring classes should have a taste for 
comforts and enjoyments, and they should be stimulated by all legal 
means in their exertions to procure them. There cannot be a better 
security against a superabundant population. (Ricardo 1962, pp. 93–
100)
Ricardo certainly did not advocate wage regulation: ‘Like all other contracts, 
wages should be left to the fair and free competition of the market, and should 
never be controlled by the interference of the legislature’ (p. 105). Yet if ‘the 
natural price of labour’ were conventionally determined, adjusting to ‘the 
habits and customs of the people’, might there not be scope for regulatory 
intervention directed at raising, over time, the people’s expectations?
That question was rarely, if ever, asked and certainly not answered 
affirmatively during the greater part of the 19th century. By its end, however, the 
doctrine that payment of a sufficient wage was an obligation upon employers, 
and that ‘market forces’ should not necessarily prevail, was making some, albeit 
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slow, headway. Its most celebrated statement was in the pontifical encyclical 
Rerum Novarum of 1891. This was the Catholic Church’s attempt to provide a 
definitive response to the ‘social problem’—the conflicts between the haves and 
the have-nots that had emerged in 19th century Europe (Coleman and Baum 
1991). It affirmed the right of private property, but also rights of workers. Leo 
XIII declared that the worker who accepted less than a just wage because the 
employer would pay no more was ‘the victim of force and injustice’; and a 
just wage was one that would support the worker in conditions of ‘reasonable 
and frugal comfort’. The encyclical provided no guidance as to the family for 
which the wage should provide, as Burns noted:
If the wage earner was entitled to receive enough to support him 
‘in reasonable and frugal comfort’, did this include the comfort of a 
wife, and of possible children? The question was a delicate one. It was 
referred by the Pope to Cardinal Zigliaria, who unhelpfully replied 
that though an employer who paid less than a ‘family’ wage would not 
violate justice, yet such action might sometimes be contrary to charity 
or to natural righteousness. No further solution came from the Church. 
(Burns 1926, p. 326)
‘Once again’, said Burns, ‘it was in Australia that the work was done.’
In 1906, John A Ryan, a Catholic priest who was Professor of Ethics 
and Economics in the St Paul Seminary, Minnesota, published A Living Wage 
(Ryan 1906). He observed that ‘the doctrine that every labourer has the right 
to a Living Wage is obviously in direct conflict with existing business practice 
and theory’ (p. 3). The wage paid was the outcome of relative bargaining 
power, which did not ensure a living wage.1 The claim to a living wage 
was grounded in the natural rights of the human being. Ryan discussed at 
length the issue referred to Cardinal Zigliaria and his response, which had 
apparently engendered much controversy. The Cardinal’s answer turned on 
the consideration that the worker’s family were not contributors to production 
and were, therefore, beyond the employer’s direct responsibility. Ryan and 
1  Ryan’s discussion of bargaining over wages is reminiscent of Higgins’ comments on the 
‘higgling of the market’.
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others found this reasoning to be at odds with the principle that receipt of a 
living wage was a right that flowed from the worker’s claim to human dignity.2
In the United Kingdom, the germ of the idea of a living wage can be 
found in the ‘Fair Wages Resolution’. This was pioneered in 1889 by the 
London School Board. Fair Wages Resolutions were passed by the House of 
Commons in 1891 and 1893. The 1893 Resolution was:
That in the opinion of this House, no person should, in Her Majesty’s 
Naval Establishments, be engaged at wages insufficient to maintain a 
proper maintenance, and that the conditions of labour as regards hours, 
wages, insurance against accidents, provision for old age, etc, should be 
such as to afford an example to employers throughout the country.
This was passed without dissent and was regarded as applicable to all public 
departments (Snowden 1913, p. 18). It was renewed from time to time, in 
different forms, and was extended to government contractors. It remained 
operative policy until the time of the Thatcher Government.
In late 19th century Britain, the agitations and inquiries of social 
reformers, such as Booth and Rowntree, awakened attention to the plight of 
much of the working population. The demands that were generated could 
be assigned to the ‘anti-sweating’ category as much as to the living wage, but 
the latter had certainly become part of the lexicon. The economist Alfred 
Marshall, writing in 1890, discussed the adequacy of wages from the viewpoint 
of industrial efficiency:
But it will serve to give some definiteness to our ideas, if we consider 
here what are the necessaries for the efficiency of an ordinary agricultural 
or an unskilled town labourer and his family, in England, in this 
generation. They may be said to consist of a well-drained dwelling with 
2  Ryan devoted a chapter of his book to estimates of the dollar amount of a living wage in the 
United States. Some of these estimates were made by the Department of Labor. The Church’s 
ambivalence about the claim of the wage-earner to an amount sufficient for a family, as well as 
himself, seems to have been resolved later. For example, in the encyclical Divini Redemptoris of 
1937, Pius XI said: ‘But social justice cannot be said to have been satisfied so long as working 
men are denied a wage that will enable them to secure proper sustenance for themselves and 
their families …’ (cited in Fogarty 1961, p. 272).
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several rooms, warm clothing, with some changes of underclothing, 
pure water, a plentiful supply of cereal food, with a moderate amount of 
meat and milk, and a little tea, etc, some education and some recreation, 
and lastly, sufficient freedom for his wife from other work to enable her 
to perform properly her maternal and her household duties. If in any 
district unskilled labour is deprived of any of these things, its efficiency 
will suffer in the same way as that of a horse that is not properly 
tended, or a steam-engine that has an inadequate supply of coals. All 
consumption up to this limit is strictly productive consumption; any 
stinting of this consumption is not economical, but wasteful. (Marshall 
1961, pp. 69–70)3
The edition of Palgrave’s Dictionary of Political Economy published in 
1906 contains an entry on the ‘Living Wage’, written by William Smart, 
Professor of Economics in the University of Glasgow. The term, said Smart,
came to the front during the great coal strike of 1893. But it is impossible 
to limit the claim of a living wage to any section of workers—by whom, 
indeed, it might be attainable given strict combination, limitation of 
numbers, and maintenance of price—and the expression seems likely 
to take root as the claim of labour generally to a preference share in the 
total product of industry. (p. 617)
Philip Snowden’s The Living Wage was written in 1913. Snowden was 
a Labour MP (and a future Chancellor of the Exchequer). He had strong 
religious convictions and propounded a highly idealised view:
It may be impossible to give a precise or satisfactory definition of a 
Living Wage. But it expresses an idea, a belief, a conviction, a demand. 
A thousand questions may be asked of those who advocate the Living 
Wage which it may be difficult to answer, but the faith of its advocates 
3  In a footnote, Marshall estimated the cost of ‘the strict necessaries for an average agricultural 
family’ at 15 to 18 shillings per week. ‘Conventional necessaries’ required an extra 5s. Different 
estimates were given for other classes of labour: ‘For a man whose brain has to undergo great 
continuous strain the strict necessaries are perhaps two hundred or two hundred and fifty 
pounds a year if he is a bachelor; but more than twice as much if he has an expensive family to 
educate. His conventional necessaries depend on the nature of his calling’ (p. 70).
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in its justice and possibility is not shaken by these objections. The idea 
of a Living Wage seems to have come from the fount of justice, which no 
man has ever seen, which no man has ever explained, but which we all 
know is an instinct divinely implanted in the human heart. (Snowden 
1913, p. 3)
Not only was the living wage a right of the worker as a human being; it 
also accorded with the dictates of efficiency, for there was ‘an incalculable loss 
of national wealth by the underpayment of large bodies of workers, who in 
consequence of low wages are underfed, insufficiently clothed, badly housed, 
poorly educated, industrially inefficient and politically incompetent’ (p. 7). 
Many employers had discovered the benefit of treating workers well, but often 
were defeated by what we now call the ‘race to the bottom’, wherein competition 
enforced a neglect of external costs and benefits. In the unorganised and 
unskilled industries, conditions were set by ‘the least scrupulous employer, 
who finds it more profitable to draw upon (at the expense of the community) 
the unlimited supply of half-starved and helpless labour, which he quickly uses 
up’.
In terms strongly reminiscent of H B Higgins and his counterparts in 
State tribunals, Snowden expressed strong antipathy to the strike as a method 
of achieving a just wage. Invoking the examples of Australia and New Zealand, 
he favoured compulsory arbitration.
Also occurring in 1913 was a church-based conference on The Industrial 
Unrest and the Living Wage. ‘The industrial unrest’ alluded especially to 
the coal strike of 1911, which had led the Asquith Government to enact, 
reluctantly, a Coal Mines (Minimum Wage) Act 1912. A number of speakers, 
mainly churchmen, strongly advocated the living wage. The Reverend A J 
Carlyle, for example, said that ‘the living wage is not a matter of philanthropic 
consideration but of justice—that is to say, it is something that is, or ought 
to be, regarded as an inherent feature of the social system just as a man’s right 
to his life or his person is a necessary feature of a social order. … it is not 
something which individual employers should grant out of consideration, 
generosity or mercy, it is something which morality and law should guarantee 
61Keith Hancock
as a right which work can claim’ (The Industrial Unrest and the Living Wage 
1913, p. 67). Contrary views were put by the Reverend Philip H Wicksteed, 
a well-known economist, and Miss Mary Theresa Rankin, also an economist, 
who later published a book about the Australian and New Zealand wage-
fixing systems (Rankin 1916).4
Miss Constance Smith presented a paper about the International 
Association for Labour Legislation. Clearly a forerunner of the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO), this had two sections: the International 
Labour Bureau (located in Switzerland), which collected, classified, and 
published countries’ labour laws; and the Federation of Labour Sections. 
The Federation had the objective of improving labour laws. It met every two 
years and comprised (said Miss Smith) ‘Parliamentary representatives of all 
parties, ministers of different Churches, men of science and social reformers, 
University professors and Trade Union Secretaries’. Miss Smith described the 
movement of the Federation’s thinking from a concentration on sweating 
towards the enforcement of minimum wages through wages boards, observing 
that ‘the little fire kindled in Australia in the nineties is already beginning to 
light country after country of the Old World’. ‘And so’, she said, ‘the general 
movement in favour of a living wage, towards which the establishment of a 
minimum wage must be considered the first necessary step, tends to proceed 
on Christian lines, dealing first with the poorest, the humblest, the most 
helpless’ (The Industrial Unrest and the Living Wage 1913, pp. 158–168).
It was indicative of the extent to which the idea of the living wage had 
taken hold that the Peace Treaty of 1919 called upon the High Contracting 
Parties to promote ‘the payment to the employed of a wage adequate to maintain 
a reasonable standard of life as this is understood in their time and country’ 
(quoted by Anderson 1929, p. 188). Achieving compliance with Article 427 
of the Treaty became a concern of the ILO. In 1928 the Chief of the Statistical 
Section wrote that ‘it would be a great success for international policy if every 
4  Whether she visited Australia and New Zealand is unclear. She was a Carnegie Research 
Scholar in 1911–12 and 1912–13. J Shield Nicholson, in an introduction to her book, writes 
that ‘in all cases the sources used were official reports and publications’.
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State were to accept a binding obligation to provide suitable machinery for 
the payment of a minimum wage wherever the individual worker, owing to 
his economic helplessness, fails to earn enough by a full day’s work to cover 
his recognised minimum needs—an obligation which at bottom is almost self-
evident’ (Pribram 1928, p. 331).
Thus, in the early decades of the 20th century, the living wage was 
very much ‘in the air’. It was a revolt against perceived evils of 19th century 
capitalism and industrialism. At the same time, the support that it captured 
owed much to the economic advances, and the rising average income levels, 
which these had caused. Evelyn Burns, in 1926, described the living wage as 
the most widely accepted principle of wage prescription, having by then been 
adopted in a number of American States and some of the Canadian Provinces 
(Burns 1926, p. 260). It would be a major research endeavour, beyond the 
scope of this study, to analyse and to explain fully the emergence, in a number 
of advanced countries, of a sentiment favouring the implementation of a 
living wage. Adoption of the idea in Australia owed something to the influence 
of overseas opinion, but Australia’s experiments were, in turn, an inspiration 
to proponents of the living wage elsewhere. The Australian wage-fixers 
were involved at the level of application, and had to face practical issues—
prescription of a specific amount, determining the family unit for which the 
wage was to provide, and adjusting the wage to the changing value of money—
that might be glossed over if the living wage were merely an aspiration.
I cannot say when the idea first entered Australian discourse. A well-
known affirmation of it, however, was made in 1890 by Samuel Griffith, who 
brought into the Queensland Parliament a strange Bill ‘to declare the natural 
law relating to the acquisition and ownership of property’. It resembled the 
yet-to-be-published Rerum Novarum inasmuch as it affirmed both the right of 
private property and the claim of labour to a sufficient wage. The Bill (which 
did not pass) referred thus to wages: ‘The natural and proper measure of wages 
is such a sum as is a fair immediate recompense for the labour for which they 
are paid, having regard to its character and duration; but it can never be taken 
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at a less sum than such as is sufficient to maintain the labourer and his family 
in a state of health and reasonable comfort’ (Sawkins 1933, p. 9).
The development of thought about a living wage was stultified in 
the 1890s by economic depression, the industrial defeats of labour, and 
the priorities of establishing wage-setting mechanisms and of countering 
sweating. None of the studies of early wage fixation of which I am aware refers 
to the enunciation of a living-wage principle before the first decade of the 
20th century. The index to Coghlan’s monumental study (which extends to 
1901) has no entry for ‘living wage’, the closest approximation being one for 
minimum rates prescribed in New South Wales (1894) and Victoria (1896) 
for contractors on public works (Coghlan 1969, vol. IV, pp. 2027–2028; 
2051–2052; 2214). More intensive research might uncover opinions about 
the living wage that have escaped my notice; but they would not be abundant. 
The idea did not feature in the Convention debates on the proposal that led 
to section 51(xxxv) of the Constitution or in the parliamentary debates on the 
Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Bill.
That it first makes its appearance within the wage-fixing system probably 
reflects the practicality that tribunals had to find bases for their decisions. 
There were several possibilities: a living wage, what the trade could bear, what 
‘reputable employers’ were paying, and compromise between the positions of 
the disputants. The statutory requirement for wages to be ‘fair and reasonable’ 
(embodied, for example, in the Excise Tariff Act 1906) might seem, at first 
sight, to be another criterion, but was so wide as to leave the arbitrator virtually 
undirected.
All of the above options found places in early decisions of the tribunals. 
Indeed, none—except perhaps ‘reputable employers’—was discarded. The 
living wage, however, was the most likely to appeal to an adjudicator wishing 
to invoke a principle applicable to different cases—a typical aspiration of 
courts of law. Hence, the establishment of arbitration courts enhanced the 
likelihood of the tribunals adopting the living wage. If the Harvester case 
(discussed below) is any indication, the living wage was an idea that judges, 
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rather than the parties, brought into the practice of wage fixation. As educated 
men, they had some awareness of the discussions in other countries. Higgins, 
for example, corresponded with Seebohm Rowntree and Sidney Webb, and it 
can be taken for granted that social considerations relevant to wage adequacy 
would have been discussed (Macarthy 1969, pp. 19–38).
Sawkins states (and I have no contrary evidence) that the first clear 
mention of a living wage in an arbitral decision was that of Justice Heydon in 
1905 in the New South Wales Court of Arbitration (Sawkins 1933, p. 12). 
Heydon referred to ‘the duty of assisting to, if possible, so arrange the business 
of the country that every worker, however humble, shall receive enough to 
enable him to lead a human life, to marry and bring up a family and maintain 
them and himself with, at any rate, some small degree of comfort; this … may 
be shortly defined as the duty to prevent sweating …’. But it was necessary 
to ‘keep the law of supply and demand carefully in view’ and ‘I can discover 
nothing in or out of the Act to prevent full effect being given to this in the 
case of all labour above the lowest or living wage limit …’. Heydon did not, on 
this occasion, attempt any quantification of needs. That was a task to which 
Higgins purportedly addressed himself in Harvester.5
3.2 the Harvester case6
3.2.1 The legislation
The agricultural implements industry, one of the few branches of engineering 
involved in manufacture, as opposed to jobbing, was exposed to growing 
competition from North America, from which it sought relief. After an 
inquiry, this relief was afforded by import duties imposed under the Custom 
Tariff Act 1906.
5  Macarthy (1968, pp. 127–128) argues that before 1907 Victorian wages boards and the 
Industrial Appeals Court virtually ignored the living wage principle. In those determinations 
which included a minimum wage for unskilled labour, the predominant rate was 36s. The 
Harvester standard was not generally adopted until the 1917–21 period.
6  For other perspectives on the case, see Macarthy (1969), and Fahey and Lack (2007).
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The proposal to impose duties on imported agricultural machinery was 
before the Parliament in August 1906 upon a motion of Sir William Lyne 
(Minister of Customs and Excise) in the Committee of Ways and Means. 
During his speech, interjectors asserted the need for complementary action 
to benefit workers. Mr Hume Cook asked: ‘Will the Massey Harris Company 
pay fair wages?’; and Mr Page said: ‘If we are going to have protection for the 
manufacturer, we must have protection for the worker.’ Lyne said: ‘I think—
and I believe it is the desire of the Committee—that some conditions will 
have to be imposed in the Bill, or a Wages Board will have to be appointed, to 
prevent the payment of unduly low wages to those engaged in the industry’. 
(Mr Tudor interjected—‘And to prevent the employment of too many boys’.) 
Lyne explained that the motion ‘is intended really for the information of the 
Committee, and is not part and parcel of the Bill to be hereafter submitted’ 
(Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, vol. 33 [33 CPD], pp. 3443–3445).
The policy of New Protection sought to ensure that employees benefited 
from the protection provided to employers. New Protection, Alfred Deakin 
explained,
aims at according to the manufacturer that degree of exemption from 
unfair outside competition which will enable him to pay fair and 
reasonable wages … It does not stop there. Having put the manufacturer 
in a position to pay good wages, it goes on to assure the public that he 
does pay them. (New Protection … 1907, p. 1)
When Deakin spoke (in the week after that of the debate reported above) 
about the proposed legislative package, an interjector asked how he would 
define reasonable wages. He replied: ‘So far as Victoria is concerned, that point 
would be decided according to the decisions of the Wages Boards. In other 
cases, they would be decided according to the current rates in the locality, 
under a power similar to that vested in the Minister of Trade and Customs 
with regard to the sugar industry in Queensland’ (34 CPD, p. 3969). Sixteen 
days later, Deakin said that ‘to my mind protective duties which benefit 
only the manufacturer fall far short of conferring any real advantage upon 
the community. It is desirable that some portion of the direct benefit derived 
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from the imposition of duties should, if possible, go to the employees’. By 
then, however, the proposal to exempt from duty employers who complied 
with decisions of Victorian wages boards had been abandoned. The reason, 
said Deakin, was the view of the Attorney-General that exemptions from 
duty upon compliance with decisions of State tribunals would infringe the 
constitutional prohibition of taxation that discriminated between the States 
(34 CPD, pp. 5137–5138).
The Custom Tariff Act 1906 imposed the import duties. For example, 
the price of a stripper-harvester was around £70, and the duty payable from 
7 September 1906 was £12. Consistent with Deakin’s expressed concern for 
consumers, there were specified maximum prices for Australian stripper-
harvesters and drills. If these were not observed, the Governor-General could 
Alfred Deakin
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reduce the import duties by 50 per cent. Complementary to this measure 
was the Excise Tariff Act 1906. This imposed excise duties equal to half of the 
import duties, but with the proviso that
this Act shall not apply to goods manufactured by any person in any 
part of the Commonwealth under conditions as to the remuneration of 
labour which—
(a) are declared by resolution of both Houses of Parliament to be fair 
and reasonable; or
(b) are in accordance with an industrial award under the Commonwealth 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904; or
(c) are in accordance with the terms of an industrial agreement filed 
under the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904; or
(d) are, on application made for the purpose to the President of the 
Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, declared to 
be fair and reasonable by him or by a Judge of the Supreme Court 
of a State or any person or persons who compose a State Industrial 
Authority to whom he may refer the matter.
As the agriculture implement industry was not subject to either a 
Commonwealth award or a filed agreement, it may be that the exemption 
routes were intended for wider application, to be embodied in other legislation. 
Deakin said that he expected route (a) to be used rarely. The terms of (d) 
deserve brief notice. An application for exemption would be made to the 
President of the Arbitration Court and an exemption would be granted if he 
deemed the wages to be fair and reasonable. That is, the application, was made, 
not to the Court, but to the President and adjudged by him. Alternatively, the 
President could refer the matter to a Judge of a State Court—not to the State 
Court—or to a person or persons composing a State authority—not to the 
authority. The procedure of imposing responsibility on the officer, but not the 
tribunal itself, may have reflected a constitutional concern. During the hearing 
of Harvester, Higgins said that the matter was not before the Court, but before 
him. An implication was that he could choose his method of inquiry, and that 
68 Australian Wage Policy
an arbitration-like procedure was not a requirement. This view, which appears 
to be correct, did not emerge in the judgment (2 CAR 1, 1).
It is a matter for speculation whether the legislative technique of 
affording conditional protection would have been deployed more widely if the 
High Court had not disallowed the Excise Tariff Act 1906.
3.2.2 The case
Neither Higgins’ short-serving predecessor O’Connor nor Higgins himself 
delegated any of the manufacturers’ applications. Each took the responsibility 
of certifying, or not certifying, that the wages paid by an applicant were fair 
and reasonable. O’Connor, earlier in 1907, had dealt with the question in a 
manner summarised by Anderson:
In Bagshaw’s case certain interested unions were allowed representation, 
and at a conference arranged by Mr Justice O’Connor between 
representatives of employers and of employees at Adelaide in June, 
1907, an agreement as to rates of wages was reached. This agreement was 
important, because it enabled the President to adopt it as a standard by 
which to judge ‘fair and reasonable’ rates, and it enabled manufacturers 
to know the wage rates which would pass the test of ‘fair and reasonable’. 
Mr Justice O’Connor granted the applications of 108 manufacturers 
whose wage rates were not less than those provided in the agreement. 
The rate fixed by the agreement for an unskilled worker was 39s per 
week of forty-eight hours. The margin for skill for blacksmiths, fitters, 
turners, woodworkers, and wheelwrights was 15s per week; semi-skilled 
workers and tradesmen of less than average capacity, from 6s to 9s per 
week. (1939, pp. 66–67)
There is no indication, in either the hearing of Harvester or the decision, that 
Higgins ascribed any persuasive authority to the Bagshaw precedent.
Confronted by a long queue of applications, he adopted, in effect, a test-
case strategy. ‘I selected Mr McKay’s application out of some 112 applications 
made by Victorian manufacturers’, he said, ‘because I found that the factory 
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was one of the largest, and had the greatest number and variety of employees; 
and because his application was to be keenly fought’ (2 CAR 1, 2). Other 
applicants would not be allowed to traverse the same issues, but would be 
afforded opportunities to show that their situations differed materially from 
McKay’s.
The hearing began on 7 October 1907 and concluded on 1 November. 
The decision was given on 8 November. McKay was represented by counsel, 
William Schutt, who was later a judge in the Victorian Supreme Court. Very 
few of McKay’s workers were union members. Nevertheless, there was union 
representation. ‘Certain unions of ironworkers’ were represented by Frank 
Gavan Duffy, later Chief Justice of Australia. Duffy became ill during the case 
and his place was taken by his junior, J A Arthur, who became a Minister in 
the Fisher Labor Government (but died soon after taking office). Some other 
H B Higgins
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unions were jointly represented by one of their secretaries. None of the unions 
comprised unskilled labourers.
Higgins made it clear that he would determine the structure of the case 
and define the questions to be considered. He did not hesitate to tell the 
representatives to desist from particular lines of argument or to insist on the 
importance of others. Except when witnesses were in the box, the proceedings 
were essentially dialogues between Higgins and those at the bar table.
It is well known that, in his decision, Higgins attended first to the wage 
for adult unskilled labourers. Having done that, he moved on to the rates 
appropriate for skilled and semi-skilled workers.
3.2.3 The cost of living
Nothing in Duffy’s opening address suggests any prior intention of treating 
as an issue the adequacy of the living standards of the employees and their 
families. Duffy strove unsuccessfully to persuade Higgins to take into account 
the profitability of McKay’s business and the claim of employees to share in the 
benefit that the firm enjoyed from tariff protection. Higgins’ insistence on the 
priority of ‘the cost of living’ seems to have forced the parties to review their 
positions. In advance of the unions’ evidence being called, Higgins inquired 
of Duffy whether there would be ‘any direct evidence of a workman’s wife 
or housekeeper’. Duffy replied that there would, and Higgins observed that 
‘there is no one can give better evidence as to the way the shoe pinches, if it 
does pinch, than the workman’s wife’ (transcript, p. 333).7 The manner in 
which the evidence of living costs was given—mostly by men whose primary 
task was to describe the work performed at McKay’s and elsewhere—suggests 
that calling this evidence was something of an afterthought. McKay’s counsel 
was certainly caught off guard, as the following exchange shows:
7  Duffy then said: ‘These women do not wish, naturally, to have their names published in 
the newspapers and I will ask Your Honour, when the time comes, to make an order that they 
shall not be published.’ Higgins asked Schutt whether he would have any objection to this. 
When he replied that he would not, Higgins said ‘I should certainly do it’.
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Mr Schutt: Before we proceed with the examination of the witness, I 
might say the remarks of Your Honour came somewhat as a surprise 
to me and the gentlemen instructing me, viz: … that Your Honour 
expected us in our case to go into questions of the cost of living.
His Honour: You need not unless you like. I only thought it fair you 
should have an opportunity, if you thought fit, as well as the other side 
to do so.
Mr Schutt: What I mean is this, that although the matter had naturally 
entered into our calculation we were not shaping our case from that 
point of view. What we thought was this. Supposing we put a case 
before Your Honour showing the conditions under which these wages 
were earned, that is to say, conditions of work, that then would be 
sufficient for our case, and if the other side disputed the fact that people 
should be comfortable under those conditions that then we might be 
allowed by Your Honour to have a rebutting case to rebut anything put 
in evidence by them.
His Honour: I could not allow a rebutting case. The burden lies on you 
to show that the conditions of remuneration are fair and reasonable. 
Then if you go and work that out you will see it is impossible to find that 
the conditions are fair and reasonable without going into the question 
of the cost of living. The way it strikes my mind is this. The legislature 
says that I am to declare whether the conditions as to remuneration are 
fair and reasonable. It gives me no guide as to what it means to be fair 
and reasonable. When you say fair and reasonable it must mean fair and 
reasonable according to some standard. Then what is the standard? On 
looking for the standard it cannot be fair and reasonable on the standard 
of competition, individual employer against individual employee. It 
must be having regard to the needs of the employee as a human being 
in the first instance. As you interfere with the principle of competition 
between the individual employer and the individual employee, that is 
the only thing we can fall back on. What I propose to do is this. I 
think the basic matter is—what is necessary for the ordinary unskilled 
labourer?
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Mr Schutt: From the point of view of living?
His Honour: Yes … what is fair and reasonable in order that he may live 
as a human being first of all. (p. 255)
Schutt sought an adjournment for McKay’s representatives to get 
evidence about living costs. Higgins refused, saying that they had had months 
to think about the matter (p. 261). On Friday 25 October, he warned Schutt 
that if he was to call such evidence, he must do so on the following Monday 
(p. 490). On the Monday, Schutt said that all that he could have done was 
to call upon some of McKay’s workmen to give evidence, and he had no wish 
to do that. ‘We did make some enquiries as to rents’, he said, ‘and we do not 
think the estate agents can be contradicted’ (p. 517). In the decision, Higgins 
said: ‘I allowed Mr Schutt … an opportunity to call evidence upon this subject 
even after his case had been closed; but notwithstanding the fortnight or more 
allowed him for investigation, he admitted that he could produce no specific 
evidence in contradiction [of the union evidence]’ (2 CAR 1, 6).
Eleven witnesses called by the unions gave evidence about the 
expenditures of their households. Higgins said in his decision that ‘some 
very interesting evidence has been given by working men’s wives and others’ 
(p. 5). In fact, three wives gave evidence. Eight men provided statements of 
household expenditure, but most said that these either had been prepared by 
their wives or were constructed in consultation with them.8
A simple average of the budgets would be misleading, because it is clear 
that some witnesses omitted items. For example, two excluded rent, three 
excluded clothing, one excluded fruit and vegetables, and one omitted tea and 
flour. (Higgins in his decision itemised some of the omissions.) Some witnesses 
probably excluded items because they were treated as ‘husband’s’ rather than 
household expenditure. Tobacco, personal insurance, and contributions 
to accident funds are in this category. It is possible, however, to construct 
8  Duffy also led evidence from an estate agent (discussed below) and a wood and coal 
merchant. The burden of the latter’s evidence was that the prices of wood and coal had risen 
over the previous two years. It throws no light on the actual prices of these items or the 
quantities consumed.
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a synthetic budget which takes such items into account and is unlikely to 
be seriously inaccurate for the class of worker to whose households the evidence 
related. Table 3.1 is such a budget.
This budget does not include some miscellaneous items. Insofar as the 
witnesses referred to such items, the burden of their evidence was that they 
could not afford them. But it is unlikely that they entirely forwent them. One 
witness said that he frequently attended football matches. Some professed to 
be teetotallers, but it is probable that the expenses of an average household 
included some alcohol.
Table 3.1: Harvester evidence—constructed budget
Note: Numbers in the last column do not sum to 100 because of rounding.
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Clearly, a labourer on 6s per day (McKay’s standard) or even the 7s that 
Higgins adopted could not afford weekly expenditure of £2 13s 6d (nearly 9s a 
day) or thereabouts. The discrepancy is largely explained by the fact that none 
of the workmen concerned was a labourer. Some were journeymen; and several 
were union officials, paid at journeymen rates or better. Of the five whose 
wages were disclosed, one received £3 per week and three—probably four—
received £2 14s. All had children, the number ranging from one to seven. In 
three instances, there was evidence that working children contributed to the 
household funds.
Several of the witnesses spoke of the difficulty of making ends meet. 
There is little evidence, however, about the quantity or quality of the purchases 
made within the budget. There is little, either, about the adjustments made to 
confine the expenditures of labourers’ households within the lesser amounts 
available to them.
An exception is housing. Smith Aumont, called by Duffy, was an 
auctioneer and estate agent. Although he carried on business in Collingwood, 
he claimed to have contact with agents in other districts and to be familiar 
with current rents. He said:
I have got 36s a week men amongst my tenants. They live in places that 
have no conveniences, such as baths and coppers. I have several houses 
that have not got baths and coppers with tenants in but I could not tell 
you what their wages are—I should gather from their occupation that 
36s was their wage. They may get less. If there is a bath and a copper 
I can claim at least another shilling a week. The owner would require 
a shilling a week extra if he had to go to the expense of connecting a 
bathroom with the sewer. … At present a labourer as a rule does not 
care to go beyond seven shillings a week. It would be a very inferior 
place at that. He could not possibly go lower than that, and if he did 
it would be a very inferior house. He could not possibly get a place for 
human habitation for less than six shillings and that would only be for 
three rooms. The artisan class go from 8s 6d up to 12s 6d. (transcript, 
pp. 502–503)
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A three-room house comprised two bedrooms and a kitchen. A fourth 
room, if there was one, was usually a dining room. Aumont’s evidence accords 
with that of the workers or the wives who commented on housing costs. Mrs 
Bayliss said that her family occupied a four-room house in North Brunswick. 
It cost eight shillings and was unsewered. The sewer would be there soon and 
its advent would raise the rent (p. 505). C J Bennett lived in a four-room house 
in Spencer Street, North Melbourne, for 12s 6d per week (pp. 487–488); 
presumably his house was sewered. Ernest Wilkinson paid 8s 6d per week for 
a four-room house, with a bath and copper in a detached room outside (pp. 
473–474). Mrs Russell’s family of eight lived in a five-room double-storey 
brick house, comprising three bedrooms, a living room and a kitchen—‘not 
a good house at that’ (p. 441). There was no bathroom, but there were a bath 
and a copper in a shed. This house cost 12s 6d a week. Mrs Smith, living at 
Port Melbourne with her husband and seven children, also paid 12s 6d rent:
The kitchen is counted in the five rooms. We use one room for the 
boys, one for myself and girls, and one for a dining room—we have 
no bathroom. We have a copper and troughs. It is a portable copper 
outside. (p. 440)
Mrs Smith added:
I cannot say how our neighbours live who only earn 38s a week. I can 
only say the houses they live in are not fit for habitation and it would be 
better to live in the fresh air. They are wooden houses, tumbling down. 
(p. 441)
David Skidmore said that the average rent for a mechanic’s house would be 
10s 6d. Labourers had ‘to go less’: ‘Labourers live in very poor houses, from 5s 
and 5s 6d up to 7s 6d. But they are not fit to live in’ (p. 429).
A rough assessment, based on the evidence, is that labourers paid 
between 2s 6d and 6s a week less in rent than the witnesses. Higgins’ estimate 
of seven shillings as the labourer’s weekly rent (Harvester decision 2 CAR 
1, 6) was probably based on Aumont’s evidence. The ‘saving’ goes a small 
way to reconciling the synthetic budget, derived from the evidence, with the 
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actual wages of labourers. The ‘cost’ of this economy was the occupation of 
distinctly inferior housing (and the artisan’s house was far from luxurious). On 
the evidence, a 7s house was typically cramped, dilapidated and unsewered. 
Higgins simply took the seven shillings estimate at face value, without reflecting 
on the efficacy of such housing in meeting ‘the normal needs of the average 
employee, regarded as a human being living in a civilised community’ (p. 3).
At the time of putting Schutt on notice that he must provide any 
evidence about living costs on the following Monday, Higgins said that in any 
event ‘I think I have enough’. It is hard to take this seriously. Higgins at one 
point said that ‘in order to know what is fair and reasonable remuneration I 
should like to know in the present state of the markets what food, clothing 
and shelter can be got for a certain wage’ (p. 253), but neither he nor the 
parties pursued that question. The evidence (with the limited exception of 
that about housing) dealt with the actual expenses of families receiving artisans’ 
wages.9 The sum required to sustain labourers’ families in conditions of ‘frugal 
comfort’ was a separate topic. That there was no evidence about it is explicable 
by the employee representation—the unions were those of skilled and semi-
skilled workers. Apart from the estate agent and the wood and coal merchant, 
the unions’ witnesses were drawn from their ranks and their members’ wives.
One route that Higgins followed for a certain distance was to derive a 
partial ‘budget’ from the evidence of actual expenses, incorporating the seven 
shillings per week standard for rent. The amount of £1 12s 5d represented 
‘the necessary average weekly expenditure for a labourer’s home of about five 
persons’ in respect of rent, groceries, bread, meat, milk, vegetables, and fuel. 
It was ‘the average of the list of nine housekeeping women’ (p. 6). As we have 
seen, there were 11 household ‘budgets’—eight presented by husbands and 
three by wives. The numbers of people in the 11 households ranged from 
three to nine, with an average of just over five. For this group, then, Higgins’ 
9  A failure to notice this is a fault in Macarthy’s article. Macarthy provides a table of ‘Unskilled 
Workingman’s [sic] Budgets (Lists offered in evidence at the Harvester hearing)’, but there was 
no such evidence (Macarthy 1969, p. 32).
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calculation of an average family of ‘about five’ was correct. Such slender 
evidence, it would seem, was the basis of what was to become a vexed issue in 
basic wage fixation—the size of the family unit.
Higgins then noted numerous items not comprehended in the £1 12s 
5d: ‘light …, clothes, boots, furniture, utensils … rates, life insurance, savings, 
accident or benefit societies, loss of employment, union pay, books and 
newspapers, tram and train fares, sewing machine, mangle, school requisites, 
amusements and holidays, intoxicating liquors, tobacco, sickness and death, 
domestic help, or any expenditure for unusual contingencies, religion, or 
charity’. These items would clearly amount to more than 3s 7d—the gap 
between £1 16s and £1 12s 5d. Hence he could be confident that £1 16s 
was an insufficient wage. The difficulty with this reasoning is inherent in the 
derivation of the £1 12s 5d. It comprises seven shillings—the estimated rent of 
a labourer’s house—and £1 5s 5d allowed for food on the basis of the evidence 
of actual expenditure. By parity of reasoning, the amount required for the 
labourer’s household might have been set at £2 13s 6d (as in the synthetic 
budget) less a ‘saving’ of 3s on rent (achieved by adopting a lower standard 
of housing)—a total of £2 10s 6d (say £2 10s). Such an amount was not 
founded on any identification of need—it was the amount (subject to the rent 
adjustment) spent by households where the breadwinners earned more than 
£2 10s; and they spent it because they could.
Schutt commented on the lack of evidence about the living conditions 
of labourers and their families:
I expected to be more enlightened by the other side on this point. It 
is perfectly true they called a lot of witnesses, but they did not call 
witnesses who were in receipt of the lowest rates of pay. … The witnesses 
they called were people who spent what they got or very near it, and 
their rate of living depended upon the amount they received. But the 
difficulty is that there was nobody called who got 36s a week. There 
was a reference made by one witness, Mrs Russell, to a time when her 
husband got 30s some time before. (transcript, p. 624)
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Higgins responded:
I also remarked that there was no evidence called of the labourer himself. 
But at the same time, it is almost a fortiori the case, that when these 
people who are receiving £2 5s, £2 10s or £3 a week find themselves 
unable even with that to get anything in the way of luxuries or anything 
more than bare necessaries, that the others would be in a worse position. 
Then Mrs Russell said something that ought to impress one, that her 
husband, who was working at a candle factory, a man doing physical 
work, sometimes was not able to get any meat. Of course, there are 
some people who have theories that meat does not do them any good, 
but if you have not meat you must have something else. For a grown 
man working hard with his back, arms and legs all day and not be able 
to get strong food impresses me as a strong case. (p. 625)
Mrs Russell referred to a time when her husband’s wage was £1 16s per week. 
(He was now, as a union secretary, receiving enough to ‘give’ his wife £2 10s.) 
Mr Russell’s restricted consumption of meat was mentioned in the decision. 
‘This inability to procure sustaining food’, said Higgins, ‘is certainly not 
conducive to the maintenance of the worker in industrial efficiency’. He did 
not mention that Mr and Mrs Russell had six children.10
In truth, the gap in living standards between the synthetic budget and 
the consumption possibilities of the labourer’s family was greater than is 
suggested if we assume a daily wage for the labourer of six or seven shillings. 
The labourer might earn such an amount in a week of 48 hours if he were fully 
employed. But the evidence showed that there were various impediments to his 
securing that amount. Most important—at least at McKay’s factory—was the 
seasonality of demand for the product. Higgins referred to this in his decision:
There is no constancy of employment, as the employer has to put a 
considerable number of men off in the intervals between the seasons. 
The seed-drill and plough season, I am told, is in the earlier part of the 
year, about April; but the busiest time is the harvester season, about 
10  The eldest child—a daughter aged 15—earned five shillings a week at bookbinding and 
probably contributed most of her wage to the household budget (p. 441).
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August to November. But even if the employment were constant and 
interrupted, is a wage of 36s fair and reasonable, in view of the cost of 
living in Victoria? (p. 5)
Seasonality was not the only cause of discontinuous employment. 
George Bult, a foreman in the harvester department at Sunshine, referred to 
the holidays observed at the factory—a fortnight at Christmas, Foundation 
Day in January, a stock-taking day in February, four days at Easter, Eight 
Hours Day, King’s Birthday, and Show Day. These were all unpaid, though a 
bonus was given at Christmas (p. 244). If there were an interruption of work 
through mechanical failure, the idle employees were not paid for the period 
of the interruption, although the employer might extend the working day to 
make up the lost time. There is no indication in the decision that Higgins 
made any attempt to factor loss of working time into his assessment of fair 
and reasonable wages.
In summary, the seven shilling standard lacked any real basis in measured 
or estimated needs. For what it was worth—but it was worth very little—the 
evidence suggested that a ‘needed’ wage was significantly above seven shillings. 
To be taken seriously, a ‘needs’ criterion required the identification of necessary 
items of consumption and their prices. It required, too, a more deliberate 
consideration of family size than reliance on the average of the 11 households.
3.2.4 The seven shillings standard
What, then, was the basis for the seven shillings? A key consideration in 
Higgins’ mind was the desirability of improving the workers’ lot. He virtually 
argued in his decision that this was a statutory duty:
The provision of fair and reasonable wages is obviously designed for 
the benefit of the employees in the industry; and it must be meant to 
secure to them something which they cannot get by the ordinary system 
of individual bargaining with employers. If Parliament meant that the 
conditions shall be such as they can get by individual bargaining—if 
it meant that those conditions are to be fair and reasonable, which 
employees will accept and employers will give, in contracts of service—
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there would have been no need for this provision. The remuneration 
could safely have been left to the ‘higgling of the market’ for labour, 
with the pressure for bread on one side, and the pressure for profits on 
the other. (p. 3)
This was a position that Higgins had clearly signalled during the hearing. For 
example, when Schutt suggested that the best approach was ‘to see whether 
the rate paid [by McKay] to the unskilled labourer is in accord with rates 
usually paid and accepted’, Higgins responded: ‘That would never do. … You 
must have regard to current rates for ratios and the rest, but the whole idea of 
the Act is interference with what is called free contract between an individual 
employer and employee’ (p. 258). Higgins could have taken the view that his 
task was to inquire whether a particular applicant, such as McKay, observed 
generally prevailing standards—an approach suggested by Deakin in the 
Parliamentary debate noted in Subsection 2.2.1.
That said, it is fair to add that the evidence lent substance to Higgins’ 
concern about the ‘higgling of the market’.
The principal witness called by Schutt was H V McKay’s brother, 
George, who was factory manager. His frank evidence was that he set all of the 
wages, taking some account of the advice of foremen. ‘In fixing the wages’, he 
said, ‘I have endeavoured to get labour at the cheapest price that I honestly 
could’ (p. 133). The wages book was tendered, showing the amounts paid to 
495 men. The classifications of labour shown in the book had been entered 
only after the application was made. Previously, there was simply a rate for 
each man, determined by George McKay. Men performing what seemed to be 
tradesmen’s work, but receiving less than might have been expected for such 
jobs, were designated by George McKay as ‘improvers’. J B Garde, manager of 
the plough department, said that the men ‘get small rises from time to time as 
they are deemed worthy. As Mr George McKay thinks fit he gives them small 
rises …’ (p. 535). In effect, Higgins was being asked to bless the wages that 
George McKay chose to offer. It is no surprise that he bridled at that idea.
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It was in his interpretation of ‘improvement’ that Higgins, in his 
decision, invoked the standard of a wage appropriate to ‘the normal needs of 
the average employee, regarded as a human being living in a civilised society’. 
Elaborating on this standard, he said:
If A lets B have the use of his horses, on the terms that he give them 
fair and reasonable treatment, I have no doubt that it is B’s duty to give 
them proper food and water, and such shelter and rest as they need; 
and, as wages are the means of obtaining commodities, surely the state, 
in stipulating for fair and reasonable remuneration for the employees, 
means that the wages shall be sufficient to provide these things, and 
clothing, and a condition of frugal comfort estimated by current human 
standards. (p. 4)
The analogy of the horses seems to imply a concept of subsistence wages. It is 
unlikely that Higgins intended that.
What other standard was there? The rates paid by other employers and 
those set by wages boards were possibilities. And Higgins moved from needs 
to accepted standards:
Then, on looking at the rates ruling elsewhere, I find that the public 
bodies which do not aim at profit, but which are responsible to electors 
or others for economy, very generally pay 7s. The metropolitan Board 
has 7s for a minimum; the Melbourne City Council also. Of seventeen 
municipal councils in Victoria, thirteen pay 7s as a minimum; and 
only two pay a man so low as 6s 6d. The Woodworkers’ Wages Board, 
24th July, 1907, fixed 7s. In the agreement made in Adelaide between 
employers and employees, in this very industry, the minimum is 7s 6d.11 
On the other hand, the rate in the Victorian railways workshops is 6s 
6d. But the Victorian Railway Commissioners do, I presume, aim at 
a profit; and as we were told in the evidence, the officials keep their 
fingers on the pulse of external labour conditions, and endeavour to 
pay not more than the external trade minimum. My hesitation has been 
11  This was incorrect. The ‘Adelaide agreement’, in Bagshaw’s case, included a rate of 6s 6d 
for unskilled labour (Anderson 1939, p. 67).
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chiefly between 7s and 7s 6d; but I put the minimum at 7s, as I do not 
think that I could refuse to declare an employer’s remuneration to be 
fair and reasonable, if I find him paying 7s. (pp. 6–7)
The implication that pursuit of profit—a dubious enough assumption 
for the railways—reduced the relevance of an employer’s wages did not emerge 
in the hearing itself. It was Higgins’ strongly asserted position that the fairness 
and reasonableness of wages was independent of the employer’s profitability. 
At the outset, Duffy sought an order requiring McKay to produce his ‘books’. 
McKay made it easier for Higgins to refuse by conceding capacity to pay, 
and Higgins expressed unwillingness ‘to make a man’s financial position 
known to his competitors’ (transcript, p. 5). But Higgins’ objection was more 
fundamental. When Duffy sought to cross-examine George McKay about 
profits, Higgins again rebuffed him. ‘The idea of the Act’, he said, ‘is to treat 
reasonable and fair wages as a first charge on the receipts whether there are 
profits or not’ (p. 187). He might, perhaps, have argued that the profit motive 
would cause an employer to exploit unduly his bargaining strength in the 
‘higgling of the market’. This was not a view that he put to the parties.
The decisions of wages boards, on the other hand, were a subject of 
repeated comment. The boards were established under Victorian law and 
comprised equal numbers of employers and employees with independent 
chairmen. If, after negotiation, there was an equality of employer and employee 
votes, the chairman exercised a casting vote. Higgins acknowledged, in principle, 
the potential persuasive power of a wages board decision, but only inasmuch 
as an agreed outcome was the result of a bargaining process: ‘… it would be 
a tremendous advantage to me if I could have a wages board determination 
provided it was a joint determination of both employers and employees’ 
(transcript, p. 256). But there was a difficulty. Wages boards established since 
October 1903 were subject to a statutory limitation that precluded them from 
imposing wages above those paid by ‘reputable employers’.12 Moreover, an 
12  Davey (1975, p. 73) writes that the ‘reputable employer’ clause was inserted ‘at labour’s 
request, and the intention was to prevent the boards from fixing a minimum wage which was 
too low’. But ‘it failed to help those it was supposed to protect’.
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appeal lay from a Board decision to a Court of Industrial Appeals comprising a 
Supreme Court judge plus an employer and an employee representative. These 
constraints, in Higgins’ view, reduced the relevance of Board decisions:
I should attach ten times as much importance to a wages board 
determination if it were the concurrent opinion of both sides than I 
would do to the determination of a wages board which is limited by what 
the employers think. Then there is again the other consideration—there 
is the Appeal Court. Under these present circumstances I understand 
the wages board comes to its decision oppressed with the fact that there 
may be an Appeal Court over them which will decide on the evidence 
which is submitted. Now the wages board’s merit, if it has any, is that it 
is composed of men who know the conditions, without evidence, and 
there is an appeal from the men who know to the court that must inform 
itself by evidence, and I, of course, should not be so much helped by the 
wages board decision as I should like. (transcript, p. 256)
The boards were required to enforce at least a living wage, but Higgins perceived 
this as something less than fair and reasonable. ‘Wages boards’, he said, ‘were 
not told to find fair and reasonable conditions of remuneration, and I am’ (p. 
625). The following exchange occurred between Schutt and Higgins:
Mr Schutt: I think six shillings would give [a labourer] the necessaries 
of life.
His Honour: How can you say that when you say you cannot contradict 
the evidence which has been given and the prices as to rent and butchers’ 
meat?
Mr Schutt: All the same, we say a man earning 36s a week can 
live comfortably. On the other hand, I find on the wages board 
determinations over and over again adults over 21 years were given 
various sums ranging from 30 shillings to 36 shillings.
His Honour: Were those boards influenced by the reputable employers’ 
clause mostly?
Mr Schutt: Well, I can find out for Your Honour.
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His Honour: Well, the only thing I can say is that on the evidence I have 
here I should not follow those standards. (pp. 626–627)
The Woodworkers’ Wages Board, to which Higgins referred with approval, had 
been established before October 1903 and was not subject to the ‘reputable 
employers’ clause. Neither was the Furniture Board, which had fixed a labourer’s 
rate of eight shillings. Although Sutch, for some of the unions, urged this rate 
on Higgins (p. 546), it was obviously outside his contemplation.
The answer to the question why Higgins chose seven shillings as the 
labourer’s wage thus combines two elements. One was a determination that 
the Excise Tariff Act 1906 should be the means of enhancing the worker’s 
position—for providing to him a benefit that he was unlikely to achieve by the 
operation of the market. (Whether at that time Higgins envisaged using the 
Court’s award-making role to generalise the Harvester standard is unknown.) 
The other element was a sense that seven shillings was a rate that could not be 
represented as excessive, because a number of employers were already paying 
that amount. Did the ‘cost of living’—the needs of the wage-earner and his 
family—play any role? Perhaps it strengthened Higgins’ resolve to enforce 
an increase. But the link between the seven shillings and living costs was so 
tenuous that nothing more is arguable.
3.2.5 Harvester and the living wage principle
As we saw earlier in this chapter, the goal of a living wage was widely advocated 
in the early decades of the 20th century, and Harvester occurred in that context. 
During the Harvester hearing, Higgins suggested that a mere ‘living wage’ fell 
below the standard at which he should aim:
‘Fair and reasonable’ means something between a good wage and a 
living wage. I think Mr Duffy is right in saying it is not merely on 
what a labourer can live. At the same time I do not think I am entitled 
to refuse a man excise remission if he does not give a good wage. It is 
something between a mere living wage in that sense and a good wage. 
(p. 253)
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In the event, the distinction came to nothing, and in arbitral discourse terms 
such as the basic wage and the living wage were interchangeable. ‘Basic wage’ 
seems to have been coined by Higgins in 1911, with the purely functional 
purpose of identifying the labourer’s wage as a foundation upon which 
secondary wages were superimposed.13 Although ‘basic wage’ became common 
usage in the Court, Powers, as Deputy President, often used ‘living wage’.
In the aftermath of Harvester, as we shall see, Higgins endowed the 
basic wage with a ‘sacrosanct’ quality that was quite at odds with the process 
by which he had arrived at the seven shillings standard. There were three 
fundamental problems with the process:
•	 the subjectivity of the very concept of wage adequacy;
•	 the tenuous connection between the seven shillings and 
identified consumption possibilities; and
•	 the superficiality of Higgins’ attention to family size.
The conceptual inadequacies of the Harvester standard as a measure of 
household needs, combined with the inadequacy of the methods of adjusting 
it to a rising price level, were to lead ultimately to the Piddington Commission 
(see Section 3.6). In fairness, it should be admitted that the circumstances of 
the Harvester case—the limited information, the parties’ narrow agendas, and 
the pressure for an early decision—did not lend themselves to sophistication in 
Higgins’ judgment. If he is to be criticised, it is not so much for the intellectual 
shortcomings of the decision as for his subsequent endeavours to endow it 
with a mystique that its origins and its contents belied.
3.3 the commonwealth basIc wage
3.3.1 The foundation element of award rates
Higgins’ first award, a year after Harvester, was for marine cooks, bakers and 
butchers (2 CAR 65). He adopted the Harvester standard for the lowest grade 
(the sculleryman), making adjustments for the fact that the workers’ ‘keep’ 
13  He used the term in the Engine-Drivers’ and Firemen’s case (5 CAR 9).
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was partially provided by the employer. In the Broken Hill case of 1909, he 
was confronted by evidence that the BHP Company’s mine was becoming 
uneconomic. Higgins deemed the Harvester wage to be inviolable, declaring 
that ‘unless great multitudes of people are to be irretrievably injured in 
themselves and in their families, it is necessary to keep this living wage as a 
thing sacrosanct, beyond the reach of bargaining’ (3 CAR 1, 32). Reinforcing 
his concern about ‘injury’ to the workers and their families was a contention 
that maintaining the living wage was necessary for industrial peace:
I cannot conceive of any such industrial dispute as this being settled 
effectively which fails to secure to the labourer enough wherewith to 
renew his strength and to maintain his home from day to day. He will 
dispute, he must dispute, until he gets this minimum; even as a man 
immersed can never rest until he gets his head above the water. (p. 20)14
The linkage between the wage and the level of unrest was taken for granted. 
It was a further—and unargued—step to suppose that the specific rate for 
unskilled workers set in Harvester was the amount that separated peace from 
turmoil.
It was the repeated stance of Higgins and Powers that the basic wage-
earner should not be called upon to share any burdens of economic adversity, 
although workers receiving additional amounts might be expected to do so. 
This principle accorded with Higgins’ decision of 1909 in the BHP case. But 
it had wider import as prices rose during the war, and the Court held margins 
constant in money terms while increasing the basic wage. Powers, in 1915, 
expounded the principle in patriotic terms:
The war necessarily causes loss and self-sacrifice, and although a worker 
is entitled to claim a living wage in times of war as well as in times 
of peace, and to get it if he can do so by the methods provided by 
Parliament—it is to be hoped that those who are employed in industries 
which cannot afford to pay higher wages for skilled workmen than are at 
14  In A New Province for Law and Order (1922, p. 6), Higgins wrote (in 1915): ‘One cannot 
conceive of industrial peace unless the employee has secured to him wages sufficient for the 
essentials of human existence’.
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present paid—for their own sakes and for the Empire’s sake—will follow 
the example of their fellow-workers in Great Britain and Ireland who, 
although receiving lower wages have, apparently—when convinced that 
the industry cannot pay all they demand—accepted, during the war, 
what can in fairness be paid. By doing so they will help, by their work, 
to keep our industries going—prevent further depression—and bring 
the war to a successful issue at as early a date as possible. … A country 
that pays 8s 6d a day to labourers in time of war—and considers claims 
for increases of such wages in war time—is surely worth fighting for and 
worth some self-sacrifice in time of need. (Tanners and Leather-Dressers’ 
case 9 CAR 209, 211–212)
In 1916, Powers referred to a decision of President Jethro Brown in 
the South Australian Industrial Court, wherein Brown had said that he felt 
justified ‘in expecting even the unskilled worker in time of war to exercise an 
abnormal economy’. ‘In this Court’, said Powers, ‘we do not feel justified in 
forcing abnormal economy on the unskilled worker …’ (Storemen and Packers’ 
case 10 CAR 629, 643). ‘The war’, said Higgins in 1918, ‘causes suffering 
everywhere, deprivation nearly everywhere; and the extra commodities 
purchasable by the secondary wage are not so vital to healthy, fully nourished 
life as the commodities to which the basic wage is to be appropriated. The 
basic wage, which is meant to secure the proper sustenance of the children, the 
future citizens, must be provided at all costs; anything, everything must be cut 
down before the basic wage’ (Coopers’ case 12 CAR 427, 428).
3.3.2 adjustment for rising prices
Until 1912, Higgins made no attempt to review the adequacy of the Harvester 
7s in relation to changing prices. In the Engine-Drivers’ and Firemen’s case 
of 1911, the union claimed a higher wage because of an alleged increase in 
the cost of living. Higgins said that the cost of living was rising, but that the 
evidence did not justify his setting a higher rate in that case; in future he might 
need to take the higher cost of living into account (5 CAR 9, 14; Anderson 
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1929, p. 230). In the Rural Workers’ case of 1912,15 however, he set a minimum 
rate of 8s (6 CAR 61). Late in 1912, the Commonwealth Statistician began 
publication of his first price index, covering food and grocery prices and 
house rentals—the A series index (see Chapter 1, Subsection 1.3.2). In the 
Gas Employees’ case, heard between March and September of 1913, Higgins 
referred to these statistics:
I have found many indications that the minimum of 7s has become too 
low, owing to the increased cost of living; and I have allowed the fact to 
influence my awards; but I have never yet had presented to me, before 
this case, evidence sufficiently specific to show me what the advance 
in the basic wage should be … According to the Commonwealth 
Statistician, the sum of 17s 4d would purchase in Melbourne in 1907 
as much of the necessaries of life as 20s 11d would purchase in 1912. 
From another statement, it appears that, if the year 1911 be taken as the 
normal year, the cost of living in Melbourne has increased from 1907 
to 1913 in the proportion of 922 to 1,111. In other words, 7s in 1907 
were worth as much in Melbourne, in real wages, as 8s 5¼d today. This, 
if taken by itself, would suggest an increase to nearly 8s 6d. (7 CAR 58, 
69)
Higgins set 8s 6d as the daily basic wage for Melbourne. The 
Statistician’s figures also allowed comparisons of the cost of the regimen in 
different places, and Higgins accordingly set specific rates for different capital 
cities. In the Engine-Drivers’ and Firemen’s case, decided in October 1913, he 
set out the comparative costs in the June quarter. The basis of comparison 
was the purchases that could have been made in 1907 with £1, on average 
of the six capital cities. The same items would by June of 1913 have cost 
23s 10d in Sydney, 22s 11d in Adelaide and Perth, 21s 3d in Hobart, 21s 
2d in Melbourne, and 19s 7d in Brisbane (7 CAR 132, 141). In some cases 
thereafter, the Court set differential rates reflective of the estimated costs of 
living, but quite often the relevant parties requested uniform rates, and the 
Court usually complied.
15  Also known as the Fruitpickers’ case.
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Once the publication of the price index had begun, it was the subject 
of frequent reference and discussion. In many cases, evidence was given by 
staff of the Labour and Industry Branch of the Commonwealth Statistician’s 
office, principally J T Sutcliffe, the officer in charge of the Branch. It appears 
from the decisions, moreover, that unions, employers’ representatives and the 
members of the Court freely contacted the office to get its advice about the 
construction and interpretation of the index. The tenor of references to the 
Statistician and his staff was invariably one of respect.
Initially, Higgins took note of the Statistician’s figures, but both he and 
Powers (from 1914) treated them simply as one factor—an important one—
in the set of considerations upon which the decisions were to be based. In 
the Waterside Workers’ case, decided in April 1914, Higgins said that wharf 
labourers ‘clearly belong to the category of unskilled labourers’. Continuing, 
he said:
The cost of living in Melbourne was in 1907, and is still, somewhat 
lower than the Australian average; on the Australian average, the basic 
wage would have been 43s. Taking 43s as the proper basic wage for the 
Australian in the capital cities in 1907, the basic wage should now be 
53s per week.
But the actual conclusion was a little different:
On the whole, and after weighing all the circumstances, I think that with 
the evidence available, and on a comparison with other industries, and 
on a moderate and conservative estimate, the minimum rate per hour 
should be fixed at such a sum as should generally insure for the worker a 
sum of 51s per week, or 8s 6d per day. This is the wage which has been 
found by Heydon, J, in his recent elaborate and valuable inquiry as to 
the cost of living (for the purpose of NSW) to be the proper minimum 
wage for ordinary work … It is also the minimum wage prescribed by 
myself for yardmen in cokeyards in Melbourne in the Gas Employees’ 
case, August 1913, and by the Victorian Coal and Coke Board in the 
determination gazetted 4th December 1913. (8 CAR 53, 64–65)
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Anderson (1929, p. 232) accurately summarises the position: ‘In May, 1914, 
Mr Justice Powers awarded 8s 6d per day to labourers engaged in tanneries. 
At that time the Court was awarding a basic rate of about 8s 6d to labourers 
in Melbourne, Sydney, and Brisbane; and that was about the rate when the 
Great War commenced in August, 1914.’ What had happened, in effect, is 
that ‘Harvester’ had become 8s 6d in lieu of 7s. The increase of 21 per cent 
over the original 7s compares with the 20 per cent rise in the cost of living 
(measured by the A series index) between 1907 and 1914.
Continuing increases in prices, especially in the early years of the war, 
led to a greater reliance on the index. Two important qualifications must be 
borne in mind, however, because they affected significantly the reality of the 
Harvester standard. One is that the basic wage was set when an award was 
made. Awards typically ran for periods of three to five years. The basic wage 
might be increased on application for variation of the award, but not before 
the union could point to a substantial increase in living costs. The other 
qualification is that Higgins and Powers, in responding to price increases, 
exercised discretion in their choice of index numbers. Generally, the choice 
was between the average prices of the previous calendar year and the average 
for the immediately preceding four quarters, with Higgins leaning to the 
former and Powers to the latter. For both reasons, the basic wage in any award 
might be well out of date in respect of living costs. At a time of rising prices, 
this meant a reduction relative to the Harvester equivalent. An example of 
the two effects is provided by Higgins’ decision of July 1915 in the Artificial 
Manure case:
It appears from the most recent publication of the Commonwealth 
Statistician … that in 1907 a sum of 17s 6d in Melbourne would go as 
far in securing groceries, food, and rent, as 22s 1d would go in 1914, 
taking the year as a whole. It also appears that the corresponding figure 
for 1914 in Adelaide is 22s 10d. The basic wage as ascertained and 
found in 1907 for Melbourne was 7s per day; and if that finding was 
correct—there has been no evidence produced to impugn it—the basic 
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wage should not be less than 8s 10d for Melbourne, or less than 9s 1d 
or 9s 2d for Adelaide. Of course, we are now at the end of July, 1915; 
and according to a return furnished by the Commonwealth Statistician, 
the cost of living has, since 1914, been increasing in a startling degree. 
For Melbourne, the Statistician’s figure for the first quarter of 1915 is 
22s 11d; for the second quarter 25s 3d. For Adelaide, the figure for 
the first quarter of 1915 is 23s 2d; for the second quarter 25s 4d. But 
I have to make an award for some years to come (both sides are willing 
that the term should be three years); and as the recent exceptional 
rapidity of the rise in prices seems to be due chiefly to the war and to 
the drought, I think it better to award according to figures for the last 
full year available, 1914. … But, although I do not propose to fix the 
wage on the basis of the cost of living figures for the first half of 1915, I 
have to take these figures as a warning, and therefore I think it right to 
give full effect to the figures for 1914. The strain of present conditions 
must at present be very great for the wage-earners. The Court has always 
power to vary the award; and if prices persistently increase, the union 
may apply for an increase on the basic wage awarded; while if prices go 
down, the employers may apply for a decrease. (9 CAR 181, 189–190)
Higgins fixed the basic wage for Victoria in this award as 53s a week (8s 10d 
a day).
In October 1915, Powers dealt with the first application for an award 
variation based on the increase in the cost of living. This was in the Tanners 
and Leather-Dressers’ case. The award still had 18 months to run. Powers said 
that it was ‘out of the question’ to fix a basic wage by reference to prices in 
the August quarter (the most recent for which figures were to hand). There 
was a likelihood that at least some of the items in the index would return to 
‘normal prices’ by the end of the year because of the breaking of the drought. 
‘This Court’, he said, ‘cannot, in fairness to employers, employees or the 
public, make awards on the figures available for a month or for a few months 
preceding the day the different awards are made—nor can it vary awards from 
time to time because of a temporary change in the cost of food and groceries, 
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or in the cost of living generally. …’ (9 CAR 209, 215). Powers decided, 
‘under all the circumstances mentioned’, to raise the basic wage in the award 
from 8s 6d to 9s.
The continued rise in prices led Higgins in September 1916, in the 
Meat Industry Employees’ case, to fix a Melbourne basic wage of 10s per day. 
This was based on a comparison of the Statistician’s index numbers for 1907 
and 1915. ‘It is true’, said Higgins, ‘that the figures are still higher for the 
present year 1916, so far as it has gone; but I do not think it expedient to act 
on the figures of the latest fraction of a year’ (10 CAR 465, 484). This entailed 
a lag of about 15 months between prices and the wage level. As the award 
ran its course, the interval grew correspondingly. In the early part of 1917, 
Higgins moved to a 10s 6d standard. ‘The cost of living is higher for 1916 
than for 1915’, he said; ‘but even in 1915 the figures would point to about 
10s 5d as the minimum daily wage. I do not see how I could be justified in 
prescribing less than 10s 6d per day, 63s per week’ (Glass Manufacturers’ case 
11 CAR 31, 33). In the following June, Powers refused to adopt the 10s 6d 
standard. In the Engine-Drivers’ case, the union drew his attention to the two 
cases in which Higgins had fixed that rate. There had in recent months been 
some fall in prices. Higgins had acted on the basis of prices for the whole of 
1916. ‘It has been my practice’, said Powers,
to make awards based on the Statistician’s figures available for twelve 
months prior to the award, and not to be guided in making an award 
on any monthly or quarterly figures, and I understood that to be the 
practice of the President, but I see he based his last award on the fact that 
1916 as a whole was higher than 1915 as a whole. The tables supplied 
to me by Mr Sutcliffe satisfy me that awards made on the Statistician’s 
tables for twelve months prior to April 1917 should not (except in the 
case of Perth) be made (if the figures of the Statistician are solely relied 
upon) for more than awards made on the same tables for twelve months 
prior to January 1917, or prior to October 1916, or to July 1916. (11 
CAR 197, 212)
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A reading of decisions between late 1917 and mid-1919 indicates that 
in fixing the basic wage the Court hovered between 10s and 10s 6d. This was 
for Melbourne. For other places, the wage might be higher or lower according 
to the Statistician’s estimates of prices of food and groceries and of house rents.
The adjustment—however crude—of the basic wage to a price index 
raised issues about the reliability of the index. Little was said about the 
collection of the data, perhaps because of the Statistician’s insistence that 
his ‘tables’ measured accurately what they purported to measure. Criticisms 
centred, rather, on two aspects of the index:
•	 it encompassed only prices of food and groceries and house 
rents; and
•	 the regimen of items included in the index was fixed.
The categories excluded from the index were clothing and miscellaneous 
items.16 It was commonly supposed that these represented about 40 per cent 
of the household expenditure of basic wage-earners. The Court’s attitude 
generally was that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it would suppose 
that the index accurately measured the decline in the purchasing power of the 
sovereign; that is, that the prices of items in the excluded categories moved in 
much the same proportions as food and grocery prices and house rents. There 
was ‘a general fall in the value of money in relation to all commodities, in all 
parts of the civilised world, and whether there are wages boards or arbitration 
Courts or not; and the burden lies on the employers to show that the price 
of clothes, furniture, fuel, etc, does not increase in substantially as high a 
ratio as the price of groceries, food, and rent’ (Artificial Manure case 9 CAR 
181, 190). Unless the employers showed otherwise, said Higgins in 1916, ‘I 
must assume that the value of the pound sterling has fallen generally as to the 
commodities of a worker’s family, in the same ratio as it has fallen in relation to 
the Statistician’s selected commodities’ (Merchant Service Guild case 10 CAR 
16  Of course, the regimen did not include all items of expenditure within the categories of 
food and groceries and rent.
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214, 225). He did not discuss the possibility that the prices of the excluded 
items might have risen more than those covered by the index.
Going into more detail, Higgins said in a later case:
Mr Knibbs [the Commonwealth Statistician] has taken food, groceries 
and house rent, and has treated the variations in their prices as best 
showing the variations in the value of money against commodities 
generally; and he has shown good reasons for the course which he has 
taken. These commodities are in steady uninterrupted demand. It is said 
that since the war began the price of clothes has increased in a somewhat 
greater ratio. But the need to purchase clothes is intermittent, irregular, 
casual, controllable. … Several of the ‘miscellaneous’ items have not 
increased at all: for instance, tram fares, union subscriptions, insurance 
premiums, newspapers etc. To my mind, it is better not to disturb the 
Statistician’s careful estimate as to the increase in the cost of living by 
inserting in it incomplete estimates of one’s own as to the increase 
for a portion of the period of some one or more of the miscellaneous 
commodities, not being all of them. (Gas Employees’ case 1919 13 CAR 
437, 457)
There may here have been an implied response to Powers’ decision in the 1918 
Public Service case (discussed below).
The possibility of variations in the composition of household 
consumption was raised by employers as a reason why the basic wage need 
not be increased to the full extent of the increase in prices. In some cases, 
there was the added suggestion that an adjustment of the menu would be a 
reasonable contribution by the wage-earner to the war effort. As we shall see, 
this contention was discussed in some detail in the New South Wales tribunal. 
The Commonwealth Court lent support to it in relation to secondary wages, 
but it had limited impact on the Court’s decisions about the basic wage. In 
the 1916 Clerks’ case (10 CAR 16) the employers tendered a letter from the 
Commonwealth Statistician, who said:
The price-index given in the Labour Bulletin accurately and 
unequivocally expresses the changing value of the sovereign for this 
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particular regimen, and for any regimen sensibly the same. … But I 
may point out that when prices are abnormally high for a particular 
commodity, people diminish the use thereof. … As prices become 
abnormal so will any given regimen cease to represent actual usage; and to 
the extent to which it differs from actual usage, so will it fail to be a true 
indication of the actual cost of living.
Powers, in his decision, noted that pork had gone up 100 per cent since the 
beginning of the war, and that people could fare quite well on other meats and 
foods. He declined to give full effect to the index (Anderson 1929, pp. 236–
237). Discounting of the index was rare, however. In the Meat Workers’ case 
(below), Higgins made plain his rejection of the focus on specific items, such 
as pork, and little more was heard of this. Normally, the index was accepted as 
an accurate measure of the change in the cost of living.
3.3.3 Basic wage principles
In two cases, the principles of basic wage fixation were discussed in more than 
usual depth.
The earlier of the two was the Meat Workers’ case (10 CAR 465). Higgins 
in September 1916 made the first federal award for the meat industry. ‘In this 
case’, he said,
I have welcomed—at last—a rational discussion of the principles on 
which the Court has hitherto ascertained the ‘basic’ wage—(I think the 
name was first given by me)—both as to its elemental factors and as to 
the mode of ascertaining the appropriate variations from time to time. 
On both subjects, Mr Parsons [the KC representing South Australian 
respondents] has very properly referred me to the elaborate and 
interesting pronouncements of Mr Justice Heydon, as reported in the 
New South Wales Industrial Gazette for March 1914, and of the same 
learned Judge, with Mr Justice Edmunds, in their recent consideration 
of the matter on August 18th last. I have also had the advantage of 
reading, since I reserved my judgment, a similar pronouncement 
made by Professor Jethro Brown, as President of the Industrial Court 
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of South Australia, in connexion with the Tinsmiths’ case. Criticism 
is desirable—is essential—on a subject so novel and difficult; and I 
have not seen any other Australian criticism which approaches these 
utterances in value. I am far more surprised at the number of points of 
agreement found in the three several and independent Courts than at 
the points of difference. No Court in Australia … rejects the principle 
of a living wage as an essential first condition in any bargain between 
employer and employee. It is also reassuring to see a consensus of 
opinion as to the need for finding a basic wage, based on the cost of 
living, as distinguished from the secondary wage, based on skill or other 
exceptional qualifications; to find also agreement as to the fundamental 
principles and methods for ascertaining the basic wage; and to find 
even approximately similar results. … I had feared that the difference 
would be greater; for the State tribunals are naturally and—if I may 
presume to say so—properly, influenced by considerations of inter-
State competition—considerations which do not embarrass this Court. 
(p. 475)
The 1907 basic wage had been fixed without the assistance of any 
‘statistician’s tables’. It was, rather, ‘the result of the selected and sifted evidence 
of thrifty and careful housekeeping women whose husbands were wage-
earners’. ‘I recollect’, said Higgins,
that counsel for the union did not propose to call any such evidence 
till I suggested it; and when these witnesses came, without notes or 
preparation, they showed, each in her artless fashion, how every 
shilling, almost every penny, was earmarked for some necessary family 
commodity. … This was my starting point—7s per day in Melbourne; 
though I had doubt whether it should not be 7s 6d. (p. 479)17
17  In A New Province for Law and Order (1922, p. 4), reproducing an essay written in 1915, 
Higgins said: ‘At my suggestion many household budgets were stated in evidence, principally 
by housekeeping women of the labouring class; and, after selecting such of the budgets as 
were suitable, I found that in Melbourne … the average necessary expenditure on rent, food, 
and fuel, in a labourer’s household of about five persons, was £1 12s 5d …; but that, as these 
figures did not cover light, clothes, boots, furniture, utensils, rates, life insurance, savings, 
accident or benefit societies, loss of employment, union pay, books and newspapers, tram or 
train fares, sewing machine, school requisites, amusements and holidays, liquors, tobacco, 
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If my earlier account of Harvester is a fair one, Higgins’ recollection could 
most kindly be characterised as romantic. It is true that Higgins ‘suggested’ 
(‘demanded’ might be the better word) the calling of evidence about the cost of 
living. Three housewives and eight men gave evidence about weekly expenses. 
But, as we have seen, the link between their evidence and the 7s standard was 
tenuous.
Since 1907, prices had risen; and since the outbreak of war, the increase 
had been ‘violent’. But by how much had prices increased? ‘It is at this point’, 
Higgins said, ‘that I make use of the Statistician’s tables; but I make use of 
them as prima facie evidence only’:
The tables purport to show the variations in the purchasing power of 
money, so far as the variations in the prices of his selected regimen, with 
its 47 items, show it. The Statistician does not affect to believe that these 
same staple commodities in the same quantities are purchased always by 
all classes in all localities, or by all families in a class; but he says that 
‘in normal circumstances properly computed index numbers of food 
and groceries and house rent combined form one of the best possible 
measures of those variations in the purchasing power of money which 
affect the cost of living’. … These index numbers do not deal with all 
the commodities purchased by the wage-earning classes, and some of 
the selected commodities may not be purchased by these classes at all; 
but—until the contrary be shown—I infer that the depreciation in the 
value of money which is found in relation to the selected commodities 
is to be found also in relation to the other commodities; that the same 
causes produce the same effects; and the contrary has not been shown. 
(pp. 479–480)
Higgins turned to the possibility of the wage-earners offsetting higher 
living costs by changing the consumption mix. For the basic wage-earner,
a compulsory change of regimen … must mean generally an inferior 
regimen, less sustenance, a failure to satisfy the normal needs of civilised 
sickness or death, religion or charity, I could not certify that any wage less than 42s per week 
for an unskilled labourer would be fair and reasonable.’
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men, a diminution of physical power, a decrease in efficiency; whereas 
a change of regimen on the part of people with larger incomes is not 
likely to have any such result. When it appears, as in this case, that one 
respondent has opened since the war a shop or stall for the sale of ox 
cheek and cuttings off the head, for which he had no market before, but 
which people buy now as meat is so dear, such a fact makes one think. 
… I notice that Mr Justice Powers, in his judgment delivered in the 
Federated Clerks’ case, March, 1916, has spoken as to the necessity of 
changing one’s regimen from things which are dear to things which are 
cheap. He has spoken of the duty of all under present circumstances, 
to make some sacrifices; but he has carefully guarded his words by 
making them apply only to the secondary wage—‘once the living 
wage is secured.’ …Yet even as to the living wage it is always open to 
employers, to prove, if they can, that there is a complete regimen which 
is physiologically as good as the kind contemplated in the calculations 
of the living wage, and which is at the same time cheaper. It is of no use, 
however, to point out merely that there is this or that possible substitute 
for this or that favourite article, and to show that it would be cheaper. 
It is of no use merely to show, for example, that ox cheek is cheaper 
than rump steak or than ribs of beef. I am told that ox cheek is actually 
richer in grammes of protein, but that it has only half as many calories 
as steak—half the fuel value, half the value for energy. If 3,500 calories 
and 125 grammes of protein be required for the worker per day, the 
deficiency must be made up somehow; so that it is idle to compare the 
different regimens except in their totality. But although the Court may 
fairly be asked to revise its conclusions as to the living wage on being 
shown that there is as good a regimen which is cheaper, it must avoid 
the morass of faddism. It must decline to be led into the absurd position 
of deciding between rival theories as to diet—for example, between a 
vegetarian diet and a diet in which animal food is allowed. It must take 
the habits of the people as they are, must refuse to dictate what to eat 
and what not to eat; must accept the practice of thrifty wage-earners’ 
homes—which make economies under pressure of stern necessity, but 
whose bread-winner’s strength has to be renewed from day to day—as 
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affording usually the best practical test as to the suitable regimen. (pp. 
480–481)
Notwithstanding his earlier deference to the evidence of the artless 
housewives, Higgins now postulated that the Harvester standard might be 
‘quite wrong’. It was always open to the parties to show this, and his acceptance 
of the 1907 standard was ‘tentative only’. The subject was ‘too novel, too 
difficult, too formidable in all its consequences, to make that finding of 1907 a 
fundamental dogma’ (pp. 481–482). In this case, the 1907 decision had been 
criticised for the assumption made about the size of the labourer’s family—
‘about five’. The assumption had also been criticised by Mr Justice Heydon 
in the New South Wales tribunal, citing statistics suggesting that the actual 
number of children aged below 14 was fewer than two. ‘But’, said Higgins,
if my judgment in the Harvester case be examined, it will be seen that 
I did not attempt to lay down the average of three as being the actual 
average. … I took the family of ‘about five’ persons as a fair type; just 
as Professor Bowley … takes a family of six (four children) as a fair 
type … As for Australia, the most satisfactory indication of the average 
that I can find is contained in tables furnished by the Commonwealth 
Statistician—furnished since Mr Justice Heydon’s inquiry. In these 
tables, the dependent children in families with incomes under £3 per 
week—and this is the class of families to be observed—the children 
under fourteen years are stated at 2.24 per family. … If we are to be so 
meticulous as is urged, we must take into the estimate of a living wage 
2.24 children; and if we are to provide for the feeding of .24, or one-
quarter of a child, may we not as well provide for the child’s other three-
quarters? … I feel strongly that our problem does not turn on the actual 
average number of dependent children per family—even if the average 
is confined to wage-earners’ families, and at the best wage-earning 
period. The problem is not to find any existing needle in any existing 
haystack, but to find what sum can be most reasonably laid down, in 
the circumstances of the time, as the foundation or basic wage—a wage 
below which employers ought to be forbidden by the state to employ 
its citizens who are labourers. I can only say that I can see no sufficient 
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reason for departing from the hypothetical case of a family of ‘about 
five’ for the purpose of fixing the basic wage. (pp. 482–484)
Anderson (1929, p. 195) drily observed: ‘As most people find it difficult 
to understand what is meant by a family of “about five”, the statement is 
usually made that the Harvester wage was fixed for a family of five, and that 
the Court’s present basic wage is fixed for a family of five.’ As we shall see, the 
issue of family size, as well as being a point of divergence between federal and 
State tribunals, was to be a major topic of consideration in the aftermath of the 
Piddington inquiry. Despite the criticisms, Higgins was given to remarking 
that—whatever might have been said of the price index—the Harvester 7s had 
not been impugned.18
The other decision that stands out for the depth in which the issue 
of basic wage prescription was debated was the Public Service Clerical case, 
decided by Powers in October 1918 (12 CAR 531). The applicant associations 
sought an increase in the basic wage of Commonwealth public servants, then 
£150 per year (9s 7d per day for 313 days). If granted, the increase would be by 
way of a war bonus for a limited term. The Public Service Commissioner and 
other respondents argued that there should be no increase. They contended, 
said Powers,
that public servants were not entitled to any increased basic wage, and 
that we must all recognise the times as abnormal, and submit to them 
in the best way we possibly can. That course is possible to those who 
receive from £300 to £3,000 a year, and the higher the income the easier 
it is to say it, and to do it; but it appears to me unreasonable to expect 
those on the basic wage in the Public Service to quietly submit to the 
greatly increased cost of living without at least applying to get the basic 
wage allowed outside the Public Service. … It is difficult to see how 
a man, his wife and family, can be expected to live on the wage fixed 
before the war. (pp. 535–536)
18  See, for example, the Artificial Manure case (1915) (9 CAR 181, 189), the Glassmakers’ case 
(1917) (11 CAR 31, 34) and the Coopers’ case (1918) (12 CAR 427, 426).
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Powers permitted employers’ federations to participate in the case. They 
argued that no increase in the basic wage beyond 63s per week (10s 6d per 
day) should be granted. This, they said, was the amount to which the pre-war 
wage should be raised to match the increase in the price index.
Powers’ very detailed decision included a long discussion of the level 
and composition of expenditure consistent with living on the basic wage. 
At the risk of oversimplifying this discussion, we can summarise it in the 
following terms. The assumption that food and rent represented about 60 per 
cent of the household’s expenditure was false: on pre-war evidence compiled 
by the Commonwealth Statistician, these items absorbed considerably more. 
This meant that the sum available for other items, including clothing, was 
intolerably low; and this inadequacy had been exacerbated by wartime 
increases in the cost of clothing that exceeded the growth in the price index. 
Powers also listed the items which, in the unions’ contention, the basic wage 
should cover. They included rent, food and groceries, clothing, fuel and light, 
and fares; and also a number of other items such as children’s school requisites, 
lodge and friendly society fees, union dues, a newspaper, maintenance and 
replacement of furniture, crockery and linen, occasional medical attendance 
and children’s dentistry, stamps and stationery, toys, tobacco and drink, and 
some provision for old age. In Powers’ view, the public would not see these 
aspirations as unreasonable.
The great amount of evidence tendered to Powers and his analysis of 
it might perhaps have been the basis of a ‘new start’. Had he moved in that 
direction, his relations with Higgins could well have been strained. In the 
event, he drew back: ‘I do not feel justified as a Deputy President of the Court 
in adopting an entirely new basis for the living wage in making this award at 
the present time’ (p. 546). He would adhere to existing practice and merely 
adjust the wage to the increase in the cost of living, granting a war bonus so 
as to raise the basic rate for married officers to £162 per year (about 10s 4d 
per day).
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At the end of the war, then, the practice of the Court, when making a 
decision about the basic wage, was simply to award an approximation of the 
Harvester standard, with imperfect allowance for the increase in prices.
3.3.4 The call for review
Both Higgins and Powers, however, had for some time been advocating a 
separate inquiry into the living wage. Powers appears to have taken the lead. 
He said in November 1916:
I certainly think that an inquiry should be made as soon as we get back 
to normal times, to ascertain as nearly as possible what a fair living 
wage for a Commonwealth award should be, based on the ordinary 
regimen of a working man and his family and the cost of all of the items 
taken into consideration … The Statistician informs me that it would 
be possible in normal times to ascertain what it does in fact cost an 
average working man and his family of two or three to live in reasonable 
comfort in the Commonwealth … (Storemen and Packers’ case 10 CAR 
629, 644)
‘It is remarkable’, said Higgins in March 1917,
that though an attempt has been made to impugn the soundness of the 
Statistician’s estimate of the change in the cost of living, no attempt has 
yet been made in this or any other case to impugn the soundness of my 
finding in 1907 as to 7s as the proper basic wage in Melbourne in that 
year. … An inquiry on this subject is eminently desirable, now that the 
finding of 1907 has stood for nearly ten years but I cannot force parties 
to an arbitration to undertake the labour of such an inquiry. I hope 
however that some party will exercise his undoubted right to challenge 
the figures as to the existing cost of living. The matter is one of extreme 
importance to the industries of the Commonwealth. (Glass Founders’ 
case 11 CAR 31, 34)
Soon afterwards, Higgins said that an inquiry would resolve issues 
surrounding both the 1907 decision and the measurement of price movements 
(Gas Employees’ case 11 CAR 267, 277). In the Engine-Drivers’ and Firemen’s 
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case, decided in June 1917, Powers gave as an additional reason for holding an 
inquiry the differences in the living wages fixed by the Commonwealth and 
State tribunals: the inquiry ‘should enable all the Courts to have a common 
basis on which uniform awards would be possible’ (11 CAR 197, 219). In the 
Public Service case of 1918, discussed above, he referred to the necessity for 
the Court ‘to reconsider the assumptions as to the percentages of expenditure, 
on which awards have, up to the present, been made; unless that is avoided 
by a full inquiry by a Commission, or by the Statistical department, on the 
questions: What sum should be fixed as a Federal living wage? Including (1) 
What average family should be allowed for; (2) What items of expenditure 
should be allowed in fixing a basic wage; (3) What proportion each item of 
expenditure approved of bears to the total sum suggested as a living wage’ (12 
CAR 531, 538). Powers said in the same case:
At the conclusion of the evidence the representative of the Acting Public 
Service Commissioner, the representative of the Employers Federation 
of Victoria and NSW, and the representative of the seven unions now 
before the Court, joined in urging that the Federal Government should 
appoint a Commission or some body to take evidence with a view to 
fixing a Federal living wage for a man, his wife, and family of three, 
on a scientific and humane basis, or to authorise the Commonwealth 
Statistician to do so. The President of this Court and I have, on more 
than one occasion, recommended that course to the Federal Government 
because we know that men, although they obey awards, feel that they are 
not getting more than a wage on which they can exist … (pp. 542–543)
Higgins and Powers, in 1919, made further calls for an inquiry. In July, 
for example, Powers said:
I again make the suggestion [for a Royal Commission] because I feel 
sure the discontent that is existent here, and in other countries, can only 
be removed by removing the cause. Prosecutions and imprisonment of 
employers or employees are necessary if they by illegal actions starve 
the community and violate the laws of the country, but the only real 
remedy is to remove the cause of the discontent wherever possible.
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I also do so because I am not satisfied that the basic wage is a living 
wage within the meaning placed on it by this Court before the war. 
… No one who has any knowledge of the subject could make himself 
believe that £3 a week would allow a man and his wife and family of 
three to live up to the standards mentioned at the present prices of food, 
clothing and rent. (Carters and Drivers’ case 13 CAR 214, 239)
In September, Powers said that ‘the President of the Court has, and 
so have I, on several occasions publicly protested against having to continue 
to go on with the work of the Court without information obtained by an 
Inquiry Board or Commission (sometimes called a living wage inquiry) as to 
the reasonable needs of a man and his wife and family in these times …’ (AWU 
case 13 CAR 563, 582–583).
3.4 the lIvIng wage In state trIbunals
In the formative years of arbitration, the State tribunals played some part in 
the development of wage-fixing principles, including those pertaining to the 
basic or living wage. Some of the State Acts, in fact, enshrined the concept 
in one way or another, whereas no such recognition was to be found in the 
Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 (Burns 1926, p. 300). 
New South Wales and South Australia were the States where the tribunals 
gave fullest consideration to the principle. There was, of course, no formal 
mechanism for consultation between tribunals—that did not come until 
the 1970s. But tribunal members read the decisions that emerged in other 
jurisdictions and, from time to time, commented on them.
The New South Wales counterpart of Higgins was Mr Justice Heydon. 
I have previously referred to Heydon’s observations of 1905 about the 
desirability of equating the minimum wage with a living wage. Heydon did 
not then attempt to measure the living wage. In 1908, the structure of the 
New South Wales system was altered. Under the new structure, the primary 
power of wage-setting rested with Boards. Their decisions, however, were 
subject to appeal. (A further, less fundamental, restructure occurred in 1912.) 
F A A Russell, the Chairman of 11 Industrial Boards, said in 1914:
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It must be a function of the Court of Appeal to co-ordinate the work 
of the Boards and to regulate them; if the Boards make mistakes and 
fix minimum wages too high the appeal is to the Court—in the New 
South Wales system this heavy responsibility has been placed almost 
altogether upon the patient shoulders of a single indefatigable judge—
and the Court has power to reduce any minimum wages that may have 
been unduly increased as well as to level up any that have been kept too 
low. (Russell 1915, pp. 344–345)
The ‘indefatigable judge’ was Heydon. In 1914, he reviewed 60 awards made 
by Industrial Boards between 1912 and 1914, finding that the minimum rate 
set by them was typically 8s per day (Sawkins 1933, p. 15). ‘This’, he said, ‘is 
the first inquiry of any extent carried out by any arbitral tribunal in order to 
fix a living wage of general application in the State’ (Board of Trade (NSW) 
1918, p. 4). The Boards had spent much time in trying to apply the Harvester 
standard to the circumstances of the cases before them. ‘Accordingly, the 
opportunity afforded by an appeal from an award was taken, and this inquiry 
was begun’ (p. 16). What was required was ‘an authoritative declaration as to 
the basic or living wage in New South Wales, together with the ascertainment 
of some method (if such can be found) of raising or lowering it with the rise 
or fall in the cost of living’ (p. 5).
Heydon reviewed the Harvester decision and rejected it. His feeling was 
‘that I cannot safely take the Harvester wage as a starting point, and that the 
living wage must be sought by an independent inquiry’ (p. 24). One ground 
for rejection was Higgins’ assumption of a family containing three children. 
The Commonwealth Statistician had supplied information, based on the 
1911 census, showing that the average number of children was less than two. 
Knibbs had also in 1911 made a survey of household food expenditures, 
which indicated that Higgins’ allowance for food was excessive (pp. 18–19). 
Heydon’s commentary on the evidence given in Harvester shows that he had 
not read the transcript and was too charitable to Higgins:
The means thus provided, after three years, by the Commonwealth 
Statistician, of testing the figures for food expenditure of the Harvester 
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witnesses, to my mind throws serious doubt upon them. Certainly … 
the nine group have the advantage of having been called, and subjected 
to cross-examination, and seen by the Court, and it seems evident that 
they were (as, in my experience, such witnesses nearly always are) worthy 
wives and mothers, whose recital in Court of their household cares and 
troubles moves both sympathy and respect. On the other hand they 
are but nine, and living in one spot. The strongest and best feelings of 
their natures, their love for their husbands and children, their regard 
for the opinion of their neighbours, their loyalty to their class, appeal 
to them to make their evidence as strong as possible—for I can feel no 
doubt that they knew the object of the hearing, and it had probably 
been frequently discussed. Then they were open to selection. When the 
managers of the case knew that heavy budgets would help them while 
light budgets would injure them, can it be doubted which they would 
choose? (pp. 20–21)
The evidentiary basis of Harvester was weaker than this passage implies, but 
Heydon’s criticisms were justified.
Heydon himself received much evidence about household budgets. The 
unions had put a great deal of effort into collecting it. ‘This’, said Heydon, ‘was 
really valuable material’. Having said that, he went on to make a fundamental 
criticism of the reliance on actual expenditures to identify needs:
The weakness of the evidence, so far as it was weak, lay in the nature 
of the method of investigation by ascertaining actual expenditure. It 
is quite evident that when a living wage is sought, the mere fact that a 
witness spends, say, £3 a week, proves nothing. If such a fact proved that 
£3 a week was a living wage, the same method might equally prove that 
£2, or £4, or £10 a week was a living wage. Nothing was brought out 
more clearly in this inquiry than the fact that nearly all the witnesses 
simply lived according to their income, whatever it might be. Of several 
of them the wage had gone up or down, or the rent had been raised, 
or a child had begun to earn money, quite recently. The expenditure 
immediately expanded or contracted as the case might be. … The real 
question is one of standard. One has to ask one’s self whether the family 
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life as disclosed exhibits hardship which should not be tolerated, or falls 
below what should be guaranteed to the humblest class, and in fixing 
the standard one has to bear in mind that it is not a thing which is 
stationary, and if it has risen the wage should rise too. (pp. 41–42)
The point seems self-evident. And yet it seems commonly to have eluded 
tribunals, advocates and researchers; the equation of needs with actual 
expenditure recurs across the 20th century.
Notwithstanding the breadth and depth of his inquiry, however, 
Heydon arrived at a superficial endorsement of the existing standard, which 
was below the Harvester equivalent. ‘I know of no case’, he said, ‘in which 
the [Commonwealth] Court has made an inquiry as full as the present, and 
I think that I should not hesitate to express what seems to me to be its true 
lesson. That is, that the living wage in Sydney, for the average family of two 
parents and two dependent children, is not more than £2 8s per week’ (p. 
60). The Commonwealth Court’s basic wage was then typically £2 11s—itself 
below the true Harvester equivalent.
Heydon did not leave the matter there. His task was to recommend a 
minimum wage to the boards. The times, he said (without citing any evidence), 
were prosperous, and the wage-earner ‘should have his share in prosperous 
times’. That would happen in a labour market unregulated by Courts, and 
regulation should not deprive the worker of a benefit that he might otherwise 
have enjoyed. An adjustment might be made on either of two bases: (1) an 
upward revision of the notions of adequacy underlying the determination of 
the living wage; or (2) simply paying more than the living wage. Heydon 
chose the latter:
it might be said that as prosperity increases the standard of living rises 
and carries the living wage with it. This would be true, but I do not 
think it is well to call what may be a mere temporary change, which 
may last for only a few years, a change of standard. To my mind, that 
expression should be limited to change of a more fixed and permanent 
character, such as become generally accepted as necessary conditions; 
such, for instance, as the adoption of footwear, both boots and stockings, 
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a change not yet, I think, quite universal in the case of children. This is 
very different from the changes wrought by a wave of prosperity, and to 
my mind (though I can understand others taking a different view) it is 
better to keep the two things separate, and to have the true living wage 
in sight, even when one departs from it … (p. 61)
Heydon’s recognition of the relativity of ‘needs’ was, for the time, an interesting 
but isolated one. He suggested to the boards that unskilled workers in Sydney 
should receive for light work 8s 6d per day, for ordinary work 8s 9d and for 
heavy work 9s (p. 62). The prosperity component raised the living wage to, or 
above, the Commonwealth standard. He offered no solution to the need for 
‘some method (if such can be found) of raising or lowering it with the rise or 
fall in the cost of living’.
By the time of the next determination of a minimum wage—December 
1915—the country was at war and there was serious inflation. Heydon said 
that he and Mr Justice Edmonds had decided, for no explicitly stated reason, 
that the minimum wage should be £2 12s 6d. They were unwilling simply to 
raise the wage to match the increased prices:
As to the great variations shown by Mr Knibbs’ tables, in the purchasing 
power of the sovereign, they are in themselves too violent, and their 
causes too obscure, and their future course too uncertain to enable 
us to rely upon them at this time, even if the war and the course of 
events should not make it necessary in some cases to abandon their use. 
However, beyond what we have said we cannot go; the prospect is too 
dark and difficult to permit us to attempt any conclusive determination. 
(p. 66)
In August 1916, the Court—Heydon sitting with Edmonds—issued 
a new judgment, far more expansive than that of the previous December. 
Referring to the 1914 decision, Heydon said that the prosperity component had 
fallen into abeyance. Much of the 1916 decision was a discussion of the weight 
to be accorded to the increase in prices, as reported by the Commonwealth 
Statistician. There were three subjects of discussion: (1) the meaningfulness of 
the statistics as a measure of the increase in the cost of living; (2) the causes of 
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the rise in prices; and (3) the appropriateness of maintaining real wages during 
the war.
The point at issue in relation to (1) was the household’s ability to counter 
the effects of higher prices by altering the composition of its consumption 
toward goods and services that had become relatively cheaper. Of course, there 
was no measurement of this effect, but Heydon put it forward as a reason for 
not automatically adjusting the wage to the value of the sovereign.
As to (2), he considered three causes of the inflation. One was the 
expansion of the Commonwealth note issue. This was ‘a war tax; and should 
not every man pay his own taxes? Is taxation which is deliberately imposed 
upon the whole community to be converted by the Court into double taxation 
upon a part of the community?’ (p. 73). The other two causes were ‘slow 
working’ and strikes. Heydon seized the opportunity to condemn these 
nefarious labour practices—the work of ‘saboteurs’:
Conscience, country, and God appear to be all alike repugnant to them. 
The real parents of such doctrines, as stupid as they are abominable, 
seem to be hatred, envy, fraud, and laziness; feelings directly opposite to 
the manly and upright instincts which mankind has in all ages admired. 
(p. 75)19
But in the final analysis, Heydon ascribed to the war itself his refusal to 
compensate for higher prices:
The main circumstance, however, which we have to consider is that 
we are at war, and we have determined to admit that fact alone as a 
modifying circumstance, and setting aside the questions hereinbefore 
discussed, of paper money, slow work, and strikes. We have repeatedly 
said that the war, in all its portentous magnitude, cannot be disregarded 
by us in considering at what the living wage should be fixed. It is 
impossible to define the living wage in terms which make it inelastic. All 
such seducing words, as ‘fair’ and ‘reasonable’, are essentially relative, 
and introduce existing circumstances into the problem. (p. 78)
19  Graham (1995, p. 77) describes the criticism that Heydon, a Catholic, made of Archbishop 
Mannix’s opposition to conscription.
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The decision was to fix the sum of £2 15s 6d as the living wage to 
be incorporated in new awards. Existing awards would be reopened, and the 
living wage in those awards be raised to £2 14s. No explanation of either 
amount was given, other than the fact that ‘an application of the method 
adopted by Mr Justice Higgins in the Artificial Manures case on the 20th July 
last year … would show a smaller wage than [£2 15s. 6d] by 1s 8d per week’ 
(p. 82). (Higgins’ ‘method’ was to set a basic wage equivalent to the Harvester 
7s, adjusted for the increase in prices up to the average of the previous calendar 
year.)
No new declaration of the living wage was made until September 1918. 
By then, the Industrial Arbitration Act had committed this function to the 
newly established Board of Trade. The Board was required from year to year to 
make ‘public inquiry into the increase or decrease in the average cost of living’ 
with a view to then declaring living wages (p. 113). Heydon, as President, sat 
with four Commissioners representing employers and employees. The Board 
began its reasoning with the 1914 declaration, ‘taking the last two quarters 
of 1913 as the period covered by the living wage inquiry, and following the 
practice of the Court of Industrial Arbitration of taking the present figure at 
the average of the last four quarters, in this case up to 30th June, 1918 …’ (p. 
114). J T Sutcliffe, who gave evidence, had applied the formula to calculate a 
living wage of £2 18s 5d, which would normally be rounded to £2 18s 6d. The 
employers argued that the proper basis for the calculation was not the wage 
set in 1914, which included the prosperity supplement, but the lesser amount 
identified as the cost of living. The Board disagreed:
It is true that the investigation of the material then before the Court 
brought out a cost of living of about £2 6s 6d, but the Court did not 
accept that result; for various reasons which may be gathered from the 
judgment, it added 1s 6d to that figure, and treated the resulting £2 8s 
as showing the cost of living, and as pointing to a living wage of the 
same amount.
In fact, the Board decided to grant more than £2 18s 6d because of the 
abnormality of ‘the times’:
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In a general way everyone complains of the increase in the cost of 
living, though even more money seems to be spent than ever before. 
Whether this is permanent, or whether the close of the war or anything 
else will end it, we cannot possibly say. It is true that everyone ought 
to economise and avoid waste as much as possible; but still we think, 
under the very special circumstances of the present time, and for the 
present time only, that something might be done for the lowest class 
of workers. We deal only with the living wage and nothing else, and as 
we have to consider it every year we are able to take short views … We 
find that the living wage proper is £2 18s. 6d. per week, but we add to 
it (for the living-wage workers only, and until our next inquiry only) 
another 3d per day, making the minimum wage … £3 0s 0d per week. 
(pp. 120–121)
Thus the Board added a ‘loading’ to a standard that was itself above the ‘cost 
of living’ identified in 1914, the combined addition being of the order of 5 
per cent.
In October 1919, the Board (presided over by Edmunds as Acting 
President) discussed a union claim for the living wage to be related to the 
needs of a family comprising a man, a wife, and three children, as in the 
Federal Court’s decisions. The Board refused:
If the number of dependent children, three, adopted by Mr Justice 
Higgins in the Harvester case of 1907, was not taken by him because 
it was presumed to be an average, it is impossible for the Board to say 
upon what grounds it was taken. The statistical inquiry into the subject 
shows that, as an average for this State, that number is wrong. The 
Board finds that during the past year this average number of dependent 
children is under two. (Compendium … 1921, p. 11)
This finding was based on analysis (by the Commonwealth Statistician) of the 
1911 census. Although there was no evidence about subsequent demographic 
change, the long-term trend in dependency was one of decline: in 1881, there 
were 2.41 children under 15 years of age per married, widowed, or divorced 
male; by 1911, the number was 1.75 (p. 16).
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The Board fixed a living wage of £3 17s. The increase of 17s exceeded 
the rise in the index and was explained by the Board’s taking into account 
evidence about the actual costs of fuel and light, clothing and boots, and other 
miscellaneous items. Alarmed by the amount of the increase, the New South 
Wales Government announced a scheme whereby the living wage would be set 
for a man and wife only. Payments related to the number of children would be 
made from a fund into which employers would pay amounts determined by 
the numbers of employees. The scheme was not approved by Parliament (Burns 
1926, pp. 328–329). A similar measure would be proposed by Piddington in 
1920 (see Subsection 3.6.7).
The following is a comparison of the declared living wages in New South 
Wales and the amounts generally being prescribed by the Commonwealth 
Court for Sydney (the latter being, for various reasons, approximate):
Thus in the years 1915–18 the Commonwealth basic wage exceeded its 
New South Wales counterpart. Although an even larger difference might be 
‘explained’ by different assumptions about family size, it is questionable whether 
this was the essence of the matter. Rather, the New South Wales Court seemed 
to regard the Harvester standard as an excessive impost on employers, and 
found an easy justification for rejecting it in Higgins’ ostensible assumption 
of three children. The 1919 New South Wales decision was a rather radical 
departure from previous practice.
In South Australia, under the terms of the Factories Act 1907, a Court 
of Industrial Appeals was appointed to hear appeals from the wages boards. 
Mr Justice Gordon, hearing an appeal from the Brushmakers Board in 1908, 
said that the Court had no power to vary a Board decision without securing 
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a living wage to the workers affected (Anderson 1929, p. 213). Unlike the 
Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904, the South Australian 
Industrial Arbitration Act 1912 formally defined the ‘Living Wage’: it would be 
a sum ‘sufficient for the normal and reasonable needs of an average employee 
living in the locality where the work under consideration is done …’ (Burns 
1926, p. 301). Regular reports of Court decisions date from 1916, when the 
Court was constituted by Mr President Jethro Brown (formerly Professor of 
Law at Adelaide University). As in the Commonwealth jurisdiction, decisions 
about the living wage in South Australia were made in the context of specific 
cases.
Brown, like Higgins, Powers, and Heydon, was given to articulating 
his views about the principles underlying the prescription of a living wage. 
In the Salt case of 1916 (1 SAIR 1, 6, cited by Anderson 1929, p. 214), he 
declared that the living wage must be based on the normal and reasonable 
needs of a married man with a wife and children to support, and that the 
higher comfort of living and the higher standard of social conditions which 
the general community in Australia allowed to those who lived by labour had 
also to be taken into consideration. In the Tinsmiths’ case of 1916, he said 
that it was ‘natural that I should pay considerable deference to awards of the 
Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration’, but proceeded to 
criticise the Commonwealth Statistician’s price index, which should be used 
with caution (1 SAIR 55, 57, 63, cited by Anderson 1929, pp. 207 and 234). 
Brown also felt justified ‘in expecting even the unskilled worker in time of 
war to exercise an abnormal economy’ (cited by Powers, with disapproval, in 
the Storemen and Packers’ case 10 CAR 629, 643; see below). In 1918, Brown 
said that while it had been held by the Court that a living wage must be paid 
even if it involved the closing down of particular industries, ‘when we come 
to interpret “living wage” in precise figures, we must remember that it must 
be a wage which is reasonable under all the conditions of the community 
or locality where it is prescribed’ (Storemen and Packers’ case, 2 SAIR 111, 
116–117, cited by Anderson 1929, p. 193).
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Brown also advocated the creation of machinery for fixing an Australian 
living wage. Dealing in 1919 with the assumptions underlying the male (as 
opposed to the female) living wage, he said:
The family living wage is assessed on the assumption that the husband 
requires no ‘skill’, and that the general conditions in the industry in 
which he works are such that no conclusive ground can be alleged for 
fixing a primary minimum which is higher than the bed-rock wage. But 
the Court has to assume, for practical and quite irresistible reasons, that 
the man may have children. He may have none. He may have six under 
14 years of age. The Industrial Court cannot base its calculations on the 
abnormal. As a matter of fact, this Court proceeds on the assumption 
that the wage-earner will, or may have, three children under 14 years of 
age. (Women’s Living Wage (Cardboard Box Makers’) case, 3 SAIR 11 at 
26–27, cited by Anderson 1929, p. 214)
Higgins and Powers from time to time referred to State decisions. I 
referred in the previous section to Higgins’ reliance in the Waterside Workers’ 
case of 1914 (8 CAR 53, 65) on a recent decision of Heydon to justify a daily 
basic wage of 8s 6d. There was a hint of self-congratulation in a comment by 
Higgins, referring to Victoria, in the Artificial Manure case of 1915:
The Court of Industrial Appeals, on an appeal from the Wages Board 
… reduced the 51s to 48s … but it is now made clear and well 
recognised that the cost of living, with the resulting pressure on the 
poor, had already risen to an unexpected height. The decision on appeal 
very nearly produced a strike; but such an extreme measure was averted 
because this federation of Victorian and South Australian chemical 
workers had been formed, and the men hoped for relief from this 
Court. The federation, though formed as early as December 1912, was 
registered on the 19th September 1913, just ten days after the decision 
of Hodges J. (9 CAR 181, 185)
In the 1916 Meat Workers’ case, Higgins both reflected upon the 
gratifyingly small differences between federal and State wages and defended 
his three-child household against the criticisms of Heydon and Edmunds. 
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Powers, in the Storemen and Packers’ case of 1916 (10 CAR 629), rejected an 
employer proposal that he adopt the various State living wages rather than 
impose a higher basic wage commensurate with the movement of prices. 
The issue, he said, had been discussed so thoroughly by Higgins in the Meat 
Workers’ case that he did not need to deal with it in detail. He noted that the 
New South Wales Court provided for only two children (p. 642). Moreover, he 
referred to Jethro Brown’s suggestion that even the living wage-earner should 
exercise ‘abnormal economy’ in time of war. ‘In this Court’, he said, ‘we do not 
feel justified in forcing abnormal economy on the unskilled worker’ (p. 642). 
Powers continued:
It is my duty as deputy president of this Court … to adopt so far as I 
can the principles laid down from time to time by this Court, instead of 
causing unrest and confusion by following judgments of other Courts 
based on different principles. It is easy for me to do so because, if equally 
free to adopt any one of the three principles on which the living wage 
was fixed (a) by this Court, (b) by the New South Wales Court, or (c) 
by the South Australian Court, I would adopt the one laid down by this 
Court in 1907 and since followed. (p. 644)
Powers, in 1917, referred to differences in minimum wages as an 
additional ground for the appointment of an inquiry into the basis wage:
The Industrial Courts in Victoria, New South Wales, South Australia, 
and Western Australia award less for a labourer’s wage than this Court 
does, while the Industrial Court in Queensland—where the Statistician 
shows the cost of living is less than in New South Wales or Victoria 
in the latter part of 1916—awarded, in some cases, higher rates to 
labourers than this Court awarded in 1916 to employees in New South 
Wales and Victoria as a labourer’s wage. The Queensland Court by a 
late Act cannot fix less than a reasonable wage for a man, his wife, and 
three children. … [The] result of an inquiry such as is suggested should 
enable all the Courts to have a common basis on which uniform awards 
would be possible. The position caused by the divergent views expressed 
by the Commonwealth and State Courts as to a basic wage … is not 
in the public interest, nor in the interests of industrial peace. … The 
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difficulty might, I think, be met to some extent by a conference of the 
presidents of the Commonwealth and the State Industrial Courts to 
see if some common basis could be found upon which awards could be 
made pending the inquiry mentioned. (Engine-Drivers’ and Firemen’s 
case 11 CAR 197, 218–219)
Powers wrote to like effect in the Public Service case of 1918 (12 CAR 531, 
543–544).
Higgins, in the Gas Employees’ case of 1919, returned to the question of 
family size and his disagreement with Heydon:
It is enough for my present purpose to say that I still follow the general 
practice of sociological inquirers of looking for the expenditure of a 
labourer’s home of ‘about five persons’; whereas Mr Justice Heydon 
looks for the expenditure of a house of four persons two children. The 
statistical returns which the learned Judge used were not limited to the 
wage-earning classes or to definite ages; and yet it is well known that the 
proportion of dependent children in the wage-earning classes is greater 
than in the middle classes. Since my decision in the Butchers’ case there 
has appeared a book written by Mr Seebohm Rowntree, ‘The Human 
Needs of Labour’; and his investigation has confirmed me in my view. 
The families were all the families of all classes, in the city of York, where 
the mother was between 40 and 45. All children over fourteen were 
ignored. Mr Rowntree finds finally ‘that if we were to base minimum 
wages on the human needs of families with less than three children, 80 
per cent of the children of fathers receiving the bare minimum wage 
would for a shorter or longer period be inadequately provided for, and 
72 per cent of them would be in this condition for five years or more.’ 
He even recommends a scheme whereby the State should supplement 
the minimum in the case of larger families. But, as between employer 
and employee, I do not put on the employer any obligation to pay a 
basic wage calculated on more than three dependent children. (13 CAR 
437, 458)
In December 1919, in the AWU case (13 CAR 823), Higgins attempted 
a more detailed critique of the Board of Trade’s decision. It went essentially 
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to two issues—the implicit allowance for clothing and miscellaneous items, 
and family size. We need not follow Higgins in revisiting the latter. As to the 
former, the Board’s discussion had some resonance with that of Powers in the 
1918 Public Service case. Using the Statistician’s index as a measure of the 
rate of increase of all prices entailed the assumption that, taken together, the 
excluded components of expenditure—clothing and miscellaneous—moved 
at the same proportional rate as the included items. The Board thought that 
it had evidence that the excluded items had in fact risen substantially more. 
Hence, a wage that reflected only the rate of increase of food, groceries, and 
rent would provide for a diminished level of overall consumption. It increased 
the living wage by 3s in recognition of the increased cost of fuel and light and 
14s for clothing ‘The Commonwealth Statistician’, said Higgins
for various sound reasons which he has repeatedly stated, has treated 
food groceries and house rent as giving the best practical test of the 
variations in the purchasing power of money generally. The demand for 
food and shelter is universally continuous, always urgent; the demand 
for clothing is of a very different character. There is a marked difference 
between casual expenditure and constant. Taking food groceries and 
house rent as constituting about 60 per cent of the worker’s expenditure, 
it may fairly be assumed, until the contrary be shown, that for the 
remaining 40 per cent the value of the shilling has fallen to an equivalent 
degree; but if we lift clothing out of the ‘miscellaneous’, we should make 
sure that the other ‘miscellaneous’ expenses, of the same casual, unstable 
character—such as on furniture and pots and cups, medical attendance, 
etc—have been similarly examined, and for the same period, on the 
same basis. (p. 840)
A reading of Higgins’ decision leaves an impression of resentment of any 
other wage-setter who seemed to be ‘taking the lead’ in the development of 
principles and policy. That impression is not allayed by his assurance that, 
notwithstanding his criticisms, he held ‘in genuine respect the great efforts 
which the Board has made, and the light which it has focused on one of the 
most difficult problems presented to our industrial tribunals’ (p. 843).
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3.5 summary: the basIc wage from 1907 to 1919
The idea of a living wage, appropriate for the unskilled male labourer, was a 
key component of wage prescription in these formative years of arbitration. 
In one way or another, the tribunals came to treat the living wage as the 
foundation amount of award wages. But there were various unresolved issues. 
These were the product of a range of factors: reliance on lawyers who lacked 
experience and training in broader social science; the rudimentary state of 
statistics; techniques of wage-setting that were ill-adapted to rapid change 
in the economic and social environment; lack of coordination between the 
various tribunals; war; and inflation. Foremost among the issues were:
•	 the definition of the standard of adequacy;
•	 the elasticity of that standard in times of economic change;
•	 the nature of the family unit for which the living wage was 
intended to provide;
•	 the measurement of price changes; and
•	 the method of adjustment for changing prices.
These were the essential questions confronted by the Piddington 
Commission.
3.6 the pIddIngton challenge
3.6.1 Background to the inquiry20
Powers and Higgins, as we have seen, had since 1916 been advocating an 
inquiry into the basic wage. Their statements were generally vague about its 
subject matter. It would, in fact, be a mistake to see them as the major reason 
for the appointment of a Royal Commission, for there is no evidence that the 
federal government took notice of them. Much greater importance attaches to 
the industrial and political circumstances of the later war years, and the first 
year of peace, and the Arbitration Court’s failure in practice to maintain the 
basic wage at even the Harvester standard. Worker discontent with the reduced 
20  In writing this subsection, I have drawn freely on Graham (1995) and Whillier (1977).
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purchasing power of the wage was certainly a factor in the thinking of Prime 
Minister Hughes.
The years 1917–19 were turbulent. Early consensus about the war had 
eroded and the issue of conscription was especially divisive. An important 
by-product was the splitting of the Labor Party, with one segment, led by 
W M Hughes, entering into a National Government and the remainder going 
into Opposition. Great bitterness surrounded the shattering of political Labor. 
Industrial discontent was evident in a higher incidence of time lost through 
strikes, relative to the size of the labour force, than at any other stage of the 20th 
century. There was a decline in support for arbitration, and left-wing union 
leaders denounced Higgins (Whillier 1977, p. 10). Undoubtedly, ideology 
played an important part, with the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) 
encouraging union militancy. If the IWW’s influence was diminishing by the 
end of the war, the events of 1917 in Russia maintained a fear of industrial 
disorder in other countries, including Australia. Although these extraneous 
forces were widely seen as causes of the strikes, there was also a measure of 
acceptance of the ‘fertile ground’ thesis: that the readiness of workers to be 
led into militant action was due significantly to real grievances, especially 
inadequacy of wages.21
Hughes, with his union and Labor background, sympathised with 
this interpretation of events. And he was anxious to do what he might to 
reduce strikes. (This brought him into headlong conflict with Higgins, who 
saw Hughes’ methods, including the making of concessions to strikers and 
the establishment of special tribunals, as disruptive of the Arbitration Court’s 
orderly approach.) He lent a sympathetic ear to a union delegation that waited 
on him shortly before the 1919 election—the first since the Labor ‘split’. The 
delegation sought an inquiry into the basic wage. Hughes told them that the 
Government had already considered the question and was prepared to appoint 
21  A view endorsed by the New South Wales Board of Trade in its Living Wage Declaration 
of 8 October 1919: ‘… interesting details were furnished of devices resorted to by housewives 
to readjust their method of living to higher costs, and anyone engaged in investigations of 
this kind is forced to the conclusion that the constant increase in the cost of commodities has 
become the most prolific source of industrial ferment’ (Board of Trade (NSW) 1921, p. 33).
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an inquiry. It would be constituted of employer and employee representatives, 
who would choose their own chairman (Whillier 1977, pp. 26–27). It is 
possible that Hughes, recently returned from the Peace Conference, was 
influenced by the support for joint consultation prevalent in the United 
Kingdom under the banner of Whitleyism. Not only did he promise an 
inquiry; he also told the delegation: ‘I am asking for power to deal with all 
industrial matters and this minimum wage, once we get it, will apply to all 
wage-board people and to everybody else. They will all have to come under it’ 
(Whillier 1977, p. 28). Here he foreshadowed the ‘Powers Referendum’ that 
was held concurrently with the election of 13 December 1919. This, if it had 
succeeded, would have given the Commonwealth a general power to regulate 
the terms of employment.22
In his policy speech of 30 October 1919, Hughes said that ‘the cause of 
much of the industrial unrest, which is like fuel to the fires of Bolshevism and 




direct action, arises with the real wages of the worker’. The Government was 
appointing a Royal Commission:
The Commission will be fully clothed with power to ascertain what is 
a fair basic wage and how much the purchasing power of the sovereign 
has been depreciated during the war; also how the basic wage may be 
adjusted to the present purchasing power of the sovereign, and the best 
means when once so adjusted of automatically adjusting itself to the 
rise and fall of the sovereign. The Government will at the earliest date 
create effective machinery to give effect to these principles. … The 
fundamental question of the basic wage having been thus satisfactorily—
because permanently—settled, there remain other causes of industrial 
unrest which must be dealt with … (Royal Commission 1920, pp. 7–8)
If there was no explicit promise to adopt the Royal Commission’s 
findings and recommendations, such a commitment was surely implied.
Hughes had, no doubt, a political purpose. But his view about the need 
for action to alleviate the grievances that contributed to industrial discontent 
was strongly held. In January 1920 he received an employer delegation which 
sought (unsuccessfully) changes in the letters patent of the Royal Commission. 
According to the record of that meeting, which Whillier has extracted from 
the archives, Hughes said:
Class hatred is not a complaint without a root, nor did it spring up in 
a night. It is a deep-seated disease, and it had its roots in the injustices 
suffered by the workers in the days that are gone, and we are now reaping 
where those who went before us have sown. … My experience of unions 
is this, that the great bulk of the men, if you take them by and large, are 
free from this bitter class consciousness. Unfortunately men have been 
from the beginning of time led by the few who have got their minds 
made up. The great bulk of our fellow-citizens are law-abiding, peaceful 
and genial people, and of course the great mass of our fellow-citizens 
[are also], like all of us, credulous, and likely to be beguiled by alluring 
statements, lying statements, propaganda which has for its objective 
overturning the state and the existing condition of things. If we are 
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to combat their propaganda, and prevent the great mass of the people 
acknowledging these men as their leaders, we must find something to 
put in its place. It was for that reason I put the basic wage proposition 
forward … [It] was an attempt to remove one of the most prolific causes 
of industrial unrest …The standard by which this effort to get industrial 
peace is tried is not what it will cost, but what it will do. If it won’t do 
anything, it is dear at any price. If it will do what we want it to do, it 
won’t matter what it costs. (Whillier 1977, pp. 40–41)
3.6.2 The Royal Commission
The letters patent of the Royal Commission on the Basic Wage were proclaimed 
in December 1919, soon after the election. The Commission was to report on:
1. The actual cost of living at the present time, according to 
reasonable standards of comfort, including all matters 
comprised in the ordinary expenditure of a household, for a 
man with a wife, and three children under fourteen years of 
age, and the several items and amounts which make up that 
cost.
2. The actual corresponding cost of living during each of the last 
five years.
3. How the basic wage may be automatically adjusted to the rise 
and fall from time to time of the purchasing power of the 
sovereign. (Royal Commission 1920, p. 1)
The Government appointed equal numbers of employer and employee 
representatives, who in turn agreed on the Chairman. The employer members 
were E E Keep of Melbourne, appointed on the nomination of the Central 
Council of Employers of Australia; J A Harper from Adelaide, President of 
the Associated Chambers of Manufactures of Australia; and G M Allard from 
Sydney, nominated by the Associated Chamber of Commerce of Australia. 
Harper resigned in February 1920 and was replaced by G D Gilfillan. The 
three employee members, elected by the Conference of Federated Unions, 
were: H C Gibson (Federated Engine-Drivers and Firemens’ Association); R 
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Cheney (Federated Carters and Drivers’ Industrial Union); and T C Maher 
(Commonwealth Public Service Clerical Association). The agreed Chairman 
was A B Piddington KC (then Chairman of the Interstate Commission).23 
J T Sutcliffe, officer in charge of the Labour and Industrial Branch of the 
Commonwealth Statistician’s Office, was appointed Statistician and Secretary 
(Whillier 1977, p. 49). He probably deserved much of the credit for the 
thoroughness and sophistication of the Royal Commission’s work.
The Commission held 184 meetings, including 115 public hearings. 
There were nearly 800 witnesses; and the Commission received 580 statistical 
reports and other exhibits. Having completed its public inquiry in September 
1920, it submitted its report to the Governor-General on Saturday 20 
November 1920 (Whillier 1977, pp. 36 and 56).24
3.6.3 Constructing a standard
The Commission began by rejecting the Harvester standard; for although 
Harvester had laid down a requirement that the minimum wage be sufficient 
to meet the cost of living, ‘the decision in the case was given without the 
cost of living having been ascertained by evidence except to a partial extent’. 
The context suggests that the Commission’s review of Harvester was confined 
to a reading of the decision, from which inferences were drawn—and 
guesses made—about the evidence provided to Higgins. That some of these 
were wrong was probably due in part to statements made over the years by 
Higgins—statements that gave a misleading impression of the depth of his 
inquiry. ‘With regard to food and groceries’, it said, ‘there was presumably 
evidence from the nine housewives examined that the amount of £1 5s 5d 
23  Piddington had in 1913 been appointed to the High Court, but before he sat he resigned 
in response to criticism of the appointment from the Bar. Later in 1913, he was appointed 
Chairman of the newly formed Inter-State Commission. The appointment was for seven 
years. During Piddington’s term, the Commission was much exercised in determining criteria 
for protection, and Piddington was seen to give much weight to labour standards. The 
Commission itself was emasculated by a High Court decision that denied it the authority to 
exercise judicial power (Graham 1995, pp. 52–53 and Chapter 5).
24  A supplementary report (Royal Commission 1921) was tendered on 2 April 1921.
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… did afford a sufficient supply of food.’25 (Royal Commission 1920, p. 10). 
There was no such evidence from either the three housewives or the eight 
husbands. The Royal Commission contrasted Higgins’ allowance of 7s for 
rent with a later finding of the Commonwealth Statistician that the rental 
of a four-room house in Melbourne in 1907 was 8s 11d. It explained the 
difference by supposing that Higgins’ four-room house was in Sunshine, rather 
than Melbourne (p. 11). Nothing in the Harvester case evidence supports this 
explanation. The key factor in the cost of housing was the inferior quality of 
houses occupied by labourers and their families.
The Royal Commission was confronted with the issue of whether it 
should identify a standard of comfort specific to low-paid wage-earners and 
their families. The employer deputation to the Prime Minister, mentioned 
above, sought an amendment of the letters patent to limit the inquiry to ‘the 
humblest worker’. In the hearing, as the Commission records, A W Foster 
(for the unions) suggested ‘that the Commission should not select any special 
occupation, whether skilled or unskilled, and ascertain the cost of living of the 
family of an employee in the occupation so selected, but should endeavour 
to picture the “typical Australian man” and determine what is his “reasonable 
standard of comfort”’. On the other hand, Russell Martin, for the Employers’ 
Federation, contended ‘that the Commission should (as he put it) “first catch 
its man” or in other words select a man in some definite calling, which, he 
maintained, should be that of “an unskilled labourer” or “the humblest worker” 
or the “lowest-paid employee” or “basic wage earner”, and ascertain for that 
family the reasonable standard of comfort’ (Royal Commission 1920, p. 14). 
Later in the inquiry, an employer representative said: ‘If we start with a man 
on the lowest level, whoever he may be, it will be very easy for the Arbitration 
Court, if our determination comes before it, to use that as a starting point and 
decide how much to give above that amount, but if we are to take the average 
Australian and start on an indefinite basis, then the Court would be in a 
difficulty as to where to start and how much to work upwards or downwards.’ 
25  Higgins had specified £1 12s 5d as the amount required for food, groceries, and rent. 
Seven shillings was the amount ascribed to rent.
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Piddington replied that this was a curious line of reasoning, for at no time 
had the Court awarded a margin above the basic wage on the ground that one 
worker required a higher standard of living than another (Whillier 1977, pp. 
67–68).
The Commission’s stance was that the appropriate standard of comfort 
was one appropriate to wage-earners, but not specifically low-paid ones. It 
referred to ‘the pitfall of supposing that, because the humblest worker ought to 
be paid the “actual cost of living according to reasonable standards of comfort”, 
therefore that “actual cost of living according to reasonable standards of 
comfort” must be ascertained by finding out what the humblest worker does 
actually spend’.26 In the main, the Commission found, there was no difference 
between skilled and unskilled workers in what was required for ‘reasonable 
standards of comfort’:
It was not contended at any time during the inquiry that it makes a 
difference to the amount necessary for a reasonable standard of comfort 
under the section of rent or of Food or of Miscellaneous requirements 
whether the employee is a skilled or an unskilled worker. Nor was an 
attempt made to establish any distinction in the section of Clothing, as 
far as the employee’s wife or his children are concerned. The only point, 
therefore, in which a difference is arguable is as to the regimen of clothing 
for the man. There is no decision to suggest to the Commission the 
conclusion that the skilled labourer ought to have a different ‘reasonable 
standard of comfort’ in respect of clothing than the unskilled. What 
is more important than the absence of decisions is that there was no 
26  In the light of the Commission’s rejection of the notion that needs could be inferred from 
actual expenditures, it is unclear why it sought evidence of actual household budgets. It did 
so by distributing some 9000 forms on which respondents were to record expenditures over 
a four-week period. This proved to be an unfruitful line of inquiry. Only 400 forms were 
returned—‘a result due, no doubt, to the exacting labour necessary to fill in a multitude of 
details, every one of which is essential if safe inferences are to be drawn’. ‘An examination of the 
returns’, said the Commission, ‘leaves no doubt that this method, though frequently adopted, 
is not effective even to discover what is the general level of expenditure. And, of course, the 
level of expenditure is not per se a criterion of the level of comfort’ (Royal Commission 1920, 
p. 18).
126 Australian Wage Policy
evidence before the Commission establishing such a difference as being 
found to exist in actual fact. On the contrary, all the evidence showed 
that, except for special occupational clothing, sensible wage-earners of 
all occupations dress very much alike. (p. 17)
Thus the Commission saw its task as one of identifying consumption standards 
‘not by reference to any one type or group of employees, but by reference 
to the needs which are common to all employees, following the accepted 
principle that there is a standard of living below which no employee should be 
asked to live’. The needs of employees and their families had to be ascertained 
by specific inquiry, uncontaminated by awareness of the wages actually being 
paid.
How, then, did the Commission establish these needs? A family unit of 
five was specified in the letters patent, and the Commissioners agreed that it 
would contain a boy of 10½, a girl of 7, and a boy of 3½ (Royal Commission 
1920, pp. 25–26).27 The Commissioners were able to refer to a Tentative 
Budget Inquiry conducted in Washington DC in 1919 by Royal Meeker, 
Commissioner of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, United States Department 
of Labor. Meeker distinguished three standards of living: (1) the pauper or 
poverty level; (2) the minimum of subsistence level; and (3) the minimum of 
health and comfort level. He had adopted the last of these. ‘Your Excellency’s 
Commissioners’, said the Royal Commission, ‘have pursued a similar aim 
and sought to find the amount which will provide real but moderate comfort 
in each section of this Inquiry’, adding that nothing less would meet the 
expectations implicit in the letters patent.28
27  Corresponding to the agreed position of the unions and the employers, except for the 
substitution of the younger boy for an infant.
28  Meeker’s description of this standard was as follows: ‘This represents a slightly higher level 
than that of subsistence, providing not only for the material needs of food, shelter, and body 
covering, but also for certain comforts, such as clothing sufficient for bodily comfort and to 
maintain the wearer’s instinct of self-respect and decency, some insurance against the more 
important misfortunes—death, disability, and fire—good education for the children, some 
amusement, and some expenditures for self development’ (Royal Commission 1920, p. 17).
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3.6.4 Measuring needs
The Commission structured its analysis of necessary expenditures under the 
obvious headings of housing, clothing, food, and miscellaneous.
In respect of rent, the Commission noted that at the time of the 1911 
census the capital cities and suburbs contained 116,308 owner-occupied houses 
and 202,135 rented houses. The former, it said, would include the houses of the 
well-to-do and those in the course of rent purchase. The Commission would 
not modify its treatment of rent to take into account owner occupation (Royal 
Commission 1920, pp. 21–22). A critical issue was the assumption to be made 
about the number of rooms—four or five. In Harvester, the Commission said, 
Higgins had adopted a standard of four rooms. (The Harvester decision, in 
fact, is silent on the issue; but the evidence was that houses were generally of 
three or four rooms.) The requirement of at least five
appeared so clear to the Commission that, at a certain stage, the 
Commission having got the impression that the point would not be 
disputed, announced its intention of confining the evidence for the 
future to houses of that size. In deference, however, to the protest of 
Mr Ferguson [for the Victorian Employers’ Federation], the matter 
was reopened. The only consequence was a loss of time in collecting 
evidence as to smaller houses, while not one witness—either house 
agent or medical authority or architect—was found to maintain that 
a four-roomed house was a proper standard for the typical family. 
The Commission had learnt from an officer of the Commonwealth 
Statistician’s Department that in 75% of the cases, of a family of three 
children under fourteen, two would be of one sex, and the third of 
the opposite sex. This necessitates two bedrooms at least, apart from 
that of the husband and wife, and, as the kitchen is always counted as 
a room, the four-roomed house leaves the worker without any other 
sitting room or social room than the kitchen. (p. 20)
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Ferguson argued that many families did live in four-roomed houses because 
of the shortage of houses; and employers should not have to provide money 
for housing that was not obtainable. The Commission’s answer was that ‘the 
amount over and above their actual rent while living in four-roomed houses 
may fairly be regarded as enabling [families] to obtain other comforts as a 
balance or compensation for the deficiency in their housing accommodation 
forced upon them by existing circumstances’ (p. 22).
A secondary issue to that of room numbers was amenities. ‘Accepting 
current standards’, the Commission said, ‘no house for the typical family can 
be considered to comply with that family’s requirements unless it has the three 
elementary household conveniences of bath, fixed copper, and fixed tubs’ 
(p. 20).29 
The standard of adequacy for clothing was elusive, but the Commission 
relied heavily on the evidence of consumers:
In no branch of the inquiry was more ample evidence adduced by both 
parties, and in no branch was the value of popular participation in 
the investigation more clearly shown, than with regard to Clothing. 
Only by such means was it possible to arrive at clear determinations 
of a matter involving so many complicated considerations, as does the 
question of the amount necessary to provide a reasonable standard of 
comfort in dress. … A number of housewives and some working men 
gave evidence as to the amount spent in the home upon Clothing and 
the requirements of the various members of the family. The general 
trend of such evidence was that at present prices and with present 
wages, families of the typical size or larger, have gone short of necessary 
clothing or lived to some extent upon what they already had, without 
being able to make necessary replacements. There can be no doubt, 
either, that since 1914, the standard of clothing enjoyed by families has 
been lowered, or that the evidence visible every day in the streets of a 
higher standard of dress than that obtaining before the war is confined 
29  The Commission said: ‘In some of the capitals the copper and the tubs frequently belong 
to the tenants, and are movable; the houses being, in this respect, below the standard which 
should be observed in Australia.’
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to employees of either sex who have benefited by the increase of wages, 
based on a typical family’s requirements, without having the liabilities 
of such a family. … The findings of the Commission as to Clothing will 
remedy whatever is well-grounded in such complaints coming from the 
typical family. (pp. 26–27)
The Commission reduced its allowance for clothing, having regard to 
the opportunities for economy that existed by taking advantage of sales (3 per 
cent) and by making down clothes at home (5 per cent) (p. 32). In relation to 
the latter, it said:
the Commission declined to adopt the argument that all clothing 
should be obtained upon a ready-made footing … It was thought by the 
Commission that savings by cutting-down, etc, are an admirable form 
of thrift, and that the work involved is not in itself the most laborious 
of a housewife’s duties. Indeed, it is far from distasteful, as appealing to 
the exercise of skill and an age-long feminine art. (p. 47)
Food lent itself to a more sophisticated treatment:
The prime conditions in the provision of a family’s food are—
First—that it shall be sufficient in food values, expressed in 
Calories, to provide warmth and energy, to renew tissue so as to 
maintain the weight of the body, and to satisfy the requirements 
of growing and developing children.
Second—that it shall contain a proper proportion of the three 
main constituents of food, viz., Proteins, which produce new 
growth or replace tissue lost, Fats and Carbohydrates to supply 
energy.
Third—the supply must permit of a sufficient variety of food for 
the preparation of palatable and digestible meals.
Fourth—the varieties of food must conform generally to the 
habits of the community. (p. 34)
The first two of these criteria were the subject of scientific evidence, 
both oral and written. The Commission adopted 3500 calories as the standard 
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for a working man (and was scathing in its criticism of Professor Osborne of 
Melbourne University, a union witness, who advocated a much higher intake). 
Recognising that calorific requirements varied with the work performed, the 
Commission opted for a man doing moderate muscular work. The assumed 
family of five was equated, for its food needs, with 3.3 man-units (pp. 36–41; 
85–87).
In relation to the composition of the food budget, the Commission 
noted a substantial fall since 1914 in the consumption of meat (probably 
due to an increase in its relative price). The Commission would have allowed 
for the 1914 standard of meat consumption ‘if it had considered that this 
consumption was necessary for the health or comfort of the community, since 
it could not be reasonably contended that the standard of comfort in Australia 
ought to be lower in the present year than it was in 1914’. It rejected the 1914 
standard, however, because
the authorities seem to be overwhelming in support of the position that 
the altered habit of our people, in consuming less meat, is far from 
inflicting any injury to health or any hardship, provided that the total 
amount of food which is necessary is obtained. The Commission has, 
therefore, accepted what appear to be the present habits of the people in 
respect to the eating of meat. (p. 44)
Miscellaneous items required case-by-case treatment. Only a selection 
of the items is discussed here. Many of the union claims were rejected.
Claims for household equipment were weighed against the considerations 
that such items could be bought before the worker had a full household 
of dependents and that many could be kept in service until the number of 
dependants diminished (p. 45). Life insurance of the breadwinner was an aspect 
of ‘reasonable comfort’, but could not be included because the Commission 
could not determine the actuarial probability of the worker’s demise while 
the family was of the prescribed size and structure. Unemployment insurance 
was excluded for similar reasons and also because arbitration tribunals, 
in fixing occupational rates, took into account the relative probabilities of 
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unemployment (p. 46). Nothing was included for ‘Church and Charity’, 
because the basic wage-earner was unlikely to spend much on them. This 
was partly because help was given in kind: ‘People of limited means help one 
another wonderfully here, as in all countries, but this help is not so much in 
money-donations as in the kindly personal offices and sacrifices that make such 
mutual help far more acceptable and helpful.’ Nor was any allowance made 
for alcoholic and soft drinks. ‘There seems no reason’, the Commission said, 
‘for regarding the regular consumption of alcoholic or soft drinks as essential 
to a reasonable standard of comfort’. The unions had claimed allowance for 
domestic help in four weeks of the year to afford the housewife some relief 
from her toils. The Commission rejected this claim, but allowed £4 a year for 
a holiday to achieve a similar benefit (p. 47). For dentistry, the Commission 
included a sum ‘thought to be sufficient as a general amount to be expended 
in the year’ (p. 50). In relation to ‘amusement recreation and library’, it said:
The claim of the federated Unions … was supported by the argument 
that families should have a due share of the intellectual and social 
enjoyments of life. The argument may be conceded to be just, but it 
is not to be forgotten that the best part of such enjoyments is often to 
be found in a family’s own resources when this family is not oppressed 
by poverty or the fear of poverty. The mistake is in supposing that life 
has no pleasures other than bought excitements. It is probable that 
few communities possess easier access, or access to a greater variety, of 
pleasure than the Australian community possesses, and can exploit at 
little, if any, cost in money. Nor could anything be done to earmark 
any sum for recreations of an intellectual character. The Commission 
has, therefore, included a sum under the one heading of Recreation, 
Amusement, and Library, leaving the use of the sum thus included to 
the choice of the wage-earner. (p. 50)
The report lists in full the items deemed to be necessary for life at the 
required standard, and shows their respective prices.30 For Melbourne, the 
total costs were:
30  For food, the list covers each of the six capital cities. The lists for clothing and miscellaneous 
items are for Melbourne only.
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The totals for other capital cities ranged from £5 6s 2½d in Brisbane to £5 
17s ¾d in Sydney.
These amounts greatly exceeded the current basic wage. The excess 
cannot be precisely stated, because there was not then a uniform basic wage, 
even for a single city. According to the Royal Commission, the most recent 
Commonwealth award contained a basic wage of £4 2s. This had been set on 
the basis of prices in the 12 months to September 1920. If it had been related to 
the September quarter price level, the amount would have been £4 13s (Royal 
Commission 1920, p. 93). That amount, perhaps, is the best approximation 
to the Harvester standard—the September quarter 1920 equivalent of £2 2s in 
1907. This was 80 per cent of the Royal Commission standard. But the failure 
of the basic wage to keep pace with price changes meant that the average 
increase in the basic wage needed to give effect to it would be greater. According 
to the Royal Commission (p. 93), the basic wage in some Commonwealth 
awards was £3 8s—73 per cent of the Harvester standard and 59 per cent of 
the Royal Commission’s. Subsequently, Piddington (still advised by Sutcliffe) 
said that the prevalent basic wage under Commonwealth awards at the date 
of the report was £3 17s (Piddington 1921, p. 6). Piddington also wrote that 
the 1907 equivalent of the Royal Commission’s standard, in Melbourne, was 
£2 13s 8d (p. 13). As we saw earlier, the evidence of household budgets in 
Harvester pointed to an amount of this order, but Higgins unsurprisingly side-
stepped the evidence to ‘award’ £2 2s. On the basis of rates then in force, both 
within and outside the agricultural implement industry, the higher amount 
would have been an unrealistic wage for the unskilled labourer. But the truth 
of the matter is that Higgins did not conduct a serious inquiry into ‘the 
normal needs of the average employee’. The Royal Commission did just that. 
133Keith Hancock
In The Next Step, Piddington remarked: ‘If it be objected that the standard 
of comfort determined by the Commission to be reasonable may be higher 
than that determined by the Harvester case, the answer is that no standard was 
determined in that case’ (Piddington 1921, p. 14). This was a fair comment.
3.6.5 Wage adjustment
As the Royal Commission was directed to report on ‘how the basic wage may be 
automatically adjusted to the rise and fall from time to time of the purchasing 
power of the sovereign’, it was insufficient for it simply to determine an amount 
appropriate to the time of its report. A way must be found of altering the basic 
wage automatically to offset variations in the cost of living. This required, in 
practice, (1) a price index that measured the changes in the cost of the regimen 
of goods and services that constituted the Royal Commission’s basic wage, and 
(2) a method of using that index to adjust the wage automatically.
The A series index, on which the Court had relied since 1913, comprised 
47 items, limited to food, groceries and rent. Although the Commonwealth 
Statistician had not developed the index for use in wage adjustment, he and 
his officers (especially Sutcliffe) gave much help to both the Court and State 
tribunals in their efforts to interpret and to apply it. As Higgins and Powers 
recognised, decisions about the basic wage that were based on the index might 
over-compensate or under-compensate for price changes if the prices of items 
within the index had risen at greater or lesser rates than those excluded. The 
unrepresented items were categorised as ‘clothing’ and ‘miscellaneous’. As we 
have seen, the Royal Commission’s regimen not only extended the food and 
groceries list and specified a standard for housing; it also contained clothing 
and miscellaneous items. The Commission collected information about the 
prices of items in its regimen between 1914 and 1920. These were annual data, 
but a beginning-and-end comparison (for Melbourne) shows that over the six 
years, when the average increase in prices was 72 per cent, the component 
increases were: rent, 26 per cent; food, 103 per cent; clothing, 82 per cent; and 
miscellaneous, 62 per cent. Rent and food together rose by 71 per cent (Royal 
Commission 1921, p. 102). By chance, therefore, there was little difference 
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between the broad index and one confined to rent and food. But within the 
six years, there were periods when they diverged significantly. If the goal were 
to measure as accurately as possible the changes in the cost of living, the more 
comprehensive index was to be preferred.
For the ongoing collection of the necessary data, the Commission 
proposed that a Bureau be created within the Commonwealth Statistician’s 
Office. It would be organised from existing members of the Public Service and 
‘should ascertain from time to time the rise or fall in the purchasing power of 
the sovereign in relation to the reasonable standards of comfort’ of the family 
defined in the letters patent (Royal Commission 1920, p. 55). The hand of 
Sutcliffe may be discerned in this suggestion. The Commission pointed to the 
role of the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics within the Department of 
Labor and emphasised that it was not recommending for Australia the creation 
of a separate department. Despite Hughes’ refusal to adopt the Commission’s 
main recommendation, the Secretary of his department advised Piddington 
that ‘on the subject of the organisation from existing Public Service of a 
Bureau of Labour Statistics to undertake the work of adjustment of the basic 
wage to the cost of living, I am directed to inform you that arrangements are 
being made to give effect to the recommendations of the Commission, and 
that the Commonwealth Statistician is being consulted as to the methods to 
be followed in this connection’ (Royal Commission 1921, p. 97).
I have referred in Section 3.3 to the delays in the adjustment of the basic 
wage inherent in the procedures adopted by Higgins and Powers. Because 
there was no single basic wage, we cannot specify the effects of these delays 
on the basic wage. To illustrate their significance, however, let us assume that 
at any point of time the wage was, on average, two years out of date. This 
assumption seems conservative. If we suppose that the basic wage for the last 
quarter of 1916 corresponded to the Harvester standard adjusted to the price 
level of the last quarter of 1914, the shortfall (in Melbourne) was 14 per cent. 
Moving forward by years, we have a ‘surplus’ in 1917 of 1 per cent (prices 
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being slightly less than at the end of 1915); a deficiency in 1918 of 7 per cent; 
in 1919, 16 per cent; and in 1920, 27 per cent.31 Discrepancies such as these 
lend a degree of unreality to the prevailing debates about the adequacy of 
the Harvester ‘standard’: had that standard actually been achieved, the living 
standards of the basic wage-earner and his family would have been materially 
higher. D T Sawkins later wrote:
The deputy Industrial Registrar of the Commonwealth Court has 
courteously provided a tabulation of the basic rates of Commonwealth 
awards current at 1st November, 1920, as an example. It appears 
that the basic rates in force at that date (all being ‘equivalents’ of the 
‘Harvester’ finding) ranged from £2 11s to £4 2s, and averaged £3 
7s 3d, or nearly 15s less per week than the latest awarded ‘Harvester’ 
equivalent. (Sawkins 1933, p. 19)
The Commission recommended quarterly adjustments. A quarter, it 
said, was ‘an interval which will reduce to a not substantial figure the risk 
of the wage-earner being paid too little’. It was necessary, however, ‘that the 
adjustment should take place upon a system which recognises the seasonal 
character of the fluctuations in price of staple commodities’. Hence the wage 
adjustment should be based on the cost of living data for the previous year: ‘thus 
the declaration to be made in November 1921 would be based on the average 
of the cost of living determinations at November 1920, February 1921, May 
1921, August 1921’ (Royal Commission 1920, p. 56). This would remove 
the seasonal effects thought to be present in quarter-by-quarter changes in 
prices. But the basic wage would still lag prices (on average) by more than half 
a year—a point of arithmetic on which the Commission did not comment.
3.6.6 The Piddington standard
Piddington, noting that the ‘prevalent’ basic wage was two-thirds of the 
recommended amount, wrote:
31  Divergences computed from a table in Royal Commission (1921, p. 104).
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In other words, all families with three children are receiving only two-
thirds of what is necessary according to current human standards. Let 
the reader turn to the summary of the Commission’s Indicator lists as 
to Food and Clothing, and take two-thirds of the stated quantities and 
then, using his own knowledge of family needs, say whether a reasonable 
standard of comfort can possibly be enjoyed on such quantities. Could a 
family of five even satisfy hunger with two-thirds of the dietary set out? 
(Piddington 1921, p. 6)
That the Royal Commission’s basic wage differed so far from current 
reality was open to several responses (or a combination of them):
•	 Its standards were excessive.
•	 The family unit prescribed in the letters patent was unrealistic.
•	 Whatever the merits of the Commission’s finding, the 
Australian economy simply could not meet it.
I refer here to the first of these points, the others being discussed later.
The notion of a benchmark living standard is disputable because of 
the arbitrary and subjective judgments involved in it. All such benchmarks, 
including modern poverty lines, are open to this objection. That said, it is 
of interest to consider the kind of living standard that Piddington implied. 
Would most regard it as reasonable or as luxurious? That question is obviously 
time-dependent: the perspective of 2013 is not that of 1921. Yet the following 
comments are to the point.
First, the report was unanimous as to the requirements of reasonable 
comfort. This meant that the finding (though not the policy consequence) 
carried the support of three employer and three employee representatives, 
as well as that of the Chairman. Those familiar with the workings of such 
committees will know that ‘unanimous’ recommendations commonly entail 
compromises. Nevertheless, we may infer that Commission members with 
divergent backgrounds were broadly persuaded that the standard was indeed 
one of reasonable comfort by contemporary standards.32
32  Two of the employer members, Keep and Gilfillan, though signatories to the main report, 
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Second, the regimen adopted by the Commission was detailed and 
evinced a great deal of consideration.
Third, it was similar to that used in the Washington survey of Dr Meeker 
(Piddington 1921, p. 9).
Fourth, a reading of the report does not suggest that the Commission 
was ‘soft’ in its attitude to union claims.33
Fifth, one can scrutinise the items approved and those rejected so as 
to judge whether ‘needs’ were defined at luxury levels. This is a difficult area 
of judgment. Some of the quantities may, indeed, seem excessive. Did the 
family really need each week 5½ pounds of sugar, 2 pounds of jam, 2 pounds 
of butter, and 8 pounds of beef? (But it must be remembered that these food 
items were within an overall calorie limit, so that less of one item would have 
entailed more of others.) Some critics (including, as we shall see, Powers) 
criticised the clothing ‘requirements’ specified in the Report; and the all-male 
Commission’s assessments of women’s clothing needs did not escape ridicule. 
On the other hand, the absence of any provision for church and charity or for 
alcohol and soft drink seems to border on the frugal.
Finally, the Commission (in its supplementary report) noted that ‘Mr H 
[sic] F Giblin, the Government Statist of Tasmania, in his Budget Inquiry in 
1920 also selected families who were known to be workers living in reasonable 
comfort with thrifty management, and that his finding for Hobart in August, 
1920, was £6 per week.’
These considerations suggest that the Piddington standard was not 
extravagant for the family unit to which it related.
tendered a memorandum of dissent going to two issues: (1) an implication which they 
discerned in the majority report, that the amount determined should be enforced as the basic 
wage; and (2) the finding that the basic wage awarded by the Court from time to time, and 
especially in 1914, did not provide a reasonable standard of comfort (Royal Commission 
1920, pp. 61–62). It is difficult to reconcile the latter point of dissent with Keep and Gilfillan’s 
endorsement of the main finding.
33  The unions had claimed sums ranging from £10 16s in Brisbane to £11 13s 6d in Hobart.
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3.6.7 Implementation?
As the Royal Commission’s deliberations drew to a close, there was, apparently, 
some expectation of a recommendation that might embarrass Hughes. On 
16 November, the Leader of the Opposition sought an assurance that the 
recommendation, once received, would be promptly put into effect.34 Hughes 
was equivocal:
May I remind honourable members opposite that when I put forward 
this proposal for a Commission at the election, they sneered at it? They 
had a quite different way of getting into the Kingdom of Heaven. 
But they have lost the keys to their paradise; they now say that this 
Commission is the thing to save Sodom and Gomorrah. When I receive 
the report, and it has been considered by my colleagues, I shall state the 
intention of the Government; more than that I cannot say. (Whillier 
1977, p. 56)
Hughes, in all likelihood, foresaw the problem that lay ahead. Having 
received the report from the Governor-General on Sunday 21 November, 
he immediately summoned Knibbs, the Commonwealth Statistician. On 
the next day, Knibbs supplied a Confidential Memorandum asserting that 
the implementation of the Royal Commission’s basic wage was impossible, 
for wages would then exceed the total value added by industries. Hughes 
thereupon asked Piddington to submit a memorandum on a range of matters, 
including ‘the effect upon industry, domestic and for foreign countries, of 
making a basic wage for all employees of £5 16s 0d’ (Royal Commission 1920, 
p. 89).
Piddington answered that night: ‘Having received your request at 5 pm 
to-day, there has been no opportunity to summon my colleagues to ascertain 
whether they desire to take part in the matter, therefore I do not sign this 
Memorandum as Chairman’ (Royal Commission 1920, p. 93). Piddington 
34  Whether Hughes could have implemented the recommendations within the 
Commonwealth’s constitutional powers (as then understood) is doubtful. Piddington’s 
personal opinion was that he could. Any legal difficulty would, of course, have been obviated 
by the carriage of the ‘Powers’ referendum.
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provided arithmetic (possibly the work of Sutcliffe) showing the effect of 
attempting to enforce the Royal Commission’s basic wage (p. 91). Assuming 
the present wage to be £4, allowing for an increase to £5 16s, and treating 
the increase as payable to 1,000,000 workers, he calculated the total cost 
as £93,000,000 per year. That amount, he said, represented 31 per cent of 
production in 1918, but the present percentage would be a little less because 
of the subsequent rise in prices. The effect on local prices would diminish 
the value of the wage increase; industries manufacturing for export would 
be ruined; and ‘the increase in the price even of the products of our primary 
industries would before long be a formidable drawback to their development, 
and possibly to their continuance.’ Hence Piddington endorsed the thrust of 
Knibbs’ advice, if not its details (which were apparently not provided to him).
But the 1911 census showed that the dependants of the average male 
wage-earner were far fewer than the letters patent had postulated. Adjusting 
George Knibbs
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the 1911 numbers slightly, Piddington said that there were about one million 
male wage-earners in 1920. If each of these were paid at a level to maintain a 
wife and three children, then industries would be supporting 450,000 non-
existent wives and 2,100,000 non-existent children. The true cost of living, 
therefore, was much less than the amount computed on the basis of a family 
of five.
He proposed a scheme that took this into account. The basic wage 
should be set for a man with a wife but no children. Piddington rejected any 
discounting of the wage for the non-existent wives. Every employee should 
receive enough to keep a man and wife ‘(1) because during bachelorhood, 
which ends, on the average for the whole Commonwealth, at the age of 20, 
ample opportunity should be provided to save up for equipping the home; 
(2) because a man should be able to marry and support a wife at an early age’. 
Children were different. Employers should pay a tax to the Commonwealth 
from which it would fund payments of child endowment. The specific 
amounts proposed were:
Thus a worker with three children would receive £5 16s, but the total payment 
that an employer would make in respect of a basic wage-earner would be only 
£4 10s (Royal Commission 1920, p. 90).
The idea of child endowment as a solution to the problems of varying 
family size was not novel. It was seen by some as a measure, not only of equity, 
but also of race survival—a response to prevalent concerns about the declining 
birth rate. A Member of the New South Wales Parliament had unsuccessfully 
proposed a scheme of endowment in 1916. After the 17s increase in the State 
living wage of 1919 (discussed above), the New South Wales Government 
proposed legislation to reduce the amount of increase and to institute 
endowment funded by employer contributions. The Bill (opposed by both 
employers and unions) was rejected by the Legislative Council (Graham 1995, 
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p. 87). Thus Piddington was suggesting a measure that already had both 
supporters and opponents.
When Hughes tabled the report on Tuesday 23 November, he said that 
the Government could not possibly advocate payment of the Commission’s 
wage. This was, by the Chairman’s own admission, impossible (Whillier 1977, 
pp. 57–58). But Piddington’s endowment proposal had ‘much to recommend 
it’. Three weeks later, Hughes introduced for the Public Service a scheme that 
provided a £4 basic wage plus 5s per child (funded by a ‘tax’ on Public Service 
salaries). Otherwise, nothing came of the proposal. Whillier reports that it was 
not generally supported. The Bulletin declared:
If you are going to pay men according to their success as breeders and 
not according to their merits as workers there will be no inducement for 
a man to excel in his vocation … Australia has no time to waste on fancy 
schemes of this description. (Whillier 1977, pp. 61–62)
The endowment ‘solution’ was not supported by the unions, which focused 
their efforts on securing the implementation of the Royal Commission 
wage. They did not have access to Knibbs’ memorandum, but focused their 
criticisms on Piddington’s arithmetic. Knibbs, responding to a further inquiry 
by Hughes, lent some support to their criticisms, but again insisted on the 
impossibility of paying the Commission’s wage (Whillier, p. 69). Piddington 
had erred. His error was to treat the £298 million as the value of all production 
in 1918. This sum did not include the value of services produced, although 
many of the workers were employed in service industries. Piddington should 
have used either a smaller amount than £93 million for the cost of the wage 
increase or a larger sum than $298 million for the value of production. (An 
intriguing question is whether Sutcliffe was implicated in the mistake.) Knibbs 
confined his calculations to manufacturing and coal. If the whole of the interest 
and profit of manufacturing industry had been diverted to paying the basic 
wage, the maximum amount payable would have been £5 13s 10d; and similar 
reasoning for coal yielded a sum of £5 5s 7d. Thus the payment of £5 16s to 
every adult male wage-earner was impossible. ‘The only way by which such a 
standard of comfort can be attained by the wage-earning class,’ said Knibbs, ‘is 
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by increase in the production per worker, either (a) by improved organisation, 
(b) by increased effort on the part of the wage-earners, or (c) by both improved 
organisation and increased effort.’35
Child endowment was a recurrent issue in federal and State politics 
at the federal and State levels in the 1920s.36 In the years 1925–29, it was 
at the heart of political disputation in New South Wales, with Piddington 
himself—a judge in the State system—a major actor (Graham 1995, chapters 
8 and 9). Commonwealth child endowment was eventually introduced—with 
a view to averting a basic wage increase—in 1941.
3.7 the court’s response to the royal commIssIon
The first reference in a Court decision to the Royal Commission was 
made by Powers, who said in November 1919: ‘I have already stated that I 
propose—until my finding in the Public Service (living wage) case is proved 
by evidence or by the findings of the proposed “Living Wage Commission” to 
be incorrect—to be guided by the decision I arrived at in that case’ (Tanners 
and Leather-Dressers’ case 13 CAR 803, 805)37 Higgins’ first comment was 
made in December 1919 in the AWU case (13 CAR 823). He referred to the 
uncertainties of the miscellaneous items (including clothing) in household 
needs:
There is, certainly, an urgent need for a scientific study of the 
miscellaneous items; but a Royal Commission composed of 
representatives of employers and employees is not a suitable body for 
such a study. Such a Commission is to be appointed for Australia, 
as I understand from the newspapers. The intention is good, and 
35  Knibbs’ reasoning and comments are contained in documents in the Commonwealth 
Archives Office, CRS.A40, Item E5/2/–.
36  Graham (1995, p. 88) writes that Hughes attributed his non-adoption of Piddington’s 
scheme to the failure of the Powers Referendum. His election promise had, he claimed, been 
premised upon its passage. Piddington twice (in 1921 and 1922) ran unsuccessfully for 
election to the federal parliament to press the case for child endowment. In 1922, his sole 
opponent was Hughes (Graham 1995, pp. 94–99).
37  This was one of the numerous cases in which the Court relied on Sutcliffe’s evidence in 
allowing for price levels and changes.
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the Commission may achieve indirectly some useful results; but one 
might as reasonably throw the question of the influence of gravity on 
light as a bone to be fought for in a Commission of employers and 
employees as leave to such a Commission the scientific question as 
to the miscellaneous expenditure. It would be even safer; for on such 
a subject as the cost of living members would be only too liable to 
be swayed by affiliations and sympathies; and the result—perhaps by 
majority vote or by compromise—will be, at the best, only another big 
guess. A cold and neutral inquiry made by competent statisticians on 
various defined bases of living and of regimen is the thing needed; and 
to the industrial tribunals should be left the responsibility of fixing the 
wages on the result of the inquiry. (pp. 841–842)
Viewed against his pronouncements in favour of an inquiry to fix a living 
wage, this commentary tends to confirm that Higgins really wanted to remain 
‘in charge’ of the principles of wage-setting and was jealous of other contenders 
for the role. He had made a like comment in an article written for the Harvard 
Law Review, published in December 1920 and reprinted in A New Province for 
Law and Order (Higgins 1922, pp. 94–95).
During the currency of the Royal Commission, the Court adhered 
to its existing practices in setting the basic wage. Higgins continued to rely 
upon the 1907 decision and to ‘update’ it by means of the Statistician’s price 
index averaged for the previous calendar year. The reference wage used by 
Powers was the amount set in his Public Service decision of 1918, discussed 
in Subsection 3.3.3.38 A problem noted by both Higgins and Powers was that 
in some instances the rise in prices implied a basic wage that the Court could 
not grant, because it would exceed the ambit of the unions’ plaints. This, of 
course, was a further reason why the Court’s basic wage might fall below the 
Harvester standard. In the Chemical and Fertiliser case, Powers reported that 
many of the employers had agreed to comply with the amount that he set as an 
‘ordinary arbitrator’, but that some employers would exercise their legal right 
38  Powers left the Court in April and was replaced in May by Mr Justice Starke. Although 
Starke made important decisions, he attempted no innovation affecting the basic wage.
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to pay 6s per week less (14 CAR 161, 164). When the AWU sought variations 
of the Pastoral Award, Higgins said that he could not fully match the rise in 
the cost of living because ‘according to the decisions of the Full High Court, 
the award must not exceed the original claim, under any circumstances’ (14 
CAR 386, 389).
Not surprisingly, unions asked the Court to adopt the Piddington wage. 
The principal discussion of the issue was in a case decided by Powers after 
his return to the Court and discussed in Chapter 6. Higgins considered the 
issue in the ASE case, decided in May 1921—the month before his departure 
from the Court (15 CAR 297, 302–306). Because of his role in the history of 
the basic wage, and especially in embedding the criterion of family need, his 
response to Piddington is of interest and importance. His principal objection 
to the Commission’s finding was its failure to propose an amount specific to 
the basic wage-earner. For this, he blamed the letters patent, relishing, perhaps, 
the opportunity for an implied ‘dig’ at Hughes. ‘I had hoped’, he said,
that I should get further illumination as to the absolute existing cost 
of living from what is called the Basic Wage Commission, created by 
the Federal Government; but my hope has not been fulfilled. What the 
Commissioners have reported is not a ‘basic wage’ at all. This is the result 
of the faulty drafting of the commission under which they acted … 
There is no mention in clause 1 of a basic wage, or of the wage relation 
at all; no mention of employees, and no distinction between skilled 
employees and unskilled. Yet there is no ‘wage’ without employment, 
and no ‘basic wage’ unless a higher class of employees, entitled to higher 
pay, a higher standard of life, be assumed. There is no meaning in ‘basic’ 
except in relation to something higher. (pp. 302–303)
He went on to say that, not liking to quote himself (a reticence not hitherto 
obvious), he endorsed a dictum of Heydon that ‘the living wage must relate to 
the humblest class of worker’. Referring to the Royal Commission’s intimation 
that, in relation to items other than clothing, no one had contended that the 
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requirements of reasonable comfort were affected by the worker’s level of skill, 
Higgins said:
Probably such a contention was not raised because the words of the 
Commission preclude it; and as a result the finding is a finding of what 
the Commissioners think to be a proper standard of living for a man 
with a wife and three children, whether the man is a messenger or a 
roll-turner, a millionaire or a street sweeper. Such a finding is of no use 
to this Court for immediate purposes. (p. 303)
He desired it to be understood that he did not dissent from the Commissioners’ 
finding ‘under the terms of their commission’.
What was necessary, said Higgins, was a properly directed inquiry; 
for ‘the evidence on which the [Harvester] judgment was given was very 
meagre, and should be supplemented by an up-to-date inquiry—preferably of 
statisticians, on cool scientific lines—as to the present appropriate basic wage’. 
The terms of the letters patent should have been more carefully weighed.
On a matter so vitally affecting the working of this Court, the 
psychology of industrial employees, industrial peace, and society as a 
whole, it is not, I hope, too much to say that my brother Powers or 
myself should have been consulted before the language of the letters 
patent was adopted. (p. 304)
It would be better ‘for all parties—union and employers—to begin again and 
to press for an inquiry which will replace the Harvester finding on scientific 
lines, rather than to press for payment of this so-called “basic wage” of the 
Commission, which is not a true basic wage, but a will o’ the wisp that will 
lead them into the ditch’.
Higgins observed, ‘in justice to the Commissioners’, that they had 
not recommended payment of £5 16s. The Commonwealth Statistician had 
reported that to pay such a wage would more than exhaust the whole produced 
wealth of the country, including profits. ‘There seems’, said Higgins, ‘to be a 
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storm coming up, with widespread scarcity of employment, and it is wise to 
keep the moorings which we have until we make certain of better.’
Notwithstanding the protestations of the unions, it was unrealistic to 
suppose that the Court would simply substitute the Piddington basic wage 
for the Harvester equivalent. What is indefensible, however, is Higgins’ 
casuistry about the Royal Commission’s letters patent. The members of the 
Royal Commission were well aware that their appointment stemmed from 
dissatisfaction with the basic wage; theirs was no mere abstract inquiry. As 
we have seen, the Commission explicitly discussed the question whether the 
amount needed to afford reasonable comfort was affected by the employee’s 
level of skill, the issue having also been highlighted by the employers’ abortive 
deputation to Hughes. ‘Reasonable standards of comfort’ is obviously a 
nebulous concept, but it was not nonsensical to identify needs that were 
common to workers of diverse skills. Meeting them was another matter: 
perhaps they were unachievable for the unskilled workers, who therefore 
could not live in reasonable comfort; perhaps they were achievable and the 
skilled worker could have something more. The Royal Commission said, and 
meant to say, that any worker with a wife and three children needed £5 16s 
(in Melbourne) to have a reasonable standard of comfort. In its supplementary 
report of April 1921, the Commission said:
It remains only to add that between the theoretical basis of the standard 
which this Commission has determined and the standard as defined in 
the Harvester Case there is no difference. The term used in the letters 
patent was ‘reasonable standards of comfort, including all matters 
comprised in the ordinary expenditure of the household for a man 
with a wife and three children under 14 years of age.’ The standard 
as defined in the Harvester Case is ‘the normal needs of the average 
employee regarded as a human being living in a civilised community.’ 
… [T]his Commission has throughout its task considered that ‘the 
normal needs of the average employee regarded as a human being living 
in a civilised community’ are exactly paraphrased in the letters patent by 
the term ‘reasonable standards of comfort,’ the word ‘man’ being used as 
147Keith Hancock
the equivalent of the words average employee …’ (Royal Commission 
1921, p. 106)
Here, surely, was an unambiguous finding that the Harvester standard was 
insufficient for its avowed purpose. Though it was published about a month 
before Higgins delivered his decision in the ASE case, he did not refer to it.
For the Court, there were several responses that would have been 
logically defensible. One was to quarrel with the finding itself. The subjectivity 
of ‘reasonable comfort’ and ‘need’ left room for a regimen different from that 
selected by the Commission. For this, however, the crudeness of Harvester 
was a problem. There is no comparison between the levels of sophistication 
of Higgins’ and the Royal Commission’s estimates. Another was to abandon 
the needs criterion and simply to portray the basic wage as an amount that 
could realistically be provided for the unskilled worker—an assessment that 
would have regard to the income of the society and other claims upon it. A 
combination of these responses would have been to accept the Commission’s 
standard as an aspiration, to find that it was not achievable, but to consider 
what movement (if any) might be made toward it. Finally, the Court might, 
in the spirit if not the letter of Piddington’s personal response, have revised 
the family size to which the basic wage was ostensibly related without altering 
its amount. That Higgins chose none of these responses, but focused on the 
letters patent, was not to his credit.
He was, however, correct in observing that the appointment, 
deliberations, and report of the Royal Commission had given rise to expectations 
that were likely to be disappointed. From that perspective, the creation of the 
Commission was a mistake. But although the unions condemned the Court’s 
rejection of the Piddington wage (Whillier 1977, pp. 69–70), little or nothing 
came of their discontent. The economic conditions of 1921 are a likely cause. 
Rising unemployment and a stiffening of employer resistance as prices fell 
were not conducive to either an increase in industrial action or abandonment 
of arbitration.
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3.8 Harvester and famIly needs
The Royal Commission had shown that Harvester did not meet the needs 
of a family of five. Its analysis, though inevitably subjective, was far more 
sophisticated than any that had been attempted (or would in the future 
be attempted) by the Court. Higgins and Powers insisted, nevertheless, on 
the relevance of the Harvester basic wage to the needs of the family of five. 
Certainly, there were compelling reasons for not adopting the Commission’s 
standard. But these were reasons of economic possibility and expedience. 
In addition to the issue raised by Knibbs and Piddington himself, namely 
whether the productive capacity of the economy would support the higher 
standard—and the depressed state of the economy in 1921—there was then 
under way the remarkable increase in real wages generated by an unintended 
change in the relation between nominal wages and prices. An attempt by the 
Court to impose a further increase of, say, 40 per cent, would have had dire 
economic consequences, or broken the federal arbitration system, or both.
Yet the notion that the Harvester wage was grounded in family needs 
stood exposed as a fiction. But it was an influential fiction. As late as 1970, the 
researchers into Melbourne poverty set a poverty line (for 1966) of $33 for a 
man, non-working wife, and two children. This amount was the basic wage 
plus child endowment. Their book explains:
This is a definition of poverty so austere as, we believe, to make it 
unchallengeable. … We chose this basic-wage content of the poverty 
line because of its relevance to Australian concepts of living standards—
the basic wage being the lowest wage which can be paid to an unskilled 
labourer on the basis of, in the famous words of Mr Justice Higgins, 
‘the normal needs of an average employee regarded as a human being 
living in a civilised community’.39 (Henderson, Harcourt, and Harper 
1970, p. 1)
The ‘Henderson’ poverty line was adopted by the Australian Government 
Commission of Inquiry into Poverty (1975) and, with subsequent 
39  A footnote records that the quoted passage was written by R I Downing.
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adjustments for prices and earnings, remains the official poverty line today. 
But its original justification was neither more nor less than that set out in 
the above quotation.40 The Royal Commission, on the other hand, made a 
serious attempt to measure needs. Adjusting its finding to a smaller family 
unit, which the letters patent precluded, would have brought its conclusion 
much more into line with economic reality. If Australia were to have a poverty 
line, an inquiry replicating its techniques (but taking account of changed 
consumption patterns) was surely appropriate.
40  ‘We should like to emphasise the importance of giving assistance first to those at the 
bottom of the ranking. To try to ensure that our recommendations have this effect we have 
drawn our “poverty line” at an austere low level—the same level as that in the Melbourne 
1966 survey, updated by average earnings since then. It cannot seriously be argued that those 
below this austere line, whom we describe as “very poor”, are not so’ (Australian Government 
Commission of Inquiry into Poverty 1975, p. 13). 

The issues demanding the arbitrators’ consideration were not, of course, 
confined to the basic wage (however termed). This chapter surveys the policies 
that emerged in other areas.
4.1 wage dIfferentIals
The setting of rates above the basic wage was dominated by four practices. 
First, the Federal Court’s usual approach, in its initial setting of rates, was 
to add to the basic wage amounts equal to the differences—proportional or 
absolute—previously established in the market or by wages boards.1 Second, 
these amounts were not adjusted thereafter for movements in prices. Third, 
although there was little attempt to determine independently the ‘value’ of 
jobs, the Court did, on various grounds, fix amounts modestly above the basic 
wage for some that had hitherto been regarded as unskilled. This meant that 
the relevant classification would be awarded a wage that was slotted in between 
the basic wage and the tradesman’s rate. Fourth, whereas the living wage was 
‘sacrosanct’, additional payments might be set at lower levels than otherwise 
if the Court were persuaded that industries needed relief from the burden of 
labour costs. The cases discussed in this section illustrate these practices.
1  Higgins (writing in 1915) said in A New Province for Law and Order (1922, p. 7): ‘The 
secondary wage, as far as possible, preserves the old margin between the unskilled labourer 
and the employee of the skilled or exceptional class.’
Broadening the scope of wage policy
4
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In the Harvester hearing, Higgins made it clear that he intended not 
merely to answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to the question whether McKay’s were paying 
fair and reasonable wages, but to lay down a scale of rates for the guidance of 
both McKay’s and other applicant employers. The other employers would bear 
the onus of showing that the scale should not apply to them. During Duffy’s 
submissions, the following exchange occurred:
His Honour: I think I can speak freely to you with regard to the skill. It 
is very much a matter of opinion and it is also a matter of custom and 
the employers. If you once fix your datum point, the unskilled labourer, 
then may I not lean with confidence upon the ratios fixed by the wages 
board decisions in the other industries which have these trades?
Mr Duffy: I should think you could.
His Honour: I think it will save a great deal of trouble. (transcript, p. 
333)
The guidance that Higgins had from the evidence is illustrated by the statement 
of Henry William Goodall:
I am a correspondence clerk in the Metropolitan Board of Works. I 
am acquainted with the wages paid by the Board to its employees. I 
produce a list showing the particular classes of labour I understood I 
should be asked about. Labourers unskilled receive 7s a day. That is the 
minimum. Blacksmiths 10s, engine fitters 10s, carpenters 10s, sewerage 
plumbers 10s, water supply plumbers 9s, and painters 8s per day … 
(pp. 402–403)
Towards the end of the hearing, Higgins said:
I can assure you that if I make any standard I shall not follow my own 
judgment—imperfect as it is. I shall follow more the opinions of those 
who have worked in the trade, who have discussed the necessary wages, 
and who know the ratios on which the men should be paid. I have got 
far more trust in that than I have in my own judgment. … Take the 
unskilled labourer, and the cost of living—that is one thing. Take the 
other men who are paid by recognised standards fixed by the wages 
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boards and unions—that is another thing.2 That will guide me in my 
judgment. I have no means in the time given me to go into the interests 
of those twenty trades in order to find out what degree of skill is required 
for each. (p. 622)
There was, in fact, little discussion of skill differentials, but a great deal 
about McKay’s practice of paying below the recognised tradesmen’s rates by 
classifying men as ‘improvers’.
The idea that existing differentials should generally be accepted flowed 
through into early awards. In his first award, for marine cooks, bakers and 
butchers (2 CAR 55), Higgins adopted the Harvester standard for the base 
grade—sculleryman—and for most other grades continued existing absolute 
differences.
In the 1911 BHP case, however, this practice was challenged. Higgins 
was called upon to deal with an employer that had not subscribed to an 
agreement between the union and other mining companies (3 CAR 32). The 
BHP Company’s Broken Hill mine was fast becoming uneconomic. Higgins 
laid down three rules that had an enduring effect. First, the wages fixed must 
include the Harvester wage as the least permissible rate. Second, the condition 
of an industry might be taken into account in fixing the rates for higher grades 
of labour; for example, skilled workers might get less than their proper wages 
so as to safeguard employment. Finally, payment of less than the proper wages 
should not be sanctioned on account of the difficulties of a particular employer.
In the Telegraphic Linesmen’s case of 1914 (8 CAR 119), Higgins said 
that the linesmen were ‘not to be treated either as skilled artisans or as unskilled 
labourers’. Accordingly, they should receive more than the basic wage and less 
than the artisan’s wage. In this case, Higgins also stipulated that the rate to 
be paid should reflect the highest functions that the employee was required 
to perform. ‘Otherwise’, he said, ‘every wages board determination may be 
evaded.’ He explained:
2  Unions were sometimes able to enforce ‘union rates’. They did so by binding their members 
not to accept less than these rates. Obviously, the practice was confined to unions of skilled 
workers.
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For instance, a skilled plumber may be out of work and in sore need; he 
may be offered a job by the employer as a labourer for several weeks, at 
a labourer’s wage, with the stipulation that he is to do plumbing work 
if and when required. It would be extraordinary if the employer could 
get his plumbing work done by this man at a labourer’s rate, and defeat 
a prosecution on the ground that the man was hired as a labourer. If the 
employer choose to use a skilled plumber to do labouring work as well, 
he must pay for the luxury. (p. 129)
The ‘highest function’ rule became standard arbitral practice.
Powers, in the Tanners and Leather Dressers’ case of 1914 (8 CAR 145), 
acquiesced in the wage differences fixed in determinations of wages boards. 
‘The amounts to be fixed for skill over and above the living wage is not so 
difficult to decide’, he said, ‘because the respondents, in all the States except 
South Australia, admitted that the amounts allowed in the Boards’ Awards 
over and above the living wage, in their opinion, represented the differences 
in the work done by the different employees’ (p. 166). Included in the rates so 
set was one of 52s per week for limejobbers, compared with 51s for labourers. 
The differential of 1s was supported by a Queensland wages board decision, 
evidence tendered about the United States and the fact that limejobbers were 
generally selected as the class from which men moved to higher rates (p. 162).
In the Mining Employees’ case of 1915 (9 CAR 330), Powers said that 
in determining classification rates for skill he proposed to follow ‘the rule laid 
down by the learned President’ in the BHP case, when Higgins said that ‘the 
relative values of the different classes of workers may generally be safely left 
to the practice of the employers and the employed’ (p. 358). Higgins himself 
invoked the ‘rule’ in the BHP case of 1916 (10 CAR 155): ‘The minimum 
wage for those who now get more than the basic wage—artisans, furnacemen, 
and others—I fix … by adding to the new basic wage the old margin for skill 
or other necessary exceptional qualities’ (p. 193).
The pre-war and wartime inflation obviously affected both the real 
value of the skill differential and its proportional relation with the basic 
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wage. Surprisingly, this did not become a significant issue in the Court before 
1916: unions, apparently, acquiesced in the mere continuance of the previous 
absolute differentials. Higgins dealt with the question, however, in his decision 
of June 1916 in the Merchant Service case (10 CAR 214). ‘It may fairly be 
urged’, he said,
that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the decrease in the value 
of the sovereign must be treated as applying to all the commodities 
required by a man in the position of an officer as well as to the 
commodities required for a family’s support on a labourer’s standard 
of living; and it is quite true that the pressure of social forces makes 
the extra expenditure for the officer almost as essential for him as the 
labourer’s expenditure for the labourer. But the fact remains that it is 
not so absolutely essential; and in a time of violent disturbance of prices 
such as the present, in a time when war has combined with the drought 
of 1914–1915 to produce the rather alarming figures for 1915 on which 
I have to act, I do not think it advisable, in framing an Award for three 
or five years to come, to push principles to an extreme. (p. 226)
Higgins increased the monthly salary of each grade by £3. ‘Probably some of 
the more highly paid masters’, he said, ‘will think the increase too small in 
their cases; but I have explained my reasons, and if we should hereafter reach 
the haven of settled times, their claims will have to be further considered’ (p. 
227). The implication that the ‘freeze’ on differentials was temporary, to be 
reconsidered in ‘settled times’, was to create problems for the Court after the 
war.
In the Meat Industry decision of September 1916 (10 CAR 465), Higgins 
retained the existing margin for slaughtermen. This was ‘not ideally just’, 
because the increase in the cost of living affected ‘the additional commodities 
which convention and social habits dictate for the skilled worker’. But these 
were abnormal times; and whereas it was necessary ‘to secure to the labourer 
sufficient wages to keep himself and his family in healthy sufficiency’, it was 
‘by no means so imperatively necessary to secure to the skilled worker to 
the full extent all the other commodities to which he has been accustomed’. 
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Nevertheless, the absolute margin had to be preserved. ‘I must do nothing’, 
said Higgins,
to diminish the recognised margin between the man of skill and the 
man without skill. It would be a fatuous step, on the part of this 
Court, to lessen the inducement to learn a trade, to attain superior 
skill and efficiency. Not only would it invite industrial discontent and 
unrest—and industrial peace is the objective of this Court; but it would 
encourage the employment of men in work for which they are not fully 
qualified, and foster the too prevalent tendency to be content with what 
is ‘good enough’—to be content with imperfect workmanship. (p. 485)
It does not seem to have occurred to Higgins that the diminishing real value 
of the margin for skill did indeed ‘lessen the inducement to learn a trade, to 
attain superior skill and efficiency’.
Higgins took a similar stance in the Postal Electricians’ case, decided in 
September 1916 (10 CAR 578). And in the Pastoral case of 1917 (11 CAR 
389) the increases that he granted in shearing rates represented a notional 
adjustment of the basic wage component only. In April 1918, he gave a 
decision affecting 343 senior employees in the public service (12 CAR 114). 
‘The Australian communities’, he said,
have earned for themselves a good name in the world by insisting that 
every labourer shall have enough wages wherewith to provide for himself 
and a family the essentials for a healthful existence; but the fact that a 
man has secured himself enough for these essentials is not an adequate 
reason for refusing to him the extra reward which induces men to face 
the drudgery of study and close application. In an ideal world it may be 
otherwise; but in the world as it is we cannot hope for a perpetual flow 
of highly trained men for the King’s services which involve laborious 
training without reasonable reward for that training. (p. 125)
‘In the stress of the present war’, however, he had generally refused to increase 
the skill margin ‘on the ground of the increase in prices, the depreciation in 
the value of money’; and he would do the same in this case (p. 126).
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In the Coopers’ case (12 CAR 427), decided in September 1918, Higgins 
again acknowledged that holding margins constant was ‘not strictly logical’. 
But it was a moderate course to take, and it had the assent of the unions. ‘The 
war’, said Higgins,
causes suffering everywhere, deprivation nearly everywhere; and the 
extra commodities purchasable by the secondary wage are not so vital 
to healthy, fully nourished life as the commodities to which the basic 
wage is to be appropriated. The basic wage, which is meant to secure the 
proper sustenance of the children, the future citizens, must be provided 
at all costs; anything, everything must be cut down before the basic 
wage. (p. 428)
Higgins foreshadowed a change of course in an Engineers’ case of 1920 
related to Broken Hill and Port Pirie (14 CAR 22). If the 10s fitter’s rate was 
appropriate when the basic wage was 7s per day, then ‘if the 7s man has to be 
raised to 12s, the 10s man ought, prima facie, to be raised to about 17s’. This 
implied a fitter’s margin of 5s. In fact, the margin remained at 3s. The reason 
for the discrepancy’, Higgins said,
is that, during the war, I thought it proper, under the very special 
circumstances, not to apply the increase in the cost of living to the 
secondary wage, but only to the basic wage; at the same time preserving 
the secondary wage which I found to have prevailed in practice, 3s. 
… It is only fair to say that the skilled unions which appeared before 
me accepted the position, as it seemed to me, patriotically, under the 
pressure of the great national emergency. These skilled men, and their 
families, certainly suffered … The question is now, should this sacrifice 
be continued indefinitely? It is very important for our industries that 
the lads (and their parents) should feel it to be worth the trouble to 
learn crafts and to learn them thoroughly. … During the course of 
the discussion in this case I stated, and I now repeat, that my mind is 
strongly inclined in favour of now granting the relief which these highly 
skilled artisans seek—at least to the extent of making the secondary 
wage 4s instead of 3s per day. (pp. 25–26)
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Because the case was limited to the two towns, Higgins deferred any increase 
until other employers had the opportunity to put arguments to the Court. 
On the same day that Higgins gave this decision, Powers gave one for Letter 
Carriers continuing the existing policy (14 CAR 40).
In the Harvard Law Review for December 1920, Higgins wrote:
During the violent financial upheaval caused by the Great War, and 
because of the widespread uncertainty as to what would follow, the Court 
has not increased the secondary wage in proportion to the increased cost 
of living; it has merely maintained the same absolute margin … Now 
that the war has ended, the question arises whether this cautious and 
conservative course should still be followed; but as the subject is to be 
discussed at an early date I refrain from further comment. (Higgins 
1922, p. 98)
The first actual change came in the Merchant Services case, decided 
by Higgins in September 1920 (14 CAR 459). Referring back to his 1916 
promise of a review when ‘settled times’ returned, Higgins said: ‘Well, the war 
is over; and, although we cannot be said to have reached the desired haven in all 
respects, it would not be fair to withhold from these trained men their proper 
secondary wage for ever’ (p. 465). Calculation of the increase was complicated 
by the need to allow for on-board keep; but the amount granted represented 
the increase necessary to restore the proportional relativity of 1907. For ‘the 
proper wage must be restored if we are to keep up a succession of trained men 
for the merchant service—and if we are even to keep our men in Australia’ 
(pp. 465–466).
In May 1921—only weeks before his already-announced resignation 
took effect—Higgins gave a decision that signified ‘restoration’ of margins to 
proper levels. This was a decision for Engineers (15 CAR 297). Higgins set out 
the background:
During the war, as the cost of living was rising to a remarkable degree, I 
found it necessary to raise the basic wage in proportion to the decrease 
in the purchasing power of money; but, in the great uncertainty as to 
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the future, I thought it well not to raise the secondary wage. I left the 
secondary wage at 3s per day as in 1907. Yet this course was not strictly 
fair to the skilled workers … The skilled men were really entitled to 
more than the 3s, but under the abnormal circumstances they accepted 
uncomplainingly the old margin of 3s. I promised, however, that when 
the war ended they should have restored to them the proper margin as 
represented in true wages, not nominal (Merchant Service Guild) [10 
CAR 214, 226]; and in a case of the same guild, decided last year but 
not yet reported, I applied the Statistician’s figures … to the secondary 
wage as well as the basic … If I adhere to the old margin of 3s per day, 
then the rate of unskilled to skilled, which was 7:10 in 1907, will be 
14:17 in 1921. This is not fair play to the skilled worker, or likely to 
induce lads to undertake the burden of learning a craft. (pp. 306–307)
Higgins increased the tradesman’s margin to 6s a day. He also expressed distaste 
for fine distinctions and for ‘specialist’ classifications below the tradesman’s 
rate. He rejected a claim for an extra 6d per day for blacksmiths, which the 
union justified by their scarcity. Scarcity was no ground for prescribing a 
higher minimum wage, and the work of the blacksmith was not of itself worth 
more than that of the general tradesman (p 310). It was useless to resist the 
spread of specialisation under the pressure of competition, ‘however injurious 
such specialisation may be to the employee as a man, however much it tends to 
monotony, to a sense of servitude to the machine, to industrial discontent’ (p. 
314). But this was no reason to pay the specialist less than the full tradesman: 
‘The best way to discourage the manufacture of imperfect tradesmen, and 
to prevent slavery to the machine, is to prescribe for them [machinists] the 
same minimum rate as for the full tradesman’ (p. 315). But he was not free to 
act fully on this view, for the union in its claim had accepted lower rates for 
‘drillers, screwers, etc’; and the three grades of machinists in the award were 
there by union consent (p. 316). Thus Higgins’ concept of a simple scale, 
containing few semi-skilled rates, was already eroded.
The first explicit challenge to the idea of restoring differentials in the 
post-war environment appears to be a decision of Starke in September 1920, 
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in the Commonwealth Railways’ case (14 CAR 496), given four days before 
Higgins decision in Merchant Services’. The unions argued for increases in 
margins commensurate with the increased cost of living. ‘I see neither justice 
nor expediency in this contention’, said Starke:
It is asserted that the comparative standard of living will otherwise be 
affected, and to some extent the assertion is true. I say ‘to some extent’ 
advisedly, because the exercise of economy, so necessary in these times, 
will still enable the skilled workman to maintain the same standard 
of living without making the proportionate increase sought by their 
representatives. However, the proposition appears to me to overlook 
a vital point. The base wage, according to the settled doctrine of this 
Court, is fixed, in industrial concerns, to enable the unskilled workman 
to keep himself, a wife and three children in reasonable comfort without 
feeling the pinch of poverty. It has little or no relation to the value of 
his work. The cost of living determines this wage; but it does not or 
ought not determine the wage of the skilled workman. He is not on the 
poverty line. The value of the work of the skilled tradesman ought, in 
my opinion, to be the guiding principle in fixing his wage, though an 
increase in the cost of commodities must not be ignored as a factor in 
arriving at a just result. Furthermore, the wage of the skilled workman 
must be sufficiently high to induce men to acquire the necessary skill. 
I admit the difficulty of forming any accurate opinion of the value of 
work apart from the economic causes which, uncontrolled, regulate the 
rate of wages, but the Court is given that control and must do what it 
considers fair and just. (p. 569)
The implication was that the value of the skilled worker should not be assessed 
by harking back to the past.
The major repudiation of Higgins’ post-war policy, however, came in 
Powers’ decision of October 1921 in the Engine Drivers’ case (15 CAR 883), 
which Chapter 6 discusses.
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4.2 wage polIcy for female work
At the 1921 census, females were 20 per cent of all breadwinners. Table 4.1 
shows the population of breadwinners as recorded by the census. Admittedly, 
the crude set of occupational classes allows only broad judgments to be made 
about the nature of women’s work. The most instructive column is probably 
the last, except that the percentages shown there need to be read in the 
context of the earlier columns; for example, the high female component in the 
‘independent’ class is unimportant when the overall size of this class is taken 
into account. The ‘domestic’ class, where females predominated, was unlikely 
(with few exceptions) to attract the jurisdiction of the Federal Court. The 
most promising areas were the ‘professional’, ‘commercial’, and ‘industrial’ 
classes. Obviously, these classes would need to be unpackaged to determine 
more reliably their potential for arbitral regulation. State tribunals had greater 
relevance to women employed in many areas, including teaching and the 
health services.
In the Commonwealth Court, issues of female employment arose in 
cases affecting fruitpicking, felthatting, journalists, clerical grades in the 
federal public service, telephonists, the clothing trades, marine stewards, and 
(to a small extent) hotels. The Court’s decisions were sporadic; its principles 
and their application confused. They were given at a time when gender 
Table 4.1: Gender composition of employment 1921 (per cent)
Source: Commonwealth Yearbook, vol. 16, 1923, pp. 950–951.
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segregation of the workforce and marked differentiation in pay were widely 
accepted norms (Lee 1987).
The most famous of these cases was the Fruitpickers’ case of 1912 
(6 CAR 61), when Higgins first discussed the principles to be followed in 
setting female rates. It concerned fruit pickers and packers in the Mildura 
area. Higgins fixed hourly rates. Males received 1s per hour. In dealing with 
women, Higgins sought to distinguish between the circumstances in which 
women should receive the same amount and those in which they should get 
less. This led him to discuss two criteria—the requirements of a living wage 
and the protection of males against female competition. In fruitpicking itself, 
employers were likely to be indifferent at equal rates, and lower pay for females 
would jeopardise men’s employment. Higgins set equal rates. Packing was 
different:
I have had the advantage of seeing the women performing packing at 
a factory; and I have no doubt that the work is essentially adapted for 
women with their superior deftness and suppleness of fingers. The best 
test is, I suppose, if the employers had to pay the same wage to women 
as to men, they would always, or nearly always, employ the women 
(p. 72).
Packing, then, was women’s work and competition with men was not an issue. 
A female rate was appropriate. In Higgins’ view, his task was ‘to find a fair 
minimum wage for these women, assuming that they have to find their own 
food, shelter, and clothing’. With little consideration as to what these needs 
actually were, he came to the conclusion that ‘as the minimum for men and 
women pickers is to be fixed at 1s per hour, the minimum for women workers 
in these processes, in which men are hardly ever employed, should be fixed 
at 9d per hour’ (p. 73). The implication was that women should be paid less 
than men if their skills were inherently superior for the task in question. I am 
not aware, however, that the Court again used this test to identify ‘women’s 
work’. That aspect of the decision may therefore be regarded as a curiosity. 
The more important implications were that a living wage for women should 
apply where women were doing women’s work; that the women’s living wage 
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was less than men’s; and that women should receive equal pay where they 
were in competition with men. The living wage differential was due to the 
presumption that women did not have the family responsibilities attributed 
to men. Higgins made no effort, in this case, to quantify the difference, and 
arbitrarily fixed a rate equal to three-quarters of the male rate.
In the Felthatting case (8 CAR 346), decided in September 1914, the 
union claimed a minimum wage for women of 30s. At the time, the basic 
wage for men in new awards was generally 54s. The employers argued for a 
female rate of 22s. Powers said that ‘women as well as men are entitled to a 
“living wage” as defined by this Court, namely, “sufficient to provide proper 
food, shelter, rest, clothing, and a condition of frugal comfort estimated by 
current human standards”’ (p. 376). He granted the 30s (56 per cent of the 
basic wage), saying that, in his view, the work done by women was worth 
this amount, whether or not it was a living wage. He does not seem to have 
considered the possibility that the living wage for a woman might be more 
than 30s—a defensible omission when he was granting the full amount of the 
union’s claim.
Powers referred briefly to female pay in the Public Service Clerks’ case (10 
CAR 58), decided in April 1916. The respondents admitted the equal value 
of male and female work, and Powers awarded equal pay in the classifications 
without discussing the possibility of a lower living wage component in the 
women’s rates.
Isaacs, serving temporarily as a Deputy President, made an award for 
journalists in April 1917 (11 CAR 67). With little comment, he noted that 
all provisions of the award applied to both sexes (p. 111). This, presumably, 
accorded with the practice of the trade. It could have been said, no doubt, that 
women were in competition with men.
Powers discussed the female living wage at greater length in May 1917, 
in the Theatrical and Amusement Employees’ case (11 CAR 133):
Before proceeding, I think it only right to mention that this Court has, 
since 1912, laid it down that women and men should be paid equal 
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wages if women are employed to do a man’s work—or where the work 
done by a woman is of as great a value as the man’s work.
It is only where the work in question is woman’s work—suitable work 
for women—that the Court awards what it considers the value of the 
work as woman’s work; or if the value is less than a living wage for a 
woman then it allows a living wage for a woman for a week’s work. (pp. 
145–146)
The ‘principles’ implied by this decision were, first, that the Court would 
identify the value of work. If this were work performed equally by men and 
women, its value would be assessed without regard to gender. If, however, it 
was ‘woman’s work’, it would be assessed as such. Powers did not discuss why 
the value of the work might be affected by gender. Second, any assessment 
of value might be overridden by the primary requirement of the living wage. 
Third, the living wage for women differed from that for men. The problem 
with this formula—apart from the large issue of assessing ‘value’—is that it 
did not describe the Court’s practice. For the Court did not determine first 
the value of work—male or female—and then superimpose a living wage, but 
rather it began with the basic wage and added to it ‘margins’ related to skill 
and the circumstances of the work. Even if equal margins were awarded, the 
difference in the base rate would apply at all levels in the pay structure.
Powers did give thought to the amount that a woman needed to support 
herself. Under an agreement of 1913 that was still in effect, the women’s wage 
was £1 5s. But, said Powers, the cost of living had increased,
and board and lodging in reasonable comfort cannot now be obtained 
in Melbourne or Sydney at less than 17s a week. Tram fares to and 
from the city where most of the work is done, it is said, average 3s a 
week. These two items on an average cost about £1 a week without 
allowance for even a light lunch. At the present wage [of ] £1 5s that 
would only leave 5s a week for clothes, laundry expenses, and the many 
other expenses that a woman must incur to live in reasonable comfort 
honestly. … On the evidence before me as to the increased cost of living 
and the greatly increased cost of clothes, I propose to fix £1 15s as 
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the minimum Federal wage for women working in the industry under 
existing circumstances for 48 hours. I know that is higher than has been 
allowed as a woman’s minimum wage, but the war prices do not justify 
me in allowing less. (p. 146)
The basic wage being set for males at this time was around £3 3s. Once again, 
the minimum female rate was 56 per cent of the basic wage.
In October 1918, Powers awarded bonuses related to the cost of living 
to lower-paid male public servants. He did not grant them to females, because 
no argument had been advanced for doing so (12 CAR 531, 609). In another 
public service case, about female note sorters and others doing similar work in 
government departments, Powers observed that the work was ‘admittedly work 
suitable for women’. The minimum rate—£110 per annum—was well below 
the minimum for males in the public service, but the employees’ association 
‘did not contend that the wage paid to adult females employed as sorters and 
checkers was less than a living wage, or call any evidence to show that it was 
not [adequate for their living costs]’ (13 CAR 69, 73).
Higgins in May 1919 returned to the question of the female living 
wage. This was in a Clothing Trades case (13 CAR 647). He awarded 65s—the 
amount claimed—as the basic wage for men. Referring back to Fruitpickers’, 
he said that ‘Mr B Seebohm Rowntree … takes practically the same view, that 
a woman’s minimum rate in women’s appropriate employments should not 
be a family rate’. After investigating the conditions of 516 women workers in 
York, and taking account of their responsibilities for dependants, Rowntree 
had estimated the appropriate post-war minimum rates as 44s for men and 
25s for women. Applying the same ratio in the case before Higgins would give 
a female minimum rate of nearly 37s. The union had claimed £2. It produced 
some ‘schedules of a few [seven] girls selected by the union officials’, but this 
was unsatisfactory evidence. (Its similarity to the kind of evidence provided, at 
Higgins’ urging, in Harvester is striking.) ‘There is’, said Higgins, ‘no subject as 
to which more care is necessary in the collection of evidence than the subject 
of the cost of living, and there is no subject on which less care is used. … 
But I must do my best on the materials available’ (p. 693). There was some 
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guidance from decisions of President Jethro Brown in South Australia and 
the New South Wales Board of Trade; and the Superintendent of a Domestic 
Arts Hostel had given evidence about clothing costs. Higgins allowed 22s for 
lodging and 12s 6d for clothing. Without commenting on other needs, he 
fixed a minimum wage for women of 35s.
Thirty-five shillings was the amount awarded by Powers two years 
earlier in the Theatrical and Amusement Employees’ case. In the interval, prices 
had risen about 12 per cent (March quarter numbers). The female minimum 
rate of 35s set by Higgins in Clothing Trades was 54 per cent of the male basic 
wage of 65s. Higgins noted that in Fruitpickers’ the relativity was 75 per cent, 
but did not comment on his choice of a lower fraction in Clothing Trades. The 
54 per cent relativity, which was to become the de facto standard until World 
War II, seems to have originated in the Clothing Trades case.
Higgins, in a further decision in the same case, given in October 1919, 
returned to the issue of gender-related pay differences. In the previous April, 
there was published in the United Kingdom a Cabinet Committee report on 
‘the relation which should be maintained between the wages of women and 
men’. The majority of the Committee held that ‘women doing similar or the 
same work should receive equal pay for equal work in the sense that pay should 
be in proportion to efficient output’. Higgins commented:
I confess that for the practical purpose of making an award in this case 
the attractive theory of paying according to ‘efficient output’ on time-
work rates seems to be unworkable. It is surely much better to leave 
it to the employer to select the person, man or woman, who seems to 
him most suitable for the job, but at the same time-work rate. … But 
it is important to notice that even this majority report does not favour 
a discrimination in wages on the mere ground of sex. The minority 
report of Mrs Sidney Webb is even more drastic. Mrs Webb … asserts—
‘That for the production of commodities and services women no more 
constitute a class than do persons of a particular creed or race.’ … To 
my mind, Mrs Webb’s conclusion is sounder for all practical purposes. 
The only difference between this lady’s position and the position which 
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I took up in the Fruit case is that I prescribed a lower minimum rate for 
women where they are engaged in what is distinctively women’s work, 
such as millinery. This difference seems to be due to the fact that I 
approached the subject from a somewhat different point of view, and 
that I gave more effect to the fact that, normally, women have not such 
responsibilities for supporting a family as a man has. This is also the 
position taken up by Mr Seebohm Rowntree … But on the question 
of wages in this tailoring industry, where men and women are fairly in 
competition, where employers would even (as I am told) prefer men but 
for women having lower wages, there seems to be no difference between 
Mrs Webb’s doctrine and the principle of the Fruit case. (pp. 703–704)
Higgins’ portrayal of his own position as somehow akin to Beatrice Webb’s 
is laughable. The very basis of the Court’s practice was that women were a 
separate class—separate both with respect to needs and with respect to their 
capacities to perform various kinds of work.
In June 1920, in the Marine Stewards’ case (14 CAR 392), Higgins 
said that the Court was called upon for the first time to fix the terms for 
stewardesses:
Equal rates are not claimed; and even if they were, I should be inclined to 
follow the system which I adopted in the Fruit case. As these stewardesses 
attend mainly to the needs of women and children passengers, as they 
do not compete with men, do not displace men by accepting a lower 
wage, as they do not normally have the responsibility, legal or actual, for 
a family, I do not think that a family wage is appropriate. In the Fruit 
case, I find that, for the reasons there stated, I prescribed for the women 
three-fourths of the minimum wage prescribed for men. In this case the 
Commonwealth Government has agreed to £9 per month; but for the 
1st saloon, or 2nd class saloon, or 3rd class stewardesses, £10. This seems 
to be a very fair arrangement, where the steward’s minimum is £13. (pp. 
399–400)
Because stewards and stewardesses received free on-board accommodation the 
relativities of female to male wages cannot be simply calculated, but it was 
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clearly more than 54 per cent. As Higgins indicated, he acquiesced in the view 
of one employer—the Commonwealth Government.
The 1920 Public Service case (14 CAR 639)—conducted shortly before 
the jurisdiction passed to the Public Service Arbitrator—was heard by Starke, 
serving as Deputy President of the Arbitration Court. He offered a rather 
different explanation of the gender difference in rates awarded by the Court: 
‘Experience shows’, he said,
that women have always been remunerated on a lower scale than men. 
… Typists, telephonists, sorters, and checkers illustrate this fact in the 
present case, and if their work were appraised on the same scale as that 
of men the tendency would be to close to them a most suitable avenue of 
employment. Again in positions such as assistants, in which both men 
and women are employed, the work is also very suitable for women, and 
a similar tendency must, in my opinion, develop if the Court makes 
no distinction on the ground of sex. ‘Equal pay for equal work’ is an 
attractive phrase, but it is ambiguous, and if equal pay would close or 
tend to close the door to women’s employment in suitable occupations 
then it can hardly be denied that the work is not equal. It is therefore 
expedient, in my opinion, that some distinction should be made on the 
ground of sex in the interests of women themselves, and also just from 
the point of view of the community which must find the money to 
remunerate its officers. (pp. 686–687)
Starke was the first member of the Court to include in his reasons the fact 
that women normally were paid less than men. If the Court were to impose 
equal rates, it would be departing from its own principles and reversing a 
pattern that prevailed independently of Court decisions. Starke was also the 
first to argue that unequal pay served the function of protecting women’s 
employment. Whereas Higgins, and to a lesser extent Powers, had emphasised 
the necessity of preserving male employment by granting equal pay where the 
sexes were in competition, Starke saw lower pay for women as an offset to their 
allegedly lesser value.
169Keith Hancock
In summary, the Court’s treatment of the minimum wage for women 
was confused. There was general agreement that, on average, women needed 
less than men, because of the difference in family responsibilities. There 
was no systematic attempt to quantify the difference, though in some cases 
attention was given to the actual needs of a single female worker. There was 
also agreement that there were some jobs that were men’s work and others that 
were women’s, though the criteria for distinguishing them were ill-defined. It 
is not so clear that there was recognition of gender-free work, but the judges, 
if asked, would probably have said that there was. In ‘women’s work’, females 
would be paid less. The main reason for this was the difference in needs, but 
in Starke’s Public Service decision there was also a suggestion that lower rates 
would preserve the employment opportunities for women that these tasks 
provided.3
In the period under review, there were decisions of State tribunals that 
contributed to the climate in which the Federal Court dealt with the gender 
issue.4
Mr Justice Cussen, in the Victorian State Court of Industrial Appeals, 
heard in 1913 an appeal from a decision of the Victorian Commercial Clerks’ 
Wages Board, which had prescribed equal rates for male and female clerks. The 
relevant State Act required the sex of the workers to be taken into account. 
Cussen expressed general agreement with Higgins’ approach in Fruitpickers’. 
The evidence indicated that if female clerks were paid as much as males, fewer 
would be employed. The principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ had a clear 
meaning when people worked on piece rates, but otherwise the problem of 
identifying equal and unequal work deprived it of practical value. If, in reality, 
3  Higgins also discussed gender pay differences in A New Province for Law and Order 
(1922, pp. 11–12): ‘The principle of the living wage has been applied to women, but with 
a difference, as women are not usually legally responsible for the maintenance of a family. 
A woman’s minimum is based on the average cost of her own living to one who supports 
herself by her own exertions. A woman or girl with a comfortable home cannot be left to 
underbid in wages other women or girls who are less fortunate.’ Higgins went on to describe 
the circumstances where women were paid the male rates and those where they were not, 
setting out the principles followed in Fruitpickers’.
4  I rely for these on Anderson (1929, Chapter XIX).
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‘equal pay for equal work’ meant that men and women should be paid the same 
amount, it failed to recognise that women were inferior to men in physical 
strength and endurance and the capacity for sustained work. If the principle 
meant that equal pay should be given for work of equal return to the employer, 
this implied that for unequal work there should be unequal pay; but this was 
opposed to the principle of the minimum wage, which was independent of 
result or value (Anderson 1929, pp. 406–408).
In 1917, the full Court of Industrial Arbitration in Queensland was 
asked to construe a requirement of the Industrial Arbitration Act 1916 that 
‘the same wage be paid to persons of either sex performing the same work or 
producing the same return of profit to the employer’. The Federated Clerks’ 
Union asked the Court to say that female clerks were doing the same work as 
males and should therefore be paid the same wages. The Court held that it was 
necessary to look behind the classifications and to inquire whether the work 
done was the same, not only in kind, but also in quantity and quality. This 
was a matter of evidence. If the Court or Board were satisfied that in this sense 
males and females were doing the same work, then it should fix the same wage; 
if not, different rates could be set (Anderson 1929, pp. 409–410). Clearly, 
however, the Queensland Act did not envisage differences based on need and 
was at odds with the practice of the Federal Court.
In two South Australian cases, in 1918 and 1919, President Jethro 
Brown in the Industrial Court considered the living wage for women. There 
was a statutory requirement that no worker be paid less than a living wage. In 
the Printing Trades case of 1918, Brown said that some women asked for wages 
to be assessed on the basis of equal pay for work of equal value; but a Court 
that tried to fix the minimum wage for unskilled labour on this basis would 
be lost in a sea of fallacy and contradiction. A judge was naturally driven to 
the standard of needs, which led to different results for men and women. In 
an industry where men might be threatened by female competition, evidence 
would need to be introduced to establish that they should be retained in the 
industry or the grade (Anderson 1929, pp. 397–399). In 1919, in the Women’s 
Living Wage (Cardboard Box Makers’) case, Brown sat with two women 
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assessors. The approach adopted was to start with the family living wage and 
work backwards to the living wage for single women. If this were assessed 
too liberally, the result would be unfair to women deprived of employment. 
The Court arrived at 30s per week (pp. 412–413). This was around half the 
amount then being set for males.
Clearly, unequal pay was the norm, reflecting several factors: custom 
and practice, a perception that women needed less than men because of their 
different family obligations, and resistance to any notion that women and 
men ordinarily performed work of equal value.
4.3 workIng hours
The Court, until 1921, was given to pronouncing a general rule of 48 hours 
per week. The 48 hours were usually worked over 5½ days—8¾ hours 
Monday to Friday and 4¼ hours on Saturday, or some variant thereof. 
There were exceptions to the 48-hour standard, based on existing practice 
in the industry concerned, the characteristics of particular jobs, and gender. 
The Commonwealth Statistician’s series for average hours, registering the 
requirements of statutes, awards, and registered agreements, begins in 1914 
(see Chapter 1, Subsection 1.3.5). It shows a gradual decline, in the case of 
males, from 48.9 hours in 1914 to 46.2 in 1921. For women, the reduction 
was from 49.1 hours in 1914 to 45.7 in 1921. The Court’s contribution to 
these reductions cannot be disentangled from that of agreements, State Acts, 
and State tribunals.
The Harvester wage of 7s per day was equated by Higgins and others to 
a weekly wage of 42s. But the 7s was simply a benchmark against which the 
rates being paid by employers could be judged. There was no requirement that 
the employer actually employ the worker for a whole day, let alone a week; and 
we saw in Chapter 3 that H V McKay’s practice was to suspend payment when 
work was interrupted by a breakdown in the machinery. The Excise Tariff Act 
1906 did not require the employer to get a certificate that the working hours, 
as well as the wages, were ‘fair and reasonable’. It might have allowed Higgins 
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to specify that the fair and reasonable wage was for 48 hours per week, but the 
unions did not claim this and it was not argued. This, no doubt, reflected a 
shared assumption that the wage was intended for 48 hours.
In his early awards, Higgins adhered to the 48-hour standard. There 
was a minor departure in the Builders’ Labourers’ case of 1913 (8 CAR 15), 
when he granted a 44-hour week, but on the condition of a reduction in 
wages commensurate with the hourly rate for 48 hours. In the Waterside 
Workers’ case of 1914 (8 CAR 53), he dealt with the issue of irregular hours in 
casual employment. Treating the waterside worker as an unskilled labourer, he 
sought to fix an hourly rate that would, over the week, provide 8s 6d per day. 
Adopting an estimate of 30 hours per week, he set an hourly rate of 1s 9d. ‘If 
a man keeps a horse’, said Higgins,
he has to feed the horse on days when he does not use him, as well as on 
the days when he does. If he keep two or more horses, and use them in 
rotation, they must be fed all the time. If people expect cabmen to be 
ready for a call at the stand, they must pay an extra rate to cover the time 
lost in waiting. It would be absurd to say, as has been urged here, that 
the obligation of the master ceases with the actual physical exertion. (p. 
73)
This decision did not entail any softening of the 48-hour rule but affected its 
application to irregular employment.
By 1914, however, there were some departures from the rule, based on 
the characteristics of the work. In the Telegraphic Linesmen’s case (8 CAR 119), 
Higgins dealt with a group of workers who were already on a 46-hour week, 
but whose union sought a reduction to 44. Higgins said that there would 
need to be some special ground for moving even further from ‘the Australian 
standard’ of 48 hours:
I never depart from that standard except for some special reason; and 
the burden lies on the Union to show me a sufficient special reason. In 
the case of the builders’ labourers, I prescribed forty-four hours, because 
the men have to ‘follow the jobs’ from place to place, and lose much 
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time in coming from and going to their homes. In the case of the postal 
electricians, I prescribed forty-four hours, because there is much indoor 
work, and much racking of the nerves. But, except in such work as 
tunnel work, these linesmen carry on their operations, almost wholly, 
in the open air; and there is little or no irritation to the nerves. I confess 
that I should like to see the hours of actual work reduced to eight on 
five days in the week, with a half-holiday on Saturday; but I do not feel 
justified in making the reduction. Except in an extreme case, it is for 
Parliament, not for this Court, to interfere with the existing standard 
of hours. (p. 135)
The principle that it was for Parliament rather than the Court to change 
the standard week was repeated several times by both Higgins and Powers. 
Neither ever explained why this potential cause of industrial disputation 
differed from others; or how the prescription of standard hours by the federal 
legislature could be supported by the Constitution.
In 1915, Higgins granted a 44-hour week (instead of the existing 46½ 
hours) for letter carriers, because of the broken day that they worked and the 
consequent length of time (5:30am to 5:45pm) from beginning to end (9 
CAR 52, 81).
In the BHP case of 1916 (10 CAR 155), conducted in the aftermath of 
a strike about working hours, he said that it was his duty ‘to accept recognised 
standards, not to create them’ and that ‘if a further general limitation of hours 
has to be made, it ought to be made deliberately by the Legislatures’ (pp. 
185–186). But the adverse health effects of mining were a special factor. While 
it was his practice not to increase wages because of risk to body or health, the 
risk could well be taken into account on a question of hours (p. 187). He was, 
apparently, leaning to a reduced working week for the miners; but before he 
gave his decision, the New South Wales Parliament prescribed a maximum of 
88 hours per fortnight for underground work. This Act, said Higgins, ‘will 
have to be obeyed whatever I award’ (p. 190). He granted a 44-hour week for 
underground men, but refused it for others.
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Making the first award for the meat industry in 1916 (10 CAR 465), 
he refused the 44-hour week for abattoir workers: there were no unhealthy 
or dangerous conditions such as those of miners (p. 491). For shop butchers, 
existing hours ranged between 50 and 52. Higgins prescribed 48 hours, to be 
worked between 6am and 6pm Monday to Friday and between 6am and 1pm 
on Saturdays. For carters and drivers, all of the wages board determinations 
that he had seen prescribed more than 48 hours. Given the variety and open-
air character of the work, he did not feel justified in enforcing the 48-hour 
standard, and awarded 52 (pp. 491–496).
In the Storemen and Packers’ case of 1916 (10 CAR 629), the union 
sought a 44-hour week on the ground of the strenuous character of the work. 
Powers was unconvinced. But since the case had begun, the union had reached 
agreement with New South Wales employers for 48 hours for 6 months of 
the year and 44 for the other 6, and with Queensland employers for 46. In 
the wool stores at Port Adelaide 45½ to 46 hours ‘have for some time been 
recognised as the hours of duty … In Adelaide, again, the recognised hours 
have always been 48’. Powers set a maximum of 46 hours in Melbourne wool 
stores from 1 April to 30 September and at Port Adelaide 46 hours throughout 
the year. He fixed Saturday finishing times at 12.00 or 12.30 (pp. 635–637). 
Clearly, the negotiators were leading the arbitrator. Likewise in the Miners’ 
case (10 CAR 681; 11 CAR 17), Powers observed that 44 hours prevailed 
in New South Wales, Victoria, and Queensland. He did not feel justified in 
retaining 48 hours for Mount Lyall and two other mines when the 44-hour 
week was general for underground work in the eastern States.
Powers was asked in 1917 to set a maximum of 48 hours in the Theatrical 
and Amusement Employees’ award (11 CAR 133). The employers said that a 60-
hour week was absolutely essential and that they paid extra for it (apparently 
at standard rates). Powers provided for a 48-hour week, with the effect that 
work in excess of 48 hours was at higher rates. ‘In that way’, he said, ‘the wage 
for 48 hours for a resident carpenter will be £4 12s, and if I had fixed 60 hours 
it would have been £5 15s for 48 hours and overtime, and if 60 hours are 
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worked it will amount to £6 5s 6d.’ That is, fixing the standard week at 48 
hours had the effect of raising the pay of the 60-hour worker by 10s 6d.
In the 1917 Pastoral case (11 CAR 389), Higgins refused the union’s 
plea for a limit of 44 hours, rather than 48, for shearers’ work: ‘I cannot find 
any sufficient ground for departing from the Australian standard of 48 hours. 
One does not find here any conditions analogous to the conditions of builders’ 
labourers, or of miners’ (p. 408).
The Gas Employees’ case of 1917 (11 CAR 267) is of interest because 
Higgins commented on inequitable differences in working hours. Some gas 
companies had conceded working weeks of fewer than 48 hours. ‘But the 
question remains’ said Higgins, ‘should I force it on [other] employers?’:
It is evident that … the men of the union contrast their treatment with 
the treatment of the office staff. In the South Australian company, for 
instance, it appears that the employees of the staff, clerks and others, have 
38½ hours of work, get all holidays on full pay, and also get fourteen 
days per annum leave of absence on full pay. How is this difference 
between the office staff and the employees at the works to be justified? 
… If I granted the claim, I should be altering recognised standards; and 
as in the case of the 48 hour week, the Australian standard of hours, I 
do not like to take on myself the responsibility of altering recognised 
standards except on very definite exceptional grounds. … I confess that 
I should like to see leave of absence conceded, as the metropolitan Gas 
Company concedes it, voluntarily. The concession may have a good 
basis even in business expediency, as tending to keep tried men attached 
to the works. It is not well that all the relations between employer and 
employed should rest on compulsion. I refuse the claim. (pp. 284–285)
The seeming inequity was again illustrated in the Commonwealth Public 
Service Professional Officers’ case of 1917 (12 CAR 114), a case that concerned 
343 officers in the Professional Division. Higgins noted that the working week 
was 36¾ hours, with the officers also enjoying 18 days of recreation leave.
Disparities were also evident in the terms of a consent award for hotels 
made by Higgins in April 1919 (13 CAR 84). There were differences between 
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States, but the provisions for Victoria can be taken as an example (pp. 106–
111). Adults who handled or distributed liquor, other than barmaids, had a 
working week of 54 hours, for which the pay was 61s. (At the time, the basic 
wage in new awards was around 65s.) Barmaids had a 50-hour week for 44s. 
For other kinds of labour specified in the award, the hours were 58 (males) and 
56 (females). The male rates of pay, without board and lodging, ranged from 
44s (day porter, pantryman, kitchenman) to 79s (first cook where kitchen staff 
exceeded eight); for females, the range was 32s (pantrymaid, kitchenmaid) to 
53s (first cook, more than eight employees). I cite the rates of pay lest it be 
thought that the long hours were compensated by higher wages. Clearly, the 
‘Australian standard’ of 48 hours was not universal.
In May 1919, Higgins made a new award for the meat industry (13 
CAR 153). The only change to working hours was for carters and drivers 
(previously 52 hours). The employers wanted 50 hours. Higgins prescribed an 
option of 48 or 50 hours, with the extra two hours to be paid at ordinary rates.
Powers in July made a new general award for carters and drivers (13 
CAR 214). The existing working week was 50 hours (48 for motor drivers). 
‘The war is now over’, he said,
and many old conditions are passing away and will pass away in all 
countries by granting fair conditions to workers or by revolutions which 
can only make things worse for every one. In Old England industries 
which were working 56 to 60 hours are working and have to prepare 
to work 48 hours a week. The Sunlight Company recently reduced its 
hours of duty to 36 hours instead of 48 hours without any reduction 
of wages. The League of Nations has declared for 48 hours a week and 
Australians are not likely to rest content with longer hours now the war 
is over. … I do not see why carters and drivers should continue to be 
forced to remain on duty longer than 48 hours a week for wages based 
on the recognised basic wage for 48 hours. (p. 230)
Powers granted the 48-hour week.
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Higgins, in 1919, made a new award for the clothing trades (13 CAR 
647). The workers were predominantly female, and at Higgins’ request the 
Attorney-General ‘appointed a lady, highly qualified for the purpose, to 
make a report to me as to the appropriate hours for females, having regard to 
health, efficiency, and output’ (p. 689). In due course, Mrs Osborne, from ‘the 
University’, tendered her report, favouring 44 hours. Drawing upon it, Higgins 
made much of the draining conditions, especially noise, in the factories. He 
was concerned, too, that some factories, at the girls’ urging, worked the 48 
hours over five days, which was bad for them (p. 706). He proposed to grant 
the claim for 44 hours,
and inasmuch as this is mainly a women’s industry, the women in the 
union outnumbering the men by nearly five to one, the hours fixed 
must be the hours appropriate for the women. In the factories it would, 
indeed, rarely pay the employer to spend electric power and light for the 
few men who would be left; and, as I have pointed out, the whole team 
system would be deranged, and discontent would be aroused. (p. 711)
The clothing trades decision could be seen as part of a slow erosion of 
the 48-hour standard. From another perspective, it met the requirement that 
some special factor or factors should be present to justify a deviation from 
the ‘Australian standard’. The same ambivalence is evident in the decision of 
Powers, in March 1920, in the Flour Mills case (14 CAR 114). The employers 
had not raised their customary dire predictions about the effects of shorter 
hours. Powers presented a broad view of the issue:
The recognised working hours in industries have been reduced by the 
Court where it is considered necessary to do so in the interests of the 
health of the employees, and in some other cases where the recognised 
hours have been more than 48 hours. … I reduced the recognised hours 
for horse-drivers in the carriers’ industry from 56 hours to 48 hours per 
week; in the theatrical business from 60 hours to 48 hours; and in the 
mining industry for underground workers from 48 hours to 44 in the 
States in which 48 hours were previously worked.
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In all civilised countries in the world it appears the workers have, at the 
present time, decided that the hours of duty they were required to work 
before the war were not fair and were not necessary; and very many large 
employers of labour in England and America have found that they were 
not necessary, from any point of view, and have granted much shorter 
hours than were recognised as necessary before the war. The workers 
generally have decided to work shorter hours than they did before 1914; 
and if they cannot get shorter hours from Parliament; and if this Court 
will not even consider claims for shortening the hours … the workers 
will secure them in their own way by not working more than the hours 
they fix, whether reasonable or unreasonable. … In the light of the fact 
that it has been proved that shorter hours, with rest periods, enable 
workers to produce as much as they produced working longer hours, 
this Court must, I think, reconsider the position as to claims for shorter 
hours, especially as the federal Parliament cannot properly legislate on 
matters left to the States and the different States from time to time fix 
different hours in the same industries. (pp. 123–128)
It would have been reasonable to infer, in 1920, that Higgins and Powers 
were feeling their way toward a more general reduction of hours.
At this time, the Government brought in legislation to amend the 
Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904, requiring that reductions 
in hours below 48 per week, along with all increases in hours, be approved by 
a Full Court.5 This was the first legislative endorsement of the practice of 
important issues being dealt with by multiple judges. Consistency, to the extent 
that it had previously been achieved, turned on the respect that the judges 
(Higgins and Powers particularly) accorded to each other’s decisions. Starke 
alluded to the impending change, with evident approval (which Higgins and 
5  The change was contained in an amendment moved by the Government in the committee 
stage of a Bill that was said to be chiefly a machinery matter (92 CPD, pp. 3593; 4076; 
4077). The amendment allowed the appointment of more than one Deputy President and 
authorised multiple-judge benches, but the requirement of a Full Court was limited to hours. 
No explanation was given for this, other than the fact that the basic wage was then under 
review by a Royal Commission. Suspicions were expressed by the Labor Opposition that it 
was directed against Higgins.
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Powers might or might not have endorsed), in the Commonwealth Railways 
case (14 CAR 496):
The Court is not dealing with principles or rules of law in which the 
settled practice is for one Judge to accept and loyally carry out the 
decisions of another Judge of equal authority until reversed by higher 
authority. It is dealing with matters of fact; with what is just and proper 
in the circumstances of a given case, and its award, on matters within 
the Court’s jurisdiction, is not open to challenge or appeal in any other 
Court on any account whatever. On such a vital point as the reduction 
of hours, each member of the Court must therefore give the matter 
separate and independent consideration and cannot shelter himself 
from responsibility under cover of an award in another case. It is to be 
regretted, in my opinion, that the members of the Court do not, and 
perhaps cannot, in the present state of the law, sit and hear together 
matters such as this. A most difficult and an intolerable position may 
easily arise. (p. 567)
The new requirement did not apply to matters already begun—an 
exclusion that allowed Higgins to make two important decisions, for timber 
workers and engineers.6
In May 1920, he had given a preliminary indication of his thinking 
in the Timber Workers’ case (14 CAR 811). He then decided to substitute 
weekly for hourly hiring, noting that hitherto the men had gone without pay 
when the work was interrupted, even if the causes were outside their control. 
He rejected the union contention that the dusty and unhealthy conditions 
in sawmills justified a shorter working week. But that was not the end of the 
matter:
The question still remains, are 48 hours necessary, are 48 hours 
appropriate, for industries generally, under present conditions. May 44 
hours be prescribed unless special reasons be shown to the contrary … 
At present we have established in Australia a standard of 48 hours per 
6  This exclusion was introduced near the end of the debate on the clause, possibly to counter 
the anti-Higgins interpretation.
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week—a standard long envied by workers in other countries, a standard 
which is now being generally adopted. But we have not in Australia 
established the 8 hours day. In order to get the boon of a Saturday 
half-holiday, the workers here have to add three-quarters of an hour, 
generally, to the 8 hours … Is this sacrifice to continue for ever? The 
unions do not now, so far as my experience goes, keep up the hopeless 
fight against new machinery; but are they to get no direct advantage 
from the introduction of labour-saving devices? (pp. 841–842)
This was not an issue for one industry. In the course of the hearing, 
the representative of an employer body contended that changing standard 
hours was a matter for the legislature—a position that Higgins and Powers 
had previously adopted. ‘I shall be very glad’, said Higgins, ‘if the Legislature 
would take it in hand, but as it has not done so, I must act. The difficulty is 
that this question is continually coming up before me’ (p. 845).
He adjourned the matter to allow the Council of Employers and the 
Trades Hall Councils to put evidence and arguments and delivered a further 
judgment in November 1920. The federal government had declined an 
invitation to appear; and the Federal Council of Employers, having said that 
it intended to appear, failed to do so. The decision sets out at great length 
instances of the introduction of 44 hours in Australia and overseas. Higgins saw 
as one of the main issues the likely effect of shorter hours on production. His 
conclusion was equivocal. The unions had not satisfied him that the reduction 
of hours would have no adverse effect; nor had the employers satisfied him 
that any effect would be proportional to the reduction in hours. Another 
issue was the claim of workers on the benefits of increased use of machinery. 
The employers agreed that machinery did raise output, but denied that the 
workers had any claim upon the increase: they were neither the inventors nor 
the patentees. Inventions, said Higgins, were a social product, to which the 
workers often made unrecognised contributions. Consumers benefited from 
the greater cheapness that machinery caused; and the employer who was not 
the inventor got the benefit of higher profit. Why should the employee not 
share in the benefit by a reduction of working hours? (p. 862)
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Higgins reduced the weekly hours for timber workers to 44, with the 
clear indication that he saw this as a new standard.7 There was, however, only 
one other case not covered by the amendment to the Act. This was the ASE 
case, decided by Higgins in May 1921 (15 CAR 297). In respect of hours, his 
decision was brief. ‘In accordance with my decision in the timber workers’ 
case’, he said, ‘I propose to make 44 hours per week the limit for ordinary 
hours of work—the limit unless payment be made for the overtime’ (p. 320).
Thus Higgins, at the end of his tenure, was clearly of a mind to substitute 
a 44-hour standard week for the earlier 48 hours. As we see in Section 6.3 of 
Chapter 6, the continuing members of the Court, influenced by deteriorating 
economic conditions, were not persuaded.
4.4 other awarded benefIts
In the Higgins years, there were few other alterations in working conditions 
which could be attributed to the Court’s intervention. Provisions of awards 
going to leave and penalty rates were commonly among the terms settled by 
the parties on which the Court was not required to arbitrate.
In our discussion of the Harvester case, we noted that employees of H V 
McKay had no paid leave. Various holidays were taken, but no payment was 
made. Higgins was not invited to interfere with this arrangement. He might 
have taken the unpaid leave into account in assessing the fairness of McKay’s 
wages, but there is no evidence in the transcript or the decision that he did so. 
I do not know how typical McKay’s practice was in 1907. Some later decisions 
of the Court suggest that it had become usual for employers to allow paid leave 
on a number of special days. In 1915, Powers fixed the holidays to be observed 
in the mining industry, the employers having resisted the extent of the union 
claim:
7  Higgins described this case in A New Province for Law and Order (Higgins 1922, pp. 124–
125). He said: ‘But the Court refused to accept the argument for the union to the effect that 
hours should be lowered because thereby more men would have to be employed; it treated 
relief from the bane of unemployment on such a ground as illusory’.
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The majority of respondents allow their employees the number of days 
asked for, but do not grant a holiday for State and federal elections. 
Some employers allow holidays at Christmas from Christmas Eve to 
the 3rd January and other days in the year. It was not shown that any 
employee was ever prevented from voting at elections. I propose to allow 
as a minimum New Year’s Day, Good Friday or Easter Monday, Eight 
Hours Day, Christmas Day, Boxing Day, and Union Picnic Day, or 
ANA, or such other day or days in lieu of any of the days named as the 
local officers of the Organisation and the respective respondents agree 
to recognise as a holiday. (Mining Employees’ case 9 CAR 330, 369)
The number of holidays in awards was commonly eight or nine. In 
1918, in the Coopers’ case, Higgins observed: ‘As the respondents consent to a 
picnic day, I prescribe 9 holidays’ (12 CAR 427, 444).
Annual leave was common in the public sector, but not in private 
employment. The Court was reluctant to grant it, except where the employees 
worked seven-day weeks. In November 1916 Powers had contemplated making 
a leave provision in a storemen and packers’ award, but after the speaking to 
the minutes said that annual holidays were not as general as he had thought:
I asked Mr Pemberton [for the union] to point out any agreement or 
award under which storemen and packers outside the Government 
service are allowed an annual holiday but he could not do so; and 
I find on inquiry that no such award has been made by this Court 
except to persons on ships who do not get the ordinary holidays, 
Saturday afternoons, and Sundays off, and to public servants. … In 
the circumstances, as it is objected to, I do not propose to cause unrest 
and dissatisfaction in other industries by granting an annual holiday to 
the members of this organization who are being granted increased pay, 
increased overtime, more public holidays, and shorter hours in the wool 
and grain business. (Storemen and Packers’ case 10 CAR 629, 659–660)
I do not recount in detail the Court’s other interventions in prescribing 
the terms of employment. There had been a variety of decisions made in 
specific cases and commonly based on special factors, all of which amounted 
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to a not inconsiderable overall improvement. Chapter 5 will note the attempts 
of Powers and Webb to demonstrate the substantial gains made by labour 
under the aegis of the Court.

CaUTION aND ResTRaINT: 1921–1929

5.1 the court
Powers became President of the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and 
Arbitration on 1 July 1921. (He left the Court in April 1920, but returned as 
Deputy President in February 1921.) Two other judges of the High Court—
Duffy and Rich—were appointed Deputy Presidents in August 1921. They 
resigned in June 1922 and two lawyers who were not High Court Judges—
Quick and Webb—were appointed as Deputy Presidents.1 From then until 
1926, the members of the Court were Powers, Quick, and Webb. In June 
1926, Powers relinquished his position, and the Court was reconstituted in 
response to a High Court requirement that judicial functions be exercised 
only by judges with life tenure. A chief justice (Dethridge) and two judges 
(Lukin and Beeby) were appointed.2 Another judge (Drake-Brockman) was 
appointed in April 1927.3 Neither Quick nor Webb was given judicial status 
1  An amendment to the Act had removed the requirement for Deputy Presidents to be drawn 
from the High Court. Sir John Quick was a distinguished jurist, active in the federation 
movement, and a former politician. N A Webb was a former Adelaide solicitor and Deputy 
President of the South Australian Industrial Court.
2  George Dethridge was a judge of the Victorian County Court; in 1919 he had been a 
Royal Commissioner inquiring into conditions of wharf labourers at Port Melbourne. Lionel 
Lukin had recently resigned from the Queensland Supreme Court. George Beeby had been a 
controversial politician in New South Wales. Since 1920, he had been a Judge of the Industrial 
Court of Arbitration and President of the Board of Trade. Biographies of these judges and 
Drake-Brockman (see the next footnote) appear in the Dictionary of Australian Biography.
3  Edmund Alfred Drake-Brockman was a former President of the Central Council of 
The setting
5
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in the reconstituted Court. Webb resigned as Deputy President in February 
1927. Quick remained until 1930 so as to complete the making of awards for 
the railway industry.4
A reading of the Commonwealth Arbitration Reports gives the impression 
of a rising work load for the Court. Various industries came under its awards 
for the first time, partly as a consequence of High Court decisions about the 
Arbitration Court’s jurisdiction (Kirby and Creighton 2004). Railways and 
printing were perhaps the most important. Speaking at the welcome to Drake-
Brockman in April 1927, Attorney-General Latham referred to the rise in 
the number of matters pending as the reason for the additional appointment. 
There is no entirely satisfactory statistical evidence of the extent of the Court’s 
influence. The Labour Reports for these years provide data of changes in wages. 
They show that in the five years 1919–23, the number of workpeople who 
experienced wage changes averaged 796,000 per year; by 1924–29 the number 
had increased to 1,170,000. Between the two periods, the proportion of these 
workpeople whose wage changes flowed from Commonwealth awards and 
registered agreements increased from 23 to 63 per cent. Measuring the changes 
by amount, rather than numbers of workpeople, gives a rather different 
impression. The amount of the changes, in weekly terms, fell from £194,000 
to £84,000. In 1919–23, Commonwealth awards and agreements accounted 
for 17 per cent of the monetary changes; in 1924–29, the percentage was 
28. The difference between the two measures may be due substantially to 
the automatic adjustment system, whereby there were frequent small changes 
in Commonwealth awards, whereas under the State arbitration systems there 
were occasional larger increases. These data suggest a rise in Commonwealth 
coverage, but the statistical evidence is tenuous.
Foenander (1937, pp. 26–27) offered a less equivocal account of the 
Court’s de facto authority:
Employers of Australia and his appointment generated strong union condemnation. He was 
a Senator from Western Australia from 1924 to 1926 (Hagan 1981, pp. 87–88; Plowman 
1989, p. 18).
4  A M Stewart, who had been Registrar since the inception of the Court, was appointed in 
1926 as a Conciliation Commissioner and combined the two functions.
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It will be understood that, by the close of the year 1926, the 
Commonwealth Court had, in point of prestige and authority, 
far outstripped its sister tribunals in the States. The balance in the 
arrangement of a dual concurrent industrial control between the 
Commonwealth and the States had tilted strongly in favour of the 
Commonwealth. Of approximately 2,000,000 wage-earners in 
Australia, about 711,000 were members of Federal trade unions and 
139,000 were registered with industrial associations not affiliated 
with the Commonwealth Court. In round figures, therefore, 84 per 
cent of Australian trade unionists were subject directly to the Federal 
jurisdiction. But the State industrial authorities as a whole have always, 
in their decisions, been strongly influenced by Federal award rates. 
This is particularly so in Victoria and Tasmania, and even in the non-
industrial States (Queensland and Western Australia) the bearing is 
fairly well marked. On an estimate it can be calculated that the awards 
of the Federal Court directly extended to somewhat more than one-
third of the workers of Australia. Indirectly, however—by reason of the 
tendency of State authorities and employers of non-union labour to be 
guided by the Federal decisions—Commonwealth awards could be said 
to be decisive in determining the general level of wages and conditions 
in Australian industries.
I have no difficulty with Foenander’s estimate of a one-third direct coverage 
of federal awards. The indirect effects are more conjectural, and Foenander 
may have exaggerated the readiness of State authorities to fall in line with 
the Court’s decisions. The Depression would underscore their exercise of an 
independent role.
A significant development affecting the Court’s ability to conduct a 
wage policy and to displace State regulation was the 1926 decision of the High 
Court in Clyde Engineering Company v Cowburn (37 CLR 466; Foenander 
1937, p. 26). New South Wales legislation in 1925 provided for a general 
44-hour week. Earlier decisions of the High Court suggested that the State 
law providing for the 44-hour week would be binding in New South Wales 
on employers operating under federal awards. This was because 48 hours in 
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federal awards represented a maximum, and it was possible for an employer to 
comply with the State Act without violating the federal award. Cowburn’s case, 
however, established that where a federal award prescribed working hours, 
the State law as to hours was of no effect as between the parties to the federal 
award. If the Federal Court intended to ‘cover the field’—in this instance the 
‘field’ of working hours—the award displaced the State law.
The Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 was extensively 
amended in 1928 (Anderson 1928). The changes were due in large measure 
to criticisms of the operation of the system, some of which are described in 
Chapter 13 (see also Foenander 1937, chapters II, III, and IV). For this study, 
a relevant amendment was the insertion of section 28D, which required the 
Court, except when dealing with the basic wage, to take into account the 
economic effects of its decisions. In the event, this section was repealed in 
1930. It does not seem to have affected the Court’s decision-making in the 
interval between enactment and repeal.
Continuing dissatisfaction with the conciliation and arbitration system, 
intensified by the British Economic Mission (see Chapter 13), together with a 
recommendation from the Royal Commission on the Constitution, crystallised 
in the Bruce Government’s decision to abandon federal conciliation and 
arbitration and to the ensuing fall of the Government in October 1929.
5.2 the economIc clImate
There are considerable uncertainties and differences of opinion about the 
performance of the economy in the 1920s. Not the least of the sources of 
uncertainty are the differences between the GDP estimates of Butlin and 
Haig, discussed in Chapter 1. Figure 5.1 shows the alternative estimates. It 
draws upon the same data as those represented in Figure 1.1, but converts the 
estimates to a base of 1920–21 = 100. We saw in Chapter 2 that there was a 
sizeable increase in the real GDP between 1919–20 and 1920–21—larger on 
Butlin’s estimates than on Haig’s. Butlin’s figures suggest that the real GDP 
then increased slowly until 1922–23, with a more rapid increase occurring 
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between the latter year and 1924–25, when the GDP peaked at 16 per cent 
above its level of four years earlier. For the remainder of the decade, on Butlin’s 
estimates, the real GDP stagnated. Haig depicts a much stronger growth, with 
the peak occurring in 1928–29 at 32 per cent above the 1920–21 level. There 
is a modicum of agreement that the growth rate of the earlier 1920s tailed off 
in the latter part of the decade. If the alternative estimates are related to other 
evidence of the economic history of the period, it may be conjectured that:
•	 Haig’s more exuberant picture conforms better to the known 
technological and structural changes of the 1920s, including 
the spread of electrical energy, the increasing use of cars and 
trucks, and the emergence of various new industries (Merrett 
and Ville 2011).
Figure 5.1
Source: See Figure 1.1.
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•	 Butlin’s estimates are the more plausible for the period from 
1920–21 to 1922–23. Contemporary evidence is that this 
was a period of some economic difficulty, unlikely to have 
witnessed the kind of growth suggested by Haig.
•	 The downturn after 1924–25, suggested by Butlin’s estimates, 
may be too early. Haig’s estimates, suggesting that the period 
of growth came to an end in about 1926–27, seem more 
probable as to timing (though not necessarily as to the level 
of the index).
•	 There is abundant evidence that the later 1920s were a difficult 
period, and Butlin’s estimates, which suggest that the loss of 




It is, of course, an unsatisfactory situation that the accuracy of the GDP 
estimates has to be guessed on the basis of more general information, rather than 
the GDP estimates being taken as a firm measure of economic performance. 
But that is the fact of the matter.
Figure 5.2, based on Butlin’s estimates, shows the movements of the 
main components of the GDP. As in the earlier period, the contributions of 
the rural sector to the GDP were volatile, but there is no clear sign of a trend. 
The principal source of growth was manufacturing, which contributed 12 
per cent of the GDP in 1920–21 and 16 per cent in 1929–30. Distributive 
industries constituted a growing sector of the economy until 1924–25, but 
thereafter declined. Construction, for most of the period, contributed 8 to 9 
per cent of the GDP, but was a smaller contributor in 1920–21 and at the end 
of the period.
Haig’s estimates of the components of the GDP are shown in Figure 5.2A. 
Once again, Haig’s estimates for the rural sector suggest less volatility than do 
Butlin’s estimates for agriculture (which includes the pastoral industry). Haig’s 
rural estimates also indicate a rising trend. There is rough agreement about a 
rising trend in manufacturing, though Haig suggests an earlier levelling-off of 
growth than does Butlin. Butlin’s estimates suggest a rise until 1924–25 and 
then a decline in the contribution of distribution, while Haig’s estimates for 
services in general show growth until 1926–27 and then a levelling-off. Taking 
the two sets of estimates into account, we can reasonably say that during the 
decade there was a modest growth in the share of manufacturing and services 
in the economy. Little more can be said with confidence.
Forster (1987), relying on Butlin’s estimates, saw the period from the end 
of the 1880s to the end of the 1930s as a time when the growth in population 
and the workforce roughly matched the growth in output. ‘It would be an 
overstatement’, he said, ‘to say that output per head was stationary, and indeed 
the quantitative estimates of national income must be treated cautiously, but 
any growth in output per head was small’ (p. 4). In this, Australia’s experience 
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contrasted with those of many other Western countries and its own experience 
in earlier and later periods.
It is always difficult to identify the contribution of policy to economic 
change. The growth in population—in which immigration played a significant 
part—and the growth of manufacturing both accorded with the objectives of 
government. But governments also wanted continued growth in agriculture 
and invested heavily in infrastructure to encourage it. Much of the farm 
sector, however, had a difficult time. This was due partly to climate; and the 
government-sponsored schemes of agricultural settlement placed many of 
new farmers on land that was marginal. The tariff raised the cost of some of 
the items that farmers bought, and the sale of much of the rural product in 
external markets meant that there was little opportunity to recoup higher costs 
through adjustment of prices. Policy pursued objectives that were not entirely 
consonant—an expanded total population, a bigger agricultural sector, a 
Figure 5.2A
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growing manufacturing sector shielded against foreign competition, and high 
labour standards.
If the 1920s could be considered a period of restored normality, they 
could hardly be seen as times of prosperity. Unemployment in 1921 was 11.2 
per cent, and in 1922 it was 9.3 per cent. Thereafter, the annual rates ranged 
between 7.0 and 11.1 per cent, the average for the years 1923–29 being 8.7 
per cent. These rates were well above the pre-war level. The Australia-wide 
and State percentages are shown in Figure 5.3. These percentages, as we have 
previously noted, are computed from returns submitted by trade unions. (I 
have referred in Subsection 1.2.3 of Chapter 1 to the limited checks on the 
reliability of the data afforded by the censuses.) The slump of 1921, persisting 
until early 1923, is evident in the national average. If we put that aside, it is 
Figure 5.3
Source: Labour Report, various numbers.
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difficult to find any clear trend in the data. Unemployment nationally was 
at its lowest at the end of 1926. Thereafter, there was a substantial increase. 
The different States varied strikingly. Queensland’s relative position improved, 
while South Australia’s deteriorated. In the early 1920s New South Wales 
experienced more severe unemployment than Victoria, but, as the decade 
progressed, unemployment in these two large States converged.
5.3 wages and prIces
5.3.1 Nominal wage rates
Figure 5.4 describes the movement across the decade of the nominal wages 
of adult males. Over the period of 9¾ years represented in this chart, the 
Australia-wide increase averaged 1.4 per cent per year. The fluctuations that 
were evident in the early years gave way, from the end of 1923, to a more stable 
rate of increase. Queensland was generally a high-wage State; South Australia 
and Tasmania, low-wage States. New South Wales became a high-wage State 
in the late 1920s.
5.3.2 Retail prices
The movement of retail prices is shown in Figure 5.5. This is based on the 
C series (‘All Items’) price index rather than the A series or B series indices. 
The A and B series indices were confined to food, groceries, and rent. The All 
Items Index includes those items but also clothing and miscellaneous items, 
the additional components being modelled on the Piddington Commission’s 
regimen of households’ requirements. Chapter 2 used the A series numbers 
because they were available for a greater proportion of the relevant period. We 
now refer to the C series Index because of its greater comprehensiveness, despite 
the Court’s continued reliance on the food, groceries, and rent index numbers 
for basic wage adjustment. (In Subsection 5.3.5, I return to the divergence of 
the indices because of its relevance to the basic wage.) Figure 5.5 demonstrates 
the dramatic fall in prices which occurred in 1921 and 1922. Over the two 
years from the last quarter of 1920 to the last quarter of 1922, the reduction 
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in the six-capitals number was 16.5 per cent. Thereafter, the index fluctuated 
around a slowly rising trend. In the third quarter of 1929, it was 7.6 per cent 
higher than in the last quarter of 1922. Prices were conspicuously lower in 
Brisbane than in the other capitals. In the latter part of the decade, Sydney 
prices rose significantly above those of the other capital cities.
5.3.3 Real wages
Deflating the nominal wages represented in Figure 5.4 by the retail prices 
described in Figure 5.5, we get the real wage levels shown in Figure 5.6. A 
combination of rising nominal wages and falling prices had the effect that 
over one year—from the last quarter of 1920 to the last quarter of 1921—real 
Figure 5.4
Source: Labour Report, various numbers.
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wages rose by 21 per cent. Thereafter, however, changes were slight. Between 
the fourth quarter of 1921 and the third quarter of 1929, the average increase 
in real wages was 0.5 per cent per year. Fixing wages and conditions in the 
1920s was a difficult task, because further advances in employment standards 
were hard to achieve. At the State level, Queensland workers enjoyed real wages 
about 10 per cent above the national average; South Australian and Tasmanian 
real wages were, on average, about 5 per cent below the all-Australian level; 
and Western Australia, where real wages were relatively high at the beginning 
of the decade, returned to the national average by its end.
Figure 5.5
Note: The vertical scale shows index numbers, where the average for the six capital cities in 
1914 is 1000. The numbers for the first three quarters of 1921 and the first quarter of 1922 
are estimated by interpolation.
Source: Labour Report, various numbers.
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5.3.4 Industry wages
As noted in Section 2.3 of Chapter 2, nominal wage data were computed for 
14 industrial groups. Such data continued to be available for later periods. 
Table 5.1 shows the relative wages in the various groups in 1921 and 1929. 
There were three conspicuous high-paid industries—books, printing, etc.; 
mining; and building—and two low-paid—agriculture and domestic. There 
was some reshuffling of the pack. The industry with the highest average wages 
in 1921—mining—had fallen to third place in 1929, behind books, printing, 
etc. (second in 1920), and building (third in 1920); and shipping, which 
was in ninth place in 1921, rose to fourth in 1929; but otherwise there were 
Figure 5.6
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only minor changes in the rankings. We saw in Chapter 2 that during the 
years 1914–21 the inter-industry pay structure became more equal. A similar 
calculation shows that between 1921 and 1929 there was little change.5
5.3.5 The federal basic wage
As we shall see in Chapter 6, in 1921 and 1922 the Arbitration Court adopted 
practices that made it meaningful to speak of the basic wage. This does not 
mean that there was a single rate, for there were geographical differences. But 
the new approach entailed simultaneous adjustment of the basic wage in most 
awards, whereas previously the amounts prescribed depended largely on the 
times at which the awards were made or (occasionally) varied.
5  The regression line fitted to the logarithms of the relativities in Table 5.1 implies that 
if industry A in 1921 had an average wage 10 per cent greater than that of industry B, the 
difference in 1929 would have been 10.05 per cent.
Table 5.1: Relative wages in industry groups, 1914 and 1921(percentage of the average 
wage)
Note: The 1921 data are for the second quarter, and the 1929 data are for the third quarter. 
In some cases the industry titles shown are abbreviations of fuller titles.
Source: Labour Report, various numbers.
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The price index used in adjusting the basic wage combined the prices of 
46 items of food and groceries and house rent. According to the Commonwealth 
Statistician, it represented about 60 per cent of the living costs of basic-wage 
earners. In respect of housing, rents of all houses were taken into account until 
1925. The Labour Report for that year reported a change of practice: in future 
only houses of four or five rooms would be included.6 The Court, however, 
apparently did not approve any change in the index used for wage adjustment.7 
The Labour Report stated that ‘the preparation of index-numbers for food, 
groceries and rent of all houses in the 30 towns of the Commonwealth will 
be continued for the use of the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and 
Arbitration … and the results will be published in the Quarterly Summary of 
Statistics’ (Labour Report, No. 16, 1925, p. 20). The Statistician’s revised index 
for food, groceries, and rent became known as the ‘B series’ Index, and the 
alternative as the ‘All Houses’ or ‘Court’ Index.
The Piddington Commission had provided—no doubt with Sutcliffe’s 
help—measurements of price movements taking into account clothing 
and miscellaneous items, as well as food, groceries, and rent. Moreover, it 
recommended that the Commonwealth Statistician maintain and publish an 
index based on the more comprehensive regimen. The Government accepted 
this recommendation. The Labour Report for 1920 (p. 25) said that the Bureau 
had been authorised ‘to extend its investigations to cover the whole of the 
ordinary expenditure of a household’ and that this was being done. It added, 
however, that ‘the index-numbers computed for food, groceries and rent in 
the past can be accepted in general as a near approximation of the variation in 
the whole ordinary household expenditure’; and that it was ‘only in abnormal 
6  This accorded with a resolution of the 1924 Conference of Statisticians of Australia and 
New Zealand. The Labour Report commented: ‘Up to the present time the practice followed in 
computing the retail price index-number has been to take into account the rentals of all houses 
ranging from those of three rooms and under to those of seven rooms and upwards. In respect 
to rent this practice is, to some extent, a departure from the principle adopted with regard 
to food and groceries, i.e., that of taking the price of the predominant type of commodity, 
inasmuch as the rent of houses other than the predominant type has been included’.
7  I have not discovered any reference to the matter in reported decisions.
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times that the results based upon the cost of food, groceries and rent can 
be vitiated to any great extent’. In the Labour Report for 1921 (p. 52), the 
Statistician said that the existing index numbers were satisfactory measures of 
the movements of food and grocery prices and house rents.8 The Bureau used 
the Royal Commission’s ‘indicator lists’ for clothing and miscellaneous items.
The new price index—the future C series Index—had a base number of 
1000 for November 1914, whereas the index for food, groceries, and housing 
had its base in 1911. The difference was due to the lack of data for the added 
items before 1914. For the 1920s, the two indices may readily be compared.
8  The Royal Commission had stipulated a standard of five-roomed houses. The Statistician 
did not apply this requirement, but said that the movements in rents reflected in the Bureau’s 
existing index numbers provided a reliable guide to movements in rents of five-roomed houses.
Figure 5.7
Source: Data supplied by the Librarian of Fair Work Australia.
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Quarterly data are available of the basic wage for each capital city and 
the six capitals combined from the second quarter of 1922 onward.9 Figure 5.7 
shows the amounts of the basic wage up to the third quarter of 1929. For the 
six capital cities, the wage increased from 78s to 90s 6d—an increase of 16 per 
cent. Most of this increase occurred by the end of 1923: over the remainder of 
the period, the increase was just 4 per cent. For most of the period, the basic 
wage was above the average level in Sydney and below it in Brisbane and Perth.
Converting the quarterly wage levels to real equivalents, we get the 
results shown in Figure 5.8. The price index used for this purpose is the C 
9  See Chapter 1, Subsection 1.3.3 for explanation of these data.
Figure 5.8
Source: Basic wage—see Figure 5.7; prices—Labour Report, various numbers.
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series Index. For the six-capitals average, the increase over the period was 11 
per cent. This was concentrated in 1922 and 1923; thereafter, the increase was 
just above zero. The figure indicates both surprising volatility in the real basic 
wage and surprising differences between the capital cities.
Some temporal variation could be expected, because of the lags inherent 
in wage adjustment and because of the nominal wage being adjusted by 
minima of a shilling. But the changes shown in the figure seem greater than 
such factors would entail. The fact is that the quarterly movements of the 
basic wage were not well correlated with movements in the price index. This 
is apparent from Figure 5.9. To allow for the possibility that the quarterly data 
assume too close an alignment in time between wage and price movements, 
Figure 5.10 shows four-quarter moving averages, which should absorb most of 
any accidents of timing. The correlation is little improved.
Figure 5.9
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The All Items (C series) Index was not, however, the index used by 
the Court for adjusting the basic wage. The Court (supported by the 
Commonwealth Statistician) preferred the less-comprehensive index covering 
food, groceries, and house rent and until 1933 used this index for basic 
wage adjustment. In Figure 5.11, we compare the six-capitals B series and C 
series indices. For this purpose, the data, taken from the Labour Report, are 
shown with a base of 100 in November 1914—the commencing date for the 
C series Index.10 Annual data for the years 1914–21 show that the C series 
Index rose considerably more than the B series—a divergence highlighted by 
the Piddington Commission. By early 1922, however, the two indices were 
close together. Thereafter the B series Index was above the C series. In the 
second quarter of 1926, the B series exceeded the C series by 9.1 per cent. 
The average excess over the period 1922–29 was 6.3 per cent. If a basic wage 
10  C series index data are annual until 1921; quarterly data begin with May 1922.
Figure 5.10
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adjusted to the C series Index was ‘correct’—in the sense of compensating for 
price movements since 1914—a wage adjusted to the B series Index entailed 
an unintended bonus for the basic wage earner. The two indices shared two 
components: food and groceries, and housing (rents); but the C series Index 
had two extra components: clothing and miscellaneous.11 Between the years 
1921 and 1929, the percentage changes in the four components were:
11  Gifford (1928) argued that because of deficiencies in the collection of data, the clothing 
and miscellaneous components of the C series index seriously understated the rise in prices (p. 
36). Further criticisms of the index were made by union advocates in the 1930–31 basic wage 
case, discussed in Chapter 9.
Figure 5.11
Source: Labour Report, various numbers.
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The increase in the B series Index over this period was 15 per cent; of 
the C series Index, 5.8 per cent. The prices of clothing and miscellaneous 
items prices were not accurately proxied by the prices of food and groceries, 
and house rents. The average benefit to the basic wage earner (in the period 
represented in Figure 5.11) of linking the wage to the more limited index was 
6.3 per cent, or over 5s per week—considerably more than the gain that he 
realised from Powers’ 3s.
Does the use of the B series Index remove some or all of the volatility and 
inter-city disparities indicated in Figure 5.8? A comparison between Figure 5.8 
and Figure 5.12 suggests that the answer is ‘only a little’.
Figure 5.8 also showed differences between the capital cities in the levels 
of the real basic wage. These are contrary to expectation, because the application 
of the price index was intended to equalise the real wage.12 Table 5.2 shows 
the average real basic wage in each of the six capital cities as a percentage of 
the 6-capitals real wage, distinguishing between the two index numbers. The 
choice of index clearly affects the comparison, and the differences were less 
with the B series Index as the deflator.
Overall, however, the volatility of the real basic wage and the inter-city 
differences remain mysterious.
It might have been expected that employers would make something 
of the difference between the alternative price indices, since deflation by the 
C series suggests that there was an unintended rise in the real wage. They 
did, but only toward the end of the period. The issue assumed importance 
in employer arguments in the 1930–31 basic wage case, discussed in a later 
chapter. In that case, the union advocates criticised the C series Index. One 
of their advocates was H C Gibson, who had been a member of the Royal 
Commission on the Basic Wage. Gibson elicited from C H Wickens, the 
Commonwealth Statistician, acknowledgement that some of the items in the 
miscellaneous category were priced at constant amounts. The amounts had 
12  This is not quite accurate, because Powers’ 3s (see Chapter 6) was not adjusted for prices.
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been identified by the Royal Commission in 1920. Hence for the whole of 
the 1920s the prices entered the index at the 1920 values. Among the items so 
recorded were fares, cinema tickets, smoking requisites, and school requisites. 
Gibson contended that the items whose prices were assumed to be constant 
had in fact become dearer, with the result that the index had a downward bias. 
Wickens claimed that the prices in question were difficult to ascertain. Gibson 
replied that the Royal Commission had been able to get them (transcript, 
pp. 199–209). Whether or not there was a systematic bias, as Gibson alleged, 
the substitution of assumed prices for prices obtained by inquiry obviously 
reduced the reliability of the miscellaneous component of the index.13




For Australia as a whole, the average working week of adult males—as measured 
by the hours prescribed in awards, statutes, and formal agreements—was 47.07 
hours on 31 December 1920. By the end of 1929, it had fallen to 45.34 hours. 
Figure 5.13 shows the movements of hours in the several States and Australia 
between 1919 and 1930.14
In three States—Victoria, South Australia, and Tasmania—nominal 
hours were similar and above those in the rest of the country. They also varied 
little across the decade. In Western Australia, there was a more gradual (though 
not uninterrupted) fall in working hours due mainly to decisions of the State 
tribunal.
It would appear that the Australia-wide pattern was significantly 
affected by State regulation in New South Wales and Queensland.15 In 1920 
the New South Wales Parliament passed the Eight Hours (Amendment) Act 
14  I can throw little light on the reliability of the data, but note that there are several instances 
in which the averages within States do not change from one year to the next. As they are given 
to two decimal points, this is somewhat surprising.
15  The ensuing outline of State provisions is based on Anderson (1929, p. 527), various 
numbers of the Labour Report, and Nyland (1987, pp. 42–44).
Table 5.2: The real basic wage in capital cities (percentage differences from 6-capitals 
average)
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1920. This created a special mechanism for dealing with applications for a 44-
hour week and created a presumption that such applications would normally 
be granted. Under this legislation, the 44-hour week was applied in many 
industries. In 1922, after a change of government, the Act was repealed and 
the discretion with respect to working hours was restored to the Court of 
Industrial Arbitration. Existing provisions for 44 hours remained in force until 
altered by the Court. Late in 1925, the New South Wales Parliament passed 
the Forty-four Hours Week Act 1925, which made the 44-hour week a general 
standard (with limited exceptions). The statutory provision for a 44-hour 
week was repealed in June 1930 and restored in the following December. The 
Queensland Parliament in 1924 passed an Act that provided for a maximum 
working week of 44 hours, with few exceptions.
Figure 5.13
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5.5 labour standards and economIc constraInts
Forster (1987) observed that a long-run situation in which per capita output 
rises little is likely to be a difficult one for labour relations, because it limits 
the scope for raising real wages and is likely to engender disputes over 
income shares. This observation has particular relevance to the 1920s, when 
labour clearly aspired to significant advances in wages and conditions. There 
was, in fact, a large increase in real wages in the years 1921 and 1922. The 
limitations of the data preclude precise statements of the orders of change, 
but the statistics suggest that the net effect of the wartime deterioration and 
the post-war resurgence was a rise in average real wages of 10 to 20 per cent. 
Superimposed on an apparently sluggish growth in productivity, this could 
only lead to a circumstance in which further improvements were difficult 
to achieve. It was not, however, an intended effect of wage-setting and went 
largely unnoticed. In demanding advances in wages and conditions, labour 
focused on the intention rather than the reality.
There is little sign, indeed, that the ‘jump’ in real wages in 1921 and 
1922 played much part in the thinking of the Court or the parties that 
appeared before it. Certainly, the trade unions appeared to believe that little 
or no progress had been made. Their attitudes were affected, no doubt, by 
the continued role of the 14-year-old Harvester standard as a benchmark 
for the basic wage and the refusal of the Court to adjust skill margins for 
inflation. This study is not about industrial disputation, but it is well known 
that much of the period was turbulent. One of the causes of the turbulence 
was the difficulty of satisfying labour’s aspirations. For its part, the Court was 
inclined to argue that the unions understated the improvements that had been 
achieved, but it evinced no strong presumption that rising standards were the 
norm. There was no expectation of continuous improvement supported by 
rising productivity. Indeed, the possibility of standards having to be wound 
back was taken seriously, both in 1921–22 and in the later 1920s.
In 1922, Powers reflected on a union contention that workers had 
benefited little from the Court’s policies and practices:
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Mr Gibson16 … asks—Is the Harvester standard fixed in 1907 to stand 
as it was in 1907? The answer to that is certainly not. As soon as some 
better standard is shown to be necessary based on what people really 
need to live in reasonable comfort, it will be altered … But as a matter 
of fact it has already been altered for the benefit of the workers generally 
and especially for those on the basic wage.
Since 1907, men have secured payment for holidays never granted in 
1907 or for many years after.
Since then the weekly wage has been granted to secure the standard 
wage for the week.
Since then the wage has been based on the cost of living on the quarter 
preceding the award which prevents losses complained of by the workers.
Quarterly adjustments have been introduced to secure the living wage 
during the award.
3s a week has been added to the Harvester standard to prevent the 
possibility of loss during any quarter.
The actual wage received by the worker has been greatly increased since 
1907 apart from the increased cost of living, and the standard of living 
has necessarily been raised because it has been proved that it was fair to 
do so.
For instance, very many classes of skilled work have been reclassified at 
higher rates since 1907 and some work for which the basic rate only was 
allowed in 1907 is now paid for as slightly skilled work at rates above 
the basic wage. Rates for work done on Sundays and holidays have been 
raised. Public holidays have been increased. Annual holidays are given 
in proper cases.
In addition hours of work generally have been reduced to the Australian 
standard of 48 hours, in some cases from 60 hours a week and in others 
from 56, 54, 52, and 50 a week to 48. Where the health of the worker 
is endangered and in the industries where the work is intermittent the 
16  Gibson had been a member of the Piddington Commission.
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hours have been reduced to 44 hours or even less to secure to the worker 
the basic wage for the week.
Workers in continuous processes who were required to work seven days 
in the week for 8 hours for 365 days in the year, now only work six days 
in the week, working on one Sunday in seven.
The conditions of work generally have been greatly improved for the 
worker by State and Federal Arbitration Awards. (Engine-Drivers’ case, 
16 CAR 1107, 1120–1121)
Powers might have added to this list the spread of the Court’s wages and 
conditions and those set by State tribunals across the labour force. Of its 
nature, this is a process whose effects cannot be measured. But they may well 
have been large.
Soon afterwards, the union representative in a Carpenters and Joiners’ 
case (16 CAR 1136) told Webb that ‘what we want is some tangible benefit, 
something that will improve our actual social and economic position, 
something that will enable us to get comforts that we are not now able to 
purchase, and to keep them all the year round’. Webb responded by quoting 
remarks of Higgins in A New Province for Law and Order:
I am not unaware of the far-reaching schemes, much discussed 
elsewhere, which contemplate conditions of society in which adjustment 
of labour conditions between profit-makers and wage-earners may 
become necessary. Our Australian Court has nothing to do with these 
schemes. It has to shape its conclusions on the solid anvil of facts, in 
the fulfilment of definite official responsibilities. It has the advantage, 
as well as the disadvantage, of being limited in its powers and objects. 
Its objective is industrial peace, as between those who do the work, and 
those who direct it. It has no duty, it has no right, to favour or condemn 
any theories of social reconstruction. It neither hinders nor helps them. 
(pp. 1139–1140)
Webb said that although it was no function of the Court ‘to alter our social 
laws’, there was a ‘striking contrast between the social and industrial conditions 
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of Australia and those in any other part of the world’; and it was ‘not unfair 
to say that the Industrial Courts of Australia have been the main factor in 
bringing about the conditions … which stand in such marked contrast to 
the wretched conditions which exist in so many other lands’. These results 
had been achieved ‘by following the simple duty of awarding fair wages and 
conditions according to definite and carefully considered principles’ (p. 1140).
In 1925, Powers again reflected on the advances in working standards 
that had been achieved under arbitration, emphasising the breadth of the 
changes:
Since [1907] the standard then fixed has been altered by increasing the 
basic wage, by increasing overtime rates, by fixing weekly instead of 
hourly rates—or allowances if the rate is daily or hourly—by allowances 
for pay during sickness, by fixing shorter hours and better conditions, 
by preventing employees being required to work seven days a week for 
365 days a year in continuous processes, by increasing the standard wage 
for women workers, and greatly improving their conditions, by basing 
the rate on the cost of living at the time the award is made instead of 
on the preceding calendar year, by ordering quarterly adjustments of 
wages to secure to the workers the living wage during the term of the 
award, by discouraging the employment of men for long periods in 
high temperatures, in mines and other places, by special conditions, rest 
periods, reduced hours or extra rates, and in many other ways to which 
it is not necessary to refer. (Resignation statement, 18 December 1925, 
22 CAR xxxi, xxxvi)
Powers might have added to his list the gradual award of margins to many 
classes of labour that hitherto had been paid only the basic wage. On the other 
hand, he could also have noted the failure of the system to preserve the real 
value of the margins paid to skilled workers.
In the Main Hours case of 1926–27 (24 CAR 755),17 Charlie Crofts 
(one of the principal union advocates) spoke of the stagnation of real wages 
since 1907:
17  Discussed, at length, in Chapter 7.
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The basic wage man has remained stationary since 1907, so far as his 
economic position is concerned. But the artisan has gone back. He has 
not maintained his position. In 1907, in the Harvester judgment, he 
received 3s per day above the basic wage. Today the Court allows 4s. The 
cost of living has gone up from 7s to 15s 1d, which is over 100 per cent, 
but the artisan’s margin has only increased from 3s to 4s. Therefore, he 
has receded in his economic position since 1907. (transcript, p. 215)
The advance of labour standards was restricted by perceptions of poor 
economic performance. In the course of this case, there was much debate 
as to whether the economy was more or less productive than it had been 
before World War I. No one claimed more than a modest gain. In his closing 
address for the unions, Crofts complained of his adversaries’ standpoint that 
‘everything has to be judged from the period 1910–14’. Was everything, he 
asked, ‘to be judged by the highest peak of prosperity’? It had been shown ‘that 
even as compared with the peak years chosen by the employers, we are within 
about 3 per cent of the production of that period’ (transcript, p. 5616–A). 
From today’s perspective, celebration of a GDP within 3 per cent of the level 
reached 15 years earlier seems extraordinary.
A discussion of the determinants of long-term change in labour 
standards occurred in the Merchant Service Guild case decided by Dethridge 
in 1928 (27 CAR 482). The Guild was concerned about a decline in the 
living standards of ships’ officers, but painted on a wider canvas. Dethridge’s 
decision discusses the movements of both ‘productivity’ and labour’s share in 
the ‘national dividend’. Of the former, he said:
As to Captain Lawrence’s contention that Australia has now reached 
the same extent of productivity per head of population as in or about 
1910, it is not at all certain that this is correct. Probably, as I said in 
the hours’ case, we are now not far short of that achievement, but one 
cannot feel a comfortable certainty on the point. … The production 
statistics on the whole rather suggest that in the years 1910–12 there 
was an abnormal increase in productivity generally, which of course 
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facilitated the granting of higher marginal wages at that time, and that 
that increase would not have been maintained even if the war had not 
intervened. (p. 499)
Dethridge’s perception, right or wrong, that there had been little or no 
productivity growth over nearly two decades is striking. It implies a limited 
scope for improvement of conditions of the employment, and it accords with 
the tenor of many of the Court’s decisions. As to income shares, Captain 
Lawrence had evidently argued that there had been a long-term shift to profits 
which the Court should try to correct. Dethridge could find little support for 
this thesis in J T Sutcliffe’s recently published book, The National Dividend. 
But he also sought the advice of C H Wickens, the Commonwealth Statistician, 
who told Dethridge that the only available data about the share of interest and 
profits in output were for manufacturing.
Mr Wickens has been good enough to furnish me with a table extracted 
from the manufacturing statistics, which shows that after deducting 
from the total factory output the cost of ‘materials’ used, fuel and light’ 
and ‘salaries and wages’, the percentage of the margin available for 
‘profit and miscellaneous expenses’, which in 1913 was 17.52 per cent, 
and in 1914 was 17.57 per cent, was practically the same in 1924 to 
1927, viz., 17.27 per cent in 1924–5, 17.16 per cent in 1925–6, and 
17.56 per cent in 1926–27. (p. 498)
Overall, the decisions of the Court in the 1920s—especially the later 
years—convey an assumption that the opportunities for advancing wages 
and conditions were severely limited. As we shall see in Chapter 7, the Court 
became convinced that the adoption of piecework would solve the problem 
of low productivity and deplored union opposition to it. It both held out the 
prospect of better terms if piece work were accepted and threatened to remove 
existing benefits if the unions continued to reject it. Its exhortations had little 
effect.
In the light of the discussion in Chapter 5, it is not surprising that wages 
policy during the 1920s was conducted in an atmosphere of stringency. In this 
chapter, we see the effects of the perceived stringency on the kinds of decisions 
made in the period of Powers’ Presidency, before the Court’s reconstruction 
in 1926.
6.1 the basIc wage
6.1.1 Powers and the Royal Commission
Having succeeded Higgins as President, Powers held his own inquiry into 
the application of the Piddington standard. The Gas Employees’ case, decided 
in September 1921, was a ‘test case’. Powers allowed unions and employers 
generally to be represented. He described the dimensions of the case:
During the hearing of this inquiry the parties have submitted 
numerous text-books, judgments, awards, statistical records, and other 
documentary evidence, and some oral evidence. The whole of the 
evidence taken before the Royal Commission, covering 2,879 pages 
of printed foolscap, has also been submitted; and the report of the 
Commission itself; the subsequent memorandum of the Chairman; the 
Supplementary Report of the Royal Commission; a pamphlet entitled 
The Next Step (by the Chairman, Mr A B Piddington); and one entitled 
The Basic Wage Betrayal, published by the Committee of the Conference 
The Powers era
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of Federated Unions. In addition I have before me the shorthand report 
of the addresses of the representatives of the parties, which occupied 
over four days. It is impossible in a judgment on the question before 
this Court, under the circumstances, to deal in detail with the evidence, 
or the reasons urged by the parties, or to do much more than state the 
decisions arrived at on the principal questions raised. (15 CAR 838, 
841–842)
It was necessary, said Powers, to consider ‘fully’ the Royal Commission’s 
report. He recalled that ‘the Court itself, to make sure that it was going on 
safe lines, strongly recommended the appointment of a Royal Commission to 
report on the basic wage question on a scientific and humane basis. Although 
the Commission suggested by this Court was not appointed, it makes it 
none the less necessary to seriously consider the report and finding of the 
Commission …’ (p. 842). Like Higgins in the ASE case (discussed in Chapter 
3), Powers made much of the Royal Commission’s letters patent. The issue 
now was
whether the Royal Commission was asked to find, or did find, a basic, 
or living wage, as recognised by the Courts in Australia, viz., one in 
which the interests of employees, employers and the public should 
be considered—or to find any basic wage at all;—or, whether the 
members were only asked to consider what the actual cost of living at 
a certain date was, according to what the members of the Commission 
considered were reasonable standards of comfort, for a man (not an 
unskilled worker only), his wife and three children under fourteen years 
of age, without having to consider the question of whether the amount 
they found could, or should, be paid by the employers, or by the public 
of Australia. (p. 843)
The answer was that the members of the Commission ‘were not bound 
to consider the basic-wage earner only, or the effect of their recommendations 
on industry generally, or the interests of employers, or of the community, and 
it is clear they did not consider the matters mentioned’ (p. 844). Moreover, 
two of the employer representatives had stated in a minority report that they 
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did not concur in the main report ‘if it could be construed as a report on what 
the basic wage should be’.
The Royal Commission, in its supplementary report, denied that it had 
made any recommendation as to what the basic wage should be or how the 
cost of living should be taken into count. Powers commented that ‘if that 
statement had been made with the original report, it would not have raised 
false hopes and it would have saved an immense amount of misunderstanding, 
and unrest, and dissatisfaction among workers with the wages that are being 
paid under the different Courts’ awards, and Wages Boards determinations, 
throughout the Commonwealth’.
Notwithstanding his emphasis on the letters patent, Powers was 
otherwise critical of aspects of the Report. The Royal Commission had allowed 
for ‘a quantity and quality of clothes which, I know from my experience 
in this Court, are not necessary for men, women and children to live in 
reasonable comfort, even when in receipt of £400 a year’ (p. 852). He cited 
Charles Powers
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newspaper advertisements offering suits for less than the prices allowed by the 
Commission (p. 854). As to food, much evidence had been taken about the 
calorie requirements of the family; but ‘whatever mistakes Mr Justice Higgins 
is supposed to have made, it was not contended that he did not allow sufficient 
for food and groceries’ (p. 855). Powers did not think it necessary ‘to trouble 
about the necessary number of calories that scientific men consider necessary’.1
‘The Commission’, Powers concluded, ‘approached the question of 
a standard of living from an entirely different point of view to that from 
which this Court has to approach the question of a basic wage, and it may 
account for the Commission itself—and the Chairman in particular—not 
recommending its finding to be adopted as a basic wage’ (p. 855). But were 
there other grounds for increasing the basic wage? Here Powers resorted to the 
‘onus’ principle that has so often been used by arbitrators to answer difficult 
questions. It would have to be proved that Harvester ‘did not in 1907 give to 
the unskilled worker a fair wage based on current human standards’; that his 
own decision of October 1918, given ‘after full inquiry into the cost of living 
including food, groceries, rent and clothing, and all items of miscellaneous 
expenditure’ was wrong; and that various decisions of State tribunals were 
also wrong (p. 856). Moreover, it was now established that the typical family 
contained fewer than three children under fourteen. But he did not propose 
to reduce the basic wage, because ‘the community has accepted the wage for 
a family of five as a fair thing’ (p. 860). Further indicators of the sufficiency 
of current wage levels were the growth of savings and the amounts spent on 
alcohol, gambling, and smoking:
No one objects to the working man having a smoke, or begrudges him 
his picture-shows, sports, or recreation; and this Court has to recognise 
1  It is true that the amount allowed by Higgins in 1907 for food alone, adjusted for price 
changes, met or exceeded the Royal Commission’s standard. The Royal Commission did not 
say otherwise; but it could hardly have taken the food component of the wage as a given 
without taking evidence on the point. Higgins’ ‘measurement’ of the food requirements of the 
family of five could not have been treated as conclusive by a serious commission of inquiry: if 
Higgins got it right, that was fortuitous.
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‘current human standards’, and that many people will smoke, drink, 
and gamble, and live in houses of less than five rooms to enable them to 
do so. It is not within the Court’s function to preach to the community, 
but I think it right to point out that the benefits the worker enjoys, 
some of which I have referred to, could not be enjoyed … if the Court’s 
awards, which are attacked by the unions as insufficient, did not at least 
secure a fair and reasonable wage to the workers generally, as long as 
they only have families of three children. (pp. 862–863)
Finally, Powers discussed the question whether the country could pay 
the Royal Commission rates. Authorities for thinking that it could not were 
the Commonwealth Statistician, the Prime Minister, and the Chairman of the 
Royal Commission. Respondent employers had submitted statistical returns 
supporting this position. The unions’ attempts to refute these contentions were 
not convincing. Knibbs’ report to the Prime Minister had not been produced 
and Knibbs was not called as a witness; but Powers assumed ‘that he could 
have satisfactorily defended his report if he had been called’ (p. 864).
The ‘fallacy’ had been pressed in this and other cases that higher wages 
were made possible by better machinery and labour-saving devices. This, said 
Powers, was wrong because these developments ‘cannot enable the employer 
to grant to workers better conditions if competitors in other countries, with 
equally good machinery and labour-saving appliances, sell their goods in 
Australia at a price which will not let the producer get a larger profit than he 
did with the inferior machinery, and that is the case at present’ (pp. 864–865). 
The technical improvements were necessary ‘to allow industry to be carried on 
at all’. Powers did not explore the question: if the improved productivity made 
possible by machinery and labour-saving devices did not flow to higher real 
wages or higher real profits, who were the beneficiaries?
Employers, it was true, always said that the time was inopportune for 
wage increases; but ‘there is no doubt about the truth of the objection this 
time’. Powers continued:
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We are living in a time of world-wide depression, causing unemployment 
everywhere, a reduction of wages in all countries, and in many countries 
longer working hours. As the world is now one market, Australia 
must be affected by what is going on elsewhere, and has already been 
affected by it … The common enemy of employers and employees at 
the present time is the economic position, and both labour and capital 
should work together instead of fighting each other, and help to secure 
greater production, so as to allow industries to be carried on and a decent 
standard of living to be maintained in Australia … I am satisfied that 
this Court, if it granted the [union application for £5 16s], would 
do so much harm to the workers of Australia that they would have 
to abandon their unions to get employment clear of award rates, or 
parliament would have to brush aside the Court and its awards to let 
industries be carried on. (pp. 865–866)
The decision was ‘to continue the fair and practicable minimum wage the 
Court has adopted for so many years, instead of adopting the higher standard 
fixed by the Royal Commission, which is not practicable at the present time 
as a flat rate’ (p. 873).
Piddington’s child-endowment proposal was ‘worthy of the most serious 
consideration by the Parliaments of the Commonwealth, for, at present, a very 
great injustice is done to families of over three dependent children’, but its 
implementation was beyond the present power of the Court.
6.1.2 applying Harvester
It is plain from earlier discussion that between 1907 and 1920 the Court’s 
methods of adjusting the basic wage so as to align it with the Harvester standard 
were crude. The long intervals between wage changes (made award by award) 
and the use of price index numbers that were outdated had the effect that, 
for much of the period, the real basic wage was significantly below Harvester. 
As we saw above, the Royal Commission proposed a method of automatic 
adjustment that would have reduced the lags; but the use of annual price 
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data would still have left room for discrepancies between the assumed and the 
actual cost of living.
In 1921, however, the economic context was significantly different 
from that of earlier years. Business was depressed, prices were falling and real 
wages were rising. The stickiness of money wages, relative to prices, turned 
in the wage-earners’ favour (if they retained their jobs). Frequent and up-
to-date adjustments became less favourable to employees than the previous 
slow processes. A continuation of the assumption described in Subsection 
3.6.5 (involving a two-year delay) implies a Melbourne basic wage for the last 
quarter of 1922 exceeding the Harvester standard by 9 per cent. By contrast, a 
delay of only one quarter entailed a rise of less than 1 per cent.
In this environment, some employers and unions began to agree on 
automatic adjustment arrangements. I cannot say whether the predominant 
motivation was that of employers wishing to avoid paying excessive wages 
or of unions thinking that rising prices might soon return. In the ASE case, 
Higgins said:
It is very gratifying to find that a practice has grown up and is increasing, 
now that employers and employees have come to understand the ways 
of this Court, of agreeing to vary the basic wage periodically according 
to the fluctuations of the tables of the Commonwealth Statistician. The 
tables are applied to my rough and tentative finding of 7s per day, 42s 
per week, in the Harvester case of 1907. (15 CAR 297, 302)
In August, Powers said in the Wallaroo and Moonta case:
It is clear that some alterations in the war methods should now be made 
to prevent employees receiving less than the living wage fixed by the 
Court in future awards during the term of the award … I think the 
method lately introduced into consent awards and agreements between 
registered unions and employers during the last twelve months will be 
found to be fair, namely, to fix a rate for the time of the award subject 
to adjustment each quarter on the Statistician’s figures. This would 
save expense, delay, and uncertainty to the parties and the time of the 
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employers, employees, and of the Court taken up at present in variations 
of awards to meet the cost of living. (15 CAR 704, 716)
Also in August, Powers in the Clothing Trades case made a consent award 
that provided for half-yearly adjustments of the basic wage: an adjustment 
would be made on 1 February for the prices of the year ended on the previous 
31 December, and another on 1 August for prices of the year ended 30 June. 
Powers added, however, that ‘the wages adjustment clauses are only made by 
consent and special request of the parties and cannot be used as a precedent 
in other cases as I have already announced that the Court is now considering 
the claim for a different basic wage and the Court intends to reconsider the 
method of fixing the basic wage in view of the continued and rapid decrease of 
the cost of living since October last’ (15 CAR 746, 747).
While both Higgins and Powers resisted the unions’ attempt to substitute 
the Royal Commission’s standard for Harvester, Powers in particular was 
exercised by the possibility that the Harvester standard, now closer to being 
achieved, might be too high for some employers. In the Wallaroo and Moonta 
case, decided in August 1921 (15 CAR 704), both the level of prices and 
the economic crisis were factors in his decision. The Wallaroo and Moonta 
Mining and Smelting Company had closed its mines because of the depressed 
price of copper, but later told employees that it would reopen them if it were 
assured that no award would be made for 6 months on plaints lodged earlier 
in the year. It would guarantee a minimum wage of 11s per shift, although 
the basic wage would ordinarily be over 12s. Most ex-employees (1354 out of 
1400) had signified their willingness to accept this, but the unions did not. 
The Company asked the Court to exercise its discretion not to make an award. 
Powers granted the application.2
This decision differed from one that Powers had given in June in the 
Mt Lyall case (15 CAR 604). Mt Lyall was the only copper producer that 
remained in operation, and the company had stated that it would close unless 
2  He added the proviso: ‘I do not definitely decide that no award shall be made for six 
months, but so long as the price of copper remains at its present price (or less than £77 a ton) 
I do not propose, on the facts at present before me, to make any award’ (p. 711).
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it were given relief from increases granted earlier in the year by Higgins. Some 
unions had agreed to a six-month deferral of the increases. Powers granted 
the deferral except for the basic wage; that is, the higher basic wage would be 
‘absorbed’ into the margins of the skilled workers.3
In the Wallaroo and Moonta case he argued both that it was proper to 
adapt the basic wage to maintain employment and that his decision did not 
entail a violation of established principles. As to the former, he did not feel 
justified ‘by any order of this Court in preventing 1,400 men from obtaining 
employment in these times at rates they think fair and reasonable’ (p. 711). 
‘The Court’s living wage’, he said, ‘was not made to prevent men working 
for nine-tenths of what the Court thinks a living wage, if they wish to do so 
without the intervention of the Court—when, if they do not, they will not get 
any wage at all—or because they know they can live in any particular locality 
for less than the Court on the evidence before it believes to be a living wage’ 
(p. 714). Even if the Court had treated the basic wage as ‘sacrosanct’, it had 
not so treated any particular method of varying it. For a time, Higgins and 
Powers had followed different practices in that Higgins related the basic wage 
to prices in the previous calendar year, whereas Powers had referred to prices 
in the immediately previous four quarters (though Higgins had adopted the 
latter method in the 1919 Gas case). Powers mentioned this
to show that the Court has not laid down any method of fixing the basic 
wage as ‘sacrosanct’; on the contrary it has always fixed it on the basis 
that seemed to it fairest at the time of the award to secure to employees 
a living wage during the term of the award. … The Court has always 
heretofore, by adopting different methods for fixing the basic wage, 
adjusted itself to existing conditions as changes take place, and it must 
continue to do so in the interests of employees, employers, and the 
community. (pp. 715–716)
It was true, Powers acknowledged, that if the Harvester 7s in Melbourne 
were adjusted to prices for the 12 months to the previous June, the amount 
in Wallaroo and Moonta would be 12s 11d. But this was an inappropriate 
3  The issue of increases in margins had a wider context, discussed in Section 6.2 below.
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benchmark. ‘I would not be justified’, said Powers, ‘in ordering the closing 
of an industry causing further unemployment, because in September and 
October of 1920 the cost of living was abnormal and not likely to recur again 
in Australia for some time to come.’ He reproduced a ‘rough graph’ prepared 
at the Statistician’s Office demonstrating, for Sydney and Wallaroo, the 1920 
peak. ‘The figures quoted and a reference to the graph’, he said, ‘confirm what 
I have already stated and show the necessity of adopting some method of 
fixing the basic wage different from that adopted during the years 1914 to 
1920 inclusive’ (pp. 719–720).
Moreover, Powers continued, Higgins and he had always taken special 
factors into account in setting a basic wage in a locality rather than ‘slavishly’ 
following the Statistician’s figures. The company provided sanitation and street 
lighting without cost to the resident. It had agreed to supply at cost, for the 
life of the agreement, working boots, work clothing, and other items. And the 
threepence per day for train and tram fares ‘usually allowed for in a basic wage’ 
was not necessary in Wallaroo.
Thus Powers found, at least to his own satisfaction, that the lesser wage 
was consistent with Harvester. Whether he would in any event have acquiesced 
in the 11s wage so as to ensure the miners’ employment is a question that he 
left unanswered. Certainly, there are passages in the judgment that could be 
taken to imply that he would. For example:
One of the matters which I feel bound to consider in the case is that 
1,354 out of 1,400 have registered for work on the terms offered by the 
company. Some have lived there for over 40 years. A great many have 
worked there for ten years or more and have worked with this company. 
They apparently are satisfied they can live in fair and reasonable comfort 
under the special conditions under which they are living at Wallaroo 
and Moonta on a basic wage of 11s. (p. 722)
In the Engine Drivers’ case (15 CAR 883) Powers dealt with pleas from 
the mining industry at large for relief from the rigorous enforcement of the 
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Harvester standard. In speaking to the minutes, on 20 December 1921, he 
said that ‘the Court cannot fairly consent to make employees work for less 
than a fair living wage in dividend-paying mines or in non-dividend paying 
mines against their wish’, though it could ‘deal with exceptional cases when 
exceptional circumstances are shown to warrant it, such as were shown in the 
Wallaroo and Mount Lyell cases’ (p. 907). He drew a distinction between 
mines making profits or paying dividends, on the one hand, and the others. 
The former would be subject to the normal terms of the award. For the latter, 
there were two concessions. One was to allow the basic wage to be set on the 
basis of the Statistician’s figures for the particular districts. ‘This,’ said Powers, 
‘is in itself a concession to a very depressed industry because, except in special 
cases, the total difference between city and country rates are not allowed in 
awards of the Court.’ The other was to allow the union and the respondent 
employer to agree to set the basic wage by reference to the Statistician’s figures 
for the September quarter, rather than the four quarters to September. Because 
of the reduction of prices, this would produce a lesser amount. If the parties 
could not agree, application could be made to the Court ‘on special grounds, 
as in the case of the Mount Lyell and Wallaroo Mining Companies’.4
For industries other than mining that were subject to the Engine-drivers’ 
award, Powers rejected a union request that he use the price numbers for 
the year to the June quarter rather than the lower numbers for the year to 
September. ‘I was again pressed [by the union]’, he said in October 1921,
to take the figures for the 30th June instead of the 30th September; but 
I do not see my way to altering the practice of the Court by adopting 
any other figures than those available for the last twelve months prior 
to the making of the award. As the practice of making a fixed rate for 
a long term has proved unfair to employees in 1920 and to employers 
in 1921, I have decided to act on the lines employers and employees 
have lately adopted in many cases, and to order wages to be adjusted 
quarterly after six months from the date of the awards, on the basis of 
4  In March 1922, Powers bound the Wallaroo and Moonta Mining Company to the award, 
but subject to the concessional terms for loss-making mining companies (16 CAR 69).
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the Statistician’s figures for the preceding twelve months prior to the 
quarterly adjustments. (Engine-drivers’ and Firemen’s case 15 CAR 883, 
913)
This decision serves to emphasise that automatic adjustments of the basic 
wage were brought into effect at a time when they operated to the benefit of 
employers.
Later in the same month, Powers commented at greater length on the 
timing issue. In the past, he said, the Court had assumed that the experience 
of the preceding twelve months would be a fair indicator of the year following 
the award, ‘and in normal times it would be’. The Court had refused to use 
quarterly figures because ‘it is well known that awards based for a time on the 
cost of living on winter or summer quarters particularly would be unfair to 
either employer or employee’. While the cost of living was rising, the Court’s 
practice ‘has not been proved to be quite fair to the employee, for they have 
received less than the figures for the different quarters alone showed was the 
actual cost of living’. But during the past twelve months the cost of living 
had been falling. As a result, ‘the employees have been benefited, and under 
existing awards, are being paid, at present, more than the figures for the 
quarter ending 30th September, 1921, only would warrant’ (Gas Employees’ 
case 16 CAR 4, 15). Powers had ‘obtained from Mr Sutcliffe’ comparative 
figures of annual and quarterly prices. Assuming that 7s a day was a fair rate 
for Melbourne in 1907, Sutcliffe had told him that the six-capital basic wage 
for the twelve months to the September quarter would be £4 4s 6d per week; 
for the September quarter alone, it was £3 19s 6d. The union, using figures 
for the year to the June quarter, was seeking £4 10s 6d. Powers proposed to 
use the year to September, noting that this afforded workers ‘5s a week more 
than is necessary to secure to them the full benefits of the Harvester judgment 
at the present time and prevents the possibility of them getting less than the 
Harvester judgment standard even if the cost of living increases again before 
April, 1922’. From April 1922, the basic wage would be adjusted automatically 
each quarter with reference to the A series numbers for the previous twelve 
months (pp. 28–32).
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By December, after the speaking to the minutes, Powers had changed 
his mind. He abandoned the previously announced basis of adjustment and 
decided on quarterly adjustments based simply on the previous quarters’ 
figures. ‘A wrong method’, he said, ‘should be altered when it has been clearly 
proved that it must act unfairly to any party or to both parties’. The union, 
apparently, preferred the method proposed in October, but Powers assured them 
that that the alternative now adopted would be to their members’ advantage. 
His reasoning is unclear, but ‘an interview with Mr Sutcliffe would, I think, 
convince the union representatives that that will be the case’. It appears that 
Powers intended to apply the automatic adjustments to the wage proposed in 
October, thereby continuing the above-Harvester standard. He intended, 
when two new judges had been appointed, to suggest a meeting of the 
Full Court to discuss and decide what method should be adopted to 
secure to the workers the benefit of the Harvester judgment recognising 
the fact that the workers did not during the abnormal increases receive 
the full benefit of the living wage, when the Court anticipating a 
decrease in the cost of living during the term of the award fixed rates 
either on the figures for the preceding calendar year or on the figures for 
the twelve months immediately preceding the award. (p. 33)
During the 1930–31 basic wage case, the union advocate H C Gibson 
gave an account of the transition to automatic adjustments based on the price 
index for the previous quarter plus an addition (later to be known as Powers’ 
Three Shillings):
It was expected by all parties that the Court would continue the practice 
which had been set by the late President, Mr Justice Higgins, and that 
practice was to make the awards on the average of the four previous 
quarters, on the last known figure. … The average for the four quarters 
ending September 30th gave the wage for Melbourne of £4 7s per week; 
the actual equated Harvester wage, as equated by the tables the Court 
now uses, was £4 1s 6d for Melbourne. The wage fixed for Melbourne 
was £4 5s. The announcement dropped like a bombshell in our camp, 
at any rate. We interviewed his Honour—when I say ‘we’ I mean Mr 
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Crofts and myself—to see if a mistake had not been made. His Honour 
declined to discuss it with us, stating that he intended to take his 
vacation as during the previous year through stress of work he had been 
deprived of his vacation, and he would go into the matter immediately 
on resuming early in the New Year. In the New Year it was the first we 
heard of this proposal that 3s had been added to the last quarter’s figures 
for the purpose of meeting the lag. As a matter of fact, it was 3s 6d on to 
the last quarter’s figures. Under the system that had then been in vogue 
… the workers working under awards of this Court had, to use a book-
keeping phrase, piled up a debit balance of at least £50 per worker. … 
By the new method, it must necessarily have taken some time to wipe 
out that debit balance and to have created a credit balance. (transcript, 
pp. 297–298)
A Full Court hearing did not occur until October 1922. In the 
meantime, a variety of adjustment methods operated. In a Clothing Trades 
decision of February 1922, Powers referred to an arrangement, proposed by an 
employer representative, which had been agreed to in July 1920. The matter 
was before Powers in 1922 because the union maintained—contrary to the 
employers’ contention—that the agreement provided only for increases: once 
the basic wage was increased, it would not be reduced, even if prices fell. The 
union, represented by R G Menzies, unsuccessfully sought an award variation 
to give effect to its understanding of the agreement (16 CAR 50). In April 
1922, Powers noted ‘the practice lately established so as to preserve to the 
workers the Harvester standard of living in the event of any increase in the 
cost of living … namely [allowing] 3s a week above the [previous] quarter’s 
figures’ (Boilermakers’ case 16 CAR 172, 177). During 1922, until August, 
he generally added three or four shillings to the Harvester equivalent as of the 
previous quarter.5
In August 1922, Powers dealt with an application by steamship owners 
to vary the seamen’s award by imposing quarterly adjustments plus the 3s, but 
5  In an ASE case, he granted 4s, reducing to 3s at the end of October (16 CAR 311, 325).
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with the cost of living determined on the average of the previous year, rather 
than the numbers for the previous quarter. Powers responded:
What the workers are entitled to is the Harvester standard for the time 
they are working and it is useless to continue to tell them they ought 
to be content with what it was twelve months ago or twelve years ago. 
What the workers are entitled to is the full rate at the time they are 
working under the Court’s awards.
It is truly said that under the present practice the workers may during 
a quarter receive 3s more than the Harvester standard, if the cost of 
living falls again, but under the old system it appears that they had to 
accept 10s or even 12s less than the cost of living at times because of the 
unexpected increase in the cost of living during the award and for more 
than a quarter, and at other times where adjustments were agreed to 
during the awards the employer had for a time to pay higher rates than 
the Harvester standard for the quarter.
‘The old method’, he said, ‘did not secure the Harvester standard’ (16 CAR 
517, 519).
The recently appointed Deputy President, Sir John Quick, in September 
1922 adjourned an application to vary an agreement so that the matter of basic 
wage adjustment could be considered by the Full Court. The Court (Powers, 
Quick, and Webb) invited representatives of unions and employers to appear, 
and gave its decision on 20 October in a case reported as The Fairest Method 
of Securing the ‘Harvester Judgment Standard’ to the Workers (16 CAR 822). 
It soon emerged that quarterly adjustment, based on the previous quarter’s 
figures, was not an issue in dispute. The matter that was contested was the 
extra 3s. The employers apparently advanced a ‘swings and roundabout’ 
argument, contending that the small delay between the change in prices and 
the consequent wage adjustment might sometimes benefit workers, just as 
they lost something at a time of rising prices. Powers would have none of 
this: his priority was to ensure that at all times the basic wage delivered the 
Harvester standard: ‘The fact that [workers] were sometimes paid more than 
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the standard rate did not meet the objection that what the worker is entitled 
to is the wage necessary to live on when the prices are high, and the cost 
of living is increasing’ (p. 830). The shortfall at some times while prices are 
high prevented the basic-wage earner ‘getting what is reasonably necessary for 
himself and his family to live in reasonable comfort—and if he gets into debt 
the possible increase may not be realised’ (p. 832). Quick and Webb wrote 
concurring decisions.
Automatic adjustments based on the previous quarters’ data responded 
to the perceived unfairness of reliance on a year’s index numbers, which were 
lagged an average of 2½ quarters behind the quarter in which the adjusted wage 
was paid. There remained the lag of about 2½ months that was inescapable 
with the current quarter’s value of the index necessarily being an unknown.6 
Powers’ Three Shillings, as it became known, was meant to cure this problem. 
6  For example, the price index for the three months to the end of June (centred in mid-May) 
would be reflected in a wage adjustment at the beginning of August. A delay was necessary, of 
course, to await the publication of the index.
John Quick Noel Webb
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It constituted an addition to the basic wage equal, at the time, to about 3¾ 
per cent.
Some sense of the dimensions of the problems caused by the lags can 
be gained from analysing the quarterly index numbers from their inception in 
1912 to the end of 1922. Across that period, the average excess of the quarterly 
index numbers over the index for the four quarters ended in the same quarter 
was 1.4 per cent. Adjustments based on quarterly, rather than annual, numbers 
took care of this problem. There remained the lag inherent in the collection 
and publication of the quarterly price data and the delay in altering the wage. 
The average excess of a given quarter’s index number over that of the previous 
quarter was 1.1 per cent. From the beginning of 1919 to the end of 1922, the 
initial inflation and subsequent deflation lent great significance to the lags. In 
the third quarter of 1920, a basic-wage earner receiving a wage related to the 
previous four quarters’ prices would be getting only 86 per cent of the full 
Harvester standard; and had he received a wage related to the immediately 
previous quarter’s index, he would have received 93 per cent. In the fourth 
quarter of 1921, on the other hand, the worker getting a basic wage based on 
the preceding four-quarter average would be getting 11 per cent ‘too much’.7 
It is not surprising that, in a period of falling prices, unions would favour the 
lengthening of lags and employers their shortening.
The automatic adjustment system plus Powers’ 3s, approved by the Full 
Court in 1922, was the platform of basic-wage fixation for the remainder 
of the decade. In April 1923, the Full Court (Powers, Quick, and Webb) 
promulgated ‘rules of practice’. The rules for the basic wage were:
1. The basic wage adopted by the Full Court is the one based on the 
Statistician’s figures for food, groceries and rent for the preceding 
quarter plus 3s a week assuming 7s a day was a fair basic wage for a 
labourer in Melbourne in 1907, and the method decided upon will 
not be departed from by a single Judge until it is decided by the Full 
Court to vary that method.
7  The calculations referred to in this paragraph are based on the A series price index for six 
capitals.
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2. The Court will continue its practice of fixing one rate only when 
the parties desire it, or when the Court thinks it just to do so, and 
it will continue its practice of fixing uniform rates for groups of 
capital cities—or of country towns—or of districts as heretofore—
where the parties desire it or when the Court thinks it just to do so. 
Where one rate only is fixed or one rate for each group it will be 
fixed on the Statistician’s figures showing the average of the capitals 
or places (as the case may be) in which the respondents employ 
members of the union.
3. The Full Court has already decided that in new awards the 
adjustment of rates shall be quarterly based on the increased or 
decreased purchasing power of a sovereign shown by the Statistician’s 
figures.
4. The basic rates are to be fixed on the Statistician’s figures showing 
the cost of food, groceries and rent for the preceding quarter and 
not on any new basis until approved by the Full Court, but such 
allowances as may be deemed fair in country districts will be allowed 
on any ground the presiding Judge thinks just.
Rule 1 affirmed the Court’s continued reliance on the Harvester standard. 
Rule 2 allowed some room for manoeuvre in choosing between geographical 
variants of the price index. Rules 3 and 4 dealt with the adjustment system. 
Rule 4 specified that the price index to be used was that for food, groceries, 
and rent—not the broader index that the Statistician had recently begun to 
publish. Formally, these rules were no more than advisory to the individual 
arbitrators. The Act did not then reserve the basic wage to the Full Court; nor 
did it provide for appeals. By the late 1920s there were signs of discomfort 
(noted more fully in Chapter 7) within the reconstituted Court with existing 
practices in setting the basic wage; but they remained in effect until the 
Depression.
Automatic adjustments were implemented by means of tables included 
in the awards.8 These tables specified ranges of the price index; for each range, 
8  There were some exceptions, normally by consent, to the automatic adjustment system. For 
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there was a monetary amount. Lukin, in 1928, described the origin of this 
practice:
In June, 1922, Mr Justice Powers held a consultation with Mr Sutcliffe, 
and some of the representatives of employers and employees, at which, 
apparently, a desire held in common by employers and employees 
was expressed, so I am informed, that the principle of no fraction of 
a shilling should be applied in making the quarterly adjustments from 
time to time. Mr Sutcliffe proposed a formula which was revised and 
amended in detail, and inserted in subsequent awards of the Court. 
(Timber Workers’ case 27 CAR 577, 608)
Although automatic adjustments were not seriously criticised, Powers’ 
3s was a subject of contention, both before and within the Court and especially 
after the reconstitution of 1926. In October 1924, Powers commented that 
employers had sought the omission of the 3s on the ground that, with the 
cost of living no longer rising, it was unnecessary; but ‘as I pointed out to the 
respondents, until the Full Court alters the rule, I feel bound to add the 3s to 
the basic wage in ordinary cases’ (Engineers’ case 20 CAR 1135, 1152–1153). 
Quick, in 1924, began the task of making awards for the railways (following 
the High Court decision in the Engineers’ case). In 1925, he acceded to an 
application that he make an interim award for the Victorian Railways (22 
CAR 886). This occurred because the relevant State tribunal, the Railways 
Classification Board, had not adopted the automatic adjustment system or 
added the 3s to its basic wage. Quick set a basic wage that was 4s 6d a week 
above the Board’s basic wage and added the Board’s margins to that higher 
amount.
In his resignation statement of December 1925,9 Powers referred to the 
3s:
example, in the Liquor Trades’ case (for maltsters) of 1925, Webb said that he had included the 
standard adjustment clause in the award, but the parties had jointly requested its omission, 
and he agreed to their request. The purpose was to allow certainty in contracting for the 
supply of malt (22 CAR 675, 685).
9  This did not become effective until mid-1926.
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The Court, as at present constituted, has continued to carry out the 
work of the Court on the principles and practices laid down by Mr 
Justice Higgins, and we have, where practicable, granted new and better 
conditions and permanently increased the basic wage by 3s a week, 
which 3s I first allowed as a temporary measure to secure the basic wage 
during the term of the award. (22 CAR, xxxi)
The implication that the 3s had mutated from a device for preserving the 
Harvester standard into a permanent addition to it troubled some members 
of the reconstituted Court. After 1926, they were prepared, in some special 
instances, to dispense with it (see Chapter 7).
6.1.3 Raising the standard
Some unions, in their formal plaints, avowedly sought basic wages that 
exceeded the Harvester standard. These claims were invariably rejected. For 
example, in a Carters and Drivers’ case of 1923, Quick said that the union had 
asked him to state a case for the opinion of the Full Arbitration Court on the 
question of the basis and fairness of the Harvester judgment. He refused to do 
so: ‘In view of the decision of the Full Court to continue to make awards on the 
Harvester judgment basis and that the method of fixing the basic wage would 
not be altered by any one judge for any one union or one set of employers, 
the only way in my opinion to have the basis and fairness of the Harvester 
judgment again considered is by some of the important unions to join in an 
application to the Full Court to reconsider it’ (17 CAR 194, 199). Webb, in 
another Carters and Drivers’ case (21 CAR 232), said in 1924 that the union 
had demanded a higher basic wage because employees were ‘entitled to share 
in the increased productivity of the nation’. The Court, said Webb,
has no mandate from the Legislature to take the profits of an industry 
into consideration when fixing wages in an industry. Some Industrial 
Courts are expressly directed to consider such matters, but this Court 
is not, and it has always acted on the principle that such considerations 
are not within the scope of its work, nor could any one Judge take into 
consideration such a factor as a general increase in productivity. The 
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Judges of this Court have laid down certain principles to guide them in 
fixing the basic wage. It is essential that the Judges should act in harmony 
on this matter, and until all the Judges agree to an alteration, no single 
Judge could depart from the principles which have been adopted.
6.1.4 Variations around the standard
There were two ‘fringe’ issues in basic-wage fixation which we should notice. 
These were geographical differences in the wage and the concessions made to 
employers seen to be in financial difficulty. In some instances the two issues 
overlapped.
The Statistician produced price index numbers for 30 towns (which 
included the capital cities). These, he stated, could be used to link the prices 
prevailing in any of the towns to those of Melbourne in 1907, so that Harvester 
equivalents could be computed. If the basic wage were regarded strictly as 
the means of securing the Harvester standard, it would vary from place to 
place according to the levels of the price index. Exact equivalences would be 
unachievable, because a mere 30 numbers could not reflect the full diversity 
of local conditions. But the Court had the opportunity to select the ‘town’ 
most relevant to the workers covered. In reality, there was a range of practices, 
varying from a moderately close observance of local differences to a high level of 
averaging. The justifications for the former were twofold: that it was desirable 
for the basic wage to conform to the Harvester standard; and that the lower 
nominal wages that this permitted in some instances were beneficial to the 
employers concerned and might even contribute to their survival. Averaging, 
on the other hand, avoided or lessened issues in the identification of the 
right price indices; and it was sometimes portrayed as allowing employers to 
compete on equal terms. (The question whether ‘equal terms’ entailed the 
same money wages or the same real wages was overlooked.)
Webb, in 1924, made the first federal award for general printing, 
covering the metropolitan areas in Sydney, Melbourne, Adelaide, and Hobart. 
He fixed a uniform basic wage on ‘the weighted average of the figures of the 
Commonwealth Statistician for the four cities concerned’, explaining that ‘in 
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an industry which lends itself to Inter-State competition I think it is beneficial 
to fix a flat rate if such a course can be followed without injustice’ (22 CAR 
247, 249).
In 1925, Powers rejected a union claim for a uniform basic wage for 
locomotive enginemen, but set a single wage for each State (using the ‘five 
towns’ index number) (Locomotive Enginemen’s case 21 CAR 442, 448). Later 
in 1925, he said that ‘where work is done in the country … it is usual for this 
Court to fix the basic wage on the weighted average of what is known as the 
four towns of each State, omitting the capital cities, because the four towns, 
except in Tasmania, give a fair idea of the cost of living in the country’ (AWU 
case 22 CAR 973, 975). In a 1926 decision about shearers, Powers granted 
a uniform basic wage based on the weighted average index number for all 
30 towns (including the six capitals): ‘I do not see how that can be fairly 
avoided where employment for twelve months in country districts cannot be 
guaranteed’ (Pastoral case 23 CAR 458, 478).
Powers, in 1925, discussed the complexities of setting country basic 
wages:
The question of fixing [basic] rates for country towns has always been 
a very difficult one to decide. If the rates are fixed much lower than the 
capital city rates then the employees on the first opportunity leave for 
the city to get higher rates and the advantages obtainable in the cities. 
On the other hand, if the rates are not less than the city rates, large 
industries cannot be carried on in the country districts (not seaport 
towns) and employees are forced into the city. It is recognised that it is 
not in the interests of the country to get all industrial or other workers 
in the cities. … I propose to ask my colleagues to join me in considering 
the whole question of country rates and allowances for disadvantages 
recognised by all parties—to see if we can agree upon some uniform 
basis for country districts and special country towns instead of (1) on 
the capital cities rate in some cases, (2) on the five towns’ basis in others, 
(3) on the four towns’ basis in others, and (4) on the special town figures 
(as at Ballarat) in others. (Ironworkers’ case 22 CAR 707, 708)
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Unless it was done informally, the joint consideration of local rates did not 
happen.
We have noted above the convoluted endeavours of Powers to set a basic 
wage that reflected economic crises in the mining industry. The problems of 
mining confronted Webb in 1924 in respect of operations at Bendigo (Mining 
case 20 CAR 669). The attitude of the union, he said, had been very definitely 
stated by its representative:
He says that the union requests the Court to accede to its claim and 
substantially increase wages in the industry whatever the consequences 
may be. If the result is that the industry is destroyed, the men must 
find work in other avenues of life. The union contends that men ought 
not to be required to work in the industry at the rates which at present 
prevail, and if the increasing of the wages destroys the industry, the 
industry must be destroyed. The union takes the full responsibility of 
pressing its demand. (pp. 671–672)
Webb decided, however, that
in the interests of the industry, in the interests of the men employed in 
it, and in the interests of the public it is my duty to follow as nearly as 
possible what was done by Mr Justice Starke in 1920 and Mr Justice 
Powers in 1921, in the hope that the industry may continue to be 
carried on. It is not in the interests of any one that this Court should 
be the instrument of bringing about the calamity which I feel certain 
would be precipitated if the claims of the union were granted. (p. 673)
In several awards, said Webb, the basic wage for Bendigo had been set on 
the basis of the local Harvester equivalent (then £3 10s) plus 3s plus half the 
difference (6s) between that amount and the Melbourne rate—a total of 
£3 19s. If he increased the rate in mining (currently £3 10s) by 9s, ‘I have 
little doubt that the industry would be at an end’. Webb’s solution was to 
differentiate between non-profitable and profitable mines. For the former, he 
fixed the basic wage at £3 13s (the local Harvester rate plus 3s). In profitable 
mines, an extra 6s would apply.
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Webb, in 1925, also dealt with the basic wage in the dried-fruit industry 
(Dried Fruit case 21 CAR 334). When the industry was in its infancy before 
the war, practically all of the product was marketed in Australia and was heavily 
protected. The producers did well, and people were attracted to the industry. 
After the war, many returned soldiers entered the industry and an extensive 
settlement was established at Red Cliffs. Now, much of the greatly expanded 
output had to be marketed overseas at prices well below the Australian. Past 
practice had been to set a basic wage on the Melbourne price index, because 
the Mildura rate would have been higher. Sutcliffe’s evidence was that a 
Mildura-based rate would be £4 15s. Webb now fixed a rate of £4 2s, or 2s 
6d less than the Melbourne rate. Despite the wage being 14 per cent below 
Harvester, the growers protested that the concession took insufficient account 
of their predicament. Webb said that, if he were looking at this case from the 
point of view of the growers only, ‘I think I should almost be justified in saying 
that [the industry] cannot afford to pay any wages at all, and the workers must 
work for very little or nothing’; but ‘I must prescribe for these workers a wage 
which in some measure conforms to the principles which the Court has laid 
down’ (p. 349). Webb also set rates for Renmark and Leeton that were well 
below the local Harvester equivalents. The conformity of this decision to ‘the 
principles which the Court has laid down’ was slight indeed.10
The interaction of the geographical and the economic aspects of basic-
wage prescription was illustrated in a Printing case, also decided (in March 
1926) by Webb (23 CAR 124). This was about newspaper printing in 
Adelaide and Hobart. The Hobart employers tendered the report (submitted 
in September 1925) of a Committee appointed by the Premier of Tasmania 
to inquire into the State’s disabilities under federation.11 The Committee said:
Generally, it may be said that on account of her isolated position, her 
different characteristics of climate, her small population and low state 
10  Webb’s acceptance of the growers’ account of their predicament was criticised in 1939 by 
O’Mara (Judgment—Fruit Growing, etc. 41 CAR 285, 302–303).
11  Committee members were Sir N E Lewis, a former Premier (Chairman), Sir A H Ashbolt, 
a former Agent-General for Tasmania, J B Brigden, Professor of Economics, L F Giblin, State 
Statistician, and W A Woods, a former Labor MP.
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of development of secondary industries, all the defects of the Federal 
Arbitration Court methods, which in the larger States are in many cases 
of no great practical importance, have an exaggerated effect in Tasmania 
and constitute an appreciable handicap. An inquiry has shown that 
the overwhelming majority of employees in Tasmanian secondary 
industries come under Federal awards, and for the remainder the local 
Wages Board cannot, in practice, make a determination sensibly below 
the Federal standard. In the depressed state of Tasmanian secondary 
industry any consideration given to the wage-paying capacity would 
lead to Tasmanian rates rather under the general Australian level; but 
the crude principle of the cost of living criterion combines with the 
imperfections of its application to impose rates considerably higher than 
the Australian average. This puts an additional burden on Tasmanian 
enterprise and competitive production, which are already suffering from 
high coastal freights, with consequent aggravation of unemployment 
and loss of production. (quoted by Webb, p. 126)
Webb commented that there were two outstanding reasons for federation: 
defence and inter-State free trade. It was difficult for fair inter-State 
competition to exist unless industrial conditions were reasonably similar. The 
use of the Statistician’s price numbers in setting the basic wage had operated 
to Tasmania’s advantage:
The Commonwealth Statistician publishes with every Labour Report 
a return which shows the weighted hourly rate of wage for each State. 
The last of such returns … shows that for each year between 1914 and 
1924 the wages paid in Tasmania have almost invariably been the lowest 
in the Commonwealth. If low wages are an advantage to the industries 
of a State, then Tasmania has, for many years, in common with South 
Australia, had an enormous industrial advantage over the rest of the 
Australian States. (p. 127)
The Committee’s report and Webb’s response seem to conflict on 
the facts—either the Court’s policies raised Tasmanian wages above those 
of the mainland (the Committee) or they did not (Webb). The evidence is 
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ambiguous.12 The clear implication of Webb’s comment, however, was that 
wages should not be an instrument of inter-State economic adjustment. Other 
members of the Court would generally have agreed.
6.1.5 state basic wages
Four of the six States—New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia, and 
Western Australia—had explicit basic or living wages. The wages boards in 
Victoria and Tasmania did not declare basic wages, but seem to have taken 
account of notional basic wages in fixing their rates for various tasks. None of 
the States followed the Commonwealth Court into an automatic adjustment 
system. In the four States where a basic or a living wage was declared, there 
were tribunals responsible for the task, though subject in some instances to 
statutory direction. In New South Wales, the Board of Trade declared living 
wages until 1926, when the responsibility was transferred to the newly 
constituted Industrial Commission. The Commission was subject to changing 
statutory directions about the nature of the family unit for which the wage 
should provide. In Queensland, the Court of Industrial Arbitration made its 
first formal declaration of a basic wage in February 1921, setting an amount 
of 85s when the Harvester equivalent was 78s 6d. It reserved the right to set 
higher or lower amounts according to the level of prosperity of the industry 
concerned. In March 1922, the wage was reduced to 80s, at which it remained 
until September 1925. The State Parliament enacted a law fixing the rate at 
85s until September 1926, when discretion reverted to the Court. In South 
Australia, the Industrial Code 1920 committed the task of declaring a basic 
wage to the Board of Industry, which could alter the amount at minimum 
intervals of six months. In Western Australia, there was no mechanism for 
declaring a basic wage until 1925, when the Court of Arbitration was required 
to make an annual declaration.13 Figure 1.6 in Chapter 1 compares the State 
and federal basic wages.
12  Between 1923 and 1925, the price index was higher for Tasmania (5 towns) than for 
Australia (30 towns); thereafter the relation was reversed.
13  The foregoing summary of State arrangements is based on Anderson (1929, pp. 119–121) 
and the Labour Reports.
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6.2 the wage structure
The two-tier wage structure was often, and increasingly, explicit, with awards 
containing separate clauses for the basic wage and margins. In other cases, it was 
implicit: wages were prescribed as total amounts, but with the arbitrators (and 
presumably the parties) having clear understandings about their composition. 
Additions to the basic wage were generally characterised as ‘margins’. (There 
were also a few ‘industry allowances’.) Setting wages for specific grades of 
labour was perhaps the major task of the arbitrators of the 1920s. There was 
no formal mechanism of coordination, such as appeals or references to Full 
Benches. Consistency depended on agreement or collegiality. (Members of 
the Court sometimes said that they had consulted with their colleagues, who 
agreed with the pronouncements that they were making.)
6.2.1 The appeal to the past
We saw in Chapter 4 that Higgins, in the year before his departure from the 
Court, embarked on a policy of increasing margins so as to restore something 
like the proportional relativities that had existed before the war. This policy 
had been rejected by Starke. The major repudiation, however, came in Powers’ 
decision of October 1921 in the Engine Drivers’ case (15 CAR 883). ‘A new 
claim’ said Powers, ‘has been pressed in this and in every case lately … for 
what is called the full or effective margin for skill, over and above the basic 
wage, based on what was allowed in 1907 for skill; and in some cases later 
than 1907’ (pp. 896–897). This claim was based principally on two grounds: 
(1) that during the war margins for skill were not increased at all or not in 
proportion to the cost of living; and (2) ‘that the claim was recognised by the 
late President for the first time in the last award made before he resigned’.
Powers said with respect to (1) that even before the war margins had 
been awarded, not on the basis of what they might have been in 1907, but on 
‘what the skill was worth at the time’. The basic wage, in contrast, had not been 
related to the value of work but was set ‘to carry out the principles adopted by 
the Court in fixing a minimum wage, namely that each adult worker should 
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be paid enough to keep himself, his wife and three children under fourteen 
years in reasonable comfort’. During the war, some margins had actually been 
reduced (as in the public service), and in these cases the Court had promised 
to review them when times became normal. But honouring this promise was 
‘an entirely different proposition to the one now pressed for, namely, to grant 
increased margins allowed by this Court based on the value of the margins 
granted by some Board or Court or otherwise in 1907 or later under entirely 
different conditions and different hours of duty’ (pp. 897–898).
As to (2), Powers could only assume that Higgins was satisfied on the 
evidence presented to him ‘that the employees in question were entitled at 
the date he made the award to the full amount he allowed as margins for 
skill at that date’. The work of fitters and turners might well be worth what 
Higgins had awarded, ‘but that cannot, in my opinion, be determined by what 
they received in 1907’. He did not think that Higgins had based his decision 
‘on anything but the value of the skill at the date of the award under 1921 
conditions’; but if he did, as was alleged, base it solely on the ground that 
1907 margins ought to be doubled, then ‘I cannot see my way to admit that 
decision as a guide to this Court’. Powers concluded:
The principal reason why this Court does not feel justified in fixing 
margins in 1921 on the ground that certain margins were paid in 1907, 
and then double them automatically, is because the whole industrial 
position has been changed since 1907 principally—through direct 
legislation affecting labour conditions—through the constant activities 
of the unions in insisting on and obtaining better conditions for their 
members, shorter hours, standards [of ] work, etc—through the awards 
of the Court since 1907 improving conditions and shortening hours 
for the workers and through the improved machinery and appliances of 
to-day greatly lightening the labour of employees. Again in some cases 
new duties have been added. In some, duties have been reduced. In 
numerous other ways skill and duties required in 1921 are not the same 
as in 1907, and the marginal rates are not necessarily the same. (p. 900)
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At first sight, the idea that the wages of the skilled and semi-skilled 
should reflect the value of the work at the time when they were set, rather 
than movements in prices or the basic wage since some earlier time, such as 
1907, seems compelling. On closer inspection, however, it entailed significant 
complexities.
First, it implied that, when setting margins, the Court would actually 
undertake the task of evaluating the jobs. How would this be done? Higgins’ 
approach in Harvester was based on the judgment that people in the trade 
understood better than he the relative worth of the different jobs. This was 
at least arguable; and an independent assessment of ‘worth’ would hardly 
have been consistent with the time constraints of dealing with the many 
applications for relief from the excise. Starke and Powers turned their back 
on the simple formula. They might, for example, have noted the ‘custom 
and practice’ element of pre-war relativities and asked whether there were 
reasons for increasing or narrowing the spread. But having rejected the unions’ 
attempts to invoke the pre-war relativities, they offered no alternative method 
of evaluation.
Second, in the absence of a serious re-evaluation whenever margins were 
set or reviewed, what was the ‘default option’? The three conceivable choices 
were constant money amount, constant real amount, and constant relativities. 
Starke and Powers chose the first of these without seriously weighing the 
respective merits of all three options.
Third, there were unstated and perhaps unrecognised issues as to the 
interrelation of the basic wage and margins. The basic-wage component of 
the total wage was understood to be equal to the unskilled labourer’s rate, and 
changes in that rate were translated into equivalent alterations in all award 
rates. But if wage differences were to reflect the relative values of jobs, the total 
wages were surely the relevant comparators. And if the general principle was 
subject to an overriding and socially based requirement of ensuring at least 
a living wage, one method of achieving this would have been to fix all rates 
on the basis of ‘worth’ (if that could be done) but to add the proviso that not 
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less than the living wage must be paid to every worker. (This principle was 
adopted in the 1970s with the ‘minimum wage’.) The technique of allowing 
margins to ride on top of the basic wage, but only as money amounts, is almost 
impossible to reconcile with setting wages by absolute or relative worth.
This is not to deny a pragmatic justification for such a practice—that 
it might be expedient to limit the movements of wages by adjusting only a 
portion of them, the basic wage, for the cost of living. That is what the Court 
did between 1907 and 1921. But it is idle to suggest that such a policy is 
consistent with fixing wages by worth, unless ‘worth’ is so defined that the 
argument is tautologous.
Powers further considered the level of margins in the Engineers’ case, 
decided in June 1922 (16 CAR 231). In this case, the decisions of Higgins 
made a year earlier about margins and hours were under review (though the 
matter of hours had to be reserved for a Full Court and is discussed in the next 
section). ‘I am asked’, he said,
to reconsider an important award made after a very lengthy hearing by 
the late President of this Court just before his resignation as President, 
by which the learned Judge … increased margins for skill beyond any 
margins recognised by employers, employees and Wages Boards in the 
engineering industry, and contrary to the practice of this Court previous 
to the award in question, except in one award—the Merchant Service 
Guild. (p. 232)
He did not think for a moment that the rates set by Higgins were not fair 
on the evidence before him and at the time of his decision. But he was ‘also 
satisfied that on the evidence before me at the present time that the late 
President would not today make the award he did in June, 1921’.
Powers now said—contrary to what he had said in the Engine Drivers’ 
case—‘that the late President did allow the extra 2s a day [for fitters and 
turners] on the ground of the increased cost of living since 1907, not the 
increased value of skill in 1921, and to carry out his promise to give increased 
margins according to the cost of living when he thought it could fairly be 
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done’ (p. 262). But he was ‘quite satisfied that the late President would not in 
June, 1922, consider it opportune or fair to add new burdens never imposed’ 
on industries (p. 265).
There is no evidence in Powers’ decision that the margins awarded in 
any way reflected an evaluation of the work. He gave as his principal reason for 
reducing margins the ‘mass of evidence’ which showed ‘that the rates awarded 
in June last year cannot now be paid by any of the manufacturing industries at 
the present time, because the rates for all engineering and other classes of work 
in America, England, France, and Belgium have been reduced to a very great 
extent since June last year, and rates for margins are now much below what 
was proved to be the margins in June, 1921, in those countries’ (p. 262). He 
thought that it would be in the public interest to increase the pre-1921 margin 
by 1s per day (to 4s for tradesmen), recognising that ‘employers will even 
then have a hard task to face the competition while they have to pay wages so 
much higher than in England and in other continental countries, including 
Germany, with which country it is said trade relations are to be resumed in 
August’ (p. 271).
Thus the metal tradesman’s margin, which had been 18s a week between 
Harvester and 1921, and was raised to 36s by Higgins, became 24s. There it 
stayed until after the Depression.
During the 1920s, the Court consistently resisted attempts by unions to 
raise margins where the ground for the increases sought was either the erosion 
of proportional relativities or the rise in prices since pre-war years. The near-
consistent position of the Court was that margins should correspond to the 
value of the work entailed in the given classification, and that this did not 
move in proportion to the basic wage or retail prices.
In the Engineers’ case of 1924 (20 CAR 1135), the unions claimed a 
fitter’s margin of 31s per week (in place of the existing 24s). This amount 
was derived by assuming a 1907 margin of 18s and adjusting it for the rise 
in the cost of living. Rejecting this appeal to the past, Powers said that ‘to fix 
margins for skill on any other basis than its value in the market at the time the 
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awards are made would be contrary to the practice of every other Arbitration 
Court in Australia, contrary to the practice of every tribunal appointed to 
fix wages, and contrary to every State Wages Board decision in all the States 
of the Commonwealth’ (p. 1149). There were several answers to the unions’ 
argument about the declining rewards for skill:
•	 ‘That the industrial world has not stood still since 1907. That 
machinery has been invented to make the work of tradesmen 
much easier, and in many cases to do the work the fitters and 
turners did in 1907 by hand. In some cases it has simplified 
the work. In other cases, many classes of work then paid for at 
basic rates only have since been classified as skilled or slightly 
skilled, and if I allowed only the rates for skill of the 91 classes 
of work I have now to deal with on the basis of rates allowed 
in 1907 only, the rates would be much lower than they will be 
under the award.’
•	 ‘The market value of the margin for skill has not increased in 
any country at the same rate as the basic wage has increased.’
•	 ‘[T]he unions have argued strongly that I should allow fitters 
and turners’ rates to workers whose work I have the greatest 
difficulty in fixing as high as a margin as 24s a week, and 
some for which I cannot see any way to fix 24s a week margin, 
leave alone 31s a week. If I gave these men margins based on 
what they were getting as labourers in 1907, the union would 
strongly object.’
•	 If the argument from the cost of living had been available to 
fitters and turners, it should, in fairness, have been extended 
to other groups: ‘Every man who received any sum above the 
basic wage would then automatically be entitled to nearly 
double the amount whatever it was—all tradesmen of any 
sort, all clerks, foremen, accountants, and Government 
officials—including the Commissioner for Railways—and if 
it is fair for one it is fair for all. Why not a Justice of the High 
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Court, who has not even had an increase in keeping with the 
cost of living, and whose salary has, in addition, been further 
reduced by some hundreds a year through taxation? If the 
union’s contention is correct, the salaries should be raised by 
£2,500’ (p. 1150–1151).
Rejection of the historical link (whether direct or via the cost of living) 
would seem to raise two significant questions. If the margin for any grade of 
labour was to be determined on the basis of its contemporary ‘value’, how 
was that measured? And why was it that the value of the work of the more 
skilled grades had risen less (in proportional terms) than that of the unskilled 
labourer? In the passages quoted above, Powers did not confront the former 
question. As to the latter, he offered two answers. One was that mechanisation 
has reduced the demands made of the skilled worker. The other was that wage 
gains conferred on lower-paid workers (chiefly by awarding margins where 
none previously existed) had absorbed benefits that might otherwise have been 
available for the more highly skilled and qualified.
6.2.2 Fixing specific margins and industry allowances
A study of the many decisions wherein specific rates were awarded reveals a 
bewildering variety of practices and principles. Generalisation is difficult. I 
refer to a selection of decisions which will serve to demonstrate this.
The role of agreement: Agreement between the parties played a large role. 
Many awards were made by consent, giving rise to little or no commentary 
by the Court. Commonly, there would be agreement about the ranking 
of classifications; and very often there was agreement about the margins 
themselves. In these cases, no doubt, the terms of the agreements were 
influenced by the parties’ awareness of the likely attitude of the Court. In some 
decisions, however, the members of the Court emphasised their dependence 
on the parties to resolve issues that might otherwise have taxed their capacities. 
For example, Quick, in a case about electrical workers in South Australia, said 
in 1923: ‘It has been most satisfactory to notice the business-like and friendly 
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spirit shown by the representatives of all the parties concerned, without which 
it would have been impossible to have arrived at settlements solving difficult 
and complicated questions relating to the rates of pay to be made applicable to 
numerous sections of a trade so technical and having so many ramifications as 
that of electrical work’ (Electrical Trades case 18 CAR 685, 691).
The tradesman’s rate: The notion of a tradesman’s rate had some 
influence; and the most representative tradesman was commonly seen as the 
engineering fitter. It is convenient, therefore, to refer to the structure of wages 
set by Powers in 1924 for the engineering trades (20 CAR 982, 1135). This 
is shown in Table 6.1. About 30 classifications were distributed between 14 
levels of pay. Between the basic wage and the tradesman’s rate were six levels of 
margins for semi-skilled workers.
The margin of 24s for tradesmen was adopted in the first federal 
award for printing, made by Webb in 1924 (Printing Industry case 22 CAR 
247). ‘In most industries,’ said Webb, ‘there is one tradesman whose work is 
representative of the standard of skill usually achieved by the skilled worker in 
the industry. In this industry, the hand compositor is generally taken as being 
the tradesman who fixes such standard’ (p. 249). It was impossible, Webb 
said, ‘to compare things which are so widely different as the skill of men in 
different skilled trades, and I cannot properly and fairly compare one trade 
with another, although it is very natural that one should try to do so. … Each 
industry must stand on its own merits’. Nevertheless, without explicit reason, 
he fixed the hand compositor’s margin at 24s (p. 253).
In 1925, Powers made the first federal award for locomotive enginemen, 
adopting the rates currently paid in New South Wales. These included a 
margin for skill of 24s in the first year, rising by 6s in successive years to 42s 
in the fourth year, with an additional 6s for drivers of express and passenger 
trains Locomotive Enginemens’ case (21 CAR 442, 453).
Where the adoption of the ‘tradesman’s rate’ involved a large wage 
increase, however, the Court might hold its hand. In the Clothing Trades case 
of 1923 (18 CAR 1033), Webb observed:
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In this industry margins for skill are very low; indeed, I know of no 
other trade in respect of which it is necessary to serve as long periods of 
apprenticeship [5 years] as are required in this trade, where the margins 
for skill are so low. The employees contend that the reason of this is 
that in no instance has any margin for skill in this industry been fixed 
by the Court, the margins have been fixed in conferences and under 
circumstances where employees have accepted less than they thought 
they were entitled to. (p. 1046)
In a 1919 (consent) award, the margin for tailors had been set at 10s (compared 
with the fitter’s margin of 18s). This was obviously too low, and in 1921 the 
employers had agreed to a margin of 15s. The union now sought 25s, and 
Webb noted that in many trades the tradesman received a margin of 24s. The 
employers, however, said that they were faced with severe overseas competition 
Table 6.1 Margins in the engineering trades, 1924
252 Australian Wage Policy
and brought evidence to that effect. ‘On the other hand’, said Webb, ‘the 
employees press that their claims should be dealt with on their intrinsic merits, 
and contend that any simple measure of justice must greatly increase the 
wages which they are receiving’ (p. 1048). It was impossible to make an award 
that would meet these contrary positions, but ‘I must do the best I can’. His 
decision was to raise the tailor’s margin to 18s. The clothing trades remained 
a low-pay industry.
In 1925, the agricultural implement and machinery industry came 
before the Court (in the person of Quick) for the first time since Higgins had 
dealt with it (outside the arbitration jurisdiction) in 1907 (Ironworkers’ case 
22 CAR 479). Higgins had set the basic wage at 7s and the rate for fitters 
and turners at 10s—an implied margin of 3s per day or 18s per week. (Quick 
noted that in 1909 the agricultural implements wages board in Victoria had 
set a basic wage of 6s 6d and a margin for fitters and turners of 2s 6d.) When 
Higgins set an engineering tradesman’s margin of 36s in 1921, his intention 
was to restore the 10:7 ratio of 1907. Since the 36s margin had subsequently 
been replaced by one of 24s, there might have been an expectation that the 
latter would now be the amount awarded in the agricultural implement 
industry. The employers, however, strenuously resisted this:
Mr Myhill, on behalf of the employers, said that in his opinion if Mr 
Justice Higgins, who in 1907 had found that a man doing fitting and 
blacksmithing work in connection with a plough was then worth an 18s 
margin, were to assess the work which is done today, he would probably 
fix a margin of something like 9s per week owing to the altered conditions 
of the industry. The skill which was then required had almost all gone 
and no notice should therefore be taken of what was done in 1907. The 
employers have, by the introduction of modern methods and up to date 
machinery, eliminated a large amount of the skill which was required 
in this particular industry, and they contended that they are morally 
entitled to a reduction of the margins. In spite of this the employers, 
said Mr Myhill, had been fair. In 1909 the margin of the implement 
fitter and the implement smith was determined by the Wages Board at 
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15s per week. Although the employers had spent thousand of pounds 
in introducing modern methods and modern machinery, they had not 
asked for a reduction of the 15s margin, so they considered the union 
had been very well treated. (p. 485)
Quick was persuaded. ‘I am convinced’, he said, ‘that agricultural fitting is of a 
very crude nature as compared with engineering fitting’ (p. 493). He retained 
the margin of 15s set by the wages board in 1909.
Margins for other grades: In two cases of 1922, the Court articulated 
a view that mechanisation had reduced the call for higher levels of manual 
skill but had created semi-skilled jobs that justified modest margins. Webb 
distinguished between the levels of skill required of different kinds of 
‘carpenters’. ‘A carpenter,’ he said,
is a highly skilled tradesman. A carpenter on a building is, in my opinion, 
the most skilled tradesman on a building. A carpenter is entitled to a 
high margin for skill. The margin should be at least 4s per day … But 
there is a class of employee who is termed a carpenter who is employed 
on work known as stock work. This is putting together stock doors, 
stock sashes and work of a similar nature. The bulk of the work is done 
by machinery … I have inspected the work done by these employees—it 
does not require the degree of skill as is required by a general carpenter. 
His margin should not be more than 3s per day. (Carpenters and Joiners’ 
case 16 CAR 1136, 1142)
In a Glassworkers’ case, also in 1922 (16 CAR 1276), Quick described 
the changing skill requirements of the industry:
Glass bottle making was at one time exclusively a hand and mouth 
worked process, but in recent years this process has been largely 
superseded by bottle-blowing machines which are fed with liquid glass 
by skilled glass workers. More recently machines … which automatically 
feed the blowing machines have been installed. These feeders take the 
place of the skilled glass worker. (p. 1278)
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But he awarded a margin of 3s 6d a week to lehrmen, who looked after ovens 
to ensure that a stable temperature was preserved. Their work was hot and 
required a certain amount of skill plus continuous and undivided attention (p. 
1293). He also awarded 2s 6d per week to sorters, who have ‘to swiftly exercise 
sound judgment and discretion in determining whether bottles are fit to go 
into use or whether they should be rejected’ (p. 1294). Higgins had refused 
any margin to sorters because they were not skilled.
Webb, in 1923, dealt with an application for an increased margin for 
wool sorters (Wool and Basil Workers’ case 17 CAR 598). Under a 1920 award, 
sorters received a margin of 1s 2d per day. This, apparently, accorded with 
then-existing standards and the union claim. The Court, said Webb,
necessarily places great reliance on previous customs in an industry, 
and especially voluntary agreements between the parties when fixing a 
secondary wage. Almost universally these have been of the utmost value 
in guiding the Court. … Indeed, it would be an almost impossible task 
on the Court if the Judges had to perform the work of fixing a secondary 
wage without a knowledge of previous customs in the industry to guide 
them. It is true that at times some margins are seriously challenged 
and new margins are fixed. But even in fixing new margins one of the 
important factors that a Judge takes into consideration is the relative 
margins fixed by long usage and custom in the industry. (p. 599)
Initially, Webb raised the margin to 1s 4d per day. The union, however, asked 
for a variation of this decision. It was now obvious, said Webb, that a ‘claim 
was being made to fix a new and special secondary wage for the skilled work 
of a body of men whose interests had always been completely overlooked’. 
He asked the union representative how this had happened and was told that 
the sorters had been unorganised and had never had their case pressed. Webb 
appointed two assessors to advise him, and raised the daily margin to 3s.
Webb described his approach to setting margins for the timber industry. 
This passage shows the miscellany of considerations guiding the outcomes:
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I have seen most of the work done. I know that a No. 1 benchman is a 
highly skilled man, and is entitled to the full margin for a skilled worker. 
I know that a shaper machinist, boults carver machinist, general joiner 
machinist, moulding machinist, variety turning lathe machinist are 
very skilled machinists, and should receive an adequate margin for the 
work they do. Buzzer machinists, tenoning machinists, door planing 
machinists, timber bending machinists are doing work which is familiar 
to me, and I have classified them according to my knowledge of the 
work. I know nothing about coopers’ machinists, but I have followed 
rates previously agreed in respect of these machinists. I know the work 
of carpenters and joiners and stock carpenters, for I awarded for them 
in another case. Mantelpiece makers should, I think, be on the same 
margin as stock carpenters. I have seen the work of making plywood, 
and have awarded for the various classes of work done. … My object 
as far as possible has been to give a fair margin for the individual skill 
of each worker, and in every case, if possible, to fix the same margin 
for the whole of the Commonwealth. … My great desire is to reduce 
this complicated matter to some degree of co-ordination, and to 
establish as far as possible uniform rates and conditions throughout the 
Commonwealth. (Timber Workers’ case 18 CAR 325, 349–350)
In the 1923 Tanners and Leather Dressers’ case (18 CAR 790), most of the 
rates had been agreed, but the parties differed over the margin for the machine 
shaver. It had been increased in 1920, under a consent award, from 7s to 11s. 
The employers were resisting a further increase. They contended that the 1920 
award had placed the shaver ‘in the wrong place’, because it raised his relative 
position above that fixed by Powers in 1914. ‘But, if they got into the “wrong 
place”’, said Quick, ‘then it was with the consent of 128 employers … and 
with the sanction of the Court’ (p. 793). One of the employers had voluntarily 
offered an increase of 4s because of the scarcity of workers with the required 
skill, but had retracted the offer under pressure from other employers. ‘It may 
well be argued’, said Quick, ‘that if it would be just, reasonable and profitable 
for Russell Brothers to increase the rates payable to their shavers it should be 
equally just, reasonable and profitable for other employers to do the same’; but 
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the Court ‘would not necessarily be bound by the rate paid by any employer or 
any limited number of employers under such circumstances’ (p. 795). Quick 
raised the shaver’s margin by 1s 6d to 12s 6d.
The Meat Industry case of 1924 required Quick to consider both an 
industry allowance and margins (20 CAR 182). An existing agreement and 
prevailing practice justified him ‘in arriving at the conclusion that there has 
been an implied recognition of an industry allowance above the basic wage 
in the shops and factories section’. The industry was characterised by ‘special 
industrial conditions additional to and independent of margins for skill’. 
Quick decided, therefore, 
to make what is commonly called an ’industry allowance’ superadded to 
the basic wage, in consideration of the following factors, viz., distasteful 
and disagreeable and in some cases repulsive and repellent nature of the 
work, especially in the hot summer months; conditions injurious to 
health such as working in cellars and cold storage chambers; necessity 
for providing and wearing special clothing in the discharge of duties; 
wear and tear, renewal and laundry of clothing, and providing tools of 
trade. 
He awarded an allowance of 4s 6d per week, ‘which is the amount allowed 
under the New South Wales and South Australian awards …’ (p. 189).
Turning to margins, Quick noted that in 1916 Higgins had allowed 
a margin of 10s for shopmen and general butchers. This was retained in a 
1921 agreement and remained in force, but the union now sought an increase, 
which the employers opposed. ‘It is only under very special circumstances’, 
said Quick,
that the Court would be disposed to interfere with existing margins, 
but in this case I believe that butchering has of late years been a 
progressive industry, showing a great increase in methods of preparing 
and handling meat and presenting it in a form attractive to customers. 
The magnificent shop-window displays of to-day to be seen in the 
metropolitan and country shops show a great advance in the taste and 
refinement of the butchering trade, compared with the rough, ready and 
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rude methods of earlier years. Complaint has been made that the trade 
has not been attracting the services of apprentices and that the standard 
of workmanship has been endangered. The best way in my opinion of 
securing apprentices and improvers to supply the shopmen and general 
butchers of the future is to make the trade attractive and give it a better 
footing and standard, instead of allowing it to be regarded as a repulsive 
and unprogressive occupation … Under the circumstances, I propose 
to make a small marginal increase of 1s 6d per week, which is of course 
independent of the industry allowance provided for at the bottom of 
the scale. (pp. 191–192)
Quick returned to the butcher’s margin in December 1925, and in this 
case compared the butcher’s work to that of the engineering tradesman:
The margin allowed to a fitter in the engineering industry is 4s per 
day, or 24s per week. To qualify himself to earn that he has to serve 
an apprenticeship of five years. The margin allowed to shopmen and 
general butchers by the award as it now stands is 11s 6d per week, 
which is not quite half that allowed to the fitter. Now, in my opinion, 
the general butcher is a tradesman equally as useful, necessary and 
indispensable in his sphere of industrial operations as a fitter in the 
iron industry. It is true that the butcher in cutting meat has not to 
work to the same exactitude and precision as the fitter, but he has to 
understand the anatomy of oxen, hogs, and sheep, and be able to cut 
to the requirements of the retail trade with a certain amount of care 
and skill so as to avoid waste to the employer and do justice to the 
employer’s customer. (Meat Industry case 22 CAR 794, 803–804)
Quick increased the margin to 14s. There is no indication why the remaining 
‘gap’ between the fitter and the butcher (10s) was more correct than the 
previous gap of 12s 6d. (With the industry allowance of 4s 6d, the gap was 
reduced to 5s 6d.) The structure of the butcher’s wage thus became:
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Another decision that appeared to turn on the arbitrator’s assessment 
of the work was that of Webb, given in 1925, about the margin for maltsters 
(Liquor Trades case 22 CAR 675):
When a man seeks work in a malthouse he begins his work without 
any special training. But he is selected for the work by the employer 
or his foreman. Where the employer wants a man and a man offers 
for the work he is given a trial if he is a ‘likely-looking man’. The man 
may at the time know nothing about the work but there is a consensus 
of testimony that he has a lot to learn and that it takes him some time 
before he becomes proficient at the work. A maltster must be a man 
who can be relied on to do his work carefully and properly. There is 
skill in his work. It is not a high degree of skill but I am satisfied that 
the work requires some skill. … It is true that untrained men are put 
on to do the work at the full wage, but the untrained man must learn 
the work and unless he shows that he is capable of learning and that 
he is a trustworthy, reliable man he is not permitted to continue in the 
employment. (p. 681)
The reader may well ponder what margin would accord with this description 
of the maltster’s work. Webb’s answer was 12s.
In the Printing Industry case (relating to newspapers in Adelaide and 
Hobart), decided in March 1926, Webb was asked to include an industry 
allowance in the award. Having reviewed previous decisions about industry 
allowances, he said:
The cases which I have quoted establish that it is the practice of the 
Court to reflect in its awards an industry allowance where such allowance 
has been previously observed in an industry, and especially when such 
allowance has been voluntarily conceded by agreement. Now, in this 
industry, such industry allowance undoubtedly exists, and the reasons 
why an industry allowance should be granted are to be founded in the 
exacting nature of the work done, but the matter is very troublesome. 
In no two States is the same amount fixed, and the sums granted in each 
State show wide divergences. (23 CAR 124, 134)
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Webb granted an industry allowance of 6s in Adelaide and 3s in Hobart. He 
then went through the various classifications of work and, after summary 
descriptions, awarded margins. The following is an example:
Rotary Machinist—The rotary printing machine in a printing office is 
a very wonderful piece of machinery. The man who is in charge of the 
machine is the machine minder or rotary machinist. His work is very 
responsible work, and the margin for this employee will be £1 10s per 
week.
In 1921, responsibility for fixing salaries in the Commonwealth Public 
Service was transferred to the Commonwealth Public Service Arbitrator. This 
removed from the Court what had hitherto been its main responsibilities for 
white-collar and professional work. Nevertheless, in the course of the 1920s 
the Court made decisions affecting other such areas, including banking, 
insurance, local government, and clerical and higher classifications in the 
railways.
In the Insurance Clerks’ case of 1923, Quick was confronted with a 
claim for a long incremental scale (19 CAR 208). During the hearing, he had 
contrasted this claim with the normal treatment of manual workers. The fitter, 
for example, might receive £284 per year at age 21, but ‘he then becomes a 
fixture unless he gains promotion to a superior position such as that of overseer 
or manager’ (p. 223). From that point in the proceedings, ‘the argument in 
support of the ascending scale was directed to show that the insurance clerk, 
unlike the stationery fitter, is constantly increasing his knowledge and usefulness 
and is shouldering more and more responsibility’. Further, ‘the argument was 
advanced that the basic wage applicable to mechanical tradesmen and suitable 
to the age of 21 years was not sufficient for the progressive insurance clerk 
whose costs of living are necessarily greater than those of a mechanic’. Quick 
was persuaded:
At about the age of 26 or 27 years a young man naturally approaches the 
age at which he may reasonably consider and prepare for marriage, and 
if his income at that time is not sufficient to enable him to support a 
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wife and possible family his outlook is very cheerless and unsatisfactory. 
Unless he has some motive for looking forward to an improving career 
justifying the responsibilities of marriage he is in danger of losing 
interest in his work and is liable to drift into habits of carelessness and 
lack of ambition. (p. 224)
He prescribed a scale in which the rate at age 21—£220—was equated to the 
basic wage and a maximum of £390 was reached at age 32 (p. 226). In the 
Bank Officers’ case of 1924, Quick retained a similar scale, which had been 
included in a consent award of 1922 (19 CAR 272). He refused, however, to 
prescribe rates for branch managers: ‘Their appearance in such a Court as this 
alongside their bank officers, most of them subordinate to themselves, being 
members of a common labour organisation formed for the very purpose of 
prosecuting demands and obtaining awards against their employers, appears 
to me to place them as well as their employers in a false position’ (p. 284).
Much of the work of musicians and actors was casual; individual skills 
varied markedly; and assessing the level of work was seen to be a difficult 
exercise. In 1923, Powers took refuge in the fact that he was setting only 
minimum rates: ‘I am not asked to fix rates for the Mozarts, Mendelssohns, 
Kubeliks or O’Briens of the orchestra, or even the man who is worth £10 a 
week to managers, who can command their own rates, but the Court has 
to fix rates for the John Brown, Tom Jones, and Andrew Robinsons of the 
orchestra who would not get a fair rate for playing in the orchestra from some 
employers, if the Court did not fix a minimum rate for the ordinary work of 
an ordinary musician in the orchestra’ (Musicians’ case 17 CAR 900, 907).
Webb, in 1924, said that ‘to attempt to assess the value of an actor’s skill 
would be to embark on a hopeless task’ (Actors’ case 19 CAR 788, 795).
One difficulty is that there is no standard by which I can measure or 
value such skill, and another insuperable difficulty is that there is no 
standard of skill or responsibility. … I am dealing with men in respect 
of whom there is no standard at all. Their skill may be great, or it may 
be negligible. I cannot assess its value. The utmost the Court can do in 
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an industry such as this is to fix a minimum which will provide for the 
normal and reasonable needs of those workers considered as human 
beings, and further than that the Court cannot go. It must, however, I 
think, be conceded that any actor is entitled to something more than an 
unskilled labourer’s wage. He is expected to dress better than a labourer; 
he is expected to be a man of some education; his occupation requires 
that he should live under certain conditions; he is required to work at 
times when most people prefer to enjoy their leisure, and the needs of 
such a man are greater than those of an unskilled labourer. (pp. 795–
796)
Webb awarded £6 for an actor and £5 5s for an actress. These amounts 
included allowances for travelling.
In relation to musicians, Webb said that a difficulty confronting a judge 
was that there was no other industry that could be used for comparison.
The employment is more in the nature of a professional engagement 
than of an industrial occupation. In all cases the Court would experience 
great difficulties when it endeavoured to find standards by which to 
measure the value of professional services. Yet in some cases it must 
be done, and the conditions of the musicians’ employment are such 
that it is necessary that the Court extend its protection to them. Other 
professions can protect themselves. The musician is a wage-earner who 
would be hopelessly at the mercy of exploitation if he were not protected 
by the Court. (Musicians’ case 22 CAR 29, 30)
It was commonplace, said Webb,
that the skill of musicians is a very variable matter and ranges from the 
artistry of a great artist to the poor skill of a moderate player … We 
cannot compute the true worth of genius, and there are some who claim 
to be musicians the value of whose work it would be just as difficult to 
estimate from another point of view. It is between these two extremes 
that this Court has to find a wage for the body of professional musicians 
who earn their living by playing an instrument in an orchestra at a 
public performance, and it is, of course, obvious that this body of 
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musicians will, as a rule, include neither the great artist not the very 
poor performer. (p. 34)
6.2.3 Conclusion
It will be plain that when the Court moved from general principles, such as 
refusal to match movements in the basic wage, there were, on the one hand, few 
consistently applied principles for the setting of margins and, on the other, a 
plethora of criteria applied in specific cases. Obviously, there was no systematic 
job evaluation. The 24s ‘tradesman’s’ margin did provide a benchmark that 
encouraged consideration of inter-award relativities. A tendency to maintain 
existing margins was countered to a degree by the process of assigning 
small margins to work that hitherto would have been treated as unskilled: 
unfortunately, no data exist that would show the effects of this process on 
the degree of inequality in the wage structure. Hancock and Moore (1972) 
found that the degree of inequality between award wages did not change much 
during the 1920s. That finding, however, was derived from an analysis of the 
behaviour of 28 award rates across the period 1914–66. It could not allow for 
the effect of the insertion in the structure of new classifications that carried 
small margins.
6.3 hours of work
With Higgins’ resignation on 29 June 1921, Powers was for a time the sole 
member of the Court. Hence there was no ‘quorum’ to deal with possible 
hours reductions (below 48 hours) or increases. With unions making claims 
that flowed from Higgins’ decisions, a queue developed. Duffy and Rich, 
appointed Deputy Presidents on 6 August, stayed only long enough to join 
Powers in deciding upon these claims. The Standard Hours case—the first full 
bench case in the Court’s history—was heard in September and October and 
decided in December (15 CAR 1044).
Powers began his decision by listing reasons why it was necessary to deal 
with the issue at length:
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•	 ‘The unions concerned, and their members, and the public, 
are entitled to know why this Court, in November, 1921, 
refuses to lower standard hours when the late president of the 
Court … in November, 1920, and in June, 1921, decided to 
lower standard hours in two important industries.’
•	 ‘The unions concerned, and their members, should know the 
refusal of this Court to reduce standard hours generally is in 
accordance with the principles and practices laid down by this 
Court since its establishment up to the date of the Timber 
Workers’ award, namely, for 13 years’ (p. 1146).
Higgins had always, since inception of the Court, refused to reduce hours 
below 48 unless this was necessary ‘on the ground that the conditions under 
which the employees had to work seriously affected their health, and shorter 
hours would tend to prevent injury to their health, or for other special reasons 
as in the Builders Labourers’ and the Waterside Workers’ cases’ (p. 1048). 
In all other cases the Court had held that any reduction of standard hours 
was a matter for State Legislatures. ‘That practice’, said Powers, ‘was followed 
from the establishment of the Court until the award of the late president 
in the Timber Workers’ case, made in November last; after he had publicly 
announced his intention of not continuing the responsibility of conducting 
the work of this Court, as President, after the cases in hand had been dealt 
with’ (p. 1049).
Powers acknowledged, nevertheless, that in the Timber Workers’ case ‘the 
late president dealt very fully with the question of reducing standard hours in 
Australia generally, and he gave reasons why he should alter the practice of this 
Court, and reduce the standard hours of work in Australia except where special 
reasons to the contrary were shown in any case’ (p. 1051). He had carefully 
read Higgins’ decision. ‘Whether the learned Judge was right, or not, on the 
evidence submitted in that case’, conditions had since changed. ‘I doubt’, said 
Powers, ‘whether the learned Judge would under present conditions, and on 
the evidence at present before the Court, make a similar award’ (p. 1052). 
Higgins’ inquiry had been held at a time (August, September, and October 
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1920) ‘when wages were at their highest, and when employers could and did 
receive the highest prices for their products’ (p. 1054). Since then, ‘the rates 
of wages in all countries have dropped considerably and the hours of labour 
increased except in Australia’ (p. 1059). Unemployment among unionists 
had risen from 6.2 to 11.4 per cent, and the Court would not be justified 
‘in adding to the abnormal unemployment by reducing standard hours’ (pp. 
1060–1061).
The evidence in the present case showed that in all industries where 
hours had been reduced from 48 to 44, there had been reductions of output 
‘about equal to the proportion of the reduction of hours’ (p. 1062). That 
increases in production due to new and better machinery should allow workers 
to enjoy shorter hours was, in theory, quite right; but it could not do so in 
practice ‘unless the workers of the world act together and enforce that claim’:
I personally do not see how any employer in Australia can give his 
workers shorter hours because his machinery produces twice as much, 
or five times or twenty times as much, as the machinery of 1910 did if 
he has to compete with competitors in the United States and England 
who have as good or even better machinery and who have employees 
who work longer instead of shorter hours at lower wages. 
… The Court will find it difficult in the light of present happenings 
throughout the civilised world to maintain the Australian standard of 
living based on the Harvester judgment, the living wage, the standard 
of 48 hours as a maximum in industries generally, and shorter hours in 
force in special industries and for special reasons, while the world as a 
whole has reduced and is reducing standards of living, reducing wages, 
and increasing hours of work. As at present constituted the Court will 
maintain those standards … (pp. 1063; 1071)
The joint decision of Duffy and Rich reads in full:
We have carefully considered the evidence in these cases and we are not 
satisfied that any of the reductions in standard hours of work asked for 
should be imposed on employers at the present time. We have been 
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pressed to make such a reduction in certain exceptional cases where the 
work is stated to be either distasteful or prejudicial to health or both. In 
our opinion such cases can be dealt with most effectually by payment of 
additional wages for distasteful work, and by the enforcement of more 
satisfactory industrial hygienic conditions by the Parliaments of the 
States, or, in default of parliamentary action, by award of this Court. 
(p. 1071)
Thus the majority decision of the Court, for all its brevity, was even stronger 
than that of Powers. Not only did Duffy14 and Rich oppose the general 
reduction of hours envisaged by Higgins; they also rejected the ‘special factors’ 
approach that had led the Court for some time to reduce hours in specific 
industries and occupations.15
Following this decision, employers affected by Higgins’ decisions in the 
Timber Workers’ and the ASE cases sought to have the 48-hour week restored. 
With Duffy and Rich having left the Court, their claims could not be dealt 
with until new Deputy Presidents were appointed. Quick and Webb were 
appointed in June 1922.16 A new Full Bench gave its decision in September (16 
CAR 649). Not surprisingly, the employers’ claims succeeded, and concurrent 
union claims for a wider application of Higgins’ two decisions failed.17
Powers was satisfied by the evidence that ‘the industries in Australia 
generally are in a much more depressed state than they were in September, 
14  Interestingly, Duffy had been the principal union counsel in Harvester. The Standard 
Hours case was his (and Rich’s) sole involvement in the Arbitration Court.
15  In December 1921, Powers gave a decision in a case related to gold mining at Bendigo 
(15 CAR 1166). Having inspected the work, he thought that the claim for a reduction of 
hours was reasonable. ‘But as the hours cannot be reduced, and the Full Court expressed their 
opinion that special cases ought to be dealt with by increased rates (if at all), I propose to grant 
increased rates for persons working in hot places where the temperature in rises or stopes in a 
mine exceeds 76 degrees (wet bulb) Fahrenheit’ (p. 1171).
16  A note at the beginning of volume 16 of the CAR states that Duffy and Rich resigned on 
26 June and that Quick and Webb were appointed on the same date. No doubt this is correct, 
but the fact is that Duffy and Rich had done no work in the Arbitration Court since Standard 
Hours and that Powers had earlier referred to them as having resigned.
17  The issue of working hours was a cause of significant industrial disruption (Hagan 1981, 
p. 34).
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1921, and that it would not be in the interests of employees, the employers or 
the public generally, to reduce the recognised standard of 48 hours in industries 
generally in Australia at the present time or to fix 44 hours as a week’s work 
except in special cases or on special grounds’. Departing, however, from his 
earlier stance that 48 hours was a norm that only the legislatures should alter, 
he added:
Finally if the Court bases its decision not to reduce standard hours 
because it is satisfied the industries and the country cannot at present 
afford to pay the extra cost of production which would necessarily 
follow by reduction of hours of duty, it will, I think, compel this Court 
to view favourably any application to grant 44 hours a week when the 
industries can bear the extra burden … without adding too greatly to 
the burdens on the general public. (p. 671)
The Main Hours case of 1926 (discussed in Chapter 7) could be seen as an 
attempt by the unions to redeem this ‘promise’.18
Quick observed that Higgins’ decisions in the Timber Workers’ and 
ASE cases were departures not only from his earlier criteria but also from a 
term of the Treaty of Versailles, calling for ‘the adoption of an eight hours day 
or a forty-eight hours week as the standard to be aimed at where it has not 
already been attained’. (Whether the drafters of the Treaty intended to say 
that employees should not work less than 48 hours is questionable.) He felt 
that the 1921 Full Court decision had ‘reversed any new ideal standard of 44 
hours which the late president may have had in his mind and which he may 
have desired to establish in Australia’ (p. 708); and that ‘if industries which 
supply the wants of the public are prejudiced, harassed and discouraged, 
the public whose interests are supreme will suffer’ (p. 710). Webb found no 
evidence that 48 hours caused undue fatigue for workers in the industries 
concerned in the applications and was persuaded that the reduction of hours 
had caused proportional reductions of output (p. 728). An important factor 
18  It is arguable that the 1920 amendment of the Act, specifying that reductions of standard 
hours below 48 had to be dealt with by the Full Court, had the implication that such reductions 
were at least on the Court’s agenda and were not reserved to the legislatures.
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in his judgment was the import competition being experienced by the timber 
industry.
The decision left the 44-hour week intact in some sections of the timber 
industry, notably metropolitan timber yards. Some employers thereafter made 
efforts to revert to 48 hours in these areas. The Court in April 1923, however, 
refused to countenance further changes in hours:
This Full Court has already decided that it will not approve of any 
increase of recognised standard hours unless with the consent of the 
parties, or unless it is quite satisfied that it should do so in the interests 
of employers, employees and the public. It will not approve of any 
increase of standard hours in industries which can be carried on at a 
profit simply to allow employers to increase their profits. It will not 
approve of any reduction of standard hours in any industry or branch 
of an industry except with the consent of the parties—or unless it is 
satisfied it should do so on the ground that the health of the employees 
is affected by the hours worked or that the work is so strenuous that 
men cannot be fairly asked to work standard hours or for any other 
special reasons. (Timber Industry case 17 CAR 244, 250)
A few weeks later, Powers refused to refer to the Full Court an application 
by flourmillers for an increase in hours from 44 to 48. Even if the employers 
could persuade the Court that there were no longer health grounds for the 
shorter hours, it would not increase hours, because the industry was well able 
to sustain the 44-hour week (Flourmillers’ case 17 CAR 323, 324).
The Rules of Practice issued by the Full Court on 30 April 1923 
(previously mentioned in discussing the basic wage) included the following 
statements about standard hours:
•	 The ‘standard hours’ for Federal awards generally have been fixed 
by the Full Court as 48 hours a week except in cases where the 
recognised standard hours in the industry at the time the award 
is to be made are less than 48 hours a week, as they are in the 
building industry as such (apart from mixed industries)—in mining 
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(underground)—in the flour milling industry—in the shearing 
branch of the pastoral industry—and in other industries for special 
reasons.
•	 In all other cases the Act prevents a single Judge reducing the 
‘standard hours’ below 48 hours a week, or increasing them—where 
48 hours are the standard hours—or if the standard hours are less 
than 48 hours a week from increasing or reducing them, but it 
does not prevent a single Judge from refusing to increase or reduce 
hours.
•	 This Court has also decided that where the standard hours—in an 
industry as a whole—are at the present time 44 hours a week or less 
than 48 hours they will not be increased to 48 hours if the industry 
or industries are not mixed industries and can be profitably carried 
on working 44 hours a week or any number less than 48 hours. (17 
CAR 376–377)
The Court, as it had done previously, endeavoured to combat ‘long’ 
working hours, that is, hours in excess of 48 per week. For example, in July 
1923, Quick dealt with a request by owners of ships in the River Murray trade 
to be free of the 48-hour limitation, claiming that it was ‘unworkable and 
impractical’ in the circumstances of the trade. ‘If I granted this request’, said 
Quick,
the result would be to return to pre-award practices in connexion with 
privately-owned boats in which there appears to have been no limitation 
or definition of hours, there being a fixed sum paid in wages irrespective 
of time worked. Of course there could be no overtime for there was no 
daily or weekly time limit beyond which overtime could be charged. 
Men might be required to remain on duty 12 hours per day or 84 hours 
per week without any extra pay. To sanction either directly or indirectly 
such a system would be in my judgment a reactionary step from which 
I would shrink to be responsible. (Merchant Service Guild case 17 CAR 
657, 661)
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In October 1924, Powers granted a union claim to reduce standard 
hours for ships’ cooks from 63 to 56 per week (from 9 hours per day to 8 
hours in a seven-day week) (Marine Cooks’ case 20 CAR 556). He commented:
Every attempt since the Court was established to reduce standard hours 
is always met by objections. In some cases it was and is said they are 
impracticable. In others it only means an addition to the wages in the 
shape of overtime. In others that the hours are reasonable and fair and 
ought not to be reduced. In others the parties have agreed to longer 
hours. In others the industries cannot pay higher rates. (p. 560)
Powers cited various examples to show that the Court had been able to counter 
long hours without causing the dire effects predicted by the employers. Where 
workers were engaged on continuous processes, such as smelting, employers 
had insisted that a seven-day week was essential; but the Court had provided 
for a six-day week without detriment to the industries. In the case of theatrical 
employees, hours had been reduced from 60 to 48; and carters’ and drivers’ 
hours were being reduced progressively from 56 to 48.19
I referred in Section 5.1 of Chapter 5 to the decision of the High 
Court in Cowburn’s case, which rendered inoperative a New South Wales 
law prescribing a 44-hour week where the employees were subject to federal 
awards prescribing hours. In May 1926, Powers commented on the changed 
legal context:
I think it very necessary to point out the position in which this Court, 
the employers, and the employees—the employees especially—are 
placed by the New South Wales State Act fixing 44 hours per week, 
coupled with the recent declaration of the law by the High Court in 
the 44-hour case … The effect of the position is that Federal awards 
are now to be sanctuaries under which respondents to Federal awards 
can flee to escape all State laws, Commissions, Arbitration Courts and 
Wages Board decisions, which are imposed upon all other citizens in a 
State—that is as to rules and conditions fixed by Federal awards. If that 
19  In 1926, Powers wrote in similar terms in the context of a reduction of hours for marine 
stewards (Marine Stewards’ case 23 CAR 284).
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is the effect, and I think it is, then the unions will not assist to build 
the sanctuaries into which the respondents can flee, and will apply to 
determine the awards as soon as the period for which they were made 
expires. … If nothing is done, it is clear that very few awards will in 
future be made for employees in New South Wales. Queensland awards 
are very rare at present, and so are Western Australian awards. The work 
of this Court will therefore be greatly reduced if the law is not amended 
in some way … Personally, I deplore any political interference with 
the hours of duty or basic wage, but both the Federal Parliament and 
the State Parliaments have legislated in respect of hours. If the Court 
is to continue to make Federal awards, something must be done. (A 
Statement of the Position of the Court, the Employers, and the Employees 
23 CAR 386, 386–387)
Powers’ deprecation of ‘political’ interference with hours contrasts with the 
earlier insistence of Higgins and himself that the reduction of hours below 48 
was properly a matter for the legislatures. His fears of a switch of jurisdictions 
proved to be exaggerated.20
6.4 female employment
Although in 1921–22 the Federal Court moved toward recognition of the 
male basic wage (which might vary geographically), linking to it the automatic 
adjustment system, there was no declaration of a general basic wage for 
women.21 In some, but not all, awards which provided for female employees, 
however, there was acceptance of the concept of a basic rate for women.
The basic wage created by Higgins was conceived as an amount 
appropriate to an unskilled male labourer responsible for the maintenance of 
20  Quick, in May 1926, granted an application by the Storemen and Packers’ Union to 
terminate their award in respect of New South Wales. The employers consented to the 
application in return for the union’s agreeing to a wage reduction of 5s per week (Storemen 
and Packers’ case 23 CAR 402). In June 1926, Quick refused an application by the Electrical 
Trades’ Union for a 44-hour week in the tobacco industry (without loss of pay). The union 
relied on the fact that a number of New South Wales employers had agreed to such an 
arrangement (Tobacco case 23 CAR 412).
21  This remained the position until World War II.
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a family of ‘about five’. The Court, perceiving that the typical female worker 
had no similar obligations, concluded that the minimum wage appropriate 
to a woman was one that would provide for her support only. Though there 
was some variance, the wage set for unskilled female workers was commonly 
equal to about 54 per cent of the relevant male basic wage. There was no 
consistently applied principle for rewarding female skill and little discussion 
of the question.
Issues of women’s employment were, in fact, a minor part of the Court’s 
agenda in the 1920s. In most awards, no terms of employment of women were 
prescribed. Indeed, the underlying disputes and plaints mostly did not refer 
to females. The reason is clear—female employment was confined to a narrow 
range of industries and occupations. Cases in which references to women’s 
employment can be found related to: manufacturing grocers; the clothing 
trades; hotels; banking; insurance; fruit picking; food preserving; actors; 
the entertainment industry (for, example, usherettes in cinemas); marine 
stewardesses, laundresses, etc.; railway cleaners; printing; and journalists.
6.4.1 Manufacturing grocers
In 1923, Powers made a new award for manufacturing grocers (Manufacturing 
Grocers’ case 17 CAR 625). The parties in Melbourne had agreed to a slight 
reduction in the proportional minimum rate for women. Powers refused to 
accept this, saying that it would take the women’s wage below £2 2s, which 
he judged to be ‘the minimum to allow any adult woman to live in any sort 
of reasonable comfort in the capital cities in these days’. He determined that 
the female minimum would rise or fall proportionally with the male basic 
wage, but subject to the minimum of 42s. So far as I am aware, there is no 
explanation for the specific amount of 42s.
6.4.2 Clothing
Webb, in 1923, made a new award for the clothing trades (Clothing and Allied 
Trades case 18 CAR 1033). Under the previous award, the basic wage for males 
272 Australian Wage Policy
was £4 5s, and for females £2 5s 6d (a ratio of 53.5 per cent). The union sought 
basic wages of £4 15s for men and £2 15s for women, raising the female basic 
wage to 58 per cent of the male rate. ‘On behalf of the employees’, said Webb, 
‘several budgets of expenditure have been put in evidence, and these budgets 
have been criticised by the employers, who have submitted arguments and 
estimates from which they ask me to come to the conclusion that a fair basic 
rate for a woman would be about £1 18s 3d’ (p. 1039). The Court in the past 
had treated women in industry ‘from a liberal point of view’ in relation to its 
assessment of their needs:
There is a large number of women in this industry who live at home. 
In my recent inspections of the factories I questioned many girls, and 
in many cases, the girl told me that she was living at home with her 
father and mother, paying her mother often 15s, sometimes 17s 6d, and 
sometimes £1 a week for her board, and often contriving to save money 
out of her wage. Mr Justice Higgins, however, decided to adopt a single 
woman living away from her home as the type upon which to fix the 
wage according to the needs of such an individual. ‘A woman or girl in a 
comfortable home cannot be left to underbid in wages other women or 
girls who are less fortunate,’ and I think most reasonable men will agree 
with this view. (p. 1041)
Both sides had urged him to make an independent inquiry into women’s needs, 
but he had come to the conclusion that he ‘would not be justified in departing 
from the established practice in the industry with regard to the woman’s basic 
wage’. The parties had agreed on an addition of 2s as compensation for lost 
time. Accordingly, Webb raised the female minimum wage to 47s 6d.
I have previously referred to Webb’s comments about margins in the 
clothing trades. Having said that these were very low, he set a tailor’s margin 
of 18s rather than the usual tradesman’s margin of 24s. For female coat hands, 
he awarded 10s, but did not explain how far this was based on gender and how 
far on his assessment of skill.
This Clothing Trades case illustrates some of the reasons for the low pay 
of women in a predominantly female industry. One, of course, was Webb’s 
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acceptance of the needs differential in respect of the basic wage. A second was 
the apparent weakness of the union, which had previously agreed to margins 
well below those achieved by more male-dominated unions for work in other 
industries requiring comparable training and skill. A third was the arbitrator’s 
acceptance of a lesser margin for the work of skilled women. A fourth was 
a willingness of women to accept low-paid work. The last reason raises the 
issue of cause and effect. The clothing trades were a low-pay industry, for 
both women and those men who worked in it. Had the wage levels been 
similar to those of the more male-dominated industries, the clothing trades 
would have been a smaller industry.22 Webb (and his predecessors who made 
earlier awards) could have fixed rates on a par with those existing elsewhere, 
at the cost of reducing one of the few industries where women predominated. 
Hence, the low wages in clothing could be construed as the result of women 
crowding into it; or as the cause of job opportunities for women that would 
not otherwise have existed. In either case, the low pay of the female worker 
was due in part to the limited range of ‘female’ employment.
6.4.3 Insurance and banking
In the Insurance Clerks’ case of 1923 (see Subsection 6.2.2), Quick fixed 
separate scales for males and females. Whereas the male scale rose by annual 
increments between ages 15 and 32, the female scale stopped at age 23. At age 
21, the female rate was a high fraction—66 per cent—of the male rate, and at 
age 23 the relativity was 72 per cent. But by age 32, the female received only 
46 per cent of the male wage. In the Bank Officials’ case of 1924, Quick again 
awarded a long scale for males and a truncated one for females (19 CAR 272). 
In neither case did he comment on the differences between the scales, but 
it is obvious that he (and the parties) had not absorbed any notion of career 
scales for women. This now seems incongruous for a point in history when 
the casualties of World War I implied an increase in the population of single 
women.
22  This effect might have been countered by imposing higher tariffs on imported clothing.
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While the insurance and banking awards did not specify different tasks 
for the men and women employed under the respective scales, it may well be 
that differentiation existed ‘on the ground’. Otherwise, we might suppose that 
females would have driven men from these industries. The likelihood is that 
the employers—perhaps responding to customers’ expectations—tended to 
commit the more responsible work to men. For example, while bank managers 
were not covered by the banking award, the expectation that managers and 
accountants would be males is likely to have affected the assignment of work 
to employees on the basic scale. Thus, not only were females paid less, but they 
were allotted correspondingly inferior work.
6.4.4 actors and actresses
In the 1923 Actors’ case (see Subsection 6.2.2), Webb set minimum rates of 
£6 for actors and £5 5s for actresses, including allowances for travelling. He 
did not comment on the size of the difference, though it was less than what 
was usual for basic-wage and minimum-wage workers. Later in 1924, in the 
Theatrical and Amusement Employees’ case (20 CAR 16), he said of the ‘female 
basic wage’:
In the Clothing Trades case I decided that the female base wage for 
females working a 44 hour week should be 54 per cent of the male 
base wage. On a base of £4 4s 6d that would be a sum of £2 5s 7d. In 
this industry the base fixed for unskilled female workers in the previous 
award was £2 9s 1d, and this was 60 per cent of the male base of £4 2s 
2d. But this base applied to a woman working 48 hours per week under 
the condition of hours fixed by that award. I can have no reason to alter 
the increased percentage fixed in the previous award … and the wages 
for women in this industry will be fixed on a base wage of £2 10s 6d 
per week, which is 60 per cent of £4 4s 6d per week, calculated to the 
nearest sixpence. (p. 18)
Since the 44-hour week applied to both males and females in the clothing 
trades, and the basic wage was supposed to be related to needs, it is not obvious 
why the ratio of the basic wages should be different when both sexes worked 
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48 hours. But in fixing travelling allowances, Webb took into account the fact 
that the man still had to maintain his family at home, while the woman was 
to some extent relieved of her normal ‘home’ expenses. Accordingly, he fixed 
the male travelling allowance at 12s 6d per day or 45s per week and the female 
allowance at 7s 6d per day or £1 per week.
6.4.5 Food preservers
In the Food Preservers’ case decided in August 1924 (20 CAR 60), Quick set a 
female basic wage at 54 per cent of the male rate and awarded a margin of 6s per 
week for females engaged in cutting or pulping lemons or pineapples—work 
which was ‘most distasteful and irritating, and frequently causes poisoning of 
hands, fingers and face, which is not covered by the Workers’ Compensation 
Act’ (p. 81). He and the applicant union apparently assumed that only women 
would be doing this work.
6.4.6 Dried fruit
Dealing with the dried-fruit industry in February 1925 (see Subsection 6.2.2), 
Webb decided ‘to provide that the female rates and juvenile rates are to be 
fractional rates of the rates for adults [sic]. The sums are very simple, and the 
parties will have no difficulty in ascertaining the rates’. But there was a special 
provision:
In recent years, a method of selling dried fruits has come into extensive 
use. It is that of selling the fruit in cartons or cardboard boxes. Owing 
to the high rate of wage which is paid to women under the award in this 
industry, the dried fruit are not packed at the growing centres. The fruit 
is sent down in bulk to the capital cities, and there packed into cartons 
for sale. The girls at Mildura would have this work to do if it were not 
for the high rate of wage which is paid there. I propose to fix a special 
rate of wage for packing fruit in cartons in the hope that, if the girls at 
Mildura desire to take on this work, they may have the opportunity 
to do so, and that the work may be kept in the fruit-growing centres. 
(Dried Fruit case 21 CAR 334, 345–346)
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Thus the low range of job opportunities for women in the country town 
became a reason for holding down their award rate of pay.
6.4.7 Marine laundresses
In 1925, Powers set rates for marine stewards, laundresses and others (Marine 
Stewards’ case 22 CAR 193). The union claimed for the laundress the same 
rate as for the assistant laundry steward—a man. The claim was made ‘on the 
ground that it is a man’s work, but as a laundress’s work is generally recognised 
as a woman’s work I propose to allow the same rate as to the assistant 
stewardess’ (p. 195). This reflected the principle, enunciated by Higgins in 
the 1912 Fruitpickers’ case, that a differentiating criterion was whether the task 
was men’s or women’s work. If the work were ‘men’s work’, women performing 
it might be awarded equal pay. Unequal pay prevailed where the work was 
‘women’s work’ or, as in the insurance and banking industries, both sexes were 
employed.
6.4.8 Printing
Webb in April 1925, in a Printing Industry case (22 CAR 247), set the 
female basic rate at 54 per cent of the male wage, observing that this was the 
percentage that he had fixed in the Clothing Trades case. In that case, he had 
maintained the percentage relation set by Higgins in a previous case for the 
clothing trades, although Higgins did not arrive at the rate set ‘by calculating 
a proportion of the basic wage’. He had adopted the percentage in other cases, 
and he proposed to adhere to it.
6.4.9 The work
The members of the Court from time to time showed a sensitivity—
sometimes patronising—to a presumed need for women to be accorded special 
consideration as to their working conditions, especially hours. In the 1923 
Clothing Trades case (18 CAR 1033), Webb said:
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The history of the clothing trade has, no doubt, many sad pages within 
its covers. I doubt if any class of worker in unregulated industry was 
in a more defenceless position than the needlewoman. I think it was 
her plight which made factory legislation possible in its beginnings. … 
The thought that kept constantly recurring to my mind when I was 
inspecting a large number of factories in Victoria, was that females 
engaged in this industry comprised a body of superior women and 
intelligent and happy-looking girls, apparently working under healthy 
and happy conditions. They were a fine class of workers, and appeared 
to me to reflect credit on Australian conditions. (pp. 1034–1035)
And he said in the Theatrical and Amusement Employees’ case of 1924 (20 CAR 
16):
But I wholly disapprove of girls being compelled to appear as ushers and 
ticket takers in male costume and other costumes which are unbecoming 
to an Australian girl working under the conditions under which these 
girls work. It is quite unnecessary; it is not fair to the girls; and it is not 
fair to the community. The award will make a provision against this in 
the manner claimed by the union. (p. 20)
It was Webb, too, who said in 1925:
I do not wish to be misunderstood about pianola playing. I am quite 
prepared to concede that the pianola gives great pleasure to many who 
hear it and many who play it. But we all know that it is possible to have 
too much of a good thing, and most people will agree that it is not fair 
to require a girl to play a pianola for eight hours a day for six days a 
week. When I made the award I reduced the hours for pianola players to 
36 hours a week. It seemed to me that if a girl worked a pianola for six 
hours a day she had done a fair day’s work. (Theatrical and Amusement 
Employees’ case 21 CAR 769, 770)
6.5 conclusIon
The early part of Powers’ presidency, from mid-1921 to late 1922, was dominated 
by the Court’s rejection of Piddington, its response to economic contraction 
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and falling prices, and its endeavours to reverse Higgins’ policies of raising 
margins and reducing hours. Although Powers’ commentary on Piddington 
in the Gas Workers’ case stressed deficiencies in the Royal Commission’s terms 
of reference and included specific criticisms of the Commission’s assessment 
of needs, it also dealt with the inability of industry to pay a basic wage set at 
the Piddington level. In this last sense, it was an affirmation of the controlling 
role of ‘capacity to pay’. Not until the Depression would the Court affirm that 
capacity to pay was pre-eminent and family needs secondary, but the truth of 
the matter is that after Piddington the needs criterion had little purchase.
Having negotiated the Court past Piddington, Powers (with Quick 
and Webb) succeeded in establishing an innovative method of basic-wage 
adjustment. Indeed, the federal basic wage ceased for a time to be a subject 
of serious contention. From 1923 until mid-1926, the balance of the Court’s 
award-making work shifted toward micro wage-fixing, with emphasis on the 
establishment of margins within a framework set by two principles: rejection 
of any notion of adjusting margins to restore earlier proportional relativities, 
and acceptance of the tradesman’s rate as a key element in the pay structure.
From an economic perspective, the most interesting aspect of the 
period is the slight attention paid by the Court to the large increase in real 
wages that occurred, seemingly fortuitously, in 1921 and 1922. Members of 
the Court did have a sense that there had been a post-war boom, followed 
by contraction. This contributed to the reversal of Higgins’ ‘generosity’ with 
respect to margins and working hours. But the reality of the real wage increase 
seems to have passed unnoticed, seemingly obscured by the Court’s adherence 
to the Harvester standard.
The presumption which had marked the era of Powers’ Presidency—that 
economic conditions were not conducive to any substantial advance in labour 
standards—continued after the reconstruction of the Court, though the 
newly appointed judges1 had different views of the degree of restraint that the 
situation required. The available data analysed in Chapter 5, especially those 
about unemployment, indicate deterioration in the economy in the later years 
of the decade. Moreover, contemporary comparisons between the productivity 
of industry in the 1920s and in the pre-war years produced results ranging from 
actual decline to, at best, a small improvement. As the decade wore on and no 
decisive improvement emerged, there was little scope for any assumption of 
continuous improvement of wages and conditions. By the end of 1929, the 
tepid performance of earlier years was giving way to a foretaste of the crisis to 
come.
7.1 the basIc wage
Although there was no major innovation in the Court’s approach to setting 
the basic wage, there was some important working-out of existing principles.
1  See Chapter 5, Section 5.1.
The new regime
7
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7.1.1 The standard
Dethridge, in the Glass Workers’ case of 1927, dealt with a union attempt to 
revive the Piddington wage:
The union claims that the minimum wage in the industry shall be 
£5 15s 6d per week. This amount is that which was determined by 
the Basic Wage Commission of 1920, under the chairmanship of Mr 
Piddington, as to the actual cost of living at that time according to 
reasonable standards of comfort … for a man with a wife and three 
children under fourteen years of age. Since that finding the unions 
have made a practice of claiming that amount as the minimum wage in 
industries in substitution for the Harvester basic wage which this Court 
has adopted. This claim has been disallowed, reasons for its disallowance 
having been given by Mr Justice Higgins on one occasion at least, and 
at considerable length by Mr Justice Powers in the gas employees’ case. 
Notwithstanding the expression of those reasons, the claim is still made 
without regard to the fact, which is obvious to those who make any 
investigation into the statistics of the country, that the payment of a 
minimum wage of £5 15s 6d to all adult workers is quite impossible. … 
The insertion of a claim for a flat minimum wage of such an amount as 
£5 15s 6d is harmful, inasmuch as it may mislead many of the workers 
into supposing that this Court, by some miraculous power, may be able 
to force employers to grant it. (25 CAR 289, 290)
It was not surprising that unions continued to invoke the Piddington finding, 
or that the Court continued to spurn it. Piddington, as we saw in Chapter 
3, had acknowledged that the Royal Commission standard was unattainable, 
except by means of a system of child endowment which would relate income 
levels to family size. Dethridge, in the Glass Workers’ case, said that
the payment of a wage of anything like that amount to workers with 
a wife and three children depending upon them … is only possible 
if unmarried male workers and married childless workers receive 
considerably less than the Harvester wage. Such a revolutionary change 
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could not be made effectively without legislative action comprising the 
whole of Australia. (p. 290)
Linking of the basic wage to child endowment was, at the time, a live 
issue in New South Wales, where Piddington had been appointed head of the 
State tribunal. Child endowment had also been referred, by agreement of the 
Commonwealth and the States, to a Royal Commission. The Commission, by 
a 3:2 majority, recommended against it. No action was taken.
In his 1929 Timber Workers’ decision, Lukin took the argument as to 
family size a stage further. Not merely was the unreality of the wife and three-
child family an objection to adopting the Piddington wage; it called into 
question the Harvester standard itself. The union had claimed an allowance 
in recognition of the fact that men working in the bush might have families 
living elsewhere. ‘It may be said’, Lukin commented, ‘that the Court has 
gone beyond reason in making provision for all employees as if they were 
maintaining a wife and three children, when a man in fact on the average only 
maintains a fraction of a wife and a fraction of a child, and that it should go 
no further’ (27 CAR 577, 628).
7.1.2 Powers’ three shillings
Some of the Judges of the reconstituted Court indicated misgivings about 
Powers’ 3s and about Powers’ suggestion in his resignation statement that it 
was now a settled addition to the basic wage, rather than an expedient to cope 
with possible increases in the price level. They were prepared, in some special 
instances, to dispense with it.
In his 1927 decision in the Shearers’ case, Dethridge granted a ‘marginal 
wage’ which (contrary to normal practice) took account of the increase in the 
cost of living since 1911, and noted:
It will be observed that I have not added on to the basic wage for 1927 
… the 3s usually added since 1922 by the practice of this Court. I 
think that where the wage contains an adjustment clause, and where 
282 Australian Wage Policy
the marginal wage is increased proportionally with the increased cost of 
living—in this case from 9s to 15s 3d—it is equitable to leave out the 
customary 3s. (25 CAR 626, 632)
Drake-Brockman, in 1928, dealt with a claim for an adjustment of 
the basic wage in the clothing trades to recognise the unpaid loss of time in 
the industry. The workers were, he said, ‘the equivalent of about two weeks’ 
pay short of what the Harvester judgment fixed as their minimum annual 
requirements’. This, however, was partially ‘made good’ by Powers’ 3s. Drake-
Brockman adjusted the wage by 4s for the loss of time, but absorbed the 3s 
into the increase (leaving a net gain of 1s) (Clothing Trades case 26 CAR 76, 
78). Beeby, in the same year, referred to a shipowners’ endeavour to eliminate 
Powers’ 3s from the rate for waterside workers:
The [union] did not ask for any alteration in wage rates, but the 
employers contended that the 3s addition to the bare living wage should 
now be disallowed. I stated, during the proceedings, that this claim 
would not be granted, but that the application could be renewed after 
the Full Court had completed its proposed re-investigation of the whole 
problem of the living wage. (Waterside Workers’ case 26 CAR 867, 884)
This is the first reference that I have encountered to a review of the basic wage. 
No such review occurred before the Depression.2
Later in 1928, Lukin referred to ‘the Powers’ 3s addition over and above 
[the] basic wage’, commenting that ‘although … the reason for its present 
existence is not anywhere explained its allowance has been, by an order of 
the Full Court, firmly established as the practice, and ought therefore, in my 
opinion, to be continued until the Full Court otherwise orders’ (Saddlery 
Workers’ case 27 CAR 156, 158). In the Timber Workers’ case, he left no doubt 
about his own opinion:
2  Lukin said in January 1929: ‘In September, 1923, five years ago, it was evidently 
contemplated that the basic wage should be reconsidered at an early date. So far it has not 
been reconsidered, but I understand that the matter is to be reviewed by the Court, as the 
Court is now constituted, as soon as the other business of the Court will permit. This should 
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I now refer to the unsatisfactory position in which the Court stands in 
regard to this adjunct to the basic wage. … On 18th December, 1925, 
Powers J, in speaking of ‘the work and history of the Court … and 
the value of the work of the Court to the community’, said, ‘We have 
where practicable granted new and better conditions, and permanently 
increased the basic wage by 3s a week, which 3s I first allowed as a 
temporary measure to secure the basic wage during the term of the 
award.’ I cannot find where the Full Court did by any direction or order 
permanently increase the basic wage, or where, even if it had purported 
to do so, the Court obtained power to make any such permanent order. 
… If it be justifiable because the basic wage is insufficient in amount 
on the standard of 1907, or insufficient on an improved or a newly 
approved standard of to-day, or is deficient in any other respect, the 
sooner the Court says so the better; but I have an objection to allowing 
such an addition, even if it has been the practice in the past, where at 
present no assignable reason or justification other than the evidence 
of such practice can be given for so doing. … [Mr Benham] points 
out that the rising prices caused the basic wage prevailing to be below 
the Harvester equivalent at most periods between 1914 and 1921, 
and that the 3s addition, unaccompanied by rising prices, has caused 
the Harvester equivalent to be exceeded since 1921. … [H]as not the 
compensation paid since 1921 up to the present time been more than 
ample compensation for past losses previous to that year, and has not 
the time arrived when the two reasons that existed in the past having 
ceased, partly or wholly, to operate, the imposition as a consequence 
should also, partly or wholly, cease to operate? (27 CAR 577, 598–599)
In January 1930, Dethridge published a decision about wages and 
conditions in the dried fruits and canned fruits industries (Dried Fruit case 28 
CAR 597). Convinced that these industries were in dire economic condition, 
he discussed their continuing obligation to pay the Court’s basic wage. By 
this time, the issue was complicated by section 25D of the Act (see Chapter 
5, Section 5.1). This directed the Court to take into account the probable 
economic effects of its awards. That consideration, however, must not ‘affect 
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the practice of the Court in fixing the basic wage’. Members of the Court 
found some ambiguity in the word ‘practice’—specifically, whether Powers’ 3s 
was part of it. Lukin, in the Timber Workers’ case, held that it was. Dethridge 
disagreed:
But with all respect to him, I think that this view does not give sufficient 
attention to the real purpose of section 25D, which is that the Court 
should consider the economic effect of an award. Mere details of the 
Court’s practice used in fixing the basic wage, some of which details 
vary or are not used according to the circumstances of a particular case, 
have little bearing upon the consideration of the economic effect of an 
award. What does have a weighty influence is the principle upon which 
the basic wage is fixed. And I think therefore the word ‘practice’ in the 
proviso must be read as meaning the guiding principle always adopted 
by the Court in fixing that wage. That principle is that for an ordinary 
adult male, the basic wage should never be less than the true equivalent 
for the time being of the Harvester basic wage. … The section does not 
in my opinion prevent me from omitting the Powers’ 3s, but it does 
require me to award a basic wage not less in real value than the Harvester 
wage whether the industry be depressed or not. (p. 604)
Dethridge did not explicitly refer to the 1923 Rules of Practice, but said: ‘Only 
in a very exceptional case would a single Judge be justified in departing from 
the Court’s ordinary practice without the Full Court’s approval, but in my 
opinion this is an instance.’ He decided that 6d, rather than 3s, was sufficient 
to protect the basic-wage earner against any lag in the adjustment of the wage 
for higher prices.
In 1925, Powers saw the 3s as an increase in the basic wage, taking it 
above Harvester. Lukin, and probably Dethridge and Drake-Brockman, saw 
it as an anomaly. What is conspicuously lacking from the discussion is any 
reflection upon the fact that, without it, the basic wage would still have been 
set at a standard judged appropriate as long ago as 1907. 
286 Australian Wage Policy
7.1.3 The price index
Chapter 5 (Subsection 6.1.4) noted the differences in the basic wage 
that would have flowed from the use of the ‘All Items’ price index rather 
than the index for food, groceries and rent. Employers were slow to raise this 
issue. It was raised, however, in a Municipal Officers’ case decided by Quick in 
October 1926 (24 CAR 409). Existing rates had been set in an agreement that 
had operated since 1921. The basic wage corresponded to the cost of living in 
September 1921: there had been no adjustments and no Powers’ 3s. Sutcliffe 
gave evidence that the Harvester equivalent plus 3s was £4 12s, compared with 
the amount of £4 1s 6d set in the 1921 agreement. Quick commented:
Mr Derham, one of the representatives of the municipalities, availed 
himself of the opportunity of putting some questions to Mr Sutcliffe as 
to the method adopted by the statistical office in determining these cost 
of living figures. In reply, Mr Sutcliffe said that the practice had been to 
take certain commodities, such as food, groceries, and house rent, which 
are the component parts or necessary elements or factors in the cost of 
living. These amounted only to 60 per cent of the total necessaries of 
life. Yet they are taken as the guiding factors in determining the cost 
of all, including the remaining 40 per cent. Mr Derham suggested the 
view that it was not correct that any statistical authority should take 
certain items equalling 60 per cent of the total and adjust the whole 
of the wage on those items. From admissions made by Mr Sutcliffe, in 
reply to Mr Derham, I gather—(1) that by comparing the year 1920 
with 1925 on the basis of taking into consideration only 60 per cent 
of commodities, the cost of living has decreased by 5 per cent; and (2) 
that by comparing the same years and taking as a test the Basic Wage 
Commission’s findings, which cover all commodities, the reduction in 
the cost of living would be about 16 per cent. (pp. 411–412)
From further comments by Quick, Sutcliffe seems to have argued that the 
index numbers based on the Royal Commission’s regimen were more suited 
to higher-paid workers than to basic-wage earners. This led, with union 
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agreement, to a tapering of wage increases for workers receiving more than 
£500 per year.
The issue of measurement was also noticed by Lukin in his 1929 decision 
in the Timber Workers’ case (27 CAR 577). Referring to the Labour Report, he 
drew attention to the differences between the two indices, and added:
I do not suggest, and I am not here expressing any opinion, that the 
standard prescribed in the Harvester equivalent as originally determined, 
or as ascertained from time to time by the Court’s index figures, is 
excessive, sufficient, or insufficient, but I am calling attention to the 
peculiar results that follow from the application of these two different 
methods of adjustment. These marked differences, however, accentuate 
the necessity for a speedy and thorough inquiry into and a fresh 
determination of a suitable standard, of its corresponding monetary 
figures, and of a more accurate system of adjusting such figures in accord 
with the varying change in the purchasing power of the sovereign. (p. 
597)
7.1.4 Local rates
The conflicting goals in the selection of a local rate, discussed at some length 
in Chapter 6, were illustrated in a 1928 decision of Lukin for the gelatine 
industry (Gelatine Industry case 27 CAR 156). Under the existing award, there 
was a uniform basic wage corresponding to the six-capitals price index. The 
union complained that its members working at Botany received ‘4s less than 
is sufficient, according to the Harvester standard, to keep an employee his 
wife and the three children with which he is credited properly alive’. Their 
employer, the Davis Gelatine Company, ‘pointed out that it has only one 
competitor in Australia, that is in Victoria, and that if the flat rate is departed 
from it would be on the then existing figures 4s 6d worse off per employee in 
competition with its rival’. Lukin found ‘some justice in the union’s claim that 
the Sydney employees should be paid not less than the basic wage’ (p. 157). 
He continued:
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I do not need to repeat the principle of the Court as to that wage. I would 
be setting aside that principle if I should award a flat rate, and although 
the Court has apparently frequently done so, I do not believe that I 
would be justified in doing so consistently with the underlying principle 
of the basic wage. … It is unfortunate that the Sydney employer will in 
this respect be at a disadvantage when compared with the Melbourne 
employer. It is perhaps a disadvantage of his particular State citizenship, 
but it is shared by all employers in that State. I have, therefore, fixed 
the basic wage for Sydney and Melbourne on the Commonwealth 
Statistician’s figures for those cities. (p. 158)
7.1.5 summary of federal policy and practice
Reviewing the Court’s record in basic-wage setting between 1922 and the 
onset of the Depression leads to the following conclusions:
•	 The two-tier system of award wages (with the basic wage as the 
foundation wage) was treated as a given, and not discussed.
•	 There was no reconsideration of the Harvester standard, 
despite the long period that had elapsed since it was fixed.
•	 In practice, the real federal basic wage was around 10 per cent 
above Harvester, because of Powers’ 3s (hardly required to 
avert any erosion of the real wage by inflation) and the use 
of a price index that exaggerated the rise in the prices paid by 
households.
•	 An economic constraint on basic-wage setting, evident in 
the Court’s rejection of the Piddington basic wage, was also 
apparent in the special treatment accorded to some industries 
and localities, such as Bendigo mining and dried-fruit 
production.
•	 Inconsistencies in the treatment of geographically specific 
living costs made for significant differences in the living 
standard that basic wages would support.
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7.1.6 state basic wages
Chapter 6 summarised the development of State basic wages in the period 
1920–26.
In New South Wales, the three years from 1926 to 1929 saw much 
turmoil in the setting of the living wage (and in the State arbitration system 
more generally), associated with the personnel of the tribunal, changes of 
government, and the introduction of child endowment. A new Industrial 
Commission supplanted the former Board of Trade in 1926. It comprised 
representatives of employees and unions presided over by an Industrial 
Commissioner. The Commissioner appointed by the State Labor Government 
was A B Piddington. The Act directed the Commission, when setting the 
living wage, to proceed by two stages: first to determine a standard of living 
and second to declare the living wages based upon that standard for adult male 
and adult female employees in the State. In its decision of December 1926, the 
Commission adopted the Royal Commission’s finding as the basis for fixing a 
standard for a family of five. The required amount, set by Piddington in the 
absence of agreement between the parties, was £5 6s. Rather than prescribe 
this amount, however, Piddington set a living wage of £4 4s, treating this as 
appropriate to a family of three—man, wife, and one child—and coupling 
with it a recommendation to the Parliament that child endowment be paid for 
children in excess of one.
The Government responded to Piddington’s recommendation by 
securing legislation which directed the Commission to fix a living wage for a 
man, a wife and no children and provided for payment of child endowment 
at the rate of 5s per child.3 Employers had to pay a tax of 5s per employee. 
The Commission then had to consider a reduction of the living wage, because 
the assumption of one child no longer applied. Piddington identified the 
reduction as 11s, but held that ‘the term “living wage” implies current human 
standards’ and that the existing wage was at a level such as a man and a wife 
3  Subject to a condition which meant, in effect, that endowment was reduced by any excess 
of the wage received over the living wage.
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could expect to enjoy. Hence, in June 1927, he refused to reduce the wage and 
raised it to £4 5s because of a small increase in the cost of living.
A Royal Commission appointed by the New South Wales Government 
found that the Industrial Commission, in making this decision, had exceeded 
its powers. After a change of government, the Commission was reconstituted 
in 1928 so as to comprise three judges, including Piddington. The majority, in 
October 1929, overruled Piddington. Concurring in the Royal Commission’s 
finding, it determined that the living wage should be £3 12s 6d; but it deferred 
action so that the Parliament could consider the position. The Act was amended 
to require that the wage be set for a family of man, wife, and one child, with 
child endowment being payable only for the second and subsequent children. 
The Commission then fixed a living wage of £4 2s 6d.4
In Queensland and South Australia, the basic or living wage was 
unaltered during this period. There were small variations in the annual reviews 
in Western Australia. The relation of State to Commonwealth basic wages is 
shown in Figure 1.6 of Chapter 1.
7.2 the wage structure
7.2.1 The skill differential
We have seen that the Court’s failure to adjust margins so as to preserve either 
their real value or their relativity to the basic wage, and Higgins’ abortive 
attempts to restore the relative position of skilled workers, caused some 
turmoil in the early 1920s. Unions continued to make demands on the skilled 
workers’ behalf.
The principal discussion of the issue in the later 1920s is to be found 
in two decisions of Dethridge, given in December 1928. These were linked 
decisions for marine engineers and deck officers (27 CAR 446 and 482). 
Dethridge reported that his colleagues concurred in his view that ‘the Court 
4  The above summary of living-wage setting in New South Wales is based largely on Sawkins 
(1933), pp. 40–42. A much more detailed account is provided by Graham (1995), chapters 
8 and 9.
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when assessing marginal wages must pay regard to the then existing conditions 
and not accept previously awarded margins as in any way binding precedents’ 
(p. 448). Higgins had been dealing with marine officers in 1916, when he 
promised a restoration of pre-war relativities after normal times had returned. 
Dethridge said that ‘an expectation was expressed by Mr Justice Higgins that 
at some indefinite time in the future the real pre-war ratio of the marginal 
wage to the basic wage would be restored by the Court, on the assumption 
apparently that the ratio should be invariable in normal times’. ‘Mr Justice 
Higgins’, he added, ‘occasionally seemed to act on this assumption, but he by 
no means applied it to its full extent’ (p. 486). He continued:
In my opinion Powers, J, enunciated the correct principle, that is to say, 
that the Court when making an award as to marginal wages should assess 
the amounts thereof only according to the conditions existing at the time 
of the award. … The value at the time of the special skill or qualifications 
for which the marginal wage is to be paid must be ascertained, although 
to do so may, in some cases, involve the consideration of very difficult 
problems. In most cases probably the recent practice in the industry will 
afford a sufficient guide even though the amounts paid in accordance 
with that practice were originally fixed by awards of this Court when the 
purchasing power of money was greater. The margins so fixed were only 
minimum amounts, and if the industrial value of the special skill or 
qualification had become greater than the award amounts the demand 
for that skill and qualification would have tended to increase its market 
value, and that increase would have tended to show itself in practice 
notwithstanding the influence of any contrary tendency to make the 
minimum rate the maximum. The mere fact, therefore, that in many 
cases the present margin is no greater in money than the pre-war margin 
does not necessarily show that that present margin does not represent 
the present full industrial value of skill or other qualification for which 
it is paid. Since these margins were first prescribed the conditions of 
industry have materially changed and the position of the skilled worker 
has improved in other directions, although the relative advantage in 
wages that he formerly enjoyed over the unskilled worker may have 
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diminished; it is not improbable that those other changes have tended 
to lessen that advantage. (pp. 493–494)
This reasoning implied that prima facie the margins currently being received 
by skilled workers fully reflected the value of their work. If not, the market 
would ‘take over’ and provide a signal that the award margin was too low. This 
invites the question why the Court should be involved in fixing skilled rates at 
all, rather than leaving them to the market. (Of course, it had no choice, given 
that union claims included wages for the various grades of labour.)
Dethridge did not leave the matter where it stood in the above passage. 
The Court, he said, should only set minimum rates, leaving scope for 
bargaining about additional payments. ‘How then’, he asked, ‘is the present 
minimum marginal value of skilled employees to be discovered?’ He dealt with 
this question at some length. The market offered a partial answer:
In a freely competitive industrial world the relative values of the 
various services required in industry—unskilled labour, skilled labour, 
management, invention, enterprise, and capital—would evidence 
themselves in the actual price or reward given for them as the result 
of the interplay of supply and demand. The relative industrial and 
comparative market values of the different classes of services would 
fluctuate with changing social or mental or material habits of life, and 
therefore the wages or other pay for various kinds of skill or qualification 
would not retain a constant proportion either to each other or to the 
wages or pay of unskilled labour. Unforeseeable variation would occur 
in the intra-varying complex of human wants and responses which 
actuate industry as a whole, and the highly valued skill of one period 
might not be sought at all in the next period. To a large extent these 
competitive forces do operate in real life, and their effect cannot be 
ignored by this Court. (p. 495)
But, said Dethridge, a completely free competitive system had never 
existed, and probably never would, however desirable or undesirable that ideal 
might be. Moreover, public opinion did not support some of the outcomes 
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of a free market, and limitations were imposed to prevent sweating and like 
evils. This was done either by tribunals or by the use of collective instead of 
individual bargaining. Under collective bargaining,
each group seeks to gain for its members as much as it can get from the 
total product of industry, employees at times doing so, unknowingly, at 
the expense of employees in other groups. Sometimes, indeed, groups, 
believing that the product of industry is greater than it is, struggle for 
that which is not—like blind children scrambling for imaginary pennies. 
In this melee of conflicting aims particular classes of workers may fail to 
gain an equitable return for their services, but it is more likely than in 
the case of individual competition that the wages they actually receive 
are just, and therefore such wages paid in countries not widely dissimilar 
from Australia do furnish finger posts of a sort for guidance; as will be 
seen, however, such of these finger posts as are available point in rather 
different directions. (pp. 495–496)
The outcomes of collective bargaining were not decisive, for
the Court may be driven to the conclusion that the rates of pay thereby 
shown do not sufficiently reward the special skill concerned, having 
regard to the amount of training, education and mental or physical 
capacity required, the discomfort or deprivation attendant upon the 
work to be done, and the proportion such rates bear to those of other 
workmen employed in Australia, particularly in or about the same 
industry as that in which the special skill or qualification is required. … 
It is clearly in the interests of the community that men exercising skill 
and responsibility in an industry such as the shipping industry should 
receive pay so far above that of the unskilled worker as to provide a 
sufficient incentive to men to qualify themselves for the work, to enable 
them to maintain themselves and their families in a manner consonant 
with their standing, and to preserve such a distinction and separation 
from subordinates as experience seems to show to be still necessary 
for the purpose of maintaining requisite authority and discipline. In 
other countries a much more marked difference appears between the 
remuneration of those in authority and that of subordinates than seems 
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to be practicable, or probably desirable, in Australia, but a substantial 
difference is undoubtedly necessary. (pp. 496–497)
But qualifying the Court’s discretion was the need to have regard to the 
financial state of the industry concerned:
If the industry is waning its skilled employees may be forced to choose 
between a low wage and unemployment, and this Court cannot remedy 
that position. In a prosperous industry, however, although, of course, 
the Court cannot go beyond the limit imposed by economic conditions, 
it may, in cases where it has come to the conclusion that the minimum 
rates being given for skill or responsibility are inadequate, and that it can 
safely increase those rates without causing unemployment, reasonably 
make an increase. Industry and the community in general benefit by 
the development and exercise of superior skill and capacity, and the 
Court may therefore properly encourage that superior skill and capacity 
by providing the necessary incentive in wages corresponding to the 
superiority where it seems fairly clear that the increase will not ultimately 
cause unemployment—a much greater evil than the continuance of a 
rather lower rate of pay. (p. 496)
What Dethridge articulated was a confused set of principles, with 
elements of self-contradiction. The freely competitive market would have 
yielded a set of relativities, which should be taken into account. The operation 
of the free market, however, had some unacceptable outcomes. These had 
led to the intrusion of collective bargaining and tribunals. For reasons not 
explained, the existing (money) valuations of work, which reflected the effects 
of these processes, should command respect. But the Court might overrule 
them because of the desirability of preserving and increasing the supply of skill 
and maintaining the status of the skilled worker. All of these considerations, 
however, must yield to the state of the industry and the risk that higher pay 
might cause unemployment. Clear signals as to the Court’s likely approach 
to setting margins are difficult to derive from such guideposts. Nevertheless, 
there is sufficient in them to rationalise the Court’s reluctance to raise the 
money value of skilled margins.
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Dethridge, like Powers in 1924, suggested a further reason for the 
relative decline of rewards for skill: that increases in the wages of the unskilled 
and semi-skilled had eroded the capacity of industry to reward the skilled 
worker:
It may be that since 1910 some of that part of the national income 
which was formerly received by the more highly skilled and responsible 
wage or salary earners, as a reward for their special qualifications, has 
been transferred to the unskilled or low skilled wage-earners by reason 
of industrial awards or determinations or other pressures. Both in Great 
Britain and Australia the higher-paid officials certainly, and the other 
middle classes almost certainly, do not enjoy incomes of nearly pre-
war purchasing values, and have thus suffered a change which may be 
regrettable for national reasons. But I am more concerned at present 
with the possibility that in Australia there has been since 1910, partly 
by reason of direct or indirect state regulation of industrial conditions, 
such a redistribution of the national income as will tend to make it 
difficult for this Court to award what it may consider an adequate wage 
for higher classes of capacity. (pp. 499–500)
We have here an implicit criticism of the tribunals, and perhaps the unions, 
for having raised unduly the pay of the low-skilled.
What was the explanation of the compression of the skill relativity? 
Approached from a purely arithmetic perspective, the answer to this question 
is straightforward. The tribunals raised the money value of the basic wage, 
but refused to raise the margins of the skilled commensurately. This policy 
originated during World War I, when it could be seen as a response to abnormal 
conditions. Failure to restore relativities after the war was the result of (1) the 
downward rigidity of the real basic wage and (2) reluctance to increase the 
nominal values of skill margins. It was because the basic wage and margins 
had separate lives that they could follow different paths. The stickiness of 
nominal margins seems to be the result of two things: the perception—clearly 
articulated during the war—that the special needs of the skilled were less 
fundamental than the basic needs of the unskilled; and the Court’s reluctance 
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to impose added burdens on employers in the economic conditions of the 
1920s.
Though this is a broadly accurate account of wage-setting policy, 
the question remains whether there were underlying industrial, economic, 
or social forces which supported the directions of policy. Both Powers and 
Dethridge referred to the decline in the relative reward for skill in other 
countries. This suggests that there may be a risk of focusing unduly on the 
mechanisms whereby the process occurred. From an institutional perspective, 
trade unionism was becoming less of a craft phenomenon and more embracing 
of unskilled and semi-skilled workers. From a social viewpoint, the prevailing 
concerns about the conditions of life of the low-paid and their families 
entailed some priority for the amelioration of their condition. For economists, 
there were both demand and supply factors that could have tended towards 
narrower differentials. From the demand side, the spread of machinery could 
well have caused a reduction in the demand for higher-level manual skills. On 
the supply side, the extension of basic education is likely to have expanded 
the proportion of the workforce able to undertake more demanding work. 
Exploring these historical developments and their interactions is beyond the 
scope of this study; but it is necessary to remind ourselves of the context in 
which wage policies were formed and continued.
7.2.2 Fixing specific margins
The Court continued to face the challenge of identifying principles applicable 
to margins in specific industries and occupations. Possibly because many 
awards were now reasonably settled, the demands of this work seem to have 
been less than in earlier years. Examples of some of the issues that arose, and 
the Court’s responses, are provided below.
Tramways
Beeby, in 1927, fixed margins for traffic workers on tramways (Tramways 
case 25 CAR 597). This decision is an example of the Court’s moving from 
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a description of the work, and the attributes required of the workers, to a 
prescription of money amounts, without an explained link between the two.
Past State prescriptions had been influenced by local practice and 
agreements. Beeby had ‘therefore re-investigated the whole question of what 
should be the minimum wage of tramway employees, except craft workmen 
and labourers incidentally attached to the services whose wages must necessarily 
conform to those fixed for similar work in awards of general application’ (p. 
603). He turned to the work itself:
The men engaged in traffic operations are a selected body. They 
must be of average intelligence, able to pass rudimentary education 
tests. They must be physically sound and able to pass medical and 
eye-sight tests. They must also be men of the right temperament, of 
courteous demeanour, and patient in learning. Their occupation, 
whilst not arduous in the ordinary physical sense, is harassing during 
portions of each day. … Their hours of work are necessarily irregular. 
… A considerable portion of their day’s work is done in crowded city 
streets in which care, alertness, and promptness of action are always 
necessary. They must adapt themselves to the vagaries of the public and 
are responsible for large sums of money passing through their hands. 
… The main difficulty in fixing a wage scale arose from the employees 
asking for a high rate of wage because of the comparative disadvantage 
of their employment, and at the same time seeking for the removal of 
those disadvantages. The scale of wages now awarded was arrived at 
after careful consideration of the disabilities of the service and would 
have been lower if those disabilities had not been unavoidable. (pp. 
604–605)
Railway conductors
In a decision about train conductors, given in 1927, Quick confronted the 
fact that conductors in New South Wales received smaller margins than their 
Victorian counterparts (Railways’ case 25 CAR 152). The decision is of interest 
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principally for the argument advanced by the representative of the New South 
Wales employer, and Quick’s response:
The question, he said, as to whether a wage is sufficient for a particular 
occupation should, as a general rule, be regulated in a natural way by 
the law of supply and demand. If a wage attached to any particular 
position is not regarded as sufficient, men will naturally seek other 
avenues of employment.
The reply to that is that the Commonwealth Arbitration Court does 
not determine rates of pay according to any law of supply and demand. 
The only test is what is a fair and reasonable rate of pay for the value 
of services rendered. It has already been determined by this Court in 
connexion with the Victorian branch of this railway dispute that first 
class train conductors are entitled to margins of 1s 6d and 2s per day. 
… The duties of these men being identical in the two States, I am of 
opinion that, as a matter of justice and equity, the rates of pay should be 
the same in the two services. (p. 163)
This is one of very few instances of the Court’s explicitly asserting that 
criteria other than supply and demand should determine wage relativities. The 
importance of supply and demand was, of course, implicit in numerous other 
decisions, notably those that stressed the necessity of restraining wages in the 
interest of preserving or increasing employment.
The Sydney Harbour Bridge
The New South Wales Government’s contract with Dorman Long and Coy 
Limited allowed the constructor to ‘pass on’ to the Government extra costs 
caused by award wage increases. Dethridge, in 1928, dealt with a case wherein 
the union sought various increases to which Dorman Long consented. There 
had recently been a change of government, however, and the new government 
was represented to object to the increases. ‘Under the circumstances’, said 
Dethridge,
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I thought it desirable to hear evidence for myself as to whether the 
increases asked for are justified by the special nature of the work, and 
Dr Bradfield accordingly gave evidence upon that matter. He supports 
the unions’ claims, saying, in effect, that the work in question is so 
extraordinary as to justify the increased wages asked for. No evidence 
to the contrary was tendered by the Government or the contractor, and 
I have come to the conclusion that the applications should be granted. 
(AEU case 26 CAR 353, 355)
The increases granted ranged up to 11½d per hour for work on the main 
arch of the bridge. They were insufficient, however, to avoid disputation and 
strikes, notwithstanding that they gave effect to the understanding between 
the union and the contractor.
The matter was again before Beeby early in 1929, when the union 
claimed that the men had not been in a position earlier to appreciate the 
difficulties and hazards of the task. Beeby chose to disregard the agreement 
and to determine the application for variation. By what standards should he 
evaluate the work? ‘It is difficult’, he said, ‘to find any principle on which the 
Court can act in assessing the value of labour in circumstances such as those 
surrounding these applications. It is admitted that the workmen are engaged 
in one of the world’s most difficult and hazardous engineering undertakings, 
and should receive wages substantially above those relating to normal work’ 
(27 CAR 1065, 1067). Workers on similar projects in the United States and 
Canada received more than the Sydney workers, but those workers were in a 
very strong economic position:
They can often drive a bargain in which the value of the labour to the 
community plays a much smaller part than the scarcity of competent 
workmen. In such circumstances wages are regulated solely by supply 
and demand. But in Australia, with its machinery for the compulsory 
fixing of minima, there is no way of testing what wages a particular 
group can command in the open market. If the work in question were 
left to the traditional play of economic forces, the unions might be able 
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to enforce their demands. But this is only conjectural, and in any event 
cannot be accepted as a method of assessing the fair value of labour. The 
Court’s function is to check unfair claims by economic strength of both 
employers and employees. (p. 1068)
This passage is of interest for (1) the implication that the value of labour 
to the community is something other than its market price, (2) equation of 
‘supply and demand’ with collective bargaining, and (3) the assertion of the 
Court’s role in countering unfair claims reflective of the economic strength 
of the parties. Despite his comments on the causes of the high wages paid 
to comparable workers in the United States and Canada, Beeby concluded 
that ‘the only principle on which the Court can act in all the circumstances 
of this case is to approximate the wages of the Sydney workmen to those paid 
in other countries for similar work’; and since the only information about 
rates elsewhere was for the United States and Canada, he ‘as closely as possible 
awarded to the Sydney men the same effective wages which they could earn in 
those countries for similar work’ (p. 1069). Beeby increased by 6 per cent the 
rates (set by Dethridge) for the first seven panels on either side of the arch and 
by 75 per cent the rates for the centre.
This did not end the matter. Work stopped again, because the main 
decision was said to maintain too wide a margin between the skilled and 
the less-skilled workers. The stoppage was unwarranted, said Beeby, because 
the Court would always correct ‘proven errors’. But further adjustment was 
necessary:
The extra rates having been fixed as compensation for the unusual 
difficulties and dangers of the work, the unskilled man should here, 
as in Canada and the US, more nearly approach in earnings the skilled 
tradesman. The percentage margins between skilled and unskilled men 
should, I think, be generally maintained, and their disturbance to 
meet the special circumstances under review must not be accepted as a 
precedent. (p. 1071)
Beeby increased the rates for riggers and helpers by about 4d per hour. 
Perhaps the chief interest of the Harbour Bridge decisions was the difficulty 
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of maintaining a set wages policy when labour held the ‘whip hand’—a rare 
situation in the 1920s.
Timber
The reverse situation existed, by the late 1920s, in the timber industry. This, 
too, experienced great industrial unrest, as a result of labour’s attempts to resist 
the reduction of wages and the erosion of conditions.
Lukin—conspicuously the Judge least sympathetic to labour—
conducted between February 1927 and August 1928 the proceedings leading 
to a new award, and gave his decision in January 1929 (Timber Workers’ case 
27 CAR 577). (I have discussed above his comments on the basic wage, 
especially his evident hostility to Powers’ 3s. I also discuss below the Full 
Court’s restoration of the 48-hour week in the timber industry.) Dealing 
specifically with margins, Lukin observed that previous awards, by Higgins 
(largely as a result of agreement) and Webb, had been made at times of greater 
prosperity in the industry than those now existing. He also noted, on the basis 
of evidence from the Monthly Labor Review, that while in the United States 
and Canada the proportion of men on the labourer’s wage varied between 50 
to 60 per cent of the total employed, in the Australian States subject to the 
Webb award (which excluded Queensland) the proportion varied between 10 
and 15 per cent. ‘Now’, he asked, ‘on what basis should I proceed?’
Am I to assume, contrary to the fact, that the state of the timber 
industry is what the employers, the employees, the community, and 
myself would wish it to be? Am I to treat it, contrary to the fact, as 
if it were in the abnormally prosperous condition in which Higgins J 
found it, or as in the normal condition it was in when Webb DP made 
his award, or am I to treat it in accordance with the facts of to-day? 
The answer, on what it is to-day, is obvious, at the same time paying 
due regard to the history and lessons of the past, and to a reasonable 
hope and expectation of a brighter future. That, of course, means that 
I cannot, except in some particular case for some special circumstances, 
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increase the margins given by the last award and that, in some cases, I 
must reduce them. (p. 616)
Lukin’s inspections led him to the conclusion ‘that much of the work 
which is classed as skilled in this industry is labourer’s work, or little better’ 
(p. 618). Timber workers had been ‘exceptionally well treated in the past’ (p. 
619). He asserted:
A consideration of the wages paid and of the financial documents of the 
companies in past years leads me to the conclusion that the community 
has had to pay for the products of this industry a price which, while 
making allowances for other variations, is greater than it ought to have 
paid. In other words, it has been paying for the skill of a worker when 
that worker has not got such skill, or who, if he has, does not have to 
use it, that is for skill which is non-existent in the product, and for 
the antiquated methods and lack of organisation of a great number of 
employers. (p. 621)
It was possible, especially in larger establishments, said Lukin, for a few men 
to ensure the efficient functioning of the machines, ‘while the duty of the 
men on the machines is merely to feed or operate them’. This was the trend 
of modern production, and ‘unless such methods are adopted in this country 
its industries will not be able to compete with those overseas, and must lean 
all the more heavily on a constantly and ever-increasing tariff ’ (p. 621). He 
therefore provided in the award for ‘machinists who are merely operators or 
feeders’, with a margin of 3s per week, ‘not for skill, but because it appears to 
me that, as things are at present and will be under this award, the industry 
can pay such margins’. This would entail a reduction in pay for many, but if 
piecework were adopted, there would be the opportunity to offset the loss (p. 
623). Whereas the union had proposed a two-level scheme of classification, 
with some workers receiving a 30s margin and others 24s, and employers were 
generally content with the margins previously set by Webb, Lukin awarded 
margins for machinists ranging in seven steps from 3s to 21s. The evidence 
on which he acted included the confidential report of an independent expert 
whom he had appointed (p. 625).
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White-collar work in railways
In 1928, Quick retained, with modifications, incremental scales for Victorian 
railway clerks previously set by the Railways’ Classification Board (26 CAR 
639). In this decision, he also dealt with the salaries of train-control officers, 
who (aided by developments in communication) played an increasingly 
important role in the efficient running of the system. The chief train dispatcher 
received a salary of £636 (a margin of £410). The Railways Commissioners had 
recently proposed to increase this officer’s rate, but this required the approval 
of the State Government, which had rejected a part of the increase. The 
Court in 1927 had made an award giving effect to the full increase (p. 688). 
Quick, in 1929, dealt with the salaries of railway professional officers (Railway 
Professional Officers’ case 28 CAR 173). ‘In my opinion’, he said, ‘the most 
important and far-reaching question in this industrial dispute is what shall be 
the commencing salary of the lowest engineering grade in each State, because 
that will necessarily determine the relative margins in the higher grades’ (p. 
220). Having regard to the evidence of financial problems in the railways, 
Quick refused the Association’s claim for increases. In this case, as in others, 
the Court accepted career structures previously negotiated or determined by 
other authorities.
Actors
Dethridge, in 1929, made a new award for actors (Actors’ case 27 CAR 1008). 
The Federation had called on him to set rates that reflected the artistic content 
of acting. This he rejected, saying that the Court ‘would be fatuous if it 
attempted to determine the minimum rate to be paid for artistic merit’ (p. 
1009). The Court had to deal with the minimum requirements of the job:
Many of the employees now in question have little or no artistic 
merit, but they all require [sic] to possess some qualifications, either 
of education, training, or bodily capacity or appearance, not necessary 
for an unskilled labourer. For those engaged in ballet, for instance, just 
as for most artisans, some natural capacity and training of the body 
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is indispensable; in neither case is any higher natural qualification 
requisite for the ordinary performance of their work by the rank and 
file. Those who possess such higher qualifications must be left to 
bargain for themselves with the employers, if any, requiring them. The 
Court can only deal with employees in classes capable of being defined 
by ordinary qualities or attainments, and further, when dealing with a 
marginal wage for any such class, can only attempt to determine the 
minimum wage proper for every employee qualified to be in that class, 
although that wage may be inadequate for the more efficient employees 
in that class. (pp. 1009–1010)
It was of the nature of award rates of pay that they did not differentiate 
between the levels of skill of individual employees within the designated 
classifications. Employers might, if they chose, pay extra to employees whom 
they perceived as having higher value to them; and a worker with special skill 
could seek to bargain in his or her own right. The cases of the actors and 
the musicians may have exposed these realities more conspicuously than the 
occupations more commonly before the Court. The Court’s reluctance to enter 
into issues of artistic merit is understandable and defensible. The problem that 
remained, however, was to identify the characteristics of the ‘ordinary’ actor or 
musician for which the award should allow. Although the Court was obliged 
to set minimum pay rates for actors and musicians, the processes by which it 
arrived at the prescribed amounts are not at all obvious.
7.3 workIng hours5
The major area of conflict within the framework of federal arbitration in the 
1920s was standard hours. As we saw in Chapter 6, Higgins after World War 
I took initial steps toward the granting of a 44-hour week. This had led to 
federal legislation removing the capacity of a single member of the Court to 
reduce hours below 48. The Full Court’s decision of February 1927 (24 CAR 
755), in the Main Hours case, concluded the first of the general economic 
inquiries that were to become a feature of the proceedings of the Court and 
5  See also Nyland (1987).
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its successor Commissions. Over the next three years, the contest between the 
48-hour and 44-hour weeks occupied much of the Court’s time.
7.3.1 The jurisdiction issue
We saw in Chapter 6 (Section 6.3) that New South Wales legislation providing 
for a 44-hour week in the State and the High Court decision in Cowburn’s 
case—to the effect that federal award provisions for 48 hours prevailed over 
the State law—caused Powers to fear a shift between jurisdictions. This did 
not happen to any marked degree. The New South Wales legislation was 
important, however, in generating tension within the federal jurisdiction. 
Unions and their members, understandably, saw the 48-hour standard as 
ungenerous. A number of unions did apply to terminate their federal awards 
in relation to New South Wales, and in October 1926 Dethridge referred one 
of these applications to the Full Court. In a decision with which Lukin and 
Beeby agreed, Dethridge said:
In essence, the position is that unions claim that if at any time they 
think that better conditions of labour can be secured from a State 
tribunal in respect of one State they can, by application to this Court, 
obtain a variation exempting that State from the award of this Court. 
Under varying circumstances the President and Deputy Presidents of 
this Court have in the past granted similar applications, while others 
have been refused. One such application was granted by Judge Beeby 
since the constitution of this Court. It is now thought necessary that 
a general rule should be enunciated as to such applications. We do 
not decide how far this Court has power … to determine an award 
in whole or in part. Whatever the extent of that power, it is clearly 
discretionary, and we are of opinion that no such application should be 
granted merely because an applicant, whether an employer or employee, 
anticipates being able to obtain more favourable conditions from a State 
tribunal. (Locomotive Enginemens’ case 24 CAR 371, 373)
In August 1927, Dethridge made an award for the glass industry. The 
union had excluded Queensland from its log of claims, hoping to get a higher 
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wage and a 44-hour week through the State tribunal. The employer, however, 
had served a log on the union, and this enabled Dethridge to extend the award 
to Queensland. As to working hours, he said, ‘whatever the Full Court decides 
I shall take as being proper and as requiring me to disregard what the State 
tribunal may do in the matter’ (Glass Workers’ case 25 CAR 289, 294).
7.3.2 The Main Hours case6
The New South Wales, Queensland, and Western Australian adoption of the 44-
hour standard was important background to the renewed efforts of unions to get 
the 44-hour week in federal awards.7 The principal case was the Main Hours case, 
beginning immediately after inception of the reconstituted Court and heard, as the 
Act required, by the Full Court (Dethridge, Lukin and Beeby). The hearing lasted 
from August to December of 1926 and the decision was given in February 1927 
(24 CAR 755). In the depth of the inquiry and the range of the evidence and the 
argument, it exceeded any previous case before the Court.8 It was conducted on 
the basis that while the industry of immediate concern was engineering, the 
Court might make declarations that could subsequently be applied to other 
industries. The main union case was presented, not by representatives of the 
metal unions, but by those of the Trades and Labour Councils of Australia and 
the Commonwealth Council of Federated Unions.9 Much of the burden of 
6  The Librarian of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission has made available to 
me parts of the transcript of this case. Unfortunately, the remainder of the transcript and the 
exhibits have not been found.
7  In Western Australia, a Labor government had attempted to legislate for a 44-hour week, 
but was rebuffed by the Legislative Council. A compromise was eventually reached whereby 
a Court of Arbitration was brought into being. The 44-hour week was then imposed by 
arbitration.
8  A 1926 amendment of the Act permitted the Attorney-General to intervene in the public 
interest ‘in any proceeding before the Court in which the question of the standard hours of 
work in any industry or the basic wage is in dispute’. Upon any such intervention, the Court 
might permit anybody ‘interested in the determination of the question … to be heard and 
to examine and cross-examine witnesses’ (Cameron 1953–55, p. 206). The Attorney-General 
intervened. In doing so, he made it clear that his intention was not to put a substantive 
position to the Court, but to activate the procedure for allowing other interventions.
9  In the course of his submission for the unions, Charlie Crofts said that before the 
reconstitution of the Court, unions had been making desperate attempts to get the hours 
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making the case for the hours reduction was borne, however, by A W Foster, 
counsel for the New South Wales Government.
Though there was some variation, the usual practice under the 48-hour 
week was for a half-holiday to be taken on Saturday. Hence, the working days 
between Monday and Friday exceeded eight hours. One of the pleas of the 
unions was for workers to enjoy a ‘clean’ eight-hour day without forgoing 
the half-holiday on Saturdays (though in his closing address Crofts said that 
the unions would accommodate any employer preference for working the 44 
hours over five days).
Of the many issues traversed in the hearing, some of the more interesting 
entailed rudimentary national income analysis. J T Sutcliffe, who had recently 
written The National Dividend (1926), gave evidence about his methods and 
findings (and about various other matters).10 Among the vigorously debated 
questions arising from his evidence were:
•	 whether (as Sutcliffe contended) services, or only tangible 
items, should be counted in the national income. The 
employers’ counsel produced a memorandum from the former 
Commonwealth Statistician, Sir George Knibbs, opposing the 
counting of services, while Foster cited a document written 
by the current Statistician, C H Wickens, which supported 
Sutcliffe’s position;
•	 what was the appropriate price index for deflating the nominal 
values?
question settled. They deferred their applications on the assurance of the Government that 
the standard-hours matter would be the first business of the reconstituted Court (transcript, 
p. 242).
10  Sutcliffe was employed from 1911 to 1924 in the Commonwealth Statistician’s Office 
and was Head of the Labour and Industry Branch; Secretary to the Royal Commission on the 
Basic Wage 1919–20; from 1924 to 1927 Head of the Labour and Industrial Department in 
Queensland; and Chairman of the Economic Commission on the Queensland Basic Wage 
1924–25. Sutcliffe moved to the private sector in 1927 as General Manager of Amalgamated 
Textile Pty Ltd.
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The outcome of the case was a ‘split’ decision. Beeby favoured a wide 
application of the 44-hour week. Lukin would have refused any reduction below 
48 hours. Dethridge’s position became the decision of the Court, because each 
of the other Judges would support him against the third. Dethridge explained 
that
what I have said in my judgment indicates the probable course of the 
Court in future applications; that is to say, that in industries which 
are similar in their conditions as to leisure, or want of leisure, to the 
engineering industry the Court will probably apply a similar reduction 
as in the case of the engineering industry, but not in other industries, or 
not to the extent that my brother Beeby has indicated. … The majority 
of the members of the Court approve of the reduction of the standard 
hours of work in the engineering industry to 44 per week as from the 
coming into operation of the award to be made herein. (p. 904)
To Dethridge, the issue was in part one of equity. Workers on a 48-hour 
week might not be at a disadvantage relative to the many who worked fewer 
hours. The relevant comparison was not simply one of hours:
The railway porter, for instance, at the end of eight and three-quarter 
hours work, is in a position to obtain just as much real enjoyment 
or leisure as the machine worker in an engineering shop would get 
after finishing an eight-hour day of strain and toil. … Machine and 
factory workers, who have to work within four walls, frequently in 
the midst of nerve-racking noise, with a monotonous continuation of 
the same motion, and an unbroken concentration of attention upon 
uninteresting toil, have a higher claim to consideration than most 
others, and may have some reason to feel that they are not enjoying 
equality of treatment, seeing that workers in other occupations have 
already obtained the 44-hour week, although there was nothing in the 
work done to justify that priority. (p. 768)
There had been much argument and evidence about the impact of 
reduced hours on output. The unions contended that there would be no adverse 
effect, or that any such effect would be minimal, because the improvement in 
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the workers’ productivity would more than offset the reduction of working 
time. The employers disputed this. Dethridge was persuaded that there would 
be some reduction, which told against ‘an all-round easeup’, but weighed 
against this the likely adverse effect, in the long term, of resentments on the 
part of workers who were disadvantaged by the 48-hour week:
But factory, workshop, and machine employees, like the members of the 
claimant union [the Amalgamated Engineering Union], working the 
48-hour week are on the whole at a real disadvantage as compared with 
most other workers, and this contrast of condition, cumulative upon any 
contrast created by State laws or awards or administration, will certainly 
diminish zeal, efficiency, and productivity. A just standard of hours of 
labour in industry is that which places the workers in all industries on 
what is really, and not merely superficially, the same footing in point of 
leisure … Only a rough approximation to this general fair treatment 
can in practice be obtained. (pp. 790–791)
The criterion advocated by Dethridge became known as ‘the equation of 
leisure’. It was not finally rejected until 1939 (see Chapter 12, Section 12.2).
To Lukin, the crucial concerns were the prospective loss of output, the 
absence of evidence (or even claims) of adverse health effects from working 48 
hours, and his perception of the 44-hour week as a luxury that Australia could 
ill afford. He referred to the endorsement of the 48-hour week in the Treaty 
of Versailles, by the first International Labour Conference and by Seebohm 
Rowntree in The Human Factor in Business.
Lukin regarded as irrelevant, arguments about the capacity of industry 
to offset the reduction of output by mechanisation and improved methods 
unless these were directly attributable to the fewer working hours:
To say that the improvements in the future under forty-four hours will 
make up for the deficiency now between forty-eight and forty-four 
is to assume covertly that the improvement will arise only under the 
forty-four [hour] week and to ignore the fact that improvements have 
always been going on, and would continue to go on under a forty-
eight hour week. … If one could definitely attribute an improvement 
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as being consequent only on the reduction, and not on what would in 
the ordinary course of events have happened, then such improvement, 
if it be identifiable, and if its added value be ascertainable, could be used 
in conjunction with the production at the lesser hours for comparison 
with that of the greater. I think it almost impossible, in a very great 
majority of cases, to identify such an improvement or to ascertain its 
value. (pp. 805–806)
Moreover, said Lukin, ‘it must be borne in mind that the improvement of 
machinery, method and organisation is not peculiar to Australia but takes 
place on the whole contemporaneously in most of the other parts of the 
world, so that any resultant increase in productivity per hour will not ipso facto 
necessarily increase Australia’s ability to meet the foreign competition which it 
is now encountering, and from which it is now suffering’ (p. 806). The notion 
that mechanisation and better organisation were merely a means of ‘standing 
still’ if they were matched in competitor countries—an idea previously asserted 
by Powers—was hostile to any concept of ‘distributing’ to labour a share of the 
benefits of rising productivity.
Lukin made much of pronouncements by the Tariff Board. The Board 
(chiefly in its annual reports) protested strongly and repeatedly against the 
endeavours of unions to extract higher wages and better conditions after the 
Board had conferred extra protection on industries. (These pronouncements 
of the Tariff Board are discussed in Chapter 13, Subsection 13.1.4.) ‘So far as 
the unions’ demands are necessary to secure the normal standard of living and 
necessary conditions of labour’, said Lukin, ‘I think, with all due deference to 
the Tariff Board, that the unions are within their natural rights, but where, 
as here, the claim is not to secure the normal standard of living or necessary 
conditions of labour, but to provide unnecessary extra leisure, then the unions, 
as applicants with the employers for the tariff assistance, are in duty bound to 
the community … to refrain from such further claims’.
Lukin saw the suggestion of reduced working time as out of keeping 
with national goals:
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If we are to retain exclusive possession of this vast continent for 
ourselves and our posterity, is it not essential that we should develop 
and progress as expeditiously as possible? In order to do this is it not 
necessary that every Australian citizen should continuously contribute 
toward this end? Must not Australia develop its industries, primary and 
secondary, as quickly as possible to make this great country as attractive 
and prosperous as possible, so as to induce our fellow-members of 
the British Empire and other desirable members of the white races of 
the world to come to our shores and settle amongst us, so that when 
the critical time of foreign aggression arrives we will have sufficiently 
developed and have attained sufficient strength to resist such aggression 
and be enabled to retain Australia for our race? (p. 820)
The evidence left uncertainties about the economy’s productive 
performance, but the indications were that little or no progress had been made 
since before World War I. The level of the national debt was a further reason 
for resisting the reduction of working time. Sutcliffe’s evidence showed that the 
debt stood at £966 million, £400 million of which was war debt. The non-war 
debt had been used to fund assets, some of which must now be ‘discounted’.
The reduction of hours, Lukin concluded,
means an undoubted decrease in output when a substantial increase is 
so absolutely necessary to this young country; a seriously increased cost 
directly or indirectly of such reduced output … the weakening of our 
power to develop our own resources and consequent delay in doing so; 
the weakening of our power to resist foreign competition and its inroads 
and the subsequent weakening of our financial stability; the weakening 
of our power to recapture the balance of trade by making our exports 
exceed our imports and provide us with the wherewithal to meet our 
heavy overseas debts; the discouragement of our manufacturers to 
continue in some cases a hopeless struggle or to invest further capital; the 
discouragement of prospective manufacturers to invest and commence 
business in Australia under such adverse conditions when better 
conditions, more conducive to business success, prevail elsewhere in the 
world; the delay in commencing and carrying into effect further public 
312 Australian Wage Policy
utilities so necessary to our advancement; the still further weakening 
of our primary industries, which have already been over-strained by 
existing conditions and which are competing and must continue to 
compete on prices determined by competition in world markets; the 
creation of further dissatisfaction in the rural worker whose hours and 
conditions of labour appear to be out of fair proportion with that of 
the city worker and whose drift, already very serious, to the city, its 
attractions and its better living and wage conditions will be accentuated. 
And all for what purpose? (pp. 864–865)
Beeby had ‘form’ as to working hours, having presided over the New 
South Wales Royal Commission which in 1920 recommended the creation of a 
special court of inquiry to receive applications for a 44-hour week and to make 
recommendations (Labour Report 1920, pp. 109–110). Not surprisingly, one 
of the union advocates made considerable use of Beeby’s report. ‘This Court’, 
Beeby now said, ‘is not asked to introduce some novel change in industrial 
relationship, but rather to finalise a resistless trend and remove from the path 
of industry one of the most prolific causes of unrest’ (p. 873). With even 
more emphasis than Dethridge, he wrote of the need to reduce hours so as to 
counter the growing ‘monotony’ of mechanised production:
The expulsion of skilled artisans from industry to make way for machine 
operatives increases from year to year. It can be said with certainty that 
the proportion of trained mechanics with manipulative skill becomes 
relatively less each year, and that the increasing use of machinery does 
tend to make work more monotonous. More time for fostering other 
interests and for recreation is necessary to those whose natural creative 
instinct is suppressed by economic necessity. (p. 875)
Beeby argued that the States in which the 44-hour week had most 
extensively been adopted—New South Wales, Queensland and Western 
Australia—had fared at least as well, in economic terms, as those where the 
48-hour week more fully prevailed.
Entering into the debate about the extent of economic progress, if any, 
since before the war, Beeby said:
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A better way of judging the increase or decline of production and of the 
comparative prosperity or otherwise of the Commonwealth is, in my 
opinion, the analysis of statistics of the five years prior to the war, and 
of the last five years. I do not propose to follow in detail the argument 
between Mr Sutcliffe and Mr Benham on this point. Mr Benham had 
not given consideration to the practical matters before this Court; he 
had not made any inquiry as to the actual effect of the shorter week 
on production costs in industries which had changed over from 48 to 
44 hours; he had not applied his mind to historical facts, or the ethical 
issues involved. Taking available statistical figures, and applying index 
numbers, he ventured the conclusion that, although in the year 1926 
Australia recovered her pre-war productivity per head of population, 
for some years previously production had been lower than during years 
immediately before the war. I am not prepared to dispute or accept this 
conclusion. (p. 881)
At Beeby’s instigation, a table had been prepared in which the pre-war 
and the post-war production were expressed ‘per head of persons engaged in 
industry, instead of per head of population’. ‘Mr Benham’, he said,
attached no significance to this second table, probably because of 
failure to understand the purpose for which it was called. If either 
table is sufficiently accurate to form a reliable guide, then the second 
one supports the contention that our material wealth has increased 
sufficiently to increase the number of the leisured class who have retired 
from active production. It also meets the oft-repeated statement that 
loss in average production (if any) arises from the laxity of those actually 
engaged in production. (p. 883)
A further table, showing manufacturing output per hour of labour, 
indicated a 10 per cent increase between 1914 and 1924–25. If Benham were 
right in asserting that there had been a decline in productivity, the fall away 
could only have been due to the primary sector. Prices of primary products 
had been high in recent years. The decline, if any, in primary output was 
‘clearly attributable to causes other than increased labour cost’. Partly for 
these reasons, and partly because of a growth in ‘the annual value of all wealth 
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produced in the Commonwealth’ during the 1920s, Beeby refused to accept 
‘Mr Benham’s forebodings’.
He also rejected Benham’s forebodings about the size of the national 
debt. More than half of the total public debt had been subscribed in Australia, 
and more than half of the interest payments related to Australian-held debt. 
‘This’, he said,
is mainly a recent development, and is one of the substantial signs of 
the accumulation in Australia of surplus wealth derived from primary 
and manufacturing industries. Even now, after much reflection on 
Mr Benham’s evidence, I cannot understand his persistency when 
considering the comparative position of countries in refusing to see any 
difference between a debt which is represented by great public utilities 
and assets, and one against which no credit entries appear. (p. 885)
The evidence of metal trades employers did not, in Beeby’s opinion, 
outweigh the need to remove a cause of ongoing discontent. For other 
industries, ‘little evidence was furnished in support of prophecies of disaster if 
the shorter week is conceded’ (p. 896). The timber industry was in difficulty, 
due to the growing use of steel and concrete in construction, but the greater 
part of that industry was already working a 44-hour week. As to primary 
industry, Beeby was sceptical about arguments asserting that it would be 
damaged by the increased costs of a 44-hour week.
Some day, I hope, this Court will have before it reliable figures disclosing 
dissected wage, machinery, transport, and other costs of primary 
production. Until that evidence is available, and for other reasons, I 
am prepared to agree to exemption for the present of direct primary 
production from a 44-hour week declaration. But I am not prepared to 
admit that the indirect increase in costs is sufficient to exclude favourable 
consideration of the claim of wage earners in secondary and distributive 
occupations for a review of their hours of employment. (p. 901)
One point on which the three Judges agreed was the potential economic 




There followed a series of cases in which the Full Court dealt with the 
application of the Main Hours decision in other areas. In May 1927, the Court 
(by majority) approved the 44-hour week for various metal-related industries 
(Standard Hours: Boilermakers, etc. 25 CAR 64). In June, it refused (by majority) 
applications by the Commissioners of Railways of the Commonwealth and 
of the States of Victoria, South Australia, New South Wales, and Tasmania 
for exemption from the 44-hour week awarded in the metal trades industries 
(Standard Hours: Metal Workers (Railways) 25 CAR 216). The State Electricity 
Commission of Victoria was granted an exemption, and, in August, Dethridge 
granted an injunction against the union and members who were refusing to 
work more than 44 hours for the SECV (Standard Hours: Electrical Workers 
25 CAR 283). In October, there was another three-way division in respect of 
the gas industry. With Beeby wishing to grant 44 hours to more grades than 
did Dethridge, and Dethridge favouring 44 hours for more grades than Lukin, 
Dethridge’s decision prevailed (Standard Hours: Gas Employees 25 CAR 996).11 
In November, the Full Court (Dethridge and Lukin, Beeby dissenting) refused 
the 44-hour week in the agricultural implement and machinery industry 
(Standard Hours: Agricultural Machinery 25 CAR 1148).12 In December, the 
Court (Beeby dissenting) refused the 44-hour week in the glass industry, save 
for certain grades deemed to be engaged in arduous work (Standard Hours: 
Glass Workers 25 CAR 1300).
The Full Court, in December 1927, published its decision on the 
application for a 44-hour week for locomotive enginemen, firemen and 
cleaners, and drivers of electric trains (Standard Hours: Locomotive Enginemen 
25 CAR 1252). In this case, the Court was unanimous in rejecting the claim. 
Part of the union’s case was that the 44-hour week had already been granted 
to locomotive men in New South Wales, Queensland and Western Australia, 
and in New Zealand. Dethridge commented:
11  Lukin would have reduced hours for some grades because of the arduousness of the work.
12  In two later decisions, the Court (by majority) determined that engineers working in this 
industry should have a 48-hour week (26 CAR 36 and 27 CAR 367).
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The Union contends that these reductions go to show that their present 
claim is just, but the respondents allege that in every case they were 
made as the result of political action without any inquiry into the merits 
of the reduction. This contention of the respondents is supported by 
the fact that, at any rate in New South Wales, Queensland and Western 
Australia, the reduction was part of a general reduction extended to 
employees regardless of the arduousness of their work. It would not be 
safe to take these reductions as a guide to our action in this proceeding. 
(p. 1253)
Dethridge was unmoved by arguments going to the enginemen’s absences 
from home and related disadvantages: these were aspects of the work that the 
employees had knowingly accepted and which had influenced their wages and 
other conditions. The union had ‘failed to show that the conditions of work of 
its members are such as to justify an alteration of the standard hours of work 
prescribed by the current award in any of the States covered by that award’ 
(p. 1260). Lukin agreed with Dethridge. Beeby thought that introduction 
of the 44-hour week ‘in some directions’ should be gradual and that ‘to 
impose suddenly on the railways of Australia a universal 44-hour week would 
seriously hamper operations and lead to additions to running cost which, 
on consideration of the financial condition of the different railway systems, 
cannot be justified’. Introduction of the 44-hour week in railways should 
begin with mechanics and their assistants in workshops (p. 1260). Moreover, 
the locomotive men were already allowed to take their lunch in working hours, 
which reduced their effective working hours to about 45 (p. 1262).
In the Printing Industry case, decided in December 1927 (25 CAR 1265), 
the Full Court granted the 44-hour week in the commercial and newspaper 
printing awards. This was a majority decision of Dethridge and Beeby, with 
Lukin dissenting. Dethridge again referred to the widespread operation of 
44 hours under the State systems, but in this case seems to have drawn an 
opposite conclusion from that of the enginemen’s case:
The Court cannot disregard the fact that the 44-hour week already largely 
prevails in this industry. Even where this is due to State legislation or 
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awards, which this Court might override in cases within its jurisdiction, 
the fact is of some importance where the nature of the work is not 
plainly of a kind to make the 44-hour week improper, having regard 
to the principles this Court has enunciated. Still more attention must 
be given to any extensive adoption of the shorter week by agreement 
between employers and employees. (p. 1269)
An added factor was the presence of numerous females in the industry. There 
was medical evidence that 48 hours caused fatigue among these women. 
Dethridge thought it impractical to grant a 44-hour week for females only. 
Lukin, though dissenting in respect of males, supported the 44-hour week for 
females. Beeby favoured a 42 hours for females, 42 for linotype operators on 
day work, and 40 for night work, 42 for night work generally, and otherwise 
44 hours.
The Court’s decisions about standard hours in 1928 indicate a growing 
resistance to the extension of the 44-hour week.13 What this meant, in practice, 
was a hardening of Dethridge’s attitude. This trend was evident in the Timber 
Workers’ case, decided in December 1928 (27 CAR 396), when the Court 
restored the 48-hour week in those sections of the industry where the 44-hour 
week had survived the Full Court decision of 1922. The decision caused great 
industrial turmoil. A year later, in the Coach-making and Motor Body Building 
case (28 CAR 411), the Full Court (Dethridge and Lukin, Beeby dissenting) 
affirmed the 48-hour week, except for females.14 Dethridge said that
existing circumstances call for the gravest consideration of the likely 
effects of any proposed change in the conditions of an industry which 
may lessen its vitality. Where the demand for its products is brisk and 
expanding, a reduction in working hours—a desirable thing in itself—
may not unreasonably be regarded by employees as worth the forgoing 
of some possible expansion of the field of employment in that industry. 
13  Nyland (1987) argues that this was due, in part, to the unions’ refusal to entertain 
piecework. My reading of the decisions suggests a different emphasis—on deteriorating 
economic conditions. The Court’s concerns about the economic environment might have 
been alleviated somewhat by union acceptance of piecework.
14  This decision entailed an increase in hours for painters in New South Wales.
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But where the demand is likely to remain stationary for a considerable 
time in the future, and may possibly even shrink, that reduction, 
attended with a serious risk of consequent contraction in the existing 
amount of employment, should be shunned rather than welcomed by 
the employees. (p. 414)
‘General unemployment’, said Dethridge, was ‘great’, and ‘so long as the other 
causes of that general unemployment are likely to continue with consequential 
unemployment in this industry … nothing should be done to increase the evil’ 
(pp. 419–420). He recognised that some employees in the industry worked 
under State awards and enjoyed the 44-hour week, so that ‘a disadvantageous 
disparity as to working hours is now suffered by most of the members of the 
federation’ (p. 415). He also accepted that there was ‘no substantial relevant 
difference’ between the work performed in some of the trades and those metal 
trades for which 44 hours had already been granted: ‘if conditions in respect 
of unemployment were the same now as when the 44 hour week was approved 
by this Court for the metal trades industries, I should approve it for employees 
in this industry’ (p. 424).
By the end of the 1920s, the 44-hour week had made limited progress 
in the Court’s awards.
7.4 payment by results
Union resistance to piecework had been noted with disapproval by the Court 
during the Higgins era. After the reconstitution of the Court in 1926, the 
judges became more forthright in their endeavours to promote it. This was, 
of course, the era when Taylorist principles of management, which included 
piecework, were in vogue. Piecework was strenuously opposed by the unions, 
which saw it as a device for speeding the work with no likelihood of long-term 
benefit to the workers, and as a likely cause of unemployment.
The issue was canvassed during the hearing in the Main Hours case. 
For example, E J Holloway, one of the union advocates, cited an employers’ 
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official who had allegedly admitted ‘that ever since the tribunals have been in 
existence in Australia—1901 to 1924—the workers have been losing. They 
have not been getting what is now given in America, namely, an incentive to 
do their best, and to co-operate with the management, by having a share in the 
industry’ (transcript, p. 620). Dethridge commented:
It may very likely be that a part explanation is what my brother Beeby 
referred to the other day, namely, the prevalence of payment by results 
in America as compared with this country. If the good worker is 
encouraged to work and earn more than the average worker, it follows 
that the share going to the workers as a class is increased. (transcript, p. 
620)
Beeby said that in America not all work was piecework ‘and that those 
on day work participate in the higher advantages also; but they probably 
give better results because of the standard set by the pieceworkers’. Holloway 
questioned the practicality of piecework at a time when new machines were 
continually changing the nature of the tasks, and said that ‘one of the principal 
things which have made our people oppose piece-work in the past has been 
the fact that the moment men become more efficient, the rates are cut 
back’. Dethridge replied: ‘Of course, the worker has to be protected against 
imposition of that kind. In many cases, apparently, the protection has been 
ensured by placing the control of piece-work rates in the hands of a combined 
body of employers and employees’ (transcript, pp. 620–622).
In his judgment, Dethridge said:
Some form of payment by result properly safeguarded in the interest of 
the workers seems to be a necessary incentive, but most of the unions 
are officially at any rate still strongly opposed to this principle of 
remuneration. I have had the advantage of reading my brother Beeby’s 
judgment so far as it deals with methods of remuneration and agree 
with what he says as to the injury to workers themselves arising from 
the unions’ attitude upon this matter. I hope that a practical scheme 
of unemployment insurance can be devised which will help to remove 
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the fear of unemployment, which is the chief obstacle to payment by 
results as well as other instruments and methods of efficiency in output. 
(p. 773)
Beeby said:
If we could have so organised industrial life as to guarantee to every 
worthy citizen constant employment, or insurance during periods of 
unavoidable unemployment, the main objection to payment by results 
would not exist. That organised unionism is adopting a wrong remedy 
is beyond argument. All unnecessary restrictions upon production 
reduce the possibility of continuing to improve standards of living and 
to provide for the needs of increasing population. (p. 874)
Beeby criticised employers for thinking ‘that the introduction of new methods 
of payment and the fixing of piece-work and contract rates are matters of 
management only, and not subjects of consultation with their workmen’. The 
absence of joint shop committees in Australia was ‘lamentable’ (p. 875).
Lukin spoke of ‘abundant evidence in these proceedings that the worker 
in the majority of cases can reasonably do more, reasonably put more effort 
into the work than he does, reasonably give greater output than he does’. 
This was shown ‘by the rules of the unions which impose fines for exceeding 
certain limits of work, by the pronounced opposition to piece-work, by the 
greater production given, and the less time consumed where payment is made 
according to results, by frank statements made by some of the witnesses that 
the workers always have “a little up their sleeve”’ (p. 807). If the shorter week 
were granted, ‘it would not be unreasonable to make it a condition … that 
the unions should withdraw all opposition to, and give support to, payment 
by results under schemes that will prevent exploitation, and secure advantages 
both to the employers and the employees, thereby benefiting the community 
and making up, to some degree at any rate, for the loss that will be occasioned 
by the … reduction of hours’ (p. 864).
The members of the Full Court returned to the subject in June 1927, 
in giving their decisions about the (unsuccessful) applications of the railways 
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for exemption from the 44-hour week in respect of grades that fell within the 
scope of the Main Hours decision (25 CAR 216). Dethridge wrote:
In my opinion the future development of industry in Australia depends 
upon the abolition of all influences restricting production consistently 
with the fair treatment of employees. One of these influences is the 
method of payment according to time worked, and not according to 
results. A system of payment by results is not possible in some branches 
of the metal industry, but it is applicable in very many cases. In those 
cases, however, where it is so applicable, the nature of modern industry 
is such that the system requires an exhaustive and complicated series of 
investigations and adjustments to be made by experts in order to ensure 
success in practice. … Its initiation and development must come, for the 
most part, from employers, and demands from them a very considerable 
amount of difficult work and close attention. Sporadic efforts have been 
made in this direction by employers in the metal trades in Australia, 
but with no great energy or persistence in face of the opposition of the 
unions. (p. 222)
Dethridge added that if he had thought that the employers were ‘ready and 
eager’ to adopt a system of payment by results, he might have made the 
reduction of the working week conditional on the employees’ concurrence in 
its implementation; ‘but there was no sign of this, and after much deliberation 
I decided to grant my approval without requiring such concurrence as a 
condition precedent’ (p. 223). Since the Main Hours decision, an interstate 
conference of the Amalgamated Engineering Union had resolved that the 
union ‘cannot accept piece-work, bonus, contract, or task work, or any system 
of payment other than an hourly, daily, or weekly rate, as is generally known 
and observed in the trade’. ‘If this resolution … reflects the real intention 
of the employees’, said Dethridge, ‘it bodes ill for the retention of the 44-
hour week’; and ‘a suggestion worthy of serious consideration has been made 
that in view of this resolution, the Court should suspend its approval of the 
reduction of hours in the metal trades, but I have come to the conclusion that 
the employees should not be deprived of their opportunity’ (pp. 223–224).
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Given the unions’ attitude, Lukin asked rhetorically: ‘should the Court 
proceed further with this proposed experiment?’
I am strongly of the opinion that this Court should take no further step 
in applications for reductions in standard hours, and that the present 
orders, though actually made, should be suspended until the unfair 
and unreasonable restriction and limitation of ‘setting the pace’ in the 
workshop ceases, and until this determined hostility and opposition of 
the unions to payment by results is withdrawn and abandoned, and a 
more conciliatory and favourable attitude adopted. (p. 231)
Beeby said that ‘if the unions or their members place obstacles in the way 
of securing increased production without reduction of status or earnings, then 
the standard hours of work, at some future date, will have to be reconsidered’ 
(p. 234).
In the following month, Beeby published his decision about a new 
award for the metal trades (the hours aspect having been determined by the 
Full Court in the Main Hours case) (Metal Trades case 25 CAR 364). He spoke 
of ‘the prejudice against piece-work and other systems of payment by results, 
formed as the result of abuses of such systems before the days of statutory 
regulation of industrial conditions’. Employees were not alone to blame for 
the prevailing lack of cooperation.
Every benefit which they have secured during recent years has been the 
result of hard fighting, either in this Court or before State tribunals. 
No carefully thought out proposals for a better organisation of the 
industry has ever been put before them. Employers and their managers 
voluntarily offered testimony to the capacity of their workmen, but 
admitted that they had made no serious effort by means of shop 
committees or industrial councils to get into closer contact with them 
… I have therefore included in the award every possible provision for 
the formation of Joint Committees. (pp. 373–374)
Beeby announced the insertion in the award of a clause empowering employers 
and employees to make contracts for other than ordinary wages, and another 
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providing that organised prohibition of payment by results would be a breach 
of the award (pp. 376–377). He cancelled the latter provision in response to 
union protests.15
In August 1928, Drake-Brockman made the first federal award for the 
furnishing trades (the union’s 44-hour week claim having previously been 
rejected by the Full Court) (Furnishing Trades case 26 CAR 808). Margins for 
skill had been fixed, giving increases for some grades but causing reductions 
for others. Drake-Brockman added that
broadly speaking, all the sections which have been subjected to decreases 
are suitable for piece-work operations, and consequently a provision for 
piece-work is included in the award. If this provision is used the loss to 
the individuals concerned can easily be made up. (p. 809)
Under the award, pieceworkers would have to receive at least 10 per cent 
more than the time rate.
To the best of my knowledge, there is no statistical evidence as to the 
effects of the Court’s endeavours to promote payment by results. Hagan argues 
that union resistance was blunted by inter-union differences of view and by 
the willingness of workers to work at piece rates in spite of the hostility of their 
unions. He cites an estimate by Foenander that by 1937 as many as 20 per 
cent of all jobs were on piece rates (Hagan 1981, p. 85).
7.5 female employment
I have commented in Chapter 6 on the limited extent of award coverage of 
female workers and the confined range of cases in which the terms of women’s 
employment were an issue. In the later 1920s, too, there were few cases in 
which the Court specifically considered award terms for females.
In 1926, Webb gave a decision about hotels, in the course of which 
he set rates for barmen and barmaids (Liquor Trades case 24 CAR 309). The 
15  See Hagan (1981), p. 84. Hagan attributes the early survival of the Australian Council of 
Trade Unions (ACTU), founded in 1927, to its role in organising resistance to piecework.
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comments below are based on the section of his decision that deals with 
Victoria. The union had quoted a passage from Higgins’ A New Province for 
Law and Order:
But in an occupation in which men as well as women are employed, the 
minimum is based on a man’s cost of living. If the occupation is that 
of a blacksmith, the minimum is a man’s minimum; if the occupation 
is that of a milliner, the minimum is that of a woman’s minimum; if 
the occupation is that of fruitpicking, as both men and women are 
employed, the minimum must be a man’s minimum. (decision, p. 313)
Webb refused to apply this reasoning to the case before him:
No one could have a higher respect for the work done by Mr Justice 
Higgins than I have, but I am unable to accept the principle as applicable 
to this industry … The fact is that this is an industry where, from time 
immemorial, men have been employed on a man’s wage and women 
have been employed on a woman’s wage, and it is one of several in 
which a similar state of affairs exist, and must exist. I call to mind all 
kinds of domestic service, clerical work, work in shops, and so on where 
men are employed on a man’s wage and women are employed on a 
woman’s wage, and where, in my opinion, they must continue to be so 
employed. (p. 313)
He could understand the award of an equal basic wage for an industry ‘where 
it is desired to push women out of employment’—an objective disclaimed in 
this case.
Webb was correct in identifying the failure of the Fruitpickers’ principle 
to recognise the realities of mixed industries. Unequal basic wages did not 
necessarily cause industries or occupations to become all-female (though 
this may have been close to the truth in the clothing trades). The inputs of 
men and women may not have been fully substitutable. Just as custom and 
expectations may have reserved some work in banking and insurance for men, 
likewise in hotels there were (and probably still are) subtly different roles for 
barmen and barmaids.
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Differential basic wages would continue. In fixing margins, Webb said:
There has been considerable evidence called to show the nature of the 
work done by barmen. The existing margin is 2s 6d per week, and an 
increase is sought. I cannot see that there is any skill in a barman’s work. 
There is some responsibility, but I do not think I should increase the 
present margin. (p. 312)
Turning to barmaids, he said:
It must at once be conceded that a barmaid should not be on the base. 
A barmaid is a capable business woman who attracts custom by her 
personality and ability. It is essential for her work that she should spend 
money on clothes. She must be well dressed. In the previous case, I fixed 
the rate at £3 3s, when the woman’s base was £2 4s 6d; but I did not 
have all the conditions of the industry under review then, as I now have. 
I have decided to fix the wage at £1 above the basic wage. (pp. 313–314)
We might have expected some explanation as to why the barmaid deserved a 
margin of £1—a high margin when compared with the prevalent tradesman’s 
margin of 24s—while the barman got only 2s 6d. There is none, unless it is 
implied in the remarks about the barmaid’s personality, ability, and clothing.
In the Printing Industry case of 1927 (25 CAR 1265), the Full Court 
gave specific attention to the working hours of women. Dethridge explained 
that outside printing proper—in cardboard boxes, paper bags, bookbinding 
and stationery—most of the employees were female, some as young as 15. Dr 
Ethel Osborne gave evidence of an investigation of the health of the female 
workers in the industry in Victoria, and suggested that there were serious 
problems of fatigue. ‘I am disposed’, said Dethridge,
to rely on Dr Osborne’s conclusions as substantially correct. Moreover, 
it has to be remembered that women operatives have usually to bear the 
burden, not only of their factory work, but also of some home duties 
which the mode of living of our community imposes on them. I have 
little doubt that in the case of women employed in this industry the 
introduction of a shorter working week will tend to improve their health 
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and increase their vigour, so that ultimately there will be no appreciable 
falling off in their output as the result of the reduction of hours. (p. 
1274)
Even Lukin, who dissented from the award of 44 hours for males in the printing 
case, joined with Dethridge in favour of the 44-hour week for females. Beeby 
would have set the female working week at 42 hours. In the Coach-makers’ and 
Motor Body Builders’ case (28 CAR 411), decided in December 1929, the Full 
Court approved a 44-hour week for females, though refusing it for males.
In the 1928 Clothing Trades case (26 CAR 76), the union claimed a 
minimum wage for females of £5 and tendered budgets in support of the 
claim. Drake-Brockman said that he had carefully analysed the budgets. The 
claim included 19s 6d for dependants. ‘I see no reason’, said Drake-Brockman, 
‘to depart from the accepted principle of this Court that a basic wage for 
women should be fixed for a single woman without dependants’ (p. 89). He 
set a female basic wage of £2 9s 6d, to be adjusted proportionally with the 
male rate.
Dethridge, in January 1930, reviewed the female rates in the dried and 
canned fruits industries (Dried Fruit case 28 CAR 597, 609–610).16 Referring 
to Higgins’ Fruitpickers’ decision, he said:
Mr Justice Higgins, assuming that fruit harvesting was essentially 
a man’s occupation and that women who entered it would compete 
unfairly with men unless they were paid men’s rates, prescribed men’s 
rates for them. So far as the picking of grapes is concerned, I find it hard 
to agree with him; women have always been engaged in this part of the 
work to a very large extent, and it may be said that that it is as much 
women’s work as men’s work … the picking of stone fruit is almost all 
done by men. I do not think I should continue the male rate for female 
workers, but should to some extent observe the distinction between 
male and female rates according to the general practice of this Court 
and of the community. (p. 609)
16  This case is discussed in Subsection 7.1.2 in connection with the setting of the basic wage.
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Observing that the minimum rate for women was ordinarily about 54 per cent 
of the male rate, but was in some awards 60 per cent, Dethridge said that in 
fruit picking (though not in canneries) the difficulty of getting accommodation 
and maintenance warranted a higher rate, and he set a ratio of two-thirds. 
Dethridge accepted that in grape-picking, though not in other branches of 
the work, women did work of equal value to that of males. The same might 
be said of juniors.
But it would not be for the benefit of the industry or of the community 
to give the adult basic wage to either females or juniors. The adult 
basic wage is given not because it is a wage which the market value of 
the product of an industry justifies, but because for several reasons an 
adult male’s wage should not fall below that amount—he is assumed to 
have certain responsibilities which make that wage necessary. The same 
reasoning does not apply to females or juveniles—the wage for them has 
to be fixed, having regard to their individual requirements and also to 
economic results. (p. 610)
7.6 conclusIon
In these pre-Depression years, the principal matter of contention was working 
hours, reflecting the adoption of the 44-hour week in some States and the 
Court’s limited and tentative approval of 44 hours in 1927. The momentum 
for reduction of hours that might have been generated by the 1927 decision 
was countered, however, by the Court’s growing concern about deterioration 
in the condition of industries. In other areas, there was little or no advance in 
standards and numerous expressions of concern about the capacity of employers 
to maintain existing award conditions. The Timber Workers’ cases signified the 
preparedness of the Court to retreat to lower standards than had previously 
been accepted. From labour’s perspective, the decade ended dismally.
In the United States and the United Kingdom, the late 1920s were 
the period when the doctrine of ‘high wages’ commanded some support (for 
example, Rowe 1928 and Cole 1928). The idea was that high wages would 
yield economic benefits in three ways:
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•	 Workers would be motivated to greater effort.
•	 Employers would be induced to implement measures to raise 
productivity.
•	 The high wages would constitute the purchasing power 
needed to absorb increased production.
Thus Cole (1928) wrote:
The American employer pays more because he cannot get men to work 
at the pace he wants except by doing so. But, when he has paid his high 
wage in return for high output, he comes to realise that the high wage is 
itself the means through which the high output finds a market. This is 
concealed from the British employer, both because he is not subject to 
conditions which compel him to pay a high wage, and because his eyes 
are on the foreign more than on the home market. The ‘economy’ of 
high wages, therefore, has not hitherto appealed to his imagination. He 
still tries to cut his costs of production mainly, not by increasing output, 
but by reducing wage-rates and piece-work prices. He has still to realise 
that high output will not help him unless the workers’ wages are high 
enough to enable them to buy it. (p. xii)
Although union advocates and some of the judges were aware of the work 
of Cole and others, the high-wages doctrine had little purchase in Australia. 
The emphasis in contemporary debate was very much on wages as a cost. 
As the economic situation deteriorated, the predominant issue was whether 
industries could ‘afford’ existing wages and conditions. Any suggestion that 
higher labour standards could be of benefit to them would have received short 
shrift.
Wage POLICY IN DePRessION
aND ReCOVeRY 1929–1939

The Depression of the 1930s was, for many reasons, a decisive episode in 
Australian history. Not the least of those reasons was the Commonwealth 
Arbitration Court’s adoption of a wage policy directed toward a macroeconomic 
outcome. Ironically, the Court was in a position to attempt this role only 
because the election in 1929 of a Labor Government, which opposed the Court’s 
strategy of wage reduction, had averted its extinction. Its efforts to counter the 
economic effects of the Depression are the major focus of chapters 9 and 10, 
without neglecting such other developments as there were in the evolution of 
wage policy. Chapters 11 and 12 then move to the period of recovery, in which 
there was an understandably more relaxed approach to wages and conditions. 
In one important case—the basic wage inquiry of 1937—the Court’s decision 
was again shaped, in part at least, by a macroeconomic strategy, the converse 
of that of the Depression years.
8.1 the court
The four judges appointed to the Court in 1926 and 1927 remained in office 
throughout most of the 1930s. In Lukin’s case, this was a formality. He was 
appointed to the Bankruptcy Court and ceased his active membership of 
the Arbitration Court in May 1930. This left Dethridge, Beeby, and Drake-
Brockman to hear the major cases of the Depression years. A new judge, H B 
The setting
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Piper, was appointed in February 1938.1 Dethridge died in December 1938. 
Beeby was appointed Chief Justice in March 1939. At the same time, Thomas 
O’Mara became a judge of the Court.2
The Labor Government, elected in 1929, introduced new industrial 
legislation in 1930 (Foenander 1937, Chapter IV). This legislation was 
amended somewhat to secure its passage through the Senate, where the 
Opposition had a majority. The 1928 provision about the Court’s taking 
account of economic factors, which had been strenuously opposed by Labor, 
was repealed. Existing provisions for conciliation were strengthened. The Act 
provided for the appointment of Conciliation Committees, to be presided 
over by a Conciliation Commissioner. Beeby and Drake-Brockman explained 
the effect:
Once a Committee has been so appointed, the Court’s jurisdiction as 
to ‘all matters in dispute’ is suspended until, on failure of a Committee 
to come to an agreement, a Conciliation Commissioner makes an 
award or order. If an agreement is arrived at, even on the basic wage 
and standard hours of employment, the dispute or application to vary 
is finally determined. If an award or order is made by a Commissioner, 
it cannot vary standard hours or the basic wage, and is subject to review 
by the Court on appeal. (29 CAR 436, 443)
The Government appointed E H Coneybeer to be a Conciliation 
Commissioner, able to preside over Conciliation Committees.3 In December 
1930 the High Court declared invalid the provisions relating to Conciliation 
Committees.4 Coneybeer thereafter played a minor role in the proceedings of 
the Court.
1  Piper was an Adelaide solicitor. 
2  O’Mara was an industrial lawyer from New South Wales, working mainly for employers.
3  Coneybeer had been Deputy Industrial Registrar in Adelaide. He resigned as Conciliation 
Commissioner in May 1935.
4  Australian Railways’ Union v Victorian Railways Commissioners (1930) 44 CLR 319. One 
ground of the decision was that determination of matters by committee did not constitute 
arbitration and was not authorised by section 51(xxxv) of the Constitution.
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A decision of the High Court in 1935 allowed the logs of claims served 
by unions to include demands affecting employees who were not union 
members.5 Hitherto, non-members either were covered by State awards 
and determinations or were award-free. Though it would take time for the 
consequences of this decision to work through the awards, it permitted an 
important expansion of the Arbitration Court’s coverage of the workforce.6
In the later 1930s, on the other hand, the Court of its own volition 
showed some reluctance to regulate areas of employment which could be 
regulated by State authorities. Beeby, dealing with the Metal Trades award in 
August 1937, said that the Federated Ironworkers’ Association had sought the 
inclusion in the award of classifications and margins for employees working 
in steel tube and pipe making. He had come to the conclusion, however, that 
the Broken Hill Proprietary Co Ltd and its subsidiaries should be dealt with 
by the one tribunal: ‘It would be better, I think, in the interests of all parties, 
that I should clear the deck so that the State tribunal, which is dealing with all 
the other branches of the metal trades in Newcastle, should also deal with this’ 
(Variation—Metal Trades’ Awards 38 CAR 328, 331).
The Court also reflected on its jurisdiction in 1938, when meat-industry 
unions sought the cancellation of awards for butchers’ shops. The Full Court 
stated its opinion that ‘the relations of employers and employees in retail 
butchers shops are not suitable for regulation by this Court and should have 
been left to State industrial tribunals’. But the Court had, since 1916, regulated 
the shops in Victoria and South Australia and, since 1932, those in New 
South Wales and Queensland and this history would be difficult to reverse. 
Cancellation of the awards was opposed by the employers. Their objection was 
no doubt due to a fear that they would fare worse under State awards; and the 
5  Long v Chubbs Australian Co Ltd (1935) 53 CLR 143.
6  Beeby, referring to the High Court decision, said: ‘Freedom to employ non-unionists 
on conditions different from those prescribed for unionists leads to discrimination against 
unionists and is frequently a source of bitter dispute. Wherever the ambit of a dispute is wide 
enough both unionists and non-unionists should be bound’ (Variation—Metal Trades’ Award 
35 CAR 756, 758).
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union admitted that its main motive for seeking the termination of the awards 
was the likelihood of getting better outcomes, especially in respect of hours, 
from the State tribunals. When the Court made the awards, it had, ‘in effect, 
promised those concerned in the industry that it would continue to officiate 
as code maker unless substantially all of them desired it to discontinue’. To 
cancel the awards ‘would savour of repudiation by the Court’. The application 
was refused (Determination—Meat Industry Awards 39 CAR 270, 271–272).
The Court’s authority was challenged, to a degree which cannot 
accurately be measured, by the bypassing of its awards. In the Depression 
period, this took the form of underpayments. I refer in Subsection 10.6.1 of 
Chapter 10 to a statement made to the Court by an employer representative 
about award evasion and avoidance in the building industry. W R McLaurin 
visited Australia in 1934–35 from Harvard University. (He subsequently 
worked at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.) Presumably, he was 
influenced by comments that he had heard in Australia or in subsequent 
correspondence when he wrote in 1938:
The evasion of wage awards also tended to bring down the general 
level slightly more than the declared figure. One method was for the 
employee to supply a few materials with his work and make a contract 
for a fixed sum for a particular job; this procedure took him out of the 
jurisdiction of the arbitration court. Some employers violated award 
rates by making secret arrangements with their employees for a lower 
wage; but this practice was stamped out wherever possible. Employers’ 
associations not infrequently made private investigations of companies 
suspected of undercutting awards, and if undercutting was proved, steps 
were taken to stop it. Trade unions, too, made it a practice to prosecute 
all such cases that came to their attention … If violation was proved, 
the employer was liable for the full payment of back wages and a fine as 
well. There were cases in which workmen appealed to employers to give 
them odd jobs for a few shillings a week, and, after they had worked 
at these odd jobs for some time, applied to the arbitration court for 
back wages at the full rate. … As a result of all these measures, while 
there was some violation, it was not very extensive and was confined for 
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the most part to small companies and individual employers. (McLaurin 
1938, p. 74)
In the later 1930s, by contrast, the challenge to awards came from 
payment of wages above the ordinary award standards. Some unions could 
extract wage increases and other benefits by action ‘on the ground’—an 
indication of the improved economic climate. In 1937, over-award payments 
of 3s to metal tradesmen were widespread.7 Beeby, in October 1937, referred 
to an industry allowance of 3s in the gas industry conceded in response to a 
strike organised by the Boilermakers’ Society (Variation—Metal Trades’ Awards 
38 CAR 440).8 In January 1938, he decided to deregister the Amalgamated 
Engineering Union and the Australasian Society of Engineers for striking to 
gain over-award payments. ‘Mr Mundy’, he said
urged that many employers are paying above award wage rates and that 
the union was justified in its efforts to compel others whose conditions 
were equally prosperous to do the same. He disregards the fact that while 
some groups can always command higher rates the rank and file—by far 
the greater proportion of members—have the advantage of standardised 
rates which many of them could not command in an unregulated market. 
All the Court can do is to fix minimum standards to apply to employers 
prosperous or struggling and to employees of differing efficiency leaving 
the securing of higher standards to individual bargaining. Unions not 
accepting this interpretation of the Court’s powers cannot expect to 
maintain the corporate rights conferred by registration. (Cancellation of 
Registration—Amalgamated Engineering Union, Australian Section, and 
Australasian Society of Engineers 39 CAR 7, 9)
In addition to responding to union pressure, some employers no doubt 
paid above the awards simply to ‘meet the market’. 
7  In 1941 O’Mara said that he had been ‘under the impression that all members of the Metal 
Trades Employers Association were parties to an agreement made in 1937 to pay 3s per week 
above the award rates. On speaking to the minutes … [the representative of the Association] 
demurred to this … and it now appears that not all his members were parties to the 1937 
agreement’ (Judgment—Foundry Employees, NSW (War-Time) 44 CAR 215, 216).
8  Because it became part of a formal agreement, this would have entered into the nominal 
wage data. Increases granted informally by employers did not enter the data.
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The area of work with the most egregious variance from normal standards 
was probably local government, where the Municipal Officers Association 
was the relevant ‘white-collar’ union and registered agreements prevailed. In 
some—but by no means all—instances, local government employers extended 
their generosity to the manual grades (represented by the Municipal Employees 
Federation). An example is the consent variation of the Municipal Employees’ 
Agreement (Collingwood City Council), made by Beeby in September 1939 (40 
CAR 604). This provided a labourer’s wage of £5 when the Court’s basic wage 
was below £4; tar gang labourers received £5 12s and a classification called 
‘maintenance’ £6 18s. These rates were for a 40-hour week.
8.2 economIc actIvIty
Figure 8.1 shows the alternative measures of the real GDP computed by 
Butlin and Haig.9 It should be remembered that the real GDP measures the 
level of economic activity within the country, but not the real income of the 
community. An important reason for divergence between the GDP and the 
Gross National Income (GNI) is the terms of trade, which reflect the quantity 
of imports that can be bought from the proceeds of a given quantity of exports. 
The GDP, if accurately measured, is the appropriate measure of internal 
productive activity. Both the Butlin and the Haig series show a substantial 
reduction—more pronounced if Haig’s measure is preferred—between 1929–
30 and 1930–31. By comparison with 1929–30, the fall amounted to 8.4 
per cent (Butlin) or 14.3 per cent (Haig). These estimates of the reduction of 
activity, especially Butlin’s, are surprisingly low if we have regard to the rise in 
unemployment (discussed below) and the general contemporary perception of 
the severity of the Depression. Recovery began in 1931–32 (Haig) or 1932–
33 (Butlin) and continued until 1937–38. Haig’s estimates point to a stronger 
recovery than do Butlin’s. In the last pre-World War II year, there was either a 
levelling-off (Haig) or a fall (Butlin) in the real GDP. Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1 
shows that, on either set of estimates, the growth of the real GDP between the 
9  To facilitate comparison, each set of measures is converted to a base of 100 in 1928–29.
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trough and the peak of the 1930s far exceeded the growth of the working-age 
population.
The production levels of the major components of the GDP, calculated 
from Butlin’s and Haig’s estimates, are shown in figures 8.2 and 8.2A, 
respectively. Neither set of estimates points to any fall in the real output of the 
rural sector. It seems likely that graziers and farmers attempted (unsuccessfully) 
to sustain their incomes by increased production. Reductions in production 
were pronounced in the service industries (including distribution), 
manufacturing, and construction. These reductions can safely be ascribed to 
the fall in aggregate demand caused by the collapse of export prices and the 
cessation of foreign borrowing.
Figure 8.1
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Unemployment, as indicated by the trade union returns, is shown in 
Figure 8.3.10 Nationally, the unemployment percentage peaked at 30 in the 
second quarter of 1932. It fell to a minimum of 8 in the first quarter of 1938 
and then increased to 10.2 by the second quarter of 1939. The unemployment 
record is consistent with the GDP estimates, which suggest that the recovery 
from the Depression stalled in 1937–38. Figure 8.3 indicates that in the 
main part of the Depression, the severest unemployment was experienced in 
South Australia (where the percentage reached 35.4). South Australia’s relative 
position improved markedly in the later 1930s. In Queensland, seemingly the 
10  Some scholars have constructed unemployment series by treating census and related data 
as benchmarks and using the trade union statistics to interpolate and extrapolate (Forster 
1985). We remain reliant, however, on the trade union data to show the quarter-by-quarter 
changes of unemployment over time. There is no evidence that they are misleading for this 
purpose. The ‘dip’ in the Tasmanian percentage in the last quarter of 1929 (to 7.5) must surely 
be a mistake. The Labour Report offered no comment on this surprising number.
Figure 8.2
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State least affected by the Depression, the unemployment peak was 19.9 per 
cent.11 New South Wales generally recorded unemployment percentages above 
the national average.11
11  In the hearing for the 1934 basic wage case, one of the employer representatives (Mann) 
said that a reason for measured unemployment being low in Queensland was that sustenance 
workers were required to join unions, which counted them as employed, whereas in other States 
sustenance workers were counted as unemployed (transcript, pp. 429–430). The credence that 
should be given to this unverified assertion is unclear. Queensland was a substantial beneficiary 
of a scheme to assist the sugar industry. The scheme entailed a prohibition of imports of 
sugar, a subsidy for home production, and export bounties. Coleman, Cornish, and Hagger 
(2006, p. 137) calculate the budgetary cost of the scheme in 1931 as £8.7 million, which they 
contrast with £600,000 spent on capital works in schools and £150,000 public expenditure 
on housing in 1930–31. From time to time, Queensland’s favourable economic experience 
was cited in arguments before the Court. The judges often responded by mentioning the 
sugar scheme and a kindred scheme for dairying. In August 1937, Beeby said: ‘Queensland 
industrial tribunals in most industries have awarded substantially higher industrial standards 
than those of other States. Apparently, with the advantage of the sugar subsidy, the State is 
able to carry higher wage costs in the general run of industry and in operations not subject 
Figure 8.2A
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8.3 the depressIon and the recovery
It is not my intention, of course, to offer a general history of the Depression.12 
But the Court’s decisions and their possible effects cannot be understood 
without reference to their economic context.12
The later 1920s were not a good period for Australia. Business experienced 
growing pressure on profit margins; unemployment was rising; many farmers 
could not extract decent livings from their properties; governments (federal 
and State) encountered difficulties in raising loans and servicing their existing 
to competition with southern States.’ Beeby went on to observe that manufacturing had 
not developed in Queensland as it had in the Commonwealth as a whole (Variation—Metal 
Trades’ Awards 38 CAR 328, 340).
12  Several histories of the Depression were written in the 1930s, including Copland (1934) 
and Walker (1933). See also Reddaway (1938). The principal studies from a later perspective 
are Schedvin (1970), which was the subject of a review article by Hancock (1972); and 
Gregory and Butlin (1988).
Figure 8.3
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debts; and railway finances—critical to State budgets—were in a dire state. 
The available data show deterioration in the general economic position. 
Unemployment among trade union members, which averaged 7.0 per cent 
in 1927, was 11.1 per cent in 1929, and in the last quarter of that year was 
13.1 per cent. We saw in the previous chapter that after 1926 the Court, 
responding to adverse economic news, became increasingly resistant to union 
claims; and the restoration of the 48-hour week in the timber industry was in 
keeping with its perception of a need for severe restraint. Notwithstanding the 
Court’s caution, there was (as we shall see in Chapter 13) an influential body 
of opinion which held that the arbitration system had raised too high the cost 
of labour.
Australia slid into full depression during 1930. The Depression was 
an imported disease, caused by drastic reductions in the prices realised by 
Australia’s principal exports and a virtual cessation of foreign lending to 
Australian governments.13 Though part of a world phenomenon, Australia’s 
depression had local characteristics. Prices of wool and wheat, the principal 
exports, fell more than those of most other commodities and considerably 
further than those of the bulk of Australian imports. The adverse movement 
in the terms of trade implied a loss in real income (even without reductions in 
domestic activity) of the order of 9 per cent between 1929 and 1932 (Gregory 
1988, p. 10). The economic impact was much greater than this, however, 
because of the reduced spending power of the exporters. Elimination of 
foreign lending led to the curtailment of expenditure on public works, which 
had been running at high levels in the 1920s. Moreover, governments had 
serious difficulties in finding the means to service existing debt at a time when 
their revenues were depleted by the reduced yield of their taxes.
We can conjecture a scenario in which economic activity in Australia 
carried on as before, with the adverse effects of the external shocks producing 
13  Even in the absence of these two effects, the Wall Street collapse would have had real effects 
in Australia due to the fall in the local equities market and the associated loss of confidence. 
This aspect of the Depression was little discussed at the time and has been neglected in most 
of the subsequent literature.
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merely a reduction in real incomes. Australian economists attempted to 
devise and promote policies that, recognising the reality of the ‘primary’ 
income-depressing effects, would minimise ‘secondary’ effects, including 
unemployment. In the hypothetical world where only the primary effects 
operated, the real GDP (measuring the total product of domestic industry) 
would be constant except in response to factors unrelated to the Depression, 
such as changes in the labour force, productivity, and the seasons. The real 
national income (measuring the community’s command over goods and 
services) would fall, but only because of the adverse movement in the terms of 
trade. This is not what happened. A rough indicator of the secondary effects is 
the growth of unemployment between 1929 and 1932.
In thinking about the policy responses,14 we should be conscious that 
at the outset of the Depression there was virtually no economic bureaucracy 
in Australia (Hancock 2004).15 Indeed, the tertiary training of economists 
really began in the 1920s, so that the possibilities of nurturing in-house 
advice were slender. Governments, therefore, were ill-equipped to deal with a 
challenge of great severity and complexity. The consequences of administrative 
inadequacy were exacerbated by political divisions—themselves partly 
due to the Depression—that rendered some governments (including the 
Commonwealth Labor Government in 1930 and 1931) ineffectual. There 
was, in fact, a policy vacuum. Into it stepped several players. One was the 
14  For a comprehensive account, see Schedvin (1970).
15  Coleman, Cornish and Hagger (2006, p. 160) point out that there was a general lack 
of administrative expertise in the federal public service attributable in part to recruitment 
policies that entrenched the engagement of youths and militated against the employment 
of graduates. (W K Hancock had commented on this in 1930: see Chapter 13). They also 
recount (pp. 73–79) the failed experiment of the Economic Research Act 1929. This was passed 
by the Commonwealth Parliament during the tenure of the Bruce Government. Bruce was 
influenced by the economists who had participated in the recent inquiry into the Australian 
tariff. The Act provided for the constitution of a Bureau of Economic Research, with a highly 
paid Director. It was opposed by the Labor Opposition, largely because of an expectation that 
the Bureau would advise against the protectionist policies then favoured by Labor, but also 
because of a broader antagonism to professional economists. The Bureau had not been created 
by the time of the fall of the Bruce Government, and the Act remained dormant on the statute 
book until its repeal in 1950.
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Court, to which we return in later chapters. Another was the banks, whose 
influence over the exchange rate and the funding of government deficits was 
a source of considerable power (Schedvin 1970). Yet another was a small 
band of economists who proffered influential—even determinative—advice 
(Coleman, Cornish and Hagger 2006).
The recommendations of the economists were much influenced by the 
distinction between primary and secondary effects (Cain 1985, 1987a, 1987b; 
Hancock 2004; Coleman, Cornish and Hagger 2006). Its significance was 
underscored by L F Giblin’s ‘discovery’ of the foreign trade multiplier, which 
described a sequence of reductions in domestic spending in response to an 
initial fall in export proceeds.16 I discuss this matter in greater depth in Chapter 
13. But the lesson drawn from the reasoning about primary and secondary 
effects was that anti-depression policy should achieve an equal proportional 
spreading of the initial loss across the entire community. Everyone would 
be worse off, because exports would finance fewer imports. But otherwise, 
life could continue as before. ‘Equality of sacrifice’ became the formula for 
limiting the effects of the external shocks. One method of pursuing it was to 
depreciate the Australian currency, so that exporters received more for their 
produce and the rest of the community had their real incomes lowered by 
increases in the prices of traded commodities. Exchange rate depreciations 
occurred in 1930 and 1931, largely through the actions of the banks.17 
Another method was reduction of domestic incomes and prices, which would 
enhance the purchasing power of the exporters. Here, wage policy was the 
main weapon, although steps were taken to reduce other incomes such as 
interest on government debt. During 1930, economists—Giblin, Copland, 
Brigden, Melville, Shann, Mills and Wood—advocated wage reduction.18 As 
16  Coleman, Cornish, and Hagger (2006, pp. 85–90) offer suggestions as to how the idea of 
the multiplier entered Giblin’s thinking.
17  But this was in the face of opposition from the Commonwealth Bank, the nascent central 
bank.
18  Brigden’s Escape to Prosperity, published in May 1930, articles by Copland in The Argus, 
published in June, and Giblin’s ‘Letters to John Smith’, published in the Melbourne Herald in 
July, attempted to promote public acceptance of the necessity for wage reductions (Coleman, 
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we see in the next chapter, it was Copland who presented the argument to the 
Arbitration Court.
Alongside the quest for equality of sacrifice was a debate about the 
role of government in ameliorating the effects of the Depression. On the one 
hand, it might be supposed that an expansion of spending and a reduction of 
taxes would reduce the secondary effects of the external factors. On the other, 
conservative thought saw the existing budget deficits as a threat to the stability 
of the currency—a fear due in part to the German inflation of 1923—and 
to the prospects of a revival of government borrowing abroad; measures that 
would increase the deficits could only intensify these risks.19
Another anti-depression strategy was promotion of import replacement. 
Depreciation of the exchange rate contributed to it, but the main measure was 
a greatly increased protective tariff. This came into effect in 1930, and was 
the one area of economic policy in which the Labor Government was able to 
act decisively. There is no doubt that it did encourage import replacement—a 
process that became more important once economic recovery was under way. 
By raising exporters’ costs, however, it militated somewhat against equality of 
sacrifice.
The principal attempts at coherent policy were the ‘Premiers’ Plan’ of 
June 1931 and subsequent adjustments to it, though aspects of the Plan were 
already in effect because of the actions of the Court and the trading banks. In 
constructing the Plan, the non-government economists—Copland, Giblin, 
Dyason, Brigden, and Shann—had a major part. There was a combination of 
strategies. Wage reduction and exchange rate depreciation were parts of it. But 
there was a broad acceptance of the conservative view about public finance. 
State governments did spend modest amounts on the relief of the unemployed 
(funded in part by taxes on the employed). Generally, however, they tried to 
rein in their expenditures and increased their taxes so as to minimise their 
Cornish and Hagger 2006, pp. 111–112; 133–138).
19  The conservative view was strongly supported by Sir Otto Niemeyer and Sir T E 
Gregory, the two experts sent by the Bank of England in 1930 to advise the Commonwealth 
Government.
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deficits. In New South Wales, the adoption of conservative policies followed 
the dismissal of the Premier, J T Lang, in May 1931.
It is self-evident that policy failed to avert secondary effects of the external 
shocks. To hope that there would be no such effects was plainly unrealistic, 
for the external forces entailed structural changes that could not have been 
painless. Were the policies actually adopted ill-conceived? Did they add to or 
reduce the secondary effects? And by how much? These questions are difficult 
to answer. The aspects of policy that, from today’s perspective, seem hostile to 
a better outcome were the endeavour to reduce government spending and the 
related fear of ‘inflation’ (at a time when prices were tumbling). ‘Spreading the 
sacrifice’, however, was an objective that made sense. Its rationale, over and 
beyond issues of equity, was to avert the collapse of an export sector on which 
the rest of the economy was heavily reliant. Implicit in the strategy was a hope 
that export prices would revive. The alternative strategy of autarky (followed 
to a degree with the tariff increases) might eventually allow recovery in the 
level of economic activity (though not in the level of real income), but would 
have entailed severe shorter-term pains of adjustment.
There is a range of interpretations of the recovery. The concept of a 
business cycle suggests that it was a ‘natural’ phenomenon, to be expected 
as the aftermath of any slump. This may well be a correct perspective of the 
worldwide economic experience. Australia’s experience of the business cycle 
was, of course, much influenced by its working-out in the rest of the world. 
The Depression in Australia is attributable mainly to the collapse of the 
markets for its primary exports and the cessation of foreign loans, the effects 
of these external shocks being exacerbated by errors of policy. Recovery abroad 
was likely to induce recovery in Australia, with a revival of demand for its 
exports. Butlin’s (1962, p. 456) estimates of prices for the main components 
of the GDP show pastoral prices falling by 50 per cent between 1928–29 and 
1931–32. Over the same period, agricultural prices fell by 31 per cent, dairying 
prices by 30 per cent and manufacturing prices by 14 per cent. In 1938–39, 
pastoral prices were 27 per cent below the 1928–29 level, having been only 3 
per cent lower in 1936–37; agricultural prices were 2 per cent higher, dairying 
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prices 16 per cent lower and manufacturing prices 1 per cent higher. These 
percentages are indicative of strong macroeconomic and structural forces. The 
rise of wool prices between 1931–32 and 1936–37 contributed to the general 
recovery, and their subsequent fall probably explains much of the deterioration 
that occurred in 1938 and 1939.
Is the recovery in Australia better understood as a simple reversal of the 
earlier decline, or as a process of structural change? No one denies that both 
forces were at work, but there is an issue of emphasis. Schedvin (1970, pp. 
10–11) argues for the role of import-replacement, in the form of expanded 
manufacturing, as a driver of recovery—a process facilitated by higher tariffs. 
Gregory (1988, p. 26), on the other hand, disputes Schedvin’s perspective and 
accords greater weight to rural revival.20 Both Butlin’s and Haig’s estimates 
of real product in the major sectors of the economy (discussed in the 
previous section) show that growth was concentrated in domestic sectors—
manufacturing, distribution, and services. That fact, however, does not refute 
the interpretation which depicts domestic expansion as the consequence 
of recovery in the export industries. The Depression had suppressed forces 
for growth and structural change inherent in an array of technological 
developments (Merrett and Ville 2011). External recovery removed the brake 
on these forces.
Depression and recovery entail, of course, decreases and increases in 
various components of expenditure. We do not have the data necessary for 
a comprehensive analysis of the components of expenditure. An important 
component, however, is investment, which is a volatile category of expenditure. 
Its fluctuations tend to exceed, in proportional terms, those of the general 
economy; they may be a prime cause of the general cycle; and they magnify 
the effects of other causes. Both cause and effect were at work in the 1930s and 
it is difficult to separate them. Investment outlays were affected by inflow of 
foreign capital, domestic monetary conditions, and the flow of opportunities 
20  The two views come closer together when timing is taken into account. Schedvin accords 
greater weight to rural revival in the early years of the recovery; and Gregory acknowledges the 
role of manufacturing growth in later years.
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offered by movements in overall economic activity. Butlin (1962) estimated 
the amounts of gross domestic capital formation. These amounts are not 
adjusted for price changes; but they can be expressed as proportions of the 
GDP. Figure 8.4 shows public, private, and total investment as percentages 
of the GDP between 1928–29 and 1938–39. It appears that both public and 
private investment fell heavily between 1928–29 and 1931–32. Recovery 
in private investment began in 1932–33; that of public investment was 
delayed by a further two years. By the end of the decade, private investment 
had more than regained its pre-Depression relativity to the GDP, but public 
investment had not done so. The decline in public—relative to private—
investment is likely to have been a consequence of the fall in foreign lending 
to Australian governments, imposed initially by unavailability of loans and 
later by a preference to avoid the level of indebtedness that marked the late 
Figure 8.4
Source: Butlin (1962), pp. 11 and 17.
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1920s. Overall, the expectation that the volatility of investment would both 
exacerbate the decline into depression and facilitate the recovery seems to be 
confirmed.
Wages policy in the later 1930s was made in an economic context of 
significant, but incomplete, recovery. Important contributors to the recovery 
were a revival of rural incomes and increased investment. The manufacturing 
sector participated in, but did not lead, the general expansion. Whereas in the 
years of acute depression the Court saw wage reductions as an appropriate 
response to the crisis, the partial recovery created expectations of advances in 
wages and employment conditions with which it had to come to terms. The 
recovery peaked in 1937–38.
8.4 wages, prIces, and workIng hours
8.4.1 Nominal wages
The course of nominal wages over the decade is shown in Figure 8.5. For 
Australia, the lowest average rate was reached in December 1933, when the 
index stood 21 per cent below its level of September 1929. The greater part 
of the reduction occurred between September 1930 and September 1932. 
Clearly, the fall in money wages was a significant feature of the Depression. 
Between the 1932 trough and the end of 1939, the increase was 18.3 per 
cent—on average, 3.3 per cent per year. Even with that increase, money wages 
remained 6.1 per cent below the level reached in the third quarter of 1929. 
The data for the States show that wages fell most in South Australia and least 
in Queensland. In New South Wales, where wages were above the national 
average in the early 1930s, they converged to the average later in the decade. 
Western Australian wages were close to the average in the early 1930s, but in 
later years Western Australia became the highest-wage State.
Table 8.1 shows nominal male wages (expressed as percentages of 
the average) in different industry groups. The percentages are shown for 
September 1929, December 1934, and December 1939, and the industry 
groups are ranked according to their wage levels in 1929. Industry rankings 
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were generally stable, but there was a notable increase in the relative wage in 
mining and a decline in agriculture etc. An a priori expectation is that the 
degree of inequality would have widened between 1929 and 1934 because 
of the fall in the basic wage due to lower prices, with margins being largely 
unchanged in nominal terms. In the next five years, both the basic wage and 
margins were increased, and it is more difficult to make an a priori prediction. 
Regression analysis of the data in Table 8.1 suggests that there was a widening 
of differences between 1929 and 1934 and a narrowing between 1934 and 
1939, with a net growth of inequality over the 10¼ years.21
21  This statement is based on elasticities calculated by fitting regression equations to the 
logarithms of the numbers shown in Table 8.1. An elasticity of 1 implies no change (on 
average) in the degree of inequality; a negative elasticity, a decrease in inequality; and a 
positive elasticity, an increase. The calculated elasticities are: 1929–34, 1.26; 1934–39, 0.88; 
1929–39, 1.08.
Figure 8.5
Source: Labour Report, various numbers.
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8.4.2 Prices
The choice of price index was, as we shall see in Chapter 9, an issue in the 
basic wage cases between 1930–31 and 1933. In this subsection, however, we 
refer only to the ‘All Items’ or the ‘C series’ index. In Figure 8.6, the index is 
reset with a base of 100 for the Australian average in the third quarter of 1929. 
The fall in the all-Australia index between then and the first quarter of 1933 
was 22 per cent. By the end of 1934, the index was still 20 per cent below its 
level in quarter 3 of 1929. Over the next five years the rise in prices reduced 
the fall since 1929 to 10 per cent. Throughout the period, Queensland prices 
were below those of other States; New South Wales prices were above average; 
but Figure 8.6 indicates some convergence during the decade.
Table 8.1 Relative industry wages 1929–39
Note: The industry group names shown in the table are in some cases abbreviations of fuller 
designations.
Source: Labour Report, various numbers.
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8.4.3 Real wages
Figure 8.7 shows the levels of real wages calculated from the nominal wage 
and price data discussed above.22 An important feature of this figure is the rise 
in real wages in the early years of the Depression. At no stage during the years 
1930–34 was the average real wage in Australia below its level at the end of 
1929. In the last quarter of 1930, the average real wage in Australia as a whole 
was 5.6 per cent above its level of the third quarter of 1929. From 1932 to 
1934, there was a gradual reduction, taking it back roughly to the 1929 level. 
In the last quarter of 1939, the real wage, for Australia as a whole, was 4.3 per 
cent higher than in the third quarter of 1929. There was an increase of 4 per 
cent (0.8 per cent per year) between the end of 1934 and the end of 1939, 
22  The timing of the wage and price series is not exactly aligned: the former relate to the end 
of the quarter, whereas the latter represent the quarter as a whole and may be thought of as 
mid-quarter data. Hence there is a ‘gap’ of 6–7 weeks.
Figure 8.6
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concentrated in 1937–38. Of the States, Queensland conspicuously differed 
from the remainder, with real wages above the average by as much as 16.3 per 
cent. A reduction of 9.2 per cent between the end of 1934 and the beginning 
of 1937, however, reduced Queensland’s margin above the national average. 
In the other States, there were diverse experiences. Real wages in New South 
Wales increased by 9.6 per cent between September 1929 and June 1932, but 
then fell by 6.7 per cent in a single quarter. South Australian real wages rose 
by 10.3 per cent over the five quarters to December 1930, but fell by 12.7 
per cent in the next five quarters. The real wage in South Australia remained 
low for the rest of the decade. Western Australian real wages rose strongly 
in the latter part of the decade. Real wages in Victoria and Tasmania were 
consistently below the national average.
Figure 8.7
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8.4.4 The basic wage
Figure 8.8 shows the movement of the Commonwealth basic wage during 
these years. The six-capitals amount fell from 90s 6d in the third quarter of 
1929 to 62s 1d in the first quarter of 1933—a reduction of 31 per cent.23 This 
reduction had two causes: the operation of the automatic adjustment system 
and the 10 per cent reduction imposed by the Court in 1931. Arithmetically, 
the reduction of 28s 5d can be divided into 6s 11d due to the discretionary 
reduction and 21s 6d due to automatic adjustments.24 By the last quarter 
of 1934, the wage had risen to 63s 7d. Among the capital cities, the peak-
23  As was explained in Chapter 1, the quarterly amounts are calculated after taking into 
account the dates of wage adjustments within the quarters.
24  Adding back a 10 per cent reduction to 62s 1d gives 69s, which is 21s 6d less than 90s 6d. 
Of course, the discretionary reduction may well have intensified the fall in prices, and hence 
the amount of the automatic adjustments.
Figure 8.8
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to-trough reductions ranged from 29 per cent in Sydney to 37 per cent in 
Adelaide. In the next five years, the basic wage in the six capitals increased by 
13 shillings—19.7 per cent. Approximately 7 shillings of the increase was due 
to the operation of the automatic adjustment system and about 6 shillings to 
the ‘prosperity loadings’ awarded by the Court in 1937. The concentration 
of the rises in the year 1937 is evident. The figure also shows a degree of 
convergence of the capital city amounts to the six-capitals amount from 1934 
onward, similar to, but more marked than, the convergence of consumer 
prices.
Figure 8.9 shows the movements of the real basic wage during the 
period. The peak-to-trough reduction in the six-capitals values (between the 
last quarter of 1930 and the first quarter of 1932) was 15 per cent. In the 
last quarter of 1934, the six-capitals real basic wage was 8 per cent below the 
Figure 8.9
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level of the third quarter of 1929. Between then and the end of 1939, the 
six-capitals increase was 6.1 per cent, which was wholly accounted for by the 
increase in 1937. At the end of the period, the six-capitals real basic wage was 
still 2.6 per cent below the level of September 1929.
It is apparent that before 1934 there were substantial differences 
between capital cities in the levels of the real basic wage. In 1934, however, 
these differences virtually disappeared, suggesting that the Court’s ‘new start’ 
(discussed in Chapter 10, Subsection 10.6.2) succeeded in equalising real basic 
wage levels. The prosperity loadings granted in 1937 (see Chapter 11, Section 
11.2) were larger in New South Wales, Victoria, and Queensland than in the 
other States, and the unequal movements are apparent in the figure.
Until 1933, the automatic adjustment of the basic wage relied upon a 
price index confined to food, groceries, and rent (47 items). The Court then 
moved to the more comprehensive C series index, which included clothing 
and miscellaneous items as additional categories of spending, having increased 
the basic wage to offset what appeared to be an excessive reduction due to 
reliance on the ‘All Houses’ (A series) index. Figure 8.10 shows that there 
were indeed significant differences between the two indices. In this figure, 
the B series index25 and the C series are compared by expressing the former 
as a percentage of the latter.26 For the six capitals, the ratio fell by 7.1 per 
cent between the third quarter of 1929 and the first quarter of 1933. It is not 
surprising that the Court chose to take corrective action. Thereafter, the ratio 
increased. This meant that the switch to the C series index resulted in smaller 
price-related wage increases than would have occurred if the A series index 
were retained. Wage earners would have had cause for complaint had not the 
Court increased the basic wage when it accepted the C series index as the 
measure of price changes.
25  Differing from the A series because the rent component of the A series index included 
all houses, whereas the B series was confined to four and five-room houses. There is little 
difference between the two indices. The B series is used here because full data are published 
in the Labour Report.
26  Both of the underlying indices are set on a base of six capitals 1923–27 = 1000.
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The foregoing commentary relates only to the federal basic wage. In 
New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia and Western Australia, basic 
or living wages were set by State tribunals. Figure 1.6 in Chapter 1 compares 
the State basic wages in the capital cities with the respective federal basic 
wages. It shows that with the onset of the Depression the State basic wages 
rose sharply, relatively to the federal wage. In Sydney, the State basic wage was 
86 per cent of the federal wage in the first quarter of 1930; by the first quarter 
of 1931 the relativity was 120 per cent. In Brisbane, the percentage rose from 
105 in quarter 1 of 1930 to 127 a year later and 133 in quarter 1 of 1933. 
The State basic wage in Adelaide was 97 per cent of the federal wage in the 
last quarter of 1929 and 117 per cent in the second quarter of 1931. In Perth, 
the State wage was 99 per cent of the federal wage in quarter 2 of 1929 and 
119 per cent in quarter 3 of 1931. These increases in the State relativity were 
due partially to the absence of automatic wage adjustments and partially to 
Figure 8.10
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the Federal Court’s 10 per cent cut of January 1931. They go far to explaining 
the stability of overall real wages in the Depression years. From around 1933 
(earlier in Sydney) the ratios began to fall, as State tribunals made discretionary 
wage cuts and the federal wage was increased in real terms.
8.4.5 Working hours
Figure 8.11 draws upon the Commonwealth Statistician’s data of ‘Nominal 
Hours of Labour (exclusive of overtime) worked by Adult Males during a 
Full Working Week’. As previously explained, these data show only the 
working hours prescribed in awards and registered agreements. They do not, 
for example, reflect variations in time worked as a result of the reduction of 
overtime and the rationing of work during the Depression. Governments 
provided relief work, which was invariably less than the normal working week. 
Figure 8.11
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There are, to my knowledge, no available data about actual working hours in 
these years.
There was virtually no change in average full-week hours between the 
end of 1929 (45.34 hours) and the end of 1934 (45.36 hours).27 There was a 
minor increase in 1930, due to the partial restoration of the 48-hour week in 
New South Wales, reversed in 1931. Nominal weekly hours fell to 44.29 at the 
end of 1939. Figure 8.11 shows that much of the reduction was concentrated 
toward the end of the period. The figure also shows that full-week hours varied 
considerably between the States. Victoria, South Australia, and Tasmania were 
long-hours States; Western Australia was close to the average; and New South 
Wales and Queensland had below-average working weeks. The gap narrowed 
somewhat toward the end of the decade.
Although the statistics of working hours do not distinguish between 
federal and State awards, a rough indication of the relative provisions is 
probably given by comparing Victoria, South Australia, and Tasmania with 
the other States, because the tribunals in the former were more likely to 
adhere to federal standards (and were less constrained by legislation to do 
otherwise). The comparison—see Figure 8.11—suggests that workers under 
federal awards and State awards in Victoria, South Australia, and Tasmania 
had significantly longer working weeks than employees under State awards in 
New South Wales, Queensland, and Western Australia.
27  The data can be found in the Labour Report; for example, in No. 27 (1936), p. 65.
9.1 the InceptIon of depressIon wage polIcy
As discussed in Chapter 7, in the late 1920s judges referred from time to time 
to the need for a fundamental review of the basic wage. Lukin, in particular, 
was exercised by the continuance of Powers’ 3s. Apparently, a general inquiry 
into the basic wage was delayed by the volume of work claiming the Court’s 
attention. In December 1929, Dethridge, in a case before the Full Court, noted 
that the basic wage was not an issue in that case, but touched upon a concern 
to which the Court (and Dethridge in particular) would return in later cases: 
the need to balance the employment-promoting effects of high wages (due to 
the spending of the workers) against their employment-destroying effects (due 
to the costs borne by employers). It was generally recognised, said Dethridge,
that, in order to minimise industrial depression and unemployment, 
purchasing power should be widely distributed, which means in effect 
that as much as possible of the community’s production should be paid 
in wages. With our present means of information, it does not seem 
possible to measure and state the proportion that can, at any one 
moment, be so paid, but obviously the amount of that proportion, 
and therefore of employment, depends nowadays upon the amount of 
the community’s marketable production. The higher that amount the 
higher is the amount of the proportion that can and should be paid 
as wages and the lower is the unemployment, but clearly on the other 
Wage policy and the onset of Depression
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hand the lower that amount the higher becomes the unemployment. 
(Motor Body case 28 CAR 411, 421)
The Metal Industry case (28 CAR 923), which was before Beeby between 
September 1928 and March 1930, led to the creation of sub-tradesman 
classifications reflecting the growth of process work within the engineering 
industry. Dealing with the basic wage in his main decision (December 1929), 
Beeby referred to a jumble of practices in the selection of the appropriate price 
index for setting the wage.1 It was difficult to derive guiding principles from 
past decisions. ‘I have frequently expressed the opinion’, he said, ‘that the whole 
basic wage issue, including the continuation or otherwise of the 3s premium, 
calls for reconsideration by the Full Court.’ He would not disturb existing 
differentials, ‘except to remove the glaring anomaly of a higher basic rate for 
Geelong than for Melbourne’ (p. 966). As to margins, the employers did not 
seriously press their claims for reductions provided that reclassifications were 
granted (as they were); and the unions had not seriously pressed their claims 
for increases. Beeby commented: ‘If the industry since 1926 had displayed the 
buoyancy which characterised it during the preceding years, I would not have 
hesitated to increase margins in some directions in order to restore the ratio 
of allowance for skill of pre-war days’ (p. 967). This was somewhat heretical, 
because the Court since Higgins’ departure had strenuously resisted any appeal 
to pre-war relativities. As to the unions’ claims with respect to holidays, Beeby 
said:
However desirable it may be that manual workers of the community 
should receive the same holiday concessions as the more fortunate 
clerical and professional workers, the Court must consider the effect 
of its award. In the present financial position of the industry the cost 
involved in the granting of such a concession cannot be entertained. (p. 
977)2
1  In fixing a basic wage for Ballarat, for example, the Court might choose the average price 
index for 30 towns, the six-capitals average, the Melbourne index, the five-towns index for 
Victoria, the average index for four towns excluding Melbourne, or the index specific to 
Ballarat.
2  In July 1930, Dethridge refused an application for annual leave in the aerated water 
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Since the reconstitution of the Court in 1926, Beeby had been the Judge 
most generously disposed to union claims. But by the end of 1929 he was 
responding to the mounting evidence of economic decline. In March 1930, 
at the time of finalising his award for the metal trades, he commented on the 
unions’ diagnosis:
Some union advocates contended that the depression is one of the 
recurring cycles to which industry and commerce are accustomed. 
But is it? Can the Court, in the face of existing facts, act on such an 
assumption? Is it not more correct to surmise that the Commonwealth 
must face all-round re-organisation, and must rely much more on its 
own resources and on its capacity for greater and cheaper production? 
Statements that this re-organisation is impossible without profound 
economic changes are for the Legislature. The Court operates within 
the established economic system, and is bound by the Act under which 
it works to give proper consideration to the present economic situation. 
In the honest discharge of this direction, I am forced to repeat, and act 
on my opinion, that in the metal trades group of industries recovery 
to the level of 1924–1925, and further expansion, are only possible by 
reduction of costs of production, to which all factors must contribute. 
It was evident that the unions involved attached very little importance 
to the analysis of the economic position set out in the stated reasons of 
the Court for its proposed award. (pp. 1019–1020)
The basic wage in the dried fruit industry was already well below the 
Harvester equivalent (see Chapter 6, Subsection 6.1.2). When Dethridge set 
a basic wage for dried fruit in January 1930, he substituted 6d for Powers’ 3s. 
He then attempted to compute the Harvester equivalent. In doing so, he made 
a lesser provision for rent than the Statistician’s index implied, arguing that the 
smaller sum more accurately reflected the cost to workers in the industry. On 
the other hand, he made full allowance for the additional cost of other items. 
For the Mildura district, he set a basic wage of £4 4s 6d (28 CAR 597, 608). In 
industry. To grant it would be ‘an innovation in the practice of the Court, which ought not to 
be made in the present state of industrial depression’ (29 CAR 288, 293).
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real terms, this was probably a little above the amount fixed by Webb in 1925, 
but below the standard that was likely to apply if no special consideration were 
given to the industry.
Lukin, in April 1930, inserted a reservation in a new award for 
manufacturing grocers, enabling him to vary the award once the basic wage 
had been reviewed by the Full Court. He believed that the review would shortly 
take place. In previous judgments, he had pointed out ‘how unsatisfactory … 
the judgments and awards of this Court, dealing with the basic wage as laid 
down by the Harvester judgment, have for many years been, both in regard 
to the method of adjusting its monetary equivalent from time to time, and in 
regard to the additional Powers’ 3s (Manufacturing Grocers’ case 29 CAR 69, 
76).
Dethridge, in July 1930, delivered his decision on an application by 
employers for variations in the Pastoral Award. The price of wool had fallen 
from 27.1 pence per pound in 1924–25 and 17.57 pence in 1928–29 to 10.4 
pence in the incomplete year 1929–30 (Pastoral case 29 CAR 261). At the 
outset of the case, the Australian Workers’ Union had sought Dethridge’s 
advice about the import of section 25D of the Act, inserted in 1928, which 
required the Court to take into account the ‘probable economic effect’ of an 
award or agreement on the community in general and on the industry or 
industries concerned. Dethridge told the union that ‘whether or not section 
25D remained in the Act, regard must be had to economic consequences’. 
This ‘always had been the view of the Court subject to special reservation 
in respect of the Harvester basic wage’. In the past, pastoral employers had 
always conceded that they could pay such rates as the Court thought fair,3 
but Dethridge now was ‘faced with the distasteful duty of adjusting wages in 
accordance with present economic realities’. (In response to what he said, the 
AWU withdrew from the proceedings.)
3  This concession obviated any requirement to produce financial records. It had been made 
by various employers, including H V McKay in the Harvester case.
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The ‘probable economic effect’, which the Court, according to 
Dethridge, had to take into account (under section 28D or otherwise), was 
the effect on the cost of production.
The Court can only act on the foundation constituted by the existing 
mode of distribution among the members of the community of the 
benefit of the production of the community. That mode is a reciprocal 
process of buying and selling the products. The Court aims at ensuring 
for wage-earners the Harvester basic wage, so far as it lies in its power, 
but otherwise it is constrained by this process of buying and selling not 
to make awards which would result in the products of an industry being 
unsaleable except at a loss. (p. 264)
The price of wool was set in world markets. If capital and management costs 
were reduced to the least possible, and the cost of production still exceeded the 
market price, there was ‘no escape from the alternatives—either the industry 
must decrease or wage rates must decrease’. Wool growing was ‘the main staple 
industry of the country, not a parasite that Australia can afford to allow to 
wither’ (p. 265).
Dethridge turned to the argument that wages should not be cut 
in depression because wage reductions decreased purchasing power and 
employment. He had some sympathy for it: it was ‘sound economic doctrine 
that at all times, whether depressed or prosperous, the aggregate of employers 
and capitalists engaged in production and the country generally would profit by 
distributing in wages as much as possible of the return from industry’ (p. 267). 
But this reasoning could not prevail over the necessity for export industries to 
produce at costs within the prices set by world markets, over which they had 
no control; and in the domestic market costs must be constrained by market 
prices. ‘In practice’, said Dethridge,
the economic doctrine of high wages, if applied, works out with 
these results, manifestly in export industries, and less clearly in other 
industries—Wages must be kept as high as market prices in the long run 
permit; they should only be reduced when all other means of keeping 
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production costs within market prices fail; but, when all these other 
means fail, wages must be reduced or the industry must collapse. (pp. 
267–268)
Much of the rural sector was already outside the coverage of industrial 
regulation. Federal awards were confined to the pastoral industry and fruit-
growing; and State legislation severely restricted the capacity of the respective 
tribunals to make awards or determinations for rural industries (Copland and 
Foenander 1932). The applicants now sought to have station hands excluded 
from the award ‘in order that they may be free to engage them at rates 
substantially less than the true present equivalent of the Harvester wage’ (p. 
272). This, said Dethridge, should be determined by the Full Court. Referring 
to the terms of section 28D, including the exception made for ‘the practice 
of the Court in fixing the basic wage’, he said that ‘the following propositions 
and their respective opposites’ called for consideration by the Full Court:
(1) That no ‘practice’ has been established to meet the position 
that may possibly arise of the country being unable to 
continue the equivalent of the Harvester wage as the basic 
wage in industry generally and of the country being thereby 
compelled to adopt a lower basic wage.
(2) That no ‘practice’ has been established to meet the position 
when an essential industry such as the pastoral industry is 
unable to continue the Harvester wage equivalent as the basic 
wage.
(3) That the Court has established a ‘practice’ of ‘fixing’ a 
‘basic wage’ in the pastoral industry, which basic wage is the 
Harvester equivalent, and therefore the Court is prevented by 
the proviso to section 25D from allowing that practice to be 
affected by the economic effect of the award.
(4) That the allowance of the ‘Powers’ 3s’ is not part of the 
‘practice’ within the proviso. (I acted on this opinion in the 
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Fruit-growers case,4 but it is desirable that the Full Court 
should consider the point.)
(5) That adjusting the basic wage to fluctuations in the cost of 
living on the ‘food, groceries, and rent’ index figures only may 
not be part of the ‘practice’ within the proviso.
Although the repeal of section 28D rendered irrelevant the issues as to the 
meaning of the Court’s ‘practice’, this set of propositions was a signal of 
Dethridge’s preparedness to entertain a reconsideration of much of the Court’s 
approach to the setting of the basic wage.
The award prescribed piece rates for shearers. In 1927, when he made 
the award, Dethridge set the rate by reference to an underlying wage which 
excluded Powers’ 3s but included a margin that was automatically adjusted 
for price movements from 1911. He now reverted to the 1911 margin of 9s, 
but restored Powers’ 3s, the net effect being a wage reduction. He reduced 
the piecework allowance from 20 per cent to 10 per cent, raised the average 
tally from 440 sheep to 480 and reduced allowances for lost time and fares.5 
Although I cannot identify a precise amount, the total of these reductions was 
clearly considerable. The piece rate for crutching was reduced by 20 per cent.
The Full Court (Dethridge, Beeby, and Drake-Brockman) was convened 
in August 1930 to deal with applications by Railways Commissioners of New 
South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, and Tasmania for award variations 
affecting the computation of the basic wage and the standard hours of 
some employees. Recent amendments to the Act, however, provided for the 
appointment of Conciliation Committees and limited the power of the Court 
(see Chapter 8, Section 8.1). Conciliation Committees had been appointed 
for the railways. In the Arbitration Court’s view, it could not deal with the 
Railways Commissioners’ applications. The Commissioners responded, in 
September 1930, by applying for the awards to be set aside. On 4 October, the 
4  See Chapter 7, Subsection 7.1.2.
5  Dethridge explained the increase in the tally by reference to the improvements in 
equipment since it was originally set. Hitherto, the shearers had been allowed the benefit of 
these improvements, but it was now necessary to be more rigorous.
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Full Court held that its power to set aside was not rescinded by the amendment 
to the Act (29 CAR 464). It agreed to set aside the awards ‘except so far as they 
prescribe the basic wage, except so far as they prescribe standard hours of work 
and except so far as they abrogate other awards of this Court’ (p. 470).
The decision was a response to a perceived emergency. Dethridge said:
Indisputably the financial position of all the railways in question is 
extremely bad—in some of the States disastrous. Putting aside that 
portion of the operations which admittedly must be attended with a 
deficit even with normal business, the remainder shows a tremendous 
and increasing deficit. In view of the irrefutable evidence showing the 
enormous reduction of the income of Australia, due to the fall of all 
prices of our exports and to the cessation of borrowing—a reduction the 
effect of which upon industry in general the Court would be fatuous to 
disregard—that deficit on railway operations will still further increase 
in the future unless the commissioners are free to make such economies 
in running costs as are commensurate with the economies and sacrifices 
which the community in general will have to bear by way of taxation or 
otherwise. (p. 469)
Beeby was equally forthright:
The next twelve months clearly will be the most critical year in the 
history of the Commonwealth. An emergency has arisen which calls 
for immediate readjustments in all directions; readjustments of costs 
of government, costs of production, costs of living and of profits and 
other returns to capital. But foremost is restoration of some measure 
of stability of public finance and reduction of the alarming losses on 
railway operations. We are not passing through a customary cycle of 
depression. The sudden and persisting decline of national income, 
plus the ever-increasing commitments for interest payments on loans, 
make our difficulties much greater than those of other countries whose 
prosperity does not depend, as ours does, on prices received for exported 
raw materials. For the next twelve months, at least, both Federal and 
State Governments will be forced to seek emergency devices in adapting 
affairs to new conditions. Under such circumstances, I think this Court 
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for twelve months should vacate its industrial control of State railways, 
leaving each State to adjust railway finances according to the will of its 
legislature. … Except as to the basic wage and hours of employment, the 
application should be granted. The basic wage affects all industry, and 
should not be altered except after an inquiry at which parties other than 
railways commissioners if they so desire can be represented. Similarly, 
hours of employment fixed by this Court … should not be disturbed 
without general inquiry. (pp. 472–473)
Dethridge thought that ‘each of the four States concerned in these 
proceedings is faced with a grave financial crisis, and that there is, in fact, 
a grave danger of the collapse of public credit with all its attendant evil 
consequences to the community’ (p. 475).
The railways matters were again before the Full Court in October 1930. 
Speaking for the Court, Dethridge said that the Conciliation Committees had 
stated cases for the opinion of the Court ‘as to what, if any, alteration in the 
basic wage prescribed by the relevant awards or in the principles of computing 
the basic wage should be made having regard to the applications for variations 
thereof ’ (29 CAR 487, 488). Applications as to the basic wage had also been 
made in other industries. As no Conciliation Committees had been appointed 
in these industries, the Court retained jurisdiction. ‘The Court has intimated’, 
said Dethridge, ‘that it invites all organisations or associations of employers or 
employees who might be interested to take part in the hearing of the question 
as to whether any alteration in the basic wage such as is applied for should be 
made, and that it will begin the hearing on 20th October, 1930.’
The times did not lend themselves to advances in non-wage terms of 
employment. There were few serious applications for them and correspondingly 
few decisions.
As we saw in Chapter 7, the initial willingness of the Court (in practice, 
of Dethridge) to extend the decision in the Main Hours case of 1927 by 
awarding the 44-hour week in industries which made similar demands of 
employees gradually gave way to a sense that deteriorating economic conditions 
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necessitated restraint. In respect of leave, there was no counterpart of the Main 
Hours case. Whereas the Act effectively confined arbitration about standard 
hours to the Full Court, it left disputes about leave to single members. During 
the Higgins and Powers periods, the Court had generally granted paid public 
holidays (8 to 10 per year) or additional pay in lieu. It did not regard annual 
leave as a normal benefit, but might grant it if special characteristics of the 
work merited the additional rest. In some instances—typically in white-
collar employment—employers consented to shorter hours and periods of 
leave and the Court either certified agreements or awarded accordingly. For 
example, agreements in force early in 1930 between the Municipal Officers’ 
Association and the Cities of Brisbane and Melbourne provided for a 38-hour 
week (worked over 5½ days); 12 days paid annual leave; and leave between 
Christmas and New Year (29 CAR 9). The difference between the conditions 
of white-collar and blue-collar workers was recognised by Beeby in his Metal 
Trades decision of December 1929, discussed above.
In May 1930, the Full Court (Dethridge, Lukin, and Beeby) gave a 
decision about the working week in New South Wales tramways (Tramway 
Workers’ case 29 CAR 158). The Commissioners had previously agreed to a 
44-hour week, consistent with State government policy; but as there had been 
a change of government and of policy, they now sought an award provision 
of 48 hours.6 Dethridge left undecided the question whether the nature of 
the work in question met the criteria for a 44-hour week, but said that ‘even 
in the most arduous occupations’ the introduction or continuance of the 
shorter week was ‘dependent upon the capacity of the industry in question to 
maintain itself without decrease caused by the shorter working week’. In this 
case, he continued,
the fall of the income of the people as a whole of New South Wales 
overclouds all aspects other than that of the employees’ health. That 
fall is reflected in the immense loss now occurring in the operation 
of the transport industry comprising both railways and tramways. 
… This Court cannot ignore the financial position of the people as a 
6  There was some uncertainty as to whether they needed to do so.
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whole of New South Wales who are the real employers here—the real 
persons carrying on the transport industry now in question whatever 
intermediate managing Commissioners or Boards may be created. (pp. 
161–162)
Lukin said that the condition of the industry was not the major consideration. 
Rather, 48 hours were an appropriate standard, and should apply unless there 
were ‘special or exceptional circumstances’ that justified something different 
(pp. 166–167).7 Beeby expressed ‘no opinion as to what standard hours of the 
industry should be in any State in normal times’, but agreed to the employer’s 
application ‘only because I believe that for the time being it is necessary in the 
public interest and in the interests of the employees involved’ (p. 170). The 
Court’s decision to grant the Commissioners’ application accorded with its 
perception of mounting economic problems, affecting in this case the state of 
public finances.
9.2 the ten per cent cut
The Basic Wage and Wage Reduction Inquiry of 1930–31 was among the 
most important in the history of federal arbitration. I deal with it in some 
detail. Readers who are interested only in the outcome of the case should 
proceed to Subsection 9.2.9.
9.2.1 The employers’ claim
After a preliminary hearing on 6 October, the Court excluded counsel.8 The 
full hearing began on 20 October and continued, with little interruption, until 
15 January 1931.9 The Railways Commissioners apparently saw themselves as 
the principal applicants and this view seems to have been accepted by other 
7  This was Lukin’s last significant case in the Court.
8  R G Menzies KC with Stanley Lewis sought to represent ‘the employers generally—
Railways Commissioners and others’. The unions successfully objected. When the Attorney-
General exercised his right to intervene, he was represented by a barrister. Otherwise, the case 
was conducted by lay advocates.
9  The Court repeatedly rejected union applications for adjournment or granted brief 
adjournments when the unions sought much longer periods to prepare their presentations.
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employers, who wished to ensure that any gains made by the railways would 
extend more generally. At the outset, the Commissioners, through P J Carolan, 
of the Victorian Railways, defined their objective:
As already outlined, the railways, generally, are asking for the deletion of 
the Powers’ 3s, and for the basic wage to be ascertained from time to time 
by taking the Harvester 7s and ascertaining the equivalent of that 7s, by 
taking into consideration the cost of food, groceries, housing—4 and 
5 rooms only—clothing and miscellaneous, instead of food, groceries, 
and housing, all houses. The Court has, up to the present, used the latter 
table, namely, food, groceries and housing, with the weighted average 
of the six capitals, equalling 1000, in 1911, as the base. The ‘All Items’ 
table, on which the Court is asked to act, conforms in principle with 
the recommendations of the Royal Commission on the basic wage in 
1920, with modifications adopted by the Commonwealth Statistician. 
… All that the railways are asking for, it is claimed, is what they are 
entitled to, on a proper calculation of the basic wage, apart from any 
consideration of finance; but the alarming state of their finances, as 
already emphasised, has made their position so desperate that they 
cannot, at the present time, afford to be generous, and they feel that 
they must now claim that wages should be adjusted on a correct basis, 
and not on the unnecessarily generous basis which has been in vogue for 
some years past. (transcript, pp. 62–63)
The Court, during the rest of the hearing, made it very plain that it did 
not wish the issue before it to be defined in these terms. So defining it invited 
the unions to dispute the validity of the ‘All Items’ table and to contest the 
assumption that the real basic wage of 1907 had been more than maintained. 
This was an invitation that they willingly accepted. The Court, however, 
wished to disregard these issues and to focus the attention of the parties on the 
question whether the current economic circumstances necessitated a reduction 
of wages.
Carolan told the Court that he wished to have as witnesses C H Wickens, 
the Commonwealth Statistician, and D B Copland. ‘Those two gentlemen’, 
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he suggested, ‘should be called by the Court because they are in a position 
where it is thought it would be best for the Court to call them.’ The Court, 
without further discussion, agreed (p. 78).
9.2.2 Wickens’ evidence
Wickens was called on the same day. Asked by Carolan about the relative 
merits of the price index for food, groceries and rent and the ‘All Items’ index, 
Wickens said that, ‘if you can get each of them equally reliable … the wider 
your sample the better your result is going to be’. He ‘would say that we 
have good figures for all the items we are collecting at the present time’. Two 
of the union advocates—T C Maher (Railway Professional Officers) and H 
C Gibson (Federated Carters and Drivers)—had been members of the basic 
wage Royal Commission of 1919–20 and had joined in a recommendation 
that led the Statistician’s Office—somewhat against its will—to produce the 
All Items (or C series) index. The position now was that adoption of the All 
Items index would reduce the basic wage by about 5 shillings. Hence while the 
employers advocated that step, the unions sought to discredit the ‘All Items’ 
index, arguing also that even the ‘All Houses’ series index was too low. The 
principal complaint against the C series index was that some of the items were 
not, in fact, repriced each quarter or, indeed, at all; they remained in the index 
at the prices found by the Piddington Commission. Some of the items were 
now dearer than they had been a decade earlier, but were in the index at an 
unchanged price. The following exchanges occurred during Gibson’s cross-
examination of Wickens:
Mr Gibson: At the adjournment last night, we were dealing with 
smoking requisites, under the heading of miscellaneous. Has that 2s per 
week allowance been adjusted? --- No.
It still remains, in your calculations, at 2s? --- Yes, my recollection is that 
there has been no variation.
…
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The next item is 2s 6d per week allowance for fares? --- Those 
miscellaneous items have been allowed in all cases.
Does that item still stand at 2s 6d? --- As far as I can recollect, yes, but 
I will confirm it and let you know later.
…
Do you not think that that item in respect of fares should be increased 
by at least 75 per cent … I am paying over 100 per cent more, and 
walking twice as far.
Beeby J: I take it that you are not challenging the original fixation; 
what you are saying now is that it has been a stationary amount in the 
regimen, and has not been raised.
Mr Gibson: In regard to these miscellaneous items, I shall endeavour to 
prove to the Court subsequently that, with the exception of one small 
group, every item under miscellaneous has had a very strong upward 
Charles Wickens
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tendency. … The only ones so far as Mr Wickens has gone that have 
been adjusted are those which have come down.
Mr Wickens: Not because they have come down, but because they were 
the items which were available for statistical investigation.
Mr Gibson: With all due respect, here is the point. Take the item ‘fares’. 
It might be called a small item. Let us take Melbourne. The applicants in 
this case will tell you that since 1920 the price of fares (suburban) paid 
by the workers has advanced on the average over 35 per cent. Tramway 
fares have advanced over 50 per cent. Take my own individual case. I am 
one of those unfortunates who live out in the suburbs [Malvern East]. 
In 1920, I could come from my home to the Trades Hall for 6d. Today, 
on a seasonal ticket, it costs me 1s. Therefore, in my individual case it 
has gone up 100 per cent.
…
Drake-Brockman J: The difficulty, as I understand it from Mr Wickens 
at present, is that certain of these items do not lend themselves to the 
collection of statistics by his department as at present organised.
Mr Gibson: Is that to be our funeral: because the department is 
not properly organised, have the workers to suffer? … I say with 
all diffidence, as a member of the body that compiled this, it was a 
unanimous compilation … and I respectfully submit that the methods 
by which it was arrived at are the methods by which it can be adjusted—
every item of it; because, there is not one single item which was arrived 
at by guesswork.
Mr Gibson: I take it that school requisites were treated likewise? --- 
Exactly.
That is, they still stand in your compilation at the original 3d? --- Yes. 
(pp. 204–209)
A further criticism advanced by the unions applied to both the A and 
C series indices. Retailers who submitted returns to the Statistician were 
asked to provide the prices of the ‘predominant’ variety of the commodity in 
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question. If incomes were falling (as a result, for example, of unemployment), 
consumers would substitute inferior and cheaper varieties and the character 
of the ‘predominant’ variety would change accordingly. Hence the indices 
were biased by treating changes in quality as changes in price. The advocate 
representing the gas employees, Charlie Crofts (also Secretary of the ACTU), 
raised this criticism with Wickens. ‘That is a possibility, undoubtedly’, said 
Wickens. Crofts asked: ‘To what extent are you able to say that might affect 
the result, so that the lower index figure not only represents greater cheapness 
but also represents a lowering of quality?’ Wickens replied: ‘I am afraid that 
our method does not admit of such refinement.’ Crofts persisted: ‘And can 
you say whether it would be substantial or insubstantial?’ ‘I am afraid’, said 
Wickens, ‘that nothing of a satisfactory nature could be given in reply to that’ 
(p. 157). In his final address, Crofts claimed that if real wages were reduced 
directly by the Court’s decision, there would be a further indirect reduction by 
reason of the downward bias of the price index, as workers and their families 
substituted lower for higher quality items. Dethridge acknowledged the point:
I have heard no answer to that suggestion as yet, and I do not think that 
Mr Wickens could give an answer to it. The Court has to recognise that 
may be the result. I asked Mr Wickens if he could indicate the amount 
of that effect, but he could not. It seems logical that that will be the 
case, and assuming a cut in the wages is made, there will be some further 
reduction in the standard of the workers owing to the manner in which 
the index figures are compiled. (p. 2164)
In the course of Maher’s cross-examination, Wickens said:
I would say that I do not think that any index number should be 
used absolutely in fixing a wage. It is something which should inform 
those that have the fixing, but should not be used simply as an item to 
determine what the wage should be. I do not want to find fault with 
what the Court has done in the past; that is my own opinion. (p. 104)
The criticisms made of the price indices, and especially the All Items 
index, could only reinforce the Court’s wish to shift the emphasis of the case 
from the formula proposed by Carolan (and supported by other employers) 
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to the state of the economy. At the end of Wickens’ evidence, Dethridge 
addressed Carolan:
Mr Gibson suggests, in effect, that the All Items index number table 
should not be used. He says first of all that it is unreliable, and secondly 
that it is unfair in its results, and, therefore, that your suggestion that 
it should be adopted as a basis for the present proposed reduction of 
wages is unfair. That is the way he puts it, and I suppose you have to 
meet that. The position you are in is this: you say that your application 
is limited to an adjustment, so as to give the present day real equivalent 
of the Harvester wage, and you say that that adjustment which you ask 
for is to be made by first of all deleting the Powers’ 3s, and secondly by 
using the All Items index figure. Then Mr Gibson says that would not 
be right, because the All Items table is fundamentally wrong. That is 
the way he puts it. Mind you, it is just as well to meet that situation, 
because you have narrowed your application, it may be, in such a way 
as to limit us to that kind of material, and prevent us from dealing with 
the really more vital aspect of things, to which I have referred once or 
twice. I do not say that is so, but it may be. The more vital aspect—let 
us face it—is that the country cannot afford to pay as a basic wage that 
which it has been paying for the last few years. That is the fundamental 
question … the country can no longer afford to pay the Harvester wage 
at the amount at which it has been assessed in recent years. Of course, it 
may be that your application is so framed as to prevent us going outside 
a mere matter of adjustment of the Harvester wage, and prevent us from 
dealing with the underlying conditions. (p. 234)
As the case proceeded, the Court seems to have overcome any doubts 
about its capacity to disregard the employers’ formula and to substitute the 
issue of economic capacity. A factor which made this transition easier was the 
fact that the employers’ formula would cause a reduction of about 10 per cent 
in the basic wage. The Court—supported by Copland’s evidence—was able 
to shift the focus from the formula to the outcome. The Judges, especially 
Dethridge, repeatedly hypothesised about a reduction of 10 per cent and 
challenged the parties to confront the economic case for such a reduction. 
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They also made it clear that a reduction could not exceed 10 per cent because 
that would go beyond the limit of the employers’ claim.
Wickens was asked about various other matters. Among then was the 
possibility of adjusting the money supply so as to counteract the fall in prices. 
That would be done, he suggested,
by the use of something in the nature of the index numbers, as indicating 
the trend downward of prices, and not only those index numbers, but 
all other index numbers, as indicating that you are experiencing a fall in 
prices which is much too rapid for the general good of the community. 
It might be possible to devise a scheme by which you would issue notes 
when you saw your prices were rushing down too rapidly, and not only 
check the issue of notes but also cancel the notes when you found the 
reverse position, that is, when prices were coming up. But it would need 
very careful handling. It is a matter which is not new. It has been put 
up by leading writers, including J Maynard Keynes. He strongly urged 
it in 1925. (pp. 161–162)
This was a proposal that would later be argued by union witnesses, supporting 
their contention that no wage reduction was necessary to deal with the crisis.
Wickens lent his support to the view that Australia in the 1920s had 
lived beyond its means:
There was an unduly lavish expenditure. … An eminent Australian 
economist, Professor Giblin, at the Perth meeting of the Australasian 
Association gave a public address in which he indicated that at the time 
there was evidence that we were treading that primrose path that leads to 
the everlasting bonfire. He was dealing very largely with the expenditure 
on motor cars and the tendency there was in Australia for unduly lavish 
expenditure. That was as far back as 1926. (p. 228)
Beeby commented: ‘Two years ago I was a super-optimist; but I am trying to 
find out what has really happened during the last two years and what is going 
to be the effect of it on the future.’ Wickens responded: ‘I think your Honour 
is not alone in that matter’ (p. 229).
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On 12 November 1930, the Court responded to a union application 
for the Commonwealth Statistician to be asked to inquire into a variety of 
matters. The Court thought that the material already provided to the parties 
by the Statistician was sufficient:
The suggestion that he should embark upon the extensive further 
inquiries specified ignores the nature of the applications now before 
the Court. Those applications are said by the applicants to be made 
for the purpose of meeting what they allege is the gravest economic 
emergency in the history of the Commonwealth. They specifically 
raise the issue that the recent decline in the national income, and the 
reduction of the spending power of the community, arising from the 
sudden cessation of loan credits, makes an immediate reduction of the 
basic wage imperative. That is the main issue raised by the applicants; 
and it is the only issue which the Court proposes, at present, to hear 
and determine. (Basic Wage and Wage Reduction Inquiry 30 CAR 2, 4)
It is likely that the Court saw the union application as a delaying tactic, and 
that this perception was accurate.
9.2.3 Copland’s evidence
Copland gave evidence on the third day of the hearing.10 He was concerned to 
be seen as independent:
I was approached to give evidence. It was explained to me that I was 
not to give evidence for either party, but that my evidence would be 
independent. I was agreeable to give evidence because I had written 
and said so much about the problem of the basic wage and about the 
question involved in the economic readjustment. Therefore I felt under 
an obligation to come here to give evidence, if I was wanted and if I 
could be of any use to the Court. I am not here for either party. No 
one has suggested to me what I should say. My statement was prepared 
independently entirely of anyone else. (pp. 258–259)
10  Copland’s statement was based on an article which he had recently sent to The Economic 
Journal and was published in December 1930 (Copland 1930). The statement of evidence is 
printed in Shann and Copland (1931).
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From the outset, the unions made clear their suspicions of Copland and 
his professed independence:
Mr Crofts: From the Unions’ point of view, I do not know that we 
would call this witness.
Dethridge C J: I have made it clear that the Professor is a witness of 
the Court, whose evidence may be used by either side. He is not your 
witness, but you may use whatever evidence he gives that you wish.
Mr Crofts: I do not know that the Court should call Professor Copland 
as a witness.
Dethridge C J: If no such witness as he or Mr Wickens had been called, 
the Court would certainly have to consider calling such witnesses for its 
own benefit.
Crofts noted that Copland had given a copy of his statement in advance to 
the employers, but not to the unions. Dethridge told him that if the unions 
required an adjournment before cross-examining Copland, it would be granted. 
That is what happened. In the closing stage of the case, Crofts attempted 
to portray Copland as a biased witness. Among his grounds were Copland’s 
association with E C Dyason and the support given by business to the Faculty 
of Commerce at Melbourne University, which Copland had founded.
Copland began by identifying problems in the pre-Depression economy. 
Three of these were of particular importance:
•	 There was a potential problem in the obligations to the rest of 
the world caused by the accumulated foreign debt. Copland 
identified a ‘transfer problem’11 amounting to £4 10s per 
head—more than in any other country except New Zealand. 
‘It was the magnitude of this transfer problem’, he said, ‘that 
caused concern to competent observers of the economic 
condition of Australia even in the days of prosperity’ (Shann 
and Copland 1931, p. 91).
11  A term much used in the 1920s in relation to Germany’s reparations payments.
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•	 Australian prices were misaligned with those of the rest of the 
world:
In 1928, British prices as measured by the Board of Trade index 
number were about 33 per cent above pre-war levels, while 
Australian were 65 per cent up. While these figures cannot be 
taken as an accurate measure of the disparity in price movements 
in Australia and overseas, there is no doubt that the Australian 
price level was sustained at a high figure, while overseas prices 
were either falling or stable at a lower level. Two main causes 
account for this disparity. First, the overseas borrowing increased 
spending power and the volume of bank credits, and, secondly, 
the high prices for Australian exports were reflected in high 
internal prices. The tariff was, of course, a contributing factor 
in keeping up the prices of manufactured and sheltered goods, 
but in the absence of the other two main causes the tariff could 
Douglas Copland
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not have sustained high prices without forcing a contraction 
of export production and a decline in real wages. (Shann and 
Copland 1931, pp. 92–93)
 The notion that prices in Australia were too high carried the 
implicit assumption of fixed exchange rates, such as were 
associated with the gold standard.
•	 Labour costs were too high:
The general level of wages was rising. In 1922, there was added 
to the basic wage what came to be known as the Powers’ 3s. This 
was intended to compensate for the losses incurred by wage 
earners on account of the rise in the cost of living and the lag in 
the adjustment of wages, but it was continued after the reason 
for it had disappeared. Owing to the increase in the number of 
workers brought within the ambit of arbitration and wage fixing 
tribunals, including many engaged in state instrumentalities, 
the basic wage was applied to a larger number of workers. The 
adjustments in the basic wage have been made on the basis of an 
index number of retail prices of food and house rents, estimated 
to cover about 60 per cent of household expenditure. This index 
number has not fallen to the same extent as a more complex index 
number, including clothing and other household expenditure. 
Had the basic wage been adjusted according to movements in 
the more complex index number, ‘the Harvester equivalent’ … 
could have been observed with a basic wage 6 per cent less than 
has been fixed. The steady upward trend of unemployment 
must be regarded as indication of the development of wage 
rates somewhat above the capacity of industry. The average 
unemployment for the years 1922–1929 was 10 per cent with 
a rising tendency. If unemployment is ignored real wages were 
8 per cent higher in 1929 than in 1911, but when allowance 
is made for the incidence of unemployment the real wage was 
barely 1 per cent higher. (Shann and Copland 1931, pp. 93–94)
These problems would have required ‘very small’ economic adjustments: ‘A 
minor alteration in the basic wage, perhaps, a progressive reduction of overseas 
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borrowing over a series of years and an increase in taxation to balance the 
budgets, in my opinion, would have met the situation’ (transcript, p. 270a).
But the position had been transformed by the collapse of export 
prices which began in mid-1929. Copland’s diagnosis and prescription were 
summarised thus:
Export industries have sustained a severe reduction in spending power 
and so have industries that were supplying goods and services to those 
whose incomes were formerly paid direct from overseas loans. The 
reduced spending power in these industries has seriously affected all 
other Australian industries and has caused indirect or secondary losses 
of national income. These secondary losses are due to the present 
inequitable distribution of the first loss. It is beyond the scope of this 
statement to consider in detail all the problems involved in securing 
the equitable distribution of the first loss. But this distribution is a pre-
requisite of economic recovery. An essential condition is the spreading 
of the burden over all wage and salary earners. The first loss of income 
is at least 10 per cent and it follows that a reduction in wages and 
salaries of 10 per cent is required to secure its equitable distribution. 
… The reduction in wages would promote an equitable distribution of 
the first loss and would lower costs of production through the whole 
field of industry. Lowering costs would bring some relief to export 
industries and to industries competing with imports. Moreover, costs of 
production in all sheltered industries would also be reduced and the fall 
in prices would be met by some expansion of demand for the products 
of sheltered and protected industries. … As industry expanded, the 
secondary losses of national income would be made good and the total 
loss reduced to the amount of the first loss. … Equilibrium would then 
be restored at a reduced income per head, but with the loss of income 
evenly spread throughout the community. (Shann and Copland 1931, 
pp. 100–102)
Dethridge asked Copland whether he had attempted to assess the secondary 
loss. He had not—this would be ‘quite an impossible thing to get at. You 
can only take the indications of growing unemployment, reduced profits 
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in industry and things like that, as a rough indication that it is going on’ 
(transcript, pp. 273–274).
Copland told the Court that he favoured a 20 per cent depreciation 
of the exchange rate. When Dethridge asked whether ‘any economist of 
the comparatively few we have in Australia’ had considered the question of 
exchange rate parity, Copland said that the only one of his colleagues who 
disagreed with his prescription of a 20 per cent devaluation was Professor 
Melville of the University of Adelaide. ‘If I am pessimistic’, said Copland, ‘I 
do not know what he is. What I have suggested [the 20 per cent devaluation] 
is rather in the line of an encouragement to a quick way out, which he does 
not agree with’ (p. 279).12
Drake-Brockman sought to summarise Copland’s recommendation to 
the Court: ‘As I understand the Professor, what he has said is this: there is a 
necessity for a 10 per cent reduction in the basic wage; that a convenient way 
of arriving at that is to accept the Statistician’s index figures, which take into 
account all items, and to get rid of the Powers’ 3s, and that roughly is 10 per 
cent.’ Copland accepted this summary: ‘Yes. … What I said, in effect, was that 
the equivalent of the 7s of the Harvester judgment could be obtained today 
by taking the complete index number, minus the Powers’ 3s. That is really the 
whole basis of my statement’ (p. 282).
In his initial cross-examination, Crofts asked Copland whether he was 
putting it to the Court that all of the unemployed would be absorbed if wages 
were reduced by 10 per cent. Copland answered: ‘That is only the beginning; 
and you have to consider that aspect in combination with other policies that I 
have enunciated in other directions’ (p. 285).
Copland was recalled on 1 December. The barrister representing the 
Attorney-General, A M Fraser asked questions going to the ‘fairness’ of 
imposing a 10 per cent reduction on wage-earners. Copland answered that 
wage-earners would be bearing ‘their due proportion … if everybody shares 
12  An advocate from South Australia, K H Boykett, interjected: ‘Professor Melville suggested 
a drop of 15 per cent at least in wages’.
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a loss of 10 per cent in income, it is [fair]’. Fraser put it to Copland that it 
was necessary to inquire whether a wage reduced by 10 per cent would be 
‘sufficient for their ordinary and reasonable needs’. ‘I am afraid’, said Copland, 
‘that their ordinary and reasonable needs have to be considered in relation to 
the size of the national income’ (pp. 801–802).
Gibson asked whether a 10 per cent reduction would automatically 
reduce the nation’s purchasing power. Copland replied:
I do not think so. The purchasing power or spending power of the 
nation is determined by the size of the national income, and the greater 
the national income the greater the spending power. Of course if you 
reduce a certain section of the community by 10 per cent you will cause 
a certain shock to the spending power in that direction, but that will 
release spending power elsewhere, because it will make production more 
profitable, which will eventually increase the national dividend and will 
eventually increase spending. (p. 812)
This answer accorded with Dethridge’s understanding of ‘spending power’. 
The following exchange ensued:
Dethridge C J: … Is not this the position: The wage is cut by 10 per 
cent or from 83s to, say, 75s, so that the basic wage earner and everyone 
who is in employment has 8s less to spend, but the man who would 
have to pay that 8s if there had been no reduction, that is the employer, 
has 8s more to spend. The fund from which the wage earner and the 
wage payer draw the money is, say, 100s. The wage payer instead of 
drawing only 17s, as he does at present, from the 100s draws 25s, but 
what does he do with that? He spends it. I grant you that he may not 
spend it in what may be called the consumption of goods. I suppose 
that you are quite familiar with the Hobson theory? --- Yes.
Dethridge C J: The way in which it is spent may have a material 
effect upon the advantages to and the welfare of the country, but the 
spending power of the community is the same, and it is unaffected by 
the reduction of wages.
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Mr Gibson: At present I am trying to cross-examine the Professor, but 
I would like the opportunity to cross-examine your Honour on the 
subject.
Dethridge C J: I want to be educated as we go along. I want to have this 
point cleared up as it has been referred to over and over again particularly 
by Mr Crofts, but not only by Mr Crofts. I may say frankly that I have 
tried to read everything lately which has been published by both sides, 
and I saw that it was stated definitely on the question of this reduction 
of wages that instead of reducing the basic wage it should be put up …
Mr Crofts: That is what they did in America.
Dethridge C J: At present, I am mentioning the arguments which have 
been put forward, that instead of reducing the basic wage it should be 
put up, and thereby increasing the spending power of the community. 
That is the argument, but I cannot see how the spending power of 
the community would be increased. The spending power of the worker 
who is lucky enough to retain his employment would be increased, but 
I cannot see how [that] can be applied to the community. However, 
I appreciate the force of the Hobson argument, and there may be 
something in that.
…
Mr Gibson: I will take his Honour’s suggestion … that if the worker 
gets 10 per cent less the 10 per cent is in the hands of the employer 
and he necessarily spends it? --- [Professor Copland] Yes, I adopt that. 
Spending may mean the direct purchase of goods, or it may mean 
putting the money into the bank, increasing his deposits and making 
credit available to someone else for capital expenditure, and so on.
…
Do I get it from you, then, that money saved immediately goes into 
circulation? --- Yes, always.
If that is so, why the present depression? --- Because it may be that 
there is a maladjustment in the amount of spending by one nation and 
another. Saving is only spending in another form.
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Is not the present depression in the final analysis due to the fact that 
people are not spending? --- If you like to put it that way, yes, but 
they have not anything to spend. You have to go behind that. … The 
reduction in the wages fund comes because the national income has 
fallen. The spending power has already declined, and 20 per cent of the 
workers have no income at all. The maintenance of the wage rate does 
not increase the spending power of the working classes if that wage is an 
uneconomic rate. (pp. 812–814)
Gibson asked Copland: ‘Does not the circulation of the workers’ income 
supply that prosperity that we so much desire?’ Copland replied: ‘No. What 
supplies the prosperity we desire is, fundamentally, the amount of the national 
income we … produce’ (p. 823).
In addition to pressing Copland on the matter of wages and purchasing 
power, with little apparent success, the unions put the argument that the 
Depression was being exacerbated by the deflation of prices. This, indeed, was 
a recurrent issue throughout the case and there was little or no disagreement 
that falling prices reduced demand because people deferred expenditure so as 
to buy at lower future prices. There was less agreement that wages were a price 
that should not fall. Gibson raised the issue with Copland:
Is it not rather by reason of the instability of prices that the nation’s 
circulation of money has become temporarily choked up? --- I think so. 
I explained in my evidence that the faults due to Australia’s economic 
policy accounted for some part of the present trouble, and the faults due 
to overseas export prices were generally greater.
No one buys on a falling market if they can possibly help it? --- No.
Except for absolute necessities? --- Yes.
If that is so, is not the first necessity to stop falling markets? --- You 
might do that in any one of a number of ways.
Will the 10 per cent cut in the basic wage have a tendency in that 
direction? --- The 10 per cent cut in the basic wage will compensate 
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people who have been affected by the falling market, and it will help 
them to meet the costs of the falling market. (pp. 814–815)
Copland’s answer seems not to have confronted the question; but evidently 
he was putting the view that keeping wages high was the wrong way to resist 
deflation, because it would distort the relative price of labour. It was part 
of his ‘scheme’ that deflation should be checked by monetary policy and by 
depreciating the exchange rate. Relatively higher wages would be tenable if the 
general price level were buttressed by broader economic policy.
The unions also sought unsuccessfully to get Copland’s assent to the 
argument that a wage reduction should be enforced only if there were a 
comprehensive set of anti-depression measures, such as Copland advocated. 
Copland’s set of measures included, as well as lowering real wages, balanced 
budgets, reducing interest rates, depreciation of the exchange rate, and greater 
availability of bank credit. But he refused to say that the items in the mixture 
were inseparable.
Mr Crofts: Would it not be reasonably fair that we should have an 
inquiry into the whole of your suggestions before anything is done in 
any one direction? --- Things ought to be done simultaneously.
Dethridge C J: What things? --- The general scheme I have put up from 
time to time.
But Mr Crofts, I think, is directing his question to another issue.
Mr Crofts: No. The Professor agrees that there should be an inquiry 
into every aspect of Australian industry? --- No. There is no need for an 
inquiry. The duty of the country is plain, and it should be done.
…
Mr Crofts: The Professor says there is no necessity for an inquiry, but 
that they should all happen at the same time.
Dethridge C J: And the authorities who can bring that about should act 
at the same time as any wage regulation.
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Mr Crofts: And nobody should interfere with one part of the scheme 
without the other bodies doing the same thing? --- Each body has to do 
its duty.
And you suggest that they should all do it at the same time? --- It would 
be better if they did. … In order to clear up the matter I may say that 
in this Economic Record, which is just coming off the press now, you will 
find the second article, at p. 170, which represents my considered views 
on the whole position.
…
It might even be dangerous to reduce wages without the other correction 
you suggested? --- No, I do not think so. (pp. 880–881)
Crofts also challenged Copland to predict the improvement in economic 
conditions that would occur if his proposals were adopted:
Mr Crofts: I think it is a fair inference to draw that the Professor is 
advocating a low rate of wages to bring down the cost of production? --- 
I am advocating the wages which I think the country can afford to pay.
…
Dethridge C J: [Professor Copland] says that there has been that loss, 
and it has to be borne equally, or as nearly equally as it can be. The 
employers have suffered, and the unemployed have suffered. Indeed 
they have suffered more than their share of the loss and the professor 
says that it is necessary to take from them their undue share of the 
burden, and spread it among those employees who are at work.
Mr Crofts: And he wants to reduce wages in an attempt to allow the 
employers to spend more money in the endeavour to employ the 
unemployed.
Dethridge C J: That is one aspect.
Mr Crofts: I suggest to the Court that if that opinion is expressed there 
might be something behind it, particularly if it is the opinion of a 
professor of economics. I say he should be able to inform this Court as 
to the length of time it will take, if the workers of this country give up 
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10 per cent of their spending power, to reemploy their comrades. … (To 
witness): Have you given that matter serious consideration? When can 
we go to our workers and say ‘If you accept a reduction of 10 per cent, 
all your comrades who are out of employment will be employed within 
a certain time’? I want to know what time? --- I am not a prophet.
But you have come here, and you have made yourself a prophet. You 
say in effect ‘Do this thing, and something will happen.’ Tell us what 
will happen? --- … My answer is this: If you do this thing—that is 
reduce wages, and the other things I have suggested—that is balance 
budgets, and adopt the money and banking policy, I think you will get 
an immediate alleviation of unemployment.
To what extent? --- It is very difficult to say.
You are advocating that there should be a reduction in wages, but you 
think something else might happen. I want to go to the workers and tell 
them what you have said? --- I hope you will tell them truthfully.
I shall read to them what you have said; I shall not rely on my memory? 
--- I would hazard a guess—and it can only be an intelligent guess—
that it will take 18 months to get the unemployed figures down to the 
average of what they have been since the War.
What has that average been? --- A little under 10 per cent. There is going 
to be no easy way out. It is going to be a long and arduous job. The 
sooner these steps are taken the sooner we will get out of our difficulties.
First you advocate a 10 per cent reduction in wages, and then you say 
perhaps something might happen, but only to the extent that we are 
going back to a period of 10 per cent unemployment; is that normal? 
--- No; I say that it will be reduced.
What will bring about a reduction of the other 10 per cent? --- The steady 
improvement in business conditions, and efficiency in production.
Not a lowering in wages? --- I hope not.
Assume that we get a reduction of something like £30 million in the 
spending power of the people as a result of this application being 
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granted in full? --- That is a wrong assumption. The spending power of 
the people is determined by the national income. The mere reduction 
of 10 per cent in the wages of those employed does not reduce the 
spending power of the people; it reduces the spending power of those 
whose wages have been reduced.
…
What would you call a normal percentage of unemployed? --- The lowest 
percentage of unemployed in Australian history is 4.7; that was in 1911. 
The average for the period before the War was about 5.9. I should say 
you would be very fortunate if you get it down to an average of 6½ per 
cent under existing conditions of the rapid changes in industry. (pp. 
896–898)
Crofts subsequently stood aside to allow Gordon Massey to cross-
examine Copland. Massey was a salaried officer of the Victorian Railways (and 
a Councillor of the Australian Railways’ Union) who apparently had some 
acquaintance with economics.13 He was exceedingly respectful to Copland, 
but conducted a lengthy and at times tortuous cross-examination.13
Massey began by alluding to the view of Dethridge that ‘spending power’ 
was synonymous with the national income. The unions, he said, regarded the 
10 per cent cut in real wages as unreasonable ‘and further that from a national 
viewpoint it is unsound inasmuch as the reduction of wages reduced the 
spending power of the people, and consequently further reduce the national 
dividend’. He continued:
13  In 1930 Massey published a pamphlet entitled The Last Shilling: Australia’s Destiny and 
Australian Money. The thrust of it was that the imported economic problems were being 
needlessly worsened by the behaviour of the monetary system. Copland wrote an Introduction 
(dated 27 October), but indicated, both in the Introduction and in his evidence, that he 
disagreed with some of the contents. Massey told the Court that the unions had not decided 
to ask him to cross-examine Copland until some time after Copland had made his statement 
and that he had received the statement only five days earlier (p. 964). Early in 1931, he 
published a series of articles in The Railways’ Union Gazette, including one of 10 February 
entitled ‘The Arbitration Outrage’. (I thank Trevor Dobbyn, Victorian State Secretary of 
the Rail, Tram and Bus Union, for sending me copies.) I have not found any biographical 
information about Massey.
390 Australian Wage Policy
Let us consider the latter—what His Honour the Chief Judge has 
defined as a very popular fallacy at the present moment. His Honour 
has expressed the fallacy in essence by saying that purchasing power 
depends upon the amount of marketable production, and not upon 
the amount of wages paid, that is to say that the total production is 
consequently divided and spent in various proportions among the 
worker, the entrepreneur, and the rentier. Therefore, though you may 
increase proportionate shares, you cannot make any one part larger if by 
doing so you make the parts greater than the whole. Therefore the total 
spending power remains constant for a given production, though its 
incidence may vary. That is a correct statement of the principle I take it?
Dethridge C J: Substantially, but, in order to avoid any misunderstanding, 
I may say that when I put it in that precise form I am not ignoring the 
possibility of a division of the national income. If we take two divisions 
of the national income, it may be that by giving a greater share to the 
working classes in the one mode of the division than in the other mode 
of division, you do increase the real welfare of the community. I am not 
ignoring what Karl Marx pointed out many years ago in connection 
with that matter—that if you allow the entrepreneur or rentier class to 
take a large share that encourages luxury trades, and attracts capital to 
those luxury trades necessity trades [sic], [illegible] the working classes 
may be injured in that way. But that is a refinement which I have not 
bothered about.
Massey: That is the substance of your statement?
Dethridge: Yes. (pp. 947–948)
Massey prefaced a question to Copland by referring to ‘the fallacy 
alluded to by his Honour—that is to say, that the spending power will remain 
constant for a given production, though its incidence may vary’:
I am referring to the distribution of the income. It may be all there, 
but a different class may spend it. It has occurred to me that there is 
some confusion of ideas in reference to the fallacy. Is not the incidence 
of trade due to the spending power of the workers; that is to say, if the 
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workers have to spend less they will spend less upon the things which 
it is desired they shall spend money upon? --- That is true. I am not 
proposing to suggest anything which will decrease the percentage share 
of the national income which goes to the workers. They will have the 
same proportionate influence in demand as they had before.
I take it that is so, but the effect of that upon the reduced spending 
power of the worker will be reflected in the trades in which the workers 
spend their money. For instance the present obvious reduction in real 
income is materially affecting trade and commerce? --- Yes.
And a reduction in the income of the workers, either in the form of 
unemployment, or in the form of a reduction in wages would have the 
same effect? --- No—not the same effect. The same immediate effect 
on the workers’ spending, but it might mean quite a different ultimate 
effect if the reduction of real wages was one of the remedial measures 
required to reduce unemployment. (pp. 949–950)
Massey returned to the issue of whether a reduction of wages entailed a 
reduction of the national income:
Mr Massey: Is it obvious that if a proportionate share of the wage 
earners were varied, the incomes of those trading with wage earners 
would correspondingly vary, and that would affect the incidence of 
production? --- Certainly. If you altered the proportion of income going 
to wage earners that would alter the nature of the demand for goods and 
services, and would alter the nature of production.
In effect, that would introduce the unemployment factor? --- It would 
cause a disturbance in the period of adjustment and transition.
In effect, it would reduce the national dividend? --- No.
Not in terms of money? --- In terms of money—if it were accompanied 
by a fall in the price level it would reduce the income, but not in terms 
of real goods. … I do not agree [that there would be a fall in real goods 
and services], except in the respect that there would be a short period 
of disturbance due to the alteration of the nature of the demand for 
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production, in which there would probably be a reduction of national 
income.
…
Dethridge C J: That is to say that the working classes who were 
previously getting the money under the proposed decrease would cease 
to spend upon clothing and things of that kind, such as they are in the 
habit of buying? --- Yes.
The class which gets the money might delay for some little time spending 
it upon any other class of goods or services. It would be diverted to what 
we call luxuries or capital goods? --- That is what it comes down to.
Mr Massey: The point I am desirous of making is that it will have a 
deflationary effect and change the present stabilisation upon which 
trade, particularly retail trade, and many allied trades, are organised in 
Australia.
Dethridge C J: There is no doubt that there will be a disturbance, but 
it will be a transitory disturbance? --- You might get the same result 
with a great inflation where wages did not follow the price level. (pp. 
952–953)
Copland argued that a 10 per cent reduction of real wages would not 
reduce the wage-earners’ share of the national income, since there was a 
general fall of at least 10 per cent. There was, he implied, a choice between 
maintaining existing real wages but employing fewer workers or reducing the 
real wage and restoring the employment of workers who had been displaced by 
the fall in the aggregate level of spending. This issue generated the following 
exchange:
Dethridge C J: … The way I understand the Professor suggests [the fall 
in income] can be equalised is that we have to recognise that the wage 
earners as a class are already suffering at least a fall of 10 per cent in 
their income, the same as every section in the community have already 
suffered that loss. We have to spread that loss. We have to spread the 
workers’ diminished share as well as we can. At present, it is being taken 
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by employed wage earners, and by them only. The unemployed are 
getting practically no part of it. We have to spread that diminished share, 
and the only way in which we can do that is by giving something less to 
the employed workers, and giving a chance to the unemployed workers 
to get employment and to get their proportion of the diminished share 
which goes to the working classes.
Mr Crofts: That is not what the Professor says. He says that we should 
give the 10 per cent to the employer? --- No; I do not say that.
…
Dethridge C J: … Mr Crofts has suggested that this 10 per cent is to 
be taken away from the wage earners and given to the employers or the 
capitalists, if you like to so term them.
…
Mr Crofts: And the Professor agrees to that? --- That is not my 
proposition; I have never said that.
Dethridge C J: Without any corresponding benefit for the working 
classes—I understand that is what is attributed to the Professor? --- Yes, 
and that is quite wrong.
…
Mr Massey: The point I am endeavouring to make is that if the real 
wage is reduced it tends to become a permanent deflationary measure, 
perpetuating the deflation which has already taken place. Is that so? --- I 
do not think it is.
It is a reduction of real wages? --- It is a reduction of real wages, and it 
is a permanent one until the income recovers.
Then it becomes the perpetuation of the present deflation? --- No. If 
this Court calls me in three or four years’ time and there is a recovery in 
the national income, I will be the first person to say that wages ought to 
be increased. (pp. 954–955)
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Massey moved on to the threat of deflation, which was potentially the 
unions’ strongest argument:
Mr Massey: Any form of deflation has the effect of decreasing capital 
value, and with that decrease in capital values, as long as the deflation 
continues, the tendency is to prevent advances or credit from going out 
and there is a condition of arrested business or development? --- I think 
that is true.
The effect of that would be to tend further to increase unemployment? 
--- If you had a period of rapidly falling price levels on Australia, that 
would be the effect.
Has not that condition arisen today? --- I do not think so. Our price 
level has fallen about 10 per cent to 12 per cent all round in the last 
12 months, and compared with England, the fall has been practically 
double there.
Has not the rise in exchange rates had some retarding effect on the 
Australian price level? --- Yes.
Had that not operated, that retardation would not have taken place 
and the price level would have gone still lower? --- Yes, I think so. (pp. 
956–957)
Massey apparently thought that to avoid the ill-effects of deflation, it was 
necessary for wage reductions to be embedded in a comprehensive economic 
plan. In pursuing this point he was rather more subtle, and more effective, 
than Crofts had been:
Mr Massey: You have made certain proposals in a general strategical 
plan evolved by yourself, Mr Dyason and Dr Gordon Wood? --- Yes.
I think it can be said that it is a considered opinion from expert 
knowledge? --- We hope so.
The plan is directed to bringing about the welfare of the people of 
Australia as a whole, not one section? --- That is so.
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That is to say if sacrifices are involved they are not to be made for the 
benefit of one class by another? --- No.
They are entirely for the benefit of the nation? --- Yes.
I take it that the plan cannot be separated piecemeal, that any one 
portion can be picked out and another portion disregarded? --- I agree 
with that.
If that were done, the plan would not be effective? --- The plan would 
not be as effective as if it were done as a whole.
…
That is to say, all your evidence here has been keyed into your plan? --- I 
think that is true.
It is completely interlocked into it? --- I think so.
You presuppose the entire support and cooperation of all concerned? 
--- I urge it. I cannot presuppose it, because I am not getting it.
The point I am putting on this question is that as far as the wage 
reduction proposals are concerned, you have admitted that they are 
part of your general plan? --- Yes, but I believe that whatever is done 
real wages in this country will fall 10 per cent, whether it is done by 
legislative action now, by a decision of the Court or not, it will be done 
by the sheer force of economic law. (pp. 956–957)
Massey referred to the charge levelled against the banks of withholding 
credit and suggested that the banks were ‘not in a position to extend credit in 
a falling market’. Copland replied that the banks ‘have in fact extended credit 
very greatly’ (p. 958). Though he assented to a significant degree to Massey’s 
argument that the major present threat was deflation, he did not agree that 
this told against the case for a wage reduction:
There is also the factor of the less [sic] monetary value of assets, which is 
another point I wish to bring out. They are capital losses but, in effect, 
they will have to be paid out of income, and they are being paid back 
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out of income? --- That is part of the difficulty of the deflation process, 
part of the difficulty you have been mentioning.
It is another feature. That money which is being paid back is also 
sterilised—it is not going into use? --- That is so.
That is further increasing unemployment? --- Yes. I think we can say that 
the deflation of the price level does cause real difficulties for a country.
The major decline in the national dividend is due to the cumulative 
effects of falling values? --- It is.
And it is correct to say that the loss in the national dividend due to 
deflation under the present condition of instability is many times 
greater than what we describe as being our loss from borrowing and our 
loss from wool sales? --- I would not say that. It has not reached that 
point yet. The loss from value and the falling value of exports amount 
to £70 millions, and I take it that you would not suggest that the loss 
of national income is many times greater than that. … If you have a 
rapid fall in the price level, the immediate relief from a wage reduction 
would not be as great as if you reduced the wages without a rapid fall 
in price levels. … In my opinion, a wage reduction has to be made. If 
you can make a wage reduction, and put the other part of the plan into 
operation at the same time, you will achieve a better result than if you 
make the wage reduction without doing that. (p. 959)
Copland said that the primary producer would benefit from a wage 
reduction in two ways: the direct effect on his own wage bill and the lower 
costs of transport and other services for which he paid (p. 960). He agreed 
that a free exchange rate would help to spread the burden of the loss that had 
to be borne, but in response to Massey’s suggestion that the exchange rate was 
‘really the true means of distributing the burden’, he replied: ‘A free exchange 
rate is one of the parts of my plan; but I do not think that a free exchange rate 
can bring us an alleviation of our troubles, without the other parts of the plan.’ 
Dethridge interposed that
the Court is only concerned with the wage question. I assume that the 
other constituents of the professor’s scheme are receiving consideration 
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from those bodies whose duty it is to consider them. It is not our job. 
… We cannot introduce a free exchange. (p. 963)
When Massey later put it to Copland that ‘rapid deflation will produce 
a position of chaos in the country’, he replied ‘I think it will’. The evidence 
continued:
Notwithstanding that the condition of the wage earner today is bad, and 
they are suffering in common with everybody, you propose to continue 
that condition? --- No; I want to spread the loss evenly over the whole of 
the workers, not make the unemployed bear the whole burden.
You consider that the incidence of your wage reduction proposals is 
deflationary? --- Just in respect of people who are selling goods to the 
workers affected—not generally. (p. 992)
…
Assuming that wages are brought down in terms of money, that is 
deflation, that will affect the revenues of all public utilities? --- That is 
your definition of deflation all the time, and you have to realise that.
I can assure you that I have no mental reservations? --- I have.
My application of deflation is general; I do not like the word, and I am 
merely using it here because apparently it conveys an idea? --- It is a very 
ugly word.
Personally, I am hostile to the word? --- Yes. I am very hostile to the 
process.
My definition of deflation means an arbitrary alteration in the amount 
in terms of money of all utilities, used in the economic sense? --- A 
serious and continued drop in the price level is deflation. I think that is 
the proper definition.
…
The dropping of wage rates in terms of money is deflation? --- I do not 
think it is. I am speaking of the price of commodities. (p. 998)
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Though the definition of ‘deflation’ was in part a semantic issue, there 
was more to it than that. Massey was surely right in arguing that cutting money 
wages would have effects normally associated with ‘deflation’: increasing the 
real value of debt and of charges that were sticky in nominal terms; and causing 
deferral of expenditure in the expectation of obtaining goods and services 
(including labour services) at lower future prices. In one answer that he gave, 
Copland implied, but did not elaborate on, a monetarist theory of deflation: 
‘It is the credit policy which causes the fall of the price level, and the fall of the 
wages’ (p. 999). Copland would have been on firmer ground if he had simply 
said that reducing wages was necessary, despite its deflationary effects, in order 
to spread the burden of the reduced real national income.
After Massey had completed his cross-examination, Crofts and Maher 
pursued several minor matters with Copland. Maher sought his agreement 
that his contentions were simply ‘your personal opinions as a professor of 
economics’. ‘No’, said Copland; ‘they are a logical argument. My opinion does 
not count.’ Challenged as to whether there were in Australia ‘two professors 
who agree as to your particular remedy’, Copland replied ‘that every professor 
of economics in the country believes that what I have put forward is correct’.
Apart from the general persuasive power of Copland’s evidence, its 
principal effect was to entrench in the Court’s thinking the idea that the 
central issue in the case was a 10 per cent reduction in the basic wage. During 
his evidence, there was brief reference to the fact that reducing the basic wage 
by 10 per cent did not imply a 10 per cent reduction in wages because margins 
would be unaffected.14 That matter remained dormant, however, until near 
the conclusion of the hearing. The Court repeatedly affirmed that the sole 
issue in the case was whether or not the state of the economy necessitated a 10 
per cent basic wage reduction.
14  Drake-Brockman said to Copland: ‘Your proposal touches only the basic wage; it does not 
touch the secondary wage at all, which is very considerable’. Copland replied: ‘I had forgotten 
that. The total would not be 10 per cent of the wage bill; it would be something less than 10 
per cent’ (p. 894). There was no recognition of the fact that, with prices falling, the real value 
of margins was actually rising.
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9.2.4 What evidence was relevant?
The employers called numerous witnesses to testify about the poor state 
of particular industries. As this evidence proceeded, the Court manifestly 
became impatient with it. Its impatience was increased when the unions 
attempted detailed rebuttals. At no stage did the Court accept that this was 
a railways’ case. The basic wage was a general wage and had to be dealt with 
as such. Evidence about particular industries had no more value than as 
confirmation of what might be derived from broader indicators. At the end of 
Copland’s evidence, Maher asked whether railway officers ‘should be specially 
signalled [sic] out for a special wage reduction as against other employees in 
the community’. ‘I should say no’, said Copland, ‘but I am not in the position 
of having to answer for the railway industry …’ Maher continued: ‘But you are 
giving evidence in regard to the whole of these matters before the Court, and 
the railways represent the major portion of the case’. Dethridge intervened: 
‘No, do not make a mistake about that; they are not’ (p. 1015).
On the next day (Thursday 4 December), the employers closed their 
case. Crofts alleged that this was a tactic: he understood that there were to 
be other employer witnesses, and the unions had prepared to cross-examine 
them. Dethridge commented: ‘It may be that they have taken notice of what 
I said yesterday and that is that, so far as I am concerned, the evidence of 
value is the evidence of witnesses who are able to give evidence relevant to the 
position of the country as a whole. That means the evidence of men who can 
speak as expert economists and statisticians’ (p. 1055). When the employers 
protested about the unions’ unwillingness to commence their case forthwith, 
Dethridge said:
The position may have become somewhat confused by the way in 
which the case has shaped itself, as it went along. I think [the unions] 
may reasonably have felt somewhat doubtful as to what they were called 
upon to do in the earlier part of the case. … They want, perhaps, some 
time to prepare such evidence as the Court will regard as necessary, 
relevant and valuable, and it may be that the employees cannot get 
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that evidence ready by tomorrow. What I am saying now is not to be 
taken as indicating that the Court is going to admit detailed evidence 
as to a number of particular industries because the Court will disregard 
detailed evidence of either side of that kind. We have to recognise that, 
if the general condition of the country is such as to require an alteration 
of the basic wage, that alteration is not going to be held up by enquiries 
stretching out over months and, it may be, years into the detailed 
conditions of a number of particular industries. (pp. 1058–1059)
At this point Fraser referred to a ‘foregone conclusion’. Rebuked ‘as counsel’ by 
Dethridge, Fraser explained himself:
What I was proposing to say is that probably the only one in Australia 
who can give valuable and proper evidence as to the national dividend 
is the person charged with collecting statistical information with 
regard to that point; and unless Mr Wickens’ conclusions can be 
thrown overboard—they undoubtedly show a decline in the national 
dividend—and if that decline is such as to render it imperative that 10 
per cent of that decline should be spread over the employees … it does 
seem, in my opinion, that it would be a foregone conclusion. (p. 1059)
The Court adjourned until Monday 8 December in Sydney, where it 
would hear union witnesses. The Court sat for a week in Sydney.
Healy (for the Australian Workers’ Union) said at the beginning of 
the Sydney hearings that he would be calling an accountant to deal with the 
balance sheets of various companies. Dethridge said to Healy:
Probably the position will be this, that no evidence of that kind will 
be necessary for the Court’s purposes … The position as it appears to 
the Court at present is that the outstanding fact or facts which face the 
Court, face the public, and face everyone concerned in this community 
are these: a tremendous fall in the national income and a tremendous 
rise in unemployment in the community. … The fact that some 
companies—I do not dispute it for a moment—have, until this last 
year, earned considerable profits, is not of the weight which attaches to 
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the tremendous falls in our export values and the fact that we cannot 
borrow any more money from abroad. (pp. 1066–1067)
When Fraser said that some of the ‘industry’ evidence related to pastoral 
companies, the following exchange ensued:
Dethridge C J: The outstanding fact with regard to the pastoral industry 
is that wool, last season, averaged something under 11d per lb—very 
considerably less than it has brought for a number of years past. This 
year, up to now, it has averaged something under 9d. Now, whatever the 
wool companies concerned have done in the past, whatever profits they 
have made, it will not alter the fact that wool at the present moment 
is bringing an average of under 9d per lb, and it will not alter the fact 
that it costs ever so much more than 9d to produce that wool … Past 
wealth, past profits, do not alter that position. This country has to go on 
producing—if it is going to produce at all; if it is not going to lie down 
and pass out of existence—and face a world market showing prices of 
that kind.
Mr Fraser: It is going to come back to this: Apparently, in that view, so 
far as I see it, it seems very difficult to see what evidence can be called by 
the respondents, if they are going to be limited in that way.
Dethridge C J: I shall be very glad instead to hear evidence going to 
prove that wool … is going to bring 15d or 16d on an average. Bring 
that evidence, and the Court will be relieved of a lot of difficulty.
Mr Fraser: So it comes down to this, that the evidence at present is 
undisputed—it is very doubtful if it will ever be disputed—as to the 
decline in the national income; so it follows that wages must be reduced.
Dethridge C J: It does not follow. We are waiting to hear evidence that 
a reduction of wages, even in face of that fact, is inexpedient …
…
Drake-Brockman J: Does the decrease in the national income justify a 
decrease in wages: the employers say yes and we are waiting to hear your 
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answer, because that is the issue, and the only issue, before the Court. 
(pp. 1068–1071)
Healy said that the unions were having difficulties in getting appointments 
with the economics professors. Dethridge replied that ‘any economist who is 
worth his salt’ would recognise the gravity of the issue before the Court and 
‘would disregard everything else for the few hours that will be necessary in 
order to enable him to place his evidence before the Court’. He told Crofts: 
‘If you mention any name or suggest the name of any economist, the Court 
itself will call that economist. It will treat that economist in the same way as it 
treated Professor Copland’ (p. 1082).
9.2.5 Irvine’s evidence
The Court, at the unions’ request, spent the week of 8 to 12 December 
in Sydney. On the last day of the week, R F Irvine gave evidence. Though 
formally called as the Court’s witness, he was the principal witness on the 
union side, just as Copland had been on the employer side. Irvine was the 
first occupant of a Chair in Economics in Australia, having been appointed to 
it by the University of Sydney in 1912.15 He was an unorthodox economist, 
something of an outcast from the emerging body of professional economists 
in Australia, and a political radical. He left the University, under pressure, in 
1922.16 At the time of the Inquiry, he was a director of the government-owned 
Primary Producers’ Bank.
Irvine stressed, first, the international origin of the Depression. Australia 
could do very little to modify world conditions; but there was no reason, ‘other 
than the prevalence of an obsolete economics’, why the industrial situation in 
Australia should be as bad as it was (p. 1322). People unable to earn livings, 
except for charity and public relief, were ‘a reflection upon our intelligence in 
15  Irvine (1861–1941) was born in Scotland and educated in New Zealand. He became a 
school principal in New South Wales and later joined the State public service.
16  Ostensibly, Irvine’s removal from the University was due to his adultery, but Bruce 
McFarlane (Irvine’s biographer in the Australian Dictionary of Biography) suggests that it may 
have reflected the unpopularity of his political utterings.
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a country like Australia, which can produce an abundance of the necessaries 
of life and many of the luxuries of life and at the same time export enormous 
surpluses of primary products abroad’ (p. 1323).
No one who was aware of the fall in world price levels since 1924, and 
especially in the past 18 months, could fail to come to the conclusion that 
the root cause of the Depression ‘is to be found in our monetary system’. 
Australia’s experience was but one consequence of the global problem:
There may no doubt be circumstances in any particular country which 
aggravate the ill-effects of this world movement. It is of course patent to 
everyone that low prices for wool and wheat are the immediate cause of 
the drop in our national income, measured in money, and our exchange 
difficulties. Local discussion, however, scarcely concerns itself with 
ultimate causes, but fastens on certain local conditions like arbitration, 
high wages, high cost of production, extravagance, public and private, 
any and all of which may or may not have helped to aggravate the 
situation. It is overlooked, however, that altering these things or leaving 
them alone cannot affect the world’s prices for wheat and wool, nor 
stop the deflation which is accompanied by, and, in my opinion, is the 
primary cause of world depression and an appalling unemployment. 
(p. 1324)
What was the cause of the worldwide deflation?
To some small extent this decline [in prices] may be attributed to 
the over-production (or under-consumption) of some important 
commodities, but basically … it is to be regarded as the sudden outcrop 
of a period of accumulating deflation. In other words, the slump in 
the general price level has for its principal cause an appreciation in the 
buying power of money units, in the last resort gold. The supply of 
gold, allowed to function in the monetary system, and the credit money 
linked to it, have not only not kept pace with the volume of goods to be 
exchanged, but have seriously fallen behind. (p. 1326)
The problem was exacerbated by the accumulation of hoards of gold in the 
United States and France. ‘These two things, chaotic movement of gold and 
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maldistribution, have led’, said Irvine, ‘to the sterilisation of a considerable 
part of the existing gold supply. This is the initiating cause of the slump in 
prices and the world-wide business depression’ (p. 1327).
Reducing wages would have little or no beneficial effect; for ‘the vast 
mass of unemployment is more due to business dislocation brought about 
by deflation than to the resistance of the workers to wage reduction. Even if 
all wages were adjusted to the new cost of living, and in accordance with our 
reduced national income, industries starving for orders would be unable to 
absorb any great percentage of unemployed’ (p. 1328). Insofar as the problem 
had a local component, it was due to the behaviour of the monetary system:
[A]ll classes, influenced by fears for the future, have begun to hoard and 
restrict their normal rate of expenditure—a so-called thrift policy which 
gives the finishing touches to the ruin already wrought by deflation. 
The piling up of fixed deposits in banks—though very acceptable to 
the banks—is the barometer which shows clearly the fears of the non-
wage earning classes. They are spending much less than usual, and 
they have practically lost the spirit of enterprise. In the meantime, 
the banks, following a time honoured—or should we not rather say, a 
time dishonoured—practice in periods of depression begin to call up 
overdrafts, and generally to contract credit.
The pressure they bring to bear upon their clients—the entrepreneur 
class in all industries—compels the latter to unload securities on the 
market. The result, as we saw some months ago, a slump in the share 
market and a drop in property values of between 25 per cent and 50 
per cent. … Naturally deposits have gone down. Bankers did not seem 
to realise that the deposits would go down with the cancellation of 
overdrafts, but that is the inevitable effect; so the money available for 
expenditure has been correspondingly reduced. … The banks, it may be 
said, had no choice, and in truth their problem was far from easy. They 
needed cash to preserve a safe ratio between cash and demand liabilities 
and most of all they wanted money in London. But however justifiable 
it may be from a purely institutional point of view, contracting credit at 
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a time like this is like throwing a monkey-wrench into the productive 
mechanism … (p. 1329)
Irvine now moved on to recommend a monetary policy of controlled 
inflation. Before doing so, he asked for the Chief Judge’s guidance, because ‘it 
may not be quite relevant to your inquiry’. Dethridge replied that the Court 
would be glad to hear Irvine’s comments on the general situation. ‘The more 
the Court has proceeded with this inquiry’, he said, ‘the more it feels the 
difficulty of separating any mere wage issue from the general situation’ (p. 
1330). That was not a stance consistently taken by the Court. At times, it 
emphasised that its role was confined to setting wages and that other authorities 
were responsible for wider policy.
Conscious of the bad odour then attaching to the idea of ‘inflation’, 
Irvine said that ‘inflation pushed to extremes, as we know from the oft-quoted 
historical examples, has little to recommend it’. But the fear of inflation was 
itself a danger:
Impressed by these evils of extreme inflation, many people are strong 
in the conviction that even the slightest tendency to inflation must be 
ruthlessly checked. This has given them a bias in favour of deflation. 
Australia and most other countries are having a taste of deflation and 
the medicine has brought them to death’s door. … On occasion it may 
be necessary to inflate or deflate. Just now, in Australia, it is practically a 
question of life and death to stop deflation and initiate a movement in 
the opposite direction. (p. 1332)
Irvine then advanced specific proposals:
The first step is to make available to primary producers, manufacturers 
and commercial businesses sufficient credit to enable them to get going 
again. There must be nothing indiscriminate in this; nor do we need to 
put into force any novel principles. The banks should control the use 
of the new credit and should secure advances in the ordinary way. The 
process, in fact, should be identical with that used by banks in creating 
bank credit. … If a suitable amount of credit be made available, in 
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this way, it will soon begin to absorb the unemployed … as demand 
for commodities increases. … Every unemployed worker taken on 
again and every business enabled to start again or extend its operations 
will produce more wealth and at the same time provide a market for 
increased output, because they provide markets for each other. There 
is a fair amount of truth in the old adage about taking in each other’s 
washing. … Increased demand in the consumption market stimulates 
the demand for capital as well as consumption goods. With normal 
credit facilities restored and signs of increasing demand, business 
men take heart and timid capitalists venture into the arena again. … 
Confidence is restored. The banks who advanced the credit and the 
business men who borrowed it are now justified by all-round renewed 
activity. The downward movement of prices is checked. That in itself is 
an encouragement. But presently … prices recover sufficiently to make 
enterprise profitable. (p. 1333)
The expansion of credit would be achieved in the following manner:
The Government may arrange, through the Commonwealth Bank, for 
the issue of notes in such quantities as may be considered necessary 
and prudent—a matter which should not be left to political guesswork, 
but should be determined by a monetary council, consisting of 
statisticians, economists, bankers, etc, competent to assemble facts and 
apply scientific principles to their interpretation. Hitherto Australian 
Governments have entrusted the investigation of economic matters to 
prominent business men or lawyers, with the result that even if the 
relevant facts are assembled, the inferences to be properly drawn from 
them … are left to minds without specific training in handling the order 
of facts. … I should not allow any bank, not even the Commonwealth 
Bank, to determine what amount of credit we should have. The work 
of the bank is to use the credit. It is not their work to determine the 
policy. … A large part, if not the whole, of such issue as may be made 
on their advice of the ‘Monetary Council’ should naturally be allotted 
to the commercial banks. … I would issue to the commercial banks, 
because they are in touch with the whole business community, and 
their experience lies in this direction. That is the granting of credit on 
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good security. They can carry out that job better than any government 
department can. (p. 1334)
Irvine had a breathtaking faith in the powers of economic diagnosis and 
prescription: ‘The collection of price statistics and facts indicating other 
economic tendencies is now so complete that there is little difficulty in 
estimating the effects of quantitative changes in the volume of currency and 
credit. These effects are not a matter of opinion or traditional expectation, but 
of fact and scientific measurement’ (p. 1335).
The picture thus painted by Irvine was one of an economy affected 
by external deflation which had failed to protect itself against the effects of 
the deflation but might do so with a well-conceived monetary policy. It is 
very likely, indeed, that the monetary response to the Depression seriously 
exacerbated it. That was certainly Copland’s opinion. But the problem with 
Irvine’s diagnosis was its failure to allow for the loss of real income inherent 
in the fall in the terms of trade and directly evident in the decimated incomes 
of the rural sector and the loss of real resources due to the cessation of foreign 
loans. How should these real losses be absorbed and distributed? Irvine’s 
principal response to this question was to dispute the significance of the losses. 
The goods that Australia exported were merely ‘surpluses’ to be disposed of 
after satisfying the requirements of the local population:
We have got into the habit of depreciating the importance of our 
domestic production and consumption, and of exaggerating the 
importance of the surplus. We have allowed the surplus … to dominate 
the internal situation; in other words, we have let the tail wag the dog. 
Now, the surpluses over and above what we have reserved for a high 
standard of living have undoubtedly enabled us to borrow freely for 
developmental purposes, and, in addition, to import a large volume of 
goods. From that point of view, the surplus is important, but it has still 
to be regarded as something over and above what we produce for our 
own consumption … (p. 1337)
Dethridge asked whether the loss of £60 million did not work ‘to 
our real detriment’. Irvine replied that an increased volume of exports was 
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necessary to service the debt and to pay for any given quantity of imports. But 
the Government had acted to curb imports; and ‘the imports must be regarded 
as the only benefit which we got by exporting our surplus’. Dethridge made 
the seemingly obvious comment:
Undoubtedly, but the imports did not represent a mere superfluity 
which we could do without, without much inconvenience or loss; but 
they did, in effect, I think, mean a substantial gain to the community, 
in this way that the imports, or the proceeds of those imports, enabled, 
for instance, a lot of constructional work to be done by the Government 
and so on; and, without those imports, we have not got the means to 
keep the AWU men—Mr Grayndler’s people—going on construction 
work …? (p. 1338)
Irvine replied that if Dethridge meant machinery which Australia could not 
make for itself, then it was essential; ‘but I fancy that our imports were largely 
things which we could very well have done without—things which do not 
really touch the Australian standard of living’. Dethridge interposed: ‘There is 
a good deal of truth in that’, encouraging Irvine to continue:
And it looks to me as if the situation now is that, in Australia, if we 
like to employ all our people in the ordinary way, we can produce a 
very solid banquet for all our people. … I am inclined to think that 
we may work to a large extent independently of what you may call the 
international or foreign parity in prices and things of that kind. … We 
have rather considered that the world’s parity should control the whole 
situation in Australia. I do not think it should. In my opinion, we might 
establish a price quite different from the world parity, in order to secure 
to the farmer at least a fair return on the local consumption. Then the 
rest is surplus that we do not want, and we have to put it away. It might 
then pay us to burn it; but it is the surplus which we send abroad and 
get the best price we can for. (p. 1339)
When Beeby observed that ‘we must send something abroad’, Irvine 
replied: ‘Yes, to pay for our obligations abroad. I mean, the interest on 
borrowed money, and that kind of thing; but I think that we shall have to 
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ignore other countries, and really organise our own industries independently 
of them’. The evidence continued:
Beeby J: We will have to evolve a price level of our own for local 
consumption? --- Undoubtedly.
And a corresponding wage level? --- Yes. You see, if we do not do that, 
we may be steadily reducing our whole population down to the standard 
of China or some other country—a very low standard of living. That is 
not necessary in Australia. (p. 1339)
Thus the real loss, which was so central to Copland’s evidence, was to 
Irvine a minor inconvenience. The imports which had been made available by 
exports and foreign borrowing were, to a large extent, dispensable. It was true 
that the Scullin Government had adopted a policy of curtailing imports by 
tariffs and direct controls. What was not true, however, was that the supplies 
forgone were irrelevant to the country’s ability to support a standard of living. 
Irvine had not answered Copland’s contention that the reduced capacity to 
import was a real loss which had, somehow, to be shared among the population.
Dethridge asked whether Irvine had ‘formed any view or opinion on 
the question of employment and unemployment in the reduction of wages’. 
Irvine’s answer was:
I do not think that the idea that, if you reduce wages you take up a 
large number if the unemployed, because it would pay industries to take 
them at a reduced rate, would affect the situation very much. Those 
industries are not deterred by that just now. They are deterred by two 
things. First of all, they cannot get credits from the banks to go on with, 
and, secondly, they have no orders. (p. 1340A)
This, of course, accorded with Irvine’s stress on the monetary aspects of the 
Depression. When Beeby asked whether credit might be more easily obtained 
by producers whose costs were reduced, Irvine replied: ‘Then, if you have tried 
all other methods of reducing costs, you may have to fall back on labour, if 
you simply cannot carry on; but, in view of the situation in Australia where 
we have an abundance, we do not want to reduce the real wage. There is no 
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necessity for it, in my opinion’ (p. 1340A). Asked how the pastoral industry 
could carry on without some reduction in its costs of production, including 
wages, he answered: ‘Going on those lines an industry might require no labour 
cost at all or only the cost of a little rice sufficient to keep its labour alive; if you 
want that kind of industry in Australia I do not think it is worth discussing’ 
(p. 1344).
Irvine’s trivialising of the diminished capacity to import left the Judges 
uneasy, as is apparent in the following exchange:
Beeby J: I am very much concerned about the question of the national 
income, whether it is merely a change of money values or not. We have 
30 millions of interest to pay in London and we want £15 millions 
worth of goods which we cannot make.17 So in exchange for these goods 
we send to London 200,000 bales of wool and 17 million bushels of 
wheat. But London now says they won’t do that any longer, but want 
300,000 bales of wool and 100 million bushels of wheat; is that not a 
definite fall in our national income? --- In this way, we have got to give 
so much away to the public creditor, that limits the amount of goods we 
can get as a return for our exported surplus.
Dethridge C J: And those goods may be indispensable to us? --- They 
may be necessary or they may be luxuries.
…
Drake-Brockman J: Surely under the circumstances that obtain at the 
present time … there must be a very serious loss to the country? --- I 
have admitted that there may be a decrease in the national income … 
but we still have got a lot of unused labour here, people who could be 
set to work.
…
Dethridge C J: That involves the other question as to whether something 
else should not be done, that is to say, whether credit in some way or 
other should not be released to start that work going. And what has been 
17  The ‘£15 millions’ is probably a transcript error. It is likely that Beeby said ‘£50 millions’.
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said is certainly very weighty indeed, but then comes the question that, 
assuming that to be done, and assuming we get back to the position we 
were in a few years ago, and that there was no normal unemployment, 
then superimposed on that condition of things we have this real loss to 
the community because the world outside is not giving us as much as it 
was. … Assume that the world outside says ‘No longer do you get that 
£50 millions worth of goods’. Isn’t that a serious loss to the community; 
does it not hit everyone? --- I should say it is a loss undoubtedly.
And a real loss? --- I would still like your Honour to impress my view 
that what we export from Australia is really in the nature of a surplus.
But for that surplus we are getting these real goods? --- After we have 
had a very high standard of living, and then that surplus is thrown on 
the world market for what it will fetch.
Drake-Brockman J: But we must not forget that that high standard of 
living was brought about as a result of that surplus? --- Undoubtedly. 
(pp. 1346–1347)
Several questions by employer representatives suggested that it was 
only fair for the basic-wage earner to carry his share of the burdens that the 
community had to bear. Irvine’s answer was two-fold. First, there was the issue 
of effectiveness: although one had to admit ‘the suffering of the unemployed 
and the suffering of the farmer’, the question was ‘how are we to get rid of that; 
and I cannot see how the reducing of wages is going to make any improvement’ 
(p. 1355). Second, there was the issue of ability to ‘pay’. Carolan argued that 
higher income recipients had to bear much of the burden of taxation and 
providing for capital requirements. Irvine replied:
It is the ability to bear which you have to consider. When you reach 
the lowest rung, the ability to bear more is very little, whereas, the 
higher you go, the ability to bear more is greater. I think that has to be 
considered in the question of making everybody share alike or share in a 
percentage. … In one case, it might be absolute deprivation of necessary 
food, clothes and so on. In the other case it might only mean the price 
of a cigar, or some comfort of that kind. (p. 1357)
412 Australian Wage Policy
Irvine did not, at this stage of his evidence, repeat his earlier argument 
about the minor importance of the fall in the terms of trade. He did, however, 
return to his contention that the abundance of production was such as to 
support a rising standard of living for workers. Asked by Crofts for his opinion 
about an announcement by J T Lang, Premier of New South Wales, that the 
44-hour week would be restored in the State railways and wages probably 
increased, Irvine declined to give a direct answer, but continued:
I think there is one point perhaps I did not bring out this morning, 
and it is this, that with an increasing power of production taking place 
everywhere in the world today, wages and earnings ought to be going 
up. In other words, if wages are not going up then leisure ought to be 
going up, because the movement now really is in the direction of a 
tremendous improvement in the technique of production, so that in 
quite a short time the industries of the world ought to be able to do all 
their work in a very few months of the year. There is no Utopia about 
that, they can do it now. (p. 1370)
9.2.6 Other ‘economic’ evidence
At the beginning of the Sydney hearings, Crofts told the Court that ‘there are 
men who are not political economists teaching in Universities, men such as 
Mr Gordon Massey, men who have given much time and thought to political 
economy and who can express themselves, and with their practical knowledge, 
may be of more value as witnesses than these men who are attached to 
Universities’ (pp. 1084–1085). Beeby urged him to call them. The following 
is a brief account of the evidence given by such witnesses.
J A L Gunn, a chartered accountant, had (jointly) written a booklet, Is 
This Depression Necessary? He agreed with Copland’s evidence ‘as to the facts 
presented’, but not with his inferences. Copland had not given proper weight 
to falling prices. The banks’ failure to adjust the exchange rate with sufficient 
speed and to a sufficient extent had the effect that the fall in prices received by 
exporters caused a drastic fall in their incomes, which flowed through to other 
sectors. All this generated a falling internal price level. When Beeby described 
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as ‘a very obvious truism’ the proposition that rising prices cause optimism and 
falling prices caused pessimism, Gunn replied:
Yes, I wish to stress that particularly in connection with wages. … 
Coming down to the wage earner, this spending power is reduced 
through unemployment, intermittent employment, a fear of loss of 
employment, and the necessity to maintain some cash balances to pay 
for fixed charges out of deplenished income thereby causing a falling off 
in the spending power. There is the loss of health and strength of the 
worker through diminished spending power, and a loss in efficiency. 
A permanent fall in wages would bring about a change in the habits 
of the people. There would be a lowering of the standard of living and 
a consequent tendency to destroy the home market. … A reduction 
in wages cannot solve or help to solve unemployment where you have 
falling prices. … There is a real contraction in the currency through a 
change in the habits of the people. Men, and women more so, tend to 
hold larger cash balances in the household itself. That itself tends to 
destroy the velocity of money, and a real contraction of the exchange 
of goods and services. … A reduction in wages will reduce spending 
power, and that in turn will reduce orders, so that any possible gain 
to the employer … is wiped out by a still further slowing down in 
production—a still further break down in the mechanism of exchange. 
Next thing, the employer will ask for a further reduction because the 
last reduction was inadequate; and so I contend that the vicious process 
can go on until every worker can starve in his backyard … (p. 1109)
Although Gunn promised several times that he would propose an alternative 
strategy, he failed to do so, except perhaps for the implied support for 
devaluation and the insistence on not reducing wages. Dethridge and Beeby 
pressed on him the need to react to the fall in real spending power. Gunn 
argued that the fall in income should be regarded as temporary and claimed to 
have a cable from J M Keynes saying that everything depended on whether the 
fall was permanent or temporary. When Beeby said ‘Then you are assuming 
that the fall in our income from exports is only temporary’, Gunn replied: 
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‘Yes, I hope so, because I believe that the remedy lies in restoring the internal 
value of our export prices to their 1928 level’ (p. 1116).
C A Alison was an ‘engineer and manufacturer’. He had an engineering 
degree, but had not done economics at the university. His evidence was rather 
similar to Gunn’s, which is not surprising, as he and Gunn were joint authors 
of Is This Depression Necessary? He was more concrete about the adverse effects 
of wage reduction and the virtues of expanding the currency. Copland, he 
said, had not ‘interpreted the psychological factors of monetary policy in the 
proper manner’. A wage reduction
would be disastrous for the manufacturer as it would rid him of a 
considerable quantity of the purchasing power of the people that he 
now has. He may, for instance, think that he is getting a benefit by a 
reduction in wages, but it would only be in apparent self-interest, and it 
would be a sacrifice of the real self-interest and it would not annihilate 
the unemployment that is with us today unless prices started to rise 
again. But if you have a reduction of the actual wages as they are at the 
present time, I think that such a thing has a psychological effect upon 
the average man of such a nature as to make him draw in his horns as far 
as spending it goes. And that will cause a very great diminution in the 
velocity of money, and, if you reduce wages with the idea of spreading 
the money over a greater number of people, as is commonly thought, I 
consider that it would not help the situation in the slightest. It would 
be disastrous. (pp. 1138–1139)
Alison favoured an expansion of the money supply (induced by an 
increase of currency). This would directly stimulate spending and would also 
cause increases in the prices of exports and imports. The Depression ‘would 
be over in a few months, because the primary producer would then be getting 
a price for his products which would be the price at which most of most 
of the money contracts over the last few years have been made’. Dethridge 
commented:
The primary producer, for the purpose of his purchases in Australia, 
would be getting a price for his own goods similar to that which you 
415Keith Hancock
say has ruled for some time past; but he would be furnished with that 
purchasing power by whom—by the rest of the community here. That 
is how it would work out, surely. … It may be that it would not be 
unjust that the primary producer should be subsidised in that way, but 
let us recognise the fact that the subsidy would be granted at the expense 
of the rest of the community here not being primary producers? (pp. 
1143–1144)
Alison said that ‘if our monetary system had been properly correlated 
here—that is, exchange rates had been allowed to move—the fall in prices 
abroad would not have affected us to any great extent, except as regards 
paying back the debt interest, I will admit’. Dethridge pursued the point of 
the unavoidable real loss:
Dethridge C J: It is not a matter of financing only. It is a question of 
not having exchangeable goods? --- We have the same quantity of goods 
to send overseas.
You know what I mean. We have not the same quantity of goods in their 
result, because we can only get half as many British goods or British 
settlements for that same quantity of goods. That is the difficulty ---
Mr Crofts: And the witness is trying to show the Court how we can get 
---
Dethridge C J: If the witness can satisfy the Court that, by some 
internal arrangement of our monetary and credit system we can get the 
equivalent of shiploads of goods coming into Sydney harbour, Hobson’s 
Bay, and all the other ports, then his theory may have something to be 
said for it; but that is the real thing. (pp. 1192–1193)
G V Portus, from the University of Sydney, attended the Court, 
apparently at the behest of the unions.18 Crofts told the Court, however, that 
Portus could not assist it: ‘We have found that out, and Mr Portus, if I may 
say it without any disrespect to him, is an economic historian, and does not 
know the subject in the same way as Professor Copland or other economists 
18  Higgins, in A New Province for Law and Order, thanked Portus ‘for his encouragement and 
valuable assistance in preparing this little book for the press’ (Higgins 1922, p. vi).
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know it.’ Dethridge expressed ‘regret to Mr Portus for giving him unnecessary 
trouble’ and was on the point of bidding him adieu when Fraser suggested that 
‘the Professor can give some light on the subject, at any rate as to one or two 
arguments against a reduction in wages’ (p. 1179). Portus was duly called as a 
Court witness. Overall, his evidence was rather equivocal, which may be the 
reason why Crofts was reluctant to call him.
Though he agreed with Copland’s statement of the facts, Portus thought 
that there were arguments against a general reduction of wages. One was its 
limited capacity to offset the decline in export incomes:
I do not think a reduction of wages is going to help primary industry. 
… Our primary industries depend on world markets, and all world 
markets for primary industries are contracting, the prices are falling 
because there is so much surplus stuff all over the world. … But I do 
not think any 10 per cent reduction in wages is going to affect the size 
of the market overseas for Australian primary products. (p. 1200)
Another argument called for a long-run approach to wage-setting. It 
also invoked the idea of the ‘standard of living’:
But I think there is a broad social aspect which to my way of thinking, 
we cannot altogether disregard, although it is rather hard to get it before 
people, because if you speak like this people generally regard it as mere 
socialism … But it does seem to me that even if a substantial wage 
reduction effected a slight increase in employment (and that is very 
doubtful) on broad social grounds there are reasons why it would not 
be justified.
Now this country has adopted an ideal of a high standard of living for 
its workers. This is quite a commonplace to anyone who has troubled 
to read the records of wage fixation in the Courts of this country. It is 
also realised by those people that it is necessary for the community to 
exert continuous pressure on the employers to insure that they shall 
pay the highest possible wage. … It seems to me that if you take a 
long view, there is something to be said for sustaining that pressure on 
the employers even at the expense of slight unemployment in times 
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of adversity, for this reason, that if you attempt to reduce wages and 
conditions, in times of prosperity you will find that when trade gets 
back to its old levels and the workers again realise it, you are going to 
have all sorts of difficulties, all sorts of industrial disputes, in the attempt 
to get back to their old standards. … And it does seem to me this is a 
thought that should give us pause before as a community we consent 
to reduce the basic wage. It is a living standard here. I don’t think it is 
a living standard of a very high sort, but it is high in comparison with 
that of other countries in the world. All these arguments must stand 
up to the test of unemployment, and if unemployment continues, that 
indicates that wages are too high. But generally I feel that the prospect 
of recovery from this depression merely through a reduction in wages is 
not a very rosy one. (p. 1201–1202)19
F A A Russell KC was formerly a Lecturer in Commercial and Industrial 
Law and also in Economics at the University of Sydney. Before taking up 
law, he had completed a Master’s degree in political philosophy among other 
subjects, ‘and at that time I was also a student of economics, though there was 
no school in the University at that time’. He had lectured for Irvine. And he 
had been the Chairman of many Industrial Boards in New South Wales.20
The thrust of Russell’s evidence was the necessity of a stabilisation of the 
value of money. Want of stability ‘is injurious to industry, more particularly, I 
think, with falling prices than with rising prices, because in the case of falling 
prices, the producer is always selling on a falling market’ (p. 1223). He quoted 
with approval an article of J M Keynes reprinted in the Sydney Morning Herald 
in 1928: ‘The Treasury and the Bank of England,’ said Keynes, ‘have made 
the fundamental blunder of believing that, if they looked after the deflation 
of prices, the deflation of costs would look after itself. Regarding these two 
different things as though they were practically the same thing they did not 
19  In his autobiography, Portus said that the Court, with the exception of Beeby, showed 
little interest in his evidence (Portus 1953). The transcript belies this. Dethridge and Drake-
Brockman engaged him in quite extensive discussion; it was Beeby who had little to say.
20  In 1914, while he was Chairman of the Industrial Boards, Russell presented a paper to the 
British Association, which met in Sydney. His paper was published in the Economic Journal 
(Russell 1915).
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hesitate to commit the country to a deflation of costs without having any 
idea or any plan as to how it was to be brought about, yet it is extraordinarily 
difficult to deflate costs’ (p. 1230).
There were, said Russell, some prospects of international monetary 
change. But in the meantime,
it would be correct and sound to use some local palliative which might 
be called inflation. I have used the word ‘inflation’ here because I am 
facing the question that it would mean some increase of paper money, 
but it would not be a real or harmful inflation if it were applied in the 
production of marketable goods. At least, I do not think so, and my 
view is that, psychologically, the situation is such that there should be 
an attempt to do something of that kind. (p. 1236)
The banks, Russell concluded, should be encouraged to issue their own notes.
Russell made no comment on the issue of a wage reduction. The point 
of his evidence, from the unions’ viewpoint, was to show the Court that other 
measures were appropriate to the economic problems confronting the country.
H W Parkinson was a member of the Institute of Civil Engineers, a Fellow 
of the Royal Economic Society and author of a pamphlet, Unemployment: Its 
Cause and Cure. He regarded Copland as ‘a very dangerous witness’. He read 
from a critique of a paper on ‘The Restoration of Economic Equilibrium’ 
which Wood, Copland, and Giblin had delivered to the Sydney branch of the 
Economic Society.21 The Depression, said Parkinson, was worldwide:
That fact alone shows that the local effects tabulated in the paper are 
not the real cause of the trouble; and obviously the remedies suggested 
are of local, not worldwide application; they may be regarded as special 
palliatives for the special case of Australia. As such there is much to be 
said for some of them, much against others. That taxation of incomes 
derived from property and some reduction in land values is necessary, 
may be accepted, but that real wages should be reduced is, I believe, 
an egregious error. The apparently fair proposal that all should suffer 
21  I have not been able to locate this paper.
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the loss of an equal proportion of income is founded on the erroneous 
assumption that everyone is equally entitled to his present income; that 
the idle man (or the industrious man) is as much entitled to his dividends 
… as the worker is to his salary. The thesis is untenable. (p. 1311)
Parkinson drew on J A Hobson’s Wealth and Life to support a reallocation 
of income from savers to consumers.
Unemployment, at home and abroad, has already reduced the purchasing 
power of consumers and brought on a trade depression and so it is gaily 
proposed to still further reduce purchasing power—on the homeopathic 
principle! If real wages, that is, the quantity of commodities and services 
given to the bulk of the population, are reduced, it is obvious that a 
smaller proportion of the national output will be taken by workers. The 
authors make no attempt to show that reduced wages would be more 
than offset by greater numbers employed—in fact, the idea is absurd. 
(p. 1312)
The primary producer should receive a bounty—a natural corollary to 
the protection of secondary industries: ‘Of course, it should be hedged around. 
The primary producer, like the worker, should be put on a living wage. He 
should be helped until he gets, at any rate, £250 or so a year’ (p. 1317).
C E Martin, a Bachelor of Economics and a member of the Royal 
Economic Society, had recently been elected to the Legislative Assembly in 
New South Wales. Before that, he was a University District Tutor ‘lecturing 
to the various classes in economics in addition to attending to the general 
administration of that work’ (p. 1373).
No economist, he thought, could present evidence to the Court on 
the matter before it without referring to the increase in machine production. 
Economists were coming to the conclusion that there would be ‘a very definite 
and permanent displacement of man power’. Related to this was the problem 
of ‘getting purchasing power to the people’. Martin did not draw any specific 
deduction from this, but presumably he (like Parkinson) perceived a need for 
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a distribution of income that was more, rather than less, favourable to wage-
earners.
The monetary policy then being pursued was, said Martin, deflationary, 
and undue haste had been evidenced by the authorities in Australia attempting 
to revert to the gold standard. It was essential to have ‘a carefully managed 
dose of inflation’. Martin wanted ‘to introduce the Court to the question of 
interest’:
The interest rates at present in existence are not only pressing heavily 
upon Governments, but in particular are pressing heavily upon the 
farming community. … I would like to point out that actually the 
interest rates and the interest charges on the farmer are a far greater and 
more difficult charge for him to bear than are the wages costs that we 
hear so much about. … I just read a very brief extract from the ‘Index 
of the Svenska Handelsbanken’ an article on ‘The Future of the Rate of 
Interest’ by J M Keynes the eminent Swedish [sic] economist. He says, 
‘The slump is due to a retardation of new real investment so that it is 
falling seriously behind the level of current saving. This is the natural 
and inevitable result of maintaining, year after year, a rate of interest 
which would have been considered high at almost any time during the 
nineteenth or early twentieth centuries, and is surely preposterously 
high in an environment so well equipped as is the contemporary world 
with fixed investment of every description’. (p. 1375)
Dethridge asked whether Keynes had explained how interest rates could be 
brought down. Were they not ‘the subject of competition just as are other 
services or commodities’? Keynes, said Martin, had not explained this. Beeby 
suggested that ‘now we have the associated banks there is no competition’. 
Martin said that since the war there had been a psychology of high interest 
rates, ‘and until there is a general settling down I am afraid the interest rates 
will remain high’ (p. 1375).
He asserted that the Court ‘should endeavour to maintain a definite 
and real standard of living in Australia’. There was much room for increased 
efficiency (including in the wool industry) and reduction of distribution costs:
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I suggest that, if your Honours adopt the course of refusing to consent 
to wage reductions, you will force upon employers these very necessary 
economic changes. It has been observed in American industry repeatedly, 
that, when they face a difficult situation, they turn around and examine 
the question of reducing other expenses, and, in many cases, they do it 
successfully. I do not want to suggest that that is always the solution.
Dethridge commented: ‘It means they look around, and one of the first things 
they tackle is labour costs. They put in machines instead of men, and increase 
the technological unemployment’ (p. 1378).
Gordon Massey, who had cross-examined Copland for the unions, was 
called as the Court’s witness.22 His statement and his evidence contained much 
verbiage which has to be penetrated to find the essential contentions. The 
following passage encapsulates his main points:
Though there has been a real loss of income from export commodities, it 
is suggested that the amount of loss has not been ascertained sufficiently 
to form a reliable opinion upon the position, and though there has been 
a cessation of loan credits, this cannot be regarded in the nature of a loss, 
but rather as a situation of pause in the development of national assets 
which—taking all the circumstances into account—is an immediate 
benefit.
Discussing the fall in export prices, Massey said that the proper response 
was adjustment of the exchange rate, which presented ‘a far more equitable 
and essentially practical opportunity of spreading the real loss of revenue, 
than any other means’ (p. 1424). The cessation of foreign loans was beneficial 
because of the tendency for the exchange rate to respond to ‘a deficiency of 
purchaseable [sic] sterling claims on London’ and the ‘transfer to Australia 
of the need of manufacturing or otherwise providing for the replacement of 
imported commodities’. Hence ‘consideration of the reduction of £30 millions 
22  Fraser told the Court that Massey was apprehensive about his treatment by his employer, 
the Victorian Railways. Dethridge thought that the Court’s subpoena should be ample 
protection (p. 1408).
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in loan moneys as a cause for reducing living conditions within Australia is 
fallacious’ (p. 1424).
The policy of reducing real wages, recommended by Copland, would 
exacerbate the problem of deflation. Its beneficial effects on the level of activity 
were presumed, not demonstrated. In fact, it would be disruptive:
Industry, trade and commerce within Australia, have been built up, 
particularly since the inception of the Commonwealth, upon a policy 
of high wages … Therefore, consideration of any reduction or re-
distribution must take into account the disorganisation and dislocation 
which must arise—and the consequent destruction of capital values—
arising from any re-division of the national dividend.
But one of the chief results arising out of a re-division of the national 
dividend will arise from a serious decrease in the velocity of flow of 
money. The purchase of the cheaper consumer commodities by wage 
earners greatly facilitates the flow of money and there is little doubt that 
this factor had a considerable effect upon the prosperity of the United 
States until the present fall in the price level affected the economic 
situation as in this country.
Taking all the considerations into account, it is contended that the 
resultant dislocation of trade and commerce brought about by a re-
division of the national income will outweigh any apparent economic 
benefits. (pp. 1439–1440)
Later in his evidence, Massey provided what was probably the strongest 
statement of the case against the Copland prescription:
The community income or spending money is alleged to have suffered 
a loss, and it can be said in respect of the alleged loss that
1. Part is no loss at all—namely, £30,000,000 which alleged loss, in 
the writer’s firm opinion, is a great national benefit at the present 
moment and is likely to be still more beneficial as events proceed.
2. Part is immediately correctible—namely, that part due to losses 
from internal trade and commerce.
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3. Part is real, inasmuch as the reduced value of wool and wheat give the 
community less claim than heretofore on sterling or commodities 
in London or elsewhere.
…
The loss to be regarded as real for the time being is, therefore, only that 
loss arising from the decline in values of wool and wheat. … No one, 
so far, appears to have successfully attacked the problem of the means 
whereby farmers and graziers are to be induced to produce the additional 
volume of export commodities demanded. … [I]f inducements are to 
be offered, they must be of the nature of a re-establishment of price 
levels upon the 1929 basis, and a spreading of the apparent monetary 
loss over the whole community by means of the incidence of exchange 
rates. Under these circumstances, the national dividend in respect of 
the proportion derived from internal sources will increase … [L]oan 
money having ceased, the local consumer commodity pool will require 
replenishment from local sources, and the replenishment will require 
the absorption within consumer commodity production, of the workers 
hitherto engaged on capital works. … If stabilisation does not take place 
the export industries will not export and no function which this Court 
can exercise will then effect any good purpose. If stabilisation does take 
place, the incidence of exchange will spread the loss automatically over 
the whole of the community. (pp. 1628–1629)
This was a coherent argument and it is unlikely that Copland would 
have challenged its logic. The idea that workers engaged in the ‘production’ 
of public works (funded from foreign loans) would be transferred to the 
production of import-replacing consumption goods was repeated by W B 
Reddaway in the 1937 basic wage inquiry (see Chapter 11, Subsection 11.2.2). 
Massey duly recognised that the fall in export prices entailed a real loss and did 
not resort to the specious arguments of Irvine and others about the irrelevance 
or unimportance of the exported ‘surplus’. Copland would have agreed—
and did elsewhere—that, in principle, the spreading of the loss could have 
been effected entirely by depreciation of the exchange rate. Indeed, Copland 
and his fellow economists (with the initial exception of Melville) advocated 
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depreciation, but saw a sole reliance on exchange rates as impractical. The one 
logical flaw in Massey’s analysis was his reluctance to confront the fact that 
spreading of the loss necessitated a reduction of the real wage, unless wage-
earners were to be exempted. This required that the money wage rise less than 
or fall more than prices. Massey offered no advice to the Court as to how that 
could be effected. In cross-examination, he had little answer to the point that 
merely restoring the internal price level to the 1929 level would leave the prices 
received by wool-growers far below their pre-Depression levels (p. 1661).
The unions called various other witnesses. The Court’s treatment of 
these witnesses ranged from frustration at union time-wasting to a readiness to 
engage with them about the import of their evidence. Much of this evidence 
was of very low quality. An example is that of W J Riordan, the Queensland 
Branch Secretary of the Australian Workers’ Union. Riordan said that the 
award covering rural workers in Queensland had been cancelled about 18 
months earlier (except in respect of shearers). The evidence proceeded:
Mr Crofts: Can you say as to whether there has been any increase in 
unemployment since the setting aside of the awards? --- There have [sic] 
been a considerable increase in unemployment in Queensland during 
the last 12 months.
In the rural industries? --- Yes, in every industry.
And wages have been reduced in practically every industry, have they 
not? --- They have been reduced in every industry.
And that has not only not relieved the unemployment market, but has 
actually increased it? --- Very nearly doubled it in the last 12 months, 
and there have been two reductions in the [State] basic wage during that 
period. (p. 1149)
H C Gibson gave evidence about inaccuracies in the price indices and 
his own estimates of price changes (pp. 1394 et seq.). A E Williams, Secretary 
of the Federated Clerks’ Union, New South Wales Branch, said that the main 
reason why clerks were unemployed was the calculating machines that were 
invading their work (p. 1397). C Pescia, the State Secretary of the Motor 
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Employees’ Federation, said that a wage reduction would reduce spending 
power and be the end of mass production of motor vehicles (p. 1508). Asked 
whether machinery had affected the industry, Pescia replied: ‘Yes, It has had 
a wonderful effect. As a matter of fact, I think that 65 per cent of men in 
our industry are unemployed today. Of course, that came about by over-
production by mass production’ (p. 1511).23 C G P Trevelyan, the General 
Secretary of the Musician’s Union of Australia, said that wage reduction would 
not increase employment in his industry: ‘The bulk of my members are out 
of employment not through stress or distress in the industry, but through 
other means—the introduction of mechanical music and talkies, lack of 
courage and mismanagement’ (p. 1514). T Jewell, the General Secretary of 
the Australian Tramways’ Union, argued that a general wage cut would have a 
particularly adverse impact on the financial position of public utilities because 
of the reduced ability of wage-earners to use their services and because the 
burden of fixed payments associated with past borrowing would be increased 
(pp. 1854, 1859).
G Dupree, Secretary of the Victorian Branch of the Tanning and Leather 
Dressing Section of the Australian Saddlery and Tanners’ Federation, said that 
wages were only 16 to 17 per cent of the value of output; hence a 10 per 
cent cut would represent less than 2 per cent of the value of output. Drake-
Brockman pointed out that wages were more than 50 per cent of the value of 
production (pp. 1518–1519). Dethridge addressed the advocate for the union:
You may take it that the Court is already aware of the difficulties 
confronting your industry, and I think you may take it also that the Court 
recognises that those difficulties, in your industry, probably cannot be 
surmounted by any mere reduction of wages. But the argument put 
forward in support of the application is this; the applicants say that 
taking industry as a whole, at present, and having regard to the loss 
of income and so on, industry as a whole cannot afford the present 
basic wage. They do not speak of any particular industry, because they 
23  Dethridge observed that Pescia’s evidence implied that there should be no wage reduction 
for men who were able to run motor cars and doubted that there were many such workers.
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recognise, just as well as we do, that some industries are suffering from 
causes such as the witness has referred to, which are quite apart from 
questions of wages, and can be very little affected by any alteration of 
wages. … Then it is true that evidence was given as to some industries, 
and it was suggested that a reduction of wages would facilitate the 
recovery of those industries from the present position. That evidence, 
in most instances … was not very convincing. (p. 1523)
Crofts called A C a’B Chomley, an engineer whose chief occupation at 
the time was Lecturer in Economics to the National Credit Union. This was a 
body ‘that has grown out of the Citizens Education Fellowship, that has been 
studying economics’ (p. 1557a). ‘The whole problem of wages’, he said, ‘is 
bound up with the question of the creation of new money which functions as 
purchasing power but which is not part of incomes’ (p. 1559). Chomley’s views 
were along the lines of Douglas Credit, although he expressed disagreements 
on points of detail with Major Douglas. In particular, he saw the primary 
source of the economic difficulties of the time as the failure of banks to provide 
the funds necessary for people and businesses to buy the output of industry. 
Reducing real wages would exacerbate the tendency for buying power to fall 
behind the growth of productive power (p. 1576). What was required was 
government action to expand the supply of currency to fund the purchase of 
the products of industry. When Dethridge inquired how this process could 
be controlled, Chomley replied that ‘Mr Wickens could do it on his Sundays’ 
(p. 1611). The treatment of Chomley by the Bench—notably Dethridge and 
Beeby—was surprisingly sympathetic, even if in the end it took the view that 
the adoption of Chomley’s arguments was a matter for Government rather 
than the Court. Beeby said to Chomley: ‘If you can get the Governments of 
Australia to adopt your scheme, and Mr Crofts asks for a week’s adjournment, 
I do not think the Court would oppose it.’ Dethridge added: ‘I quite agree, 
Mr Chomley, that what you have been saying is the subject of thought by a 
lot of men whose opinions are worth respecting, not only here but in other 
countries where this aspect has been considered seriously’ (p. 1612). Chomley 
was emboldened to tell the Court:
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I may mention that I asked Professor Gregory, whose real name I 
understand is Gugenheimer, two or three questions which he hedged in 
a most magnificent manner, but it was quite sufficient to show me by 
his attitude and his reaction that he knew exactly what I was driving at. 
I had the greatest admiration for the manner in which he hedged as an 
efficient tactician. (pp. 1613–1614)
Beeby remarked: ‘All I can say in conclusion is that it looks wonderful, 
but, to quote a famous phrase, I am sure there is a catch in it somewhere. 
However, I am going to consider it very closely.’ When Beeby repeated that 
Chomley had ‘given us food for thought’, Chomley replied: ‘It is more than 
that. It is complete proof ’ (p. 1699).
J F Chapple, the Acting General Secretary of the Australian Railways’ 
Union (also an advocate), gave evidence in reply to claims of the Railways 
Commissioners about the state of the industry’s finances. The main effect of 
his evidence was to cause a discussion of the relevance of the railways’ position 
to the case:
Beeby J: How much of this is there? I am wondering in what way it 
relates to the issue as to whether or not we are passing through an 
economic crisis which calls for some readjustment of wages? --- There 
is a fair amount of it.
We are all familiar with it. It has been put before the Court in different 
ways. …? --- But the Commissioners came here with very strong evidence 
of a 2½ million deficit in their working, and, even if it were that figure, 
we feel that we should be allowed to present strong argument to show 
why it should be disregarded.
…
Mr Crofts: I want to put this: The employers of this country would not 
have been before this Court at the present juncture if it had not been 
for the fact that the Commissioners of Railways had a case before the 
Court. The Court would not have been hearing the basic wage case at 
all.
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Dethridge C J: That is your inference and your statement, but I am 
not sure that it is correct. … You assume that the employers in this 
particular proceeding would not have moved if the Railways had not 
started the ball rolling. I doubt if that is so.
…
Beeby J: I had referred the matter into Court. I was asked to reduce the 
basic wage in the Metal Trades case, but I refused to do it, and referred 
the matter to the Full Court, so the matter was before the Court in that 
particular trade.
…
Dethridge C J: I may indicate that personally I do not propose to go 
over a lot of the Railways evidence again; as a matter of fact, I propose 
to forget a lot of it. … But what we are concerned with is the question as 
to whether the basic wage, which is common to all industries, should be 
reduced. That, properly speaking, to my mind, should be attacked as a 
national question, and should not be dealt with incidental to particular 
industries. Properly speaking, to my mind, consideration of the basic 
wage should be kept apart from industrial disputes. … [I]t should be 
dealt with upon a consideration of the capacity of Australia as a whole to 
bear any proposed basic wage. But unfortunately this Court cannot deal 
with it in that way; we have to deal with it in this piece-meal fashion. As 
a result we get a lot of detail evidence concerning particular industries 
which is not of much value. Unfortunately we feel that we cannot reject 
that evidence altogether; we have to admit it, and then forget it. (pp. 
1748–1751)
9.2.7 The best method of fixing the basic wage?
Before the addresses began, Crofts protested about a document which 
had been given to him by a representative of the employers and was, apparently, 
to be furnished to the Court. It comprised 30 pages of typed foolscap written 
by Copland, a Bank of New South Wales circular containing an article by 
Copland, and another article by Copland. ‘What I do complain about’, said 
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Crofts, ‘is that the employers prepared the professor to give evidence for them. 
He was put in the box and accepted as the Court’s witness. … The statement 
… comments on the evidence by Professor Irvine and other witnesses and, I 
am informed, it does not do them justice’ (pp. 1869–1870).
This led to the following response by Dethridge:
That is the disadvantage about a Court, as I have said before, having 
the function of determining the basic wage. I have repeated myself over 
and over again upon that most unsatisfactory provision. The ideal body 
to decide upon the amount of the basic wage is a body composed of a 
number of representatives. Such a body would comprise, say, two or three 
men like Professor Copland, and two or three men like Professor Irvine, 
or, at any rate, one man like Professor Irvine; one like Professor Copland; 
a man like Mr Gordon Massey; it may be one or two representatives 
of employers; and one or two representatives of labour. They should 
not sit in public at all. They should get together and exchange views 
after deliberation, lengthy and expert consideration, but with each side 
represented by experts, so that they could formulate their conclusions 
without being subject to all sorts, what shall I say, of propaganda, in 
the Court and outside of the Court. It is useless to disguise the fact that 
this Court … is being subjected to all sorts of propaganda, to some 
extent in the Court, but to a much greater extent outside of the Court 
… in the press by various views, meetings of various kinds by parties 
interested, statements by employers, statements by union secretaries of 
a pronounced kind, some of them somewhat impolite, and statements 
by politicians, all with a view to influencing the decision of this Court 
… However, the job is ours until the law is altered. … Therefore, we 
have to do the best we can. In doing that, we desire to be assisted by 
expert opinions, either in the Court or outside of the Court. We must 
do the best we can to weigh the value of these opinions … If we see 
what appears to be an exposition by an expert economist or an expert of 
another kind … we will take that into consideration; we are entitled to 
do that; we are bound to do it, and we propose to do it. We want to have 
these expert opinions as far as possible subjected to critical examination 
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by both sides. Professor Copland, for instance, is unquestionably an 
expert. You may suggest that he is a partisan expert. Very well, suggest 
that, and we will remember that suggestion. (pp. 1870–1871)
Crofts maintained his protest, saying that the witnesses whom Copland 
had criticised believed that he had done them an injustice and wished to reply. 
Dethridge said that they should send their replies along to the Court.24
9.2.8 The parties’ addresses
I do not intend to summarise the arguments of the various advocates and the 
one barrister. I shall, however, refer to some of the issues that were raised and 
the Court’s responses in the course of the hearing.
C E Mundy, for the Amalgamated Engineering Union, said that the 
Court’s remarks during the case had indicated an intention ‘to fix any new 
basic wage on what the financial position of the country justifies’, with the 
standard of living a secondary consideration. That had not been the Court’s 
principle in the past and it should not be adopted now. Dethridge replied that 
the Court did not propose to go below the equivalent of 7 shillings per day in 
1907: ‘We are not asked to do that, and we do not propose to do it.’ Mundy 
then referred to the possible use of the All Items table instead of the price 
index limited to food, groceries, and house rents. We have seen earlier that 
in the early stages of the case, and especially when Wickens was in the box, 
criticisms of the C series index were made by union representatives. Gibson 
was foremost among them, and some of his criticisms seemed to have force. 
Mundy now submitted ‘that if the All Items table is going to be used, seeing 
that it is a departure from the present system or custom which the Court 
has adopted for the past 23 years, that system should not be adopted until 
such time as an inquiry has been made as to its correctness or otherwise’. 
Dethridge’s response was that ‘we shall assume that both [the A series and 
the C series indices] are compiled correctly, until a further investigation has 
been made. They are official tables which have been published for years, and 
24  I have not been able to locate either the document tendered on behalf of Copland or the 
replies.
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we will assume that they have been compiled correctly’; and ‘Government 
publications have to be regarded presumably as correct. If that were not so, the 
Court could not act on any Government publication’ (pp. 1884, 1886). In the 
event, as we shall see, the Court did not adopt the C series index until 1933.
Gibson challenged the assumption that the wage reduction sought by 
the employers would not take the basic wage below the Harvester standard. In 
the initial computation of the (A series) price index, the value for 1910 was 
set at 1000, and the Statistician produced a single number for 1907 of 875. 
Gibson (who mentioned that he had first appeared in the Court in March 
1907) disputed the reliability of this retrospective estimate:
With the exception of firms like Moran & Cato in Melbourne, and 
McIlwraith’s in Sydney, I know of no firms which keep or issue a monthly 
price list of commodities which they sell. The same thing applies in 
regard to the other services taken beside food and groceries, in regard to 
an authentic price list which can be referred to. When we come to dairy 
produce, and look at such items as onions and potatoes, and the many 
things which enter into the meat regimen, we find it almost impossible 
to get actual data as to the prices at which the respective joints were 
selling for three years prior to the investigation. I know that Sir George 
Knibbs, if he were present, would probably refute as ridiculous my 
assertion that the prices ascertained for the purpose of computing that 
figure of 1000 which he gave in 1907 were largely based on guess work 
and assumption. But to my mind it is more than a coincidence that the 
figure found for 1907 was 875; it is more than a coincidence that the 
figure of 875 divides actually by 7 … For accountancy purposes 125 
can be made equal to 1s. I am a little bit surprised that he did not fix 
the figure at 840, and thus make the calculation a little bit simpler. But 
whether it be 875 or 840, I think the contention is almost irrefutable 
that the figure itself was a matter of conjecture and guess work. (p. 1947)
Gibson also spoke of the manner in which the Court had circumscribed 
the issues in the case.
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I think it would be idle for anyone to stand up at this table and seek to 
refute that the national dividend or the national income has diminished, 
or seek to refute that cessation of public borrowing overseas … is not, 
temporarily at any rate, the position. Therefore, if those are the issues, 
to my way of thinking—and I say it with all humility, and without 
the slightest intention of being offensive—we might just as well refrain 
from addressing the Court any further … (p. 1944)
Dethridge replied that even if the facts were incontrovertible, it did not 
necessarily follow that there should be a reduction of the basic wage. Beeby 
likewise said that ‘the issue is, is wage reduction a remedy or a partial remedy 
for the new economic position which has arisen? That, to me, is the issue. … 
I was waiting anxiously to get argument on that point’ (p. 1944).
Crofts complained about the Court’s acceptance of the statement by 
Copland replying to union witnesses such as Irvine and Gunn. Dethridge 
rebuffed him: ‘I told you the other day that the Court holds itself free and in 
duty bound to exercise freedom to inform its mind in the way it thinks fair 
and just’ (p. 1971). Dethridge expanded on the point:
I know there is a difficulty in connection with investigations of this 
nature, but to let the parties know everything that influences the Court’s 
mind … is quite out of the question. To do that, taking my own case, 
for instance, it would be necessary for me to inform you of the result 
of my economic reading, which began quite a considerable number of 
years ago at the University of Melbourne, when I took Economics as 
one of my subjects, and I have kept up contact with economics to some 
extent ever since. Well, how can I inform you of the influence of that 
upon my mind? It is going to influence me, I can assure you. (p. 1973)
When Chapple attempted to discuss the condition of the railways, the 
Court’s patience was strained. The railways, said Dethridge, were a barometer 
of the general position of the country, and only in this sense were they relevant; 
but
the evidence of greatest weight rests in two categories, namely, (1) 
national income and (2) unemployment. … I think I may say that at 
433Keith Hancock
present it appears to me that the main thing, and probably the only 
thing, which this Court should consider is how far will any action that 
it takes … affect the amount of unemployment in this community at 
the present time. So far as we are concerned, unemployment is the evil 
to be remedied. (p. 1986)
Dethridge said later: ‘It will probably turn out that we will have to come to 
the conclusion that the only justification for a reduction of the basic wage is 
whether that reduction will tend to check the increase of unemployment, and 
to create more avenues of employment’ (p. 2032).
Beeby demanded a sense of perspective that was larger than the details 
of errors made by the Railways Commissioners—whether they had ‘wrongly 
built a bridge somewhere in the back country’. No one, he said,
can deny what has happened so far as our national income is concerned 
and with unemployment, that is what Mr Gibson put to the Court, and 
that is what I am interested in, namely, is a wage reduction the remedy, 
and if it must come, must it be part of a general scheme? That is what 
I am directing my mind to. I do not like constantly to be interfering 
and appearing to be irritable, but when we are dealing with a great 
national issue of that kind, to listen to trifling details of this nature is 
exasperating, and I have just about reached my limit. (p. 1986)
Beeby’s reference to a ‘general scheme’ was an allusion to Copland’s advocacy of 
a set of economic reforms whereof a wage reduction was one element: Gibson 
(and other union advocates) contended that a wage reduction should only be 
countenanced as part of an overall package, most aspects of which were outside 
the Court’s control. Copland himself had said that the wage reduction would 
have the greatest benefit if it were implemented as part of a wider plan, but had 
maintained that the reduction was necessary even if the other measures were 
not taken. Beeby said that the union argument which appealed most to him 
was Gibson’s contention that ‘this Court should not accept the old-fashioned 
principle that the first thing to do in the time of depression is to reduce wages; 
if economic forces do force a reduction of wages, it should come not first, but 
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should be part of a general scheme to bring about a re-establishment of things 
on a new basis, if it is to come at all’ (p. 2025–2026).
During Grayndler’s submissions, attention reverted to the question of 
‘spending power’. Grayndler submitted:
Naturally, no one denies that there has been a drop in the national 
income. The reason for it is not only that there are no markets overseas 
for our products but that our local markets are not being supplied 
because the people have not the money to purchase the things which 
we grow and manufacture. Therefore, a drop in wages would only 
accentuate the trouble. (p. 2064)
Dethridge said that there was ‘a great deal of confusion as to spending power’:
Many people think that money constitutes spending power, but there is 
no getting away from the fact that it does not. Money, after all, is only 
a tool to be used in the exercise of spending power, which is derived 
from marketable goods and services. Once we get that point clear in 
our minds we can see what follows from the fact that what constituted 
our spending power in the past—our wheat and our wool—is no longer 
spending power. (p. 2066)
The following discussion ensued:
Beeby J: I have never yet had this illustration properly met. Leave money 
out of the consideration altogether, and assume that for a hundred bales 
of wool we were getting 1000 boxes of tea in exchange. Now, the people 
from whom we get our tea say ‘We want 150 bales of wool in exchange 
for a thousand boxes of tea.’ That is what the whole question comes 
down to, it is a question of goods. … To that extent our spending power 
has been reduced.
Mr Grayndler: Let us admit that, let us say that it is a fact. Then we have 
the position that when the 150 boxes of tea arrive here, there is nobody 
to use it, or the people cannot buy it.
Beeby J: That is another matter.
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Mr Grayndler: The great majority of the working class have not the 
necessary tokens with which to buy the tea.
Dethridge C J: That may be, although it is hard to believe. There is 
no doubt that money is only a tool, nothing else, which we use in the 
exercise of our spending power. It may be that the supply of the money 
tool is insufficient; but that is a matter for considerable argument. The 
real spending power, as shown by the illustration which my brother 
Beeby just put, is the wool. (pp. 2066–2067)
Beeby added that a wage reduction entailed ‘no cutting down of the 
aggregate spending power, but simply a transfer of spending power from 
employed wage earners to other people’.
True, it may be that that transfer of spending power will stick to the 
employers. If it does, my personal opinion is that then the transfer will 
be of no benefit to the community. That is my own personal opinion, 
because to be of benefit to the community, that spending power must 
be transferred from the employed wage earners and the employers to the 
other section of the community. It is questionable whether it will be, 
but that point has to be argued out.
‘That’, said Drake-Brockman, ‘is the problem in a nutshell’ (p. 2068).
The comments from the Bench reported above suggest that the Judges 
were not fully alive to the secondary effects of the fall in export prices and foreign 
borrowing. Beeby’s homely example was to the point so far as it went: the 
decline in the terms of trade necessarily entailed a fall in the national income. 
The issue that remained, however, was whether this was to be the extent of the 
fall. Copland’s evidence squarely raised that issue. Copland proposed various 
measures to minimise the secondary effects, including a wage reduction. Other 
passages in the hearing, and the decision itself, leave little room for doubt 
that the Court did understand the distinction between primary and secondary 
effects, even if the exchange with Grayndler suggests otherwise. What the 
Judges were apparently unable to accept was the possibility that purchasing 
power might be ‘injected’ as one way of minimising the secondary effects. In a 
pre-Keynesian world, of course, they were not alone in this.
436 Australian Wage Policy
Crofts raised the issue of excessive dependence on the rest of the world. 
He referred to a statement of W M Hughes (in a pamphlet, Bond or Free?) 
that ‘we should maintain existing standards and concentrate upon making 
ourselves a self-contained nation’. ‘The Court’, said Crofts, ‘will remember 
that that really bears out what Professor Irvine has put’. Beeby agreed, but 
emphasised the problems of transition:
We may have to face the position that we simply cannot look to the 
future to maintain our prosperity by prices for the surplus products 
which we send abroad. We may have to concentrate on becoming more 
self-contained. I think that is inevitable. The difficulty is the period of 
transition—while we are changing over and finding employment for 
people who are out of employment now on account of the falling away 
of primary production. It is the period of transition to the new order. 
(p. 2116)
Dethridge made the point that a need for and possibility of restructuring 
did not make the current wage level viable:
Our national spending power … has materially been diminished as a 
result of the fall in our export prices and the cessation of borrowing. 
There has been a consequent loss of employing power. As a result a great 
many men are out of employment … To employ them will mean either 
the development of existing industries, or the extension of existing 
industries, or the creation of new. It may be that the only way to bring 
about that extension of existing industries, or that creation of new 
industries, will be by reduction of wage costs. (pp. 2121–2122)
Crofts and Dethridge discussed further the case for autarky:
Mr Crofts: But as to Professor Irvine, he referred to books. He said that 
we may say to the wool grower or to the wheat farmer, ‘You are growing 
too much wool and too much wheat.’ But he said that we import books, 
for instance, and that we should do this work for ourselves in the future; 
we may not get as good a cover as the imported, but ours will be as 
serviceable as the imported, and it will keep our people employed. And 
he said that there are many industries to which he could refer in that 
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way on which we could employ workers from the land more profitably 
than in growing wool.
Dethridge C J: It may be that there is a great deal of force in that, but 
the difficulty about all suggestions of that kind is that it will take a very 
long time to develop those new industries …
Mr Crofts: I disagree with that. Industries are being built up from day 
to day …
Dethridge C J: Unfortunately, unemployment is increasing more and 
more.
Crofts: We say that the reason is fear; the employers will not unbutton; 
and some of the employers would do so, but the banks will not allow 
them. (pp. 2126–2127)
A reference by Crofts to an article by R C Mills, based on a paper 
given to the Commonwealth Government’s Industrial Peace Conference in 
February 1929, led to discussion of the economic merits of ‘high wages’ and 
the associated issue of productivity (Mills 1929). Dethridge produced a copy 
of the Economic Record containing Mills’ paper and read from it. Mills said that 
‘there exists the too-common tendency here as elsewhere, especially in time of 
depression, to attack wages and standards, first as a method of reducing costs 
when it really should be the last resort to be undertaken only when other 
methods have been explored as an alternative to something worse’ (p. 2153). 
Crofts described Mills as being ‘in extreme opposition to Professor Copland’. 
Dethridge responded:
He is not. All he says there might be quite consistent with what 
Professor Copland said. The position is that Professor Mills simply says 
that real high wages [sic] are desirable, and I suppose all reasonable 
men agree with that. Then he goes on to say that high wages are not a 
cause of prosperity. … He says that high wages are not themselves the 
cause of prosperity, but are a result of prosperity. That is to say, high 
wages and high productivity run together. You cannot have high wages 
without high productivity. It does not matter what your money system 
is. And that, I am afraid, goes to a good deal of what you have been 
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saying. It does not matter a scrap what your money system is, what your 
currency methods are; unless you have high productivity, you cannot 
have high wages. It may be, I grant you, that your monetary system is 
very defective, and it may be that your monetary system is so defective 
as to militate against high productivity, but you cannot have high wages 
without high productivity. (pp. 2155–2156)
Crofts said that wages, in the past, had not been higher than the 
productivity of Australia warranted. Dethridge noted ‘some suggestion 
in the evidence here that, during the last 8 or 9 years, anyhow, wages have 
outstripped productivity per head of population, and that has shown itself, 
even before this pronounced slump at the present moment, in an increasing 
rate of unemployment’ (p. 2156). There ensued an exchange as to what had 
happened to productivity—a debate unaided by any specific definition of 
productivity, and much uncertainty as to what the numbers actually showed. 
Charles Crofts
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According to Dethridge, there may have been some increase in productivity 
during the 1920s, but it did not regain the level of 1911; and ‘assuming there 
has been an increase from 1920 in the production per head [of population], the 
suggestion is that during that ten years, there has been a still greater increase in 
effective wages’ (p. 2162).
Crofts challenged the legitimacy of the Court’s taking into account the 
problem of unemployment. ‘All this Court has to do’, he said, ‘is to settle a 
dispute and to say what is a reasonable wage for men who are in employment 
and who are going to be employed in industry’ (p. 2165). He also said that 
it was not the Court’s business to take into consideration the inability of 
Government to borrow overseas: the response to that was a matter for the 
Government, not the Court (p. 2168). Dethridge said—with particular 
reference to unemployment—
It is a problem I have been considering … The matter is a little bit 
troublesome at present. … The position is that this is another of 
the absurd results of the absurd system of fixing a basic wage in the 
Commonwealth sphere. I am waiting to hear what can be said in regard 
to the proposition that this Court can only arbitrate in actual disputes; 
that it cannot deal with matters which are of nation-wide importance; 
and that it cannot attempt to remedy evils which are not directly situated 
in the industrial dispute with which it is concerned. … It may be that 
the ultimate answer to the question is that this Court has no right, and 
never had any right, to fix a basic wage at all. … That all it can do is to 
deal with conditions between the parties to a dispute, and should not 
attempt to introduce anything in the nature of a general rule as to a 
minimum wage. As to a minimum wage in an industry, yes, but not as 
to a basic wage for general application. … It may be that we have gone 
beyond the constitutional limits. If so, it has been condoned by the 
legislature. … If we have the power to introduce a basic wage as a matter 
of general application, then I should think that it would follow that we 
have, or ought to have, the power to consider general unemployment; 
one hinges upon the other. (pp. 2165, 2168)
440 Australian Wage Policy
This exchange raised squarely the capacity of the Court to base its decisions on 
macroeconomic criteria and to pursue macroeconomic objectives. Whatever 
doubt Dethridge may have expressed here does not seem to have altered the 
Court’s course of action. The issue was resolved conclusively by the High 
Court in 1953 (R v Kelly; Ex parte Australian Railways’ Union (1953) 89 CLR 
461).
Dethridge, during Crofts’ submissions, repeatedly affirmed the cogency 
of unemployment as evidence that wages were too high. ‘I shall be very 
delighted’, he said,
to come to the conclusion that there is this productivity which has been, 
in a way, secretly annexed by employers or capitalists, or some other 
class than the wage earners. … Supposing this share has been annexed 
by the capitalist classes … What do they do with it? They do not put it 
away in oil drums in their backyards. They spend it. They may spend 
it in luxuries, but they spend it; and, if they spend it in luxuries, they 
give employment … It comes back to that. All money spent can only 
be spent, ultimately, by giving some men employment. Very well, if 
we find a considerable amount of unemployment and increasing 
unemployment, it rather suggests that this secret commandeering does 
not now exist. (pp. 2179–2180)
A subsequent exchange went as follows:
Mr Crofts: Has the Court before it any information regarding any 
particular industry other than the railways? Twenty-two organisations 
of employers are represented here, but what evidence has come from 
them; there is no evidence.
Dethridge C J: No, but we have the evidence of what is alleged to 
be a considerable fall in the national income. We also have the other 
evidence, which is of much more significance, in regard to the frightful 
increase in the number of unemployed, in the rate of unemployment.
Mr Crofts: And every industry is to get the benefit of the reduction?
…
441Keith Hancock
Dethridge C J: The only reason for an adverse decision will be if we 
come to the conclusion that it will be beneficial to wage earners chiefly, 
and to industry, and not to employers directly, except in regard to the 
restoration of industry. (pp. 2208–2209)
‘But the difficulty, and the ominous problem’, said Dethridge 
subsequently, ‘is the gradual increase of unemployment. That is the only thing 
that is of moment.’ Crofts replied that increased productivity might mean 
more unemployment. Dethridge responded:
No. Speaking broadly, the more productivity there is, the more 
employment there is. The more productivity, the greater the spending 
power and the greater the employing power. I am making allowance 
for people running Home, and spending money in Paris on luxuries 
and so on; but the greater part of increased productivity—if there is 
any—is spent at home. … Increased productivity, due to different or 
new methods, may mean less employment in a particular industry. 
But let us assume that the whole of the increased productivity is spent 
in the country producing; then that must mean employment in that 
country. … Reason it out. I am asking you to assume that in a self-
contained country from which they cannot get away with the profits 
which they have filched from the working classes, they have to spend 
those profits in order to get any use out of them. They may spend part 
in further unnecessary capital goods; but apart from that, they have to 
spend it on consumption goods; and it may be they will spend it in all 
of various ways, but it all means employment. Anything that is spent 
means employment of some kind. (pp. 2245–2246)
An obvious flaw in this argument is the failure to recognise that with an increase 
in productivity, a given level of output could be achieved with fewer workers. 
This error was probably due to the lack of any definition of ‘productivity’. I 
defer for later comment the presumption, repeatedly asserted, that production 
automatically generated commensurate spending.
Unsurprisingly, Crofts asserted a positive relation between wages and 
purchasing power—a contention that was at odds with Dethridge’s circular-
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flow analysis of production and spending power. Dethridge said that Crofts 
was assuming ‘that you can increase purchasing power by increasing wages’. ‘It 
cannot be done’, he said.
The only thing which will increase purchasing power, or which 
constitutes purchasing power, is a marketable product or service. There 
is nothing else constituting purchasing power. If you double, treble, or 
quadruple wages without increasing marketable products, either goods 
or services, you do not increase the purchasing power one scrap. (p. 
2254–2256)
Dethridge saw the ‘purchasing power’ argument for higher wages in the same 
light as monetary schemes:
I am meeting your argument that an increase in wages would at once 
lead to an increase in real purchasing power. It would simply mean an 
all round increase in prices, and everybody would be where he started 
from … That is the flaw, to my mind, in all these arguments which are 
put forward by Mr Chomley, Professor Irvine and other writers of the 
Douglas school and others who have a system of financing the working 
consumer by somehow or other handing out money to the wage earners. 
It simply means that prices are put up all round. (p. 2259)
On the issue of the automatic expenditure of spending power generated 
by production, Crofts attacked Copland, accusing him of both ignorance and 
bias:
[Professor Copland] was asked, ‘Do I get it from you, then, that money 
saved immediately goes into circulation’, and he replied, ‘Yes, always.’ 
Well, of the authorities, Hobson says different, and Professor Irvine says 
different. Professor Irvine says, as Hobson says, that it does not always 
go into circulation, and, as the balance-sheets show, a lot of it is hidden; 
a lot of it is put away in reserves and buildings, and then depreciation is 
taken off, etc, etc. Much of it, particularly in this country, does not go 
into circulation—certainly not immediately—so again it shows that this 
Professor of Economics, as I have said, is not a Professor of Economics. 
He is Chairman of the Chamber of Manufactures and Chamber of 
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Commerce school of teaching young fellows to run businesses profitably, 
and he tells them that they can only run their businesses profitably by 
reducing wages. I am putting it that the Professor apparently does not 
know his subject, or he was not prepared to put the whole of his cards 
on the table when he came to this Court. (p. 2353)
But Crofts was here in a difficult position. Not merely was he attacking 
Copland’s evidence: he was criticising a contention that Dethridge had 
repeatedly articulated as if it were a truism—that production automatically 
generates equivalent expenditure. Neither of the other Judges indicated any 
disagreement with Dethridge on this point.25
Dethridge summarised the case for a wage reduction:
I agree that, with regard to subsisting industries, the mere transfer of 
spending power from the present employed wage earners to employers 
will not have any very beneficial effect, except so far as that spending 
power is passed on from the employers to other sections of the community 
who are now short of spending power … But the main possible result of 
a reduction of the basic wage is that it will enable other industries to be 
established which will absorb the at present unemployed. That cannot be 
done at once, of course. It must be a slow process, in any event. Professor 
Copland himself indicated that any process of that kind is going to be 
fairly slow in its results, but, apparently, it is the only way of meeting 
the present situation. … A mere increase of money wages, such as has 
been suggested from your end of the table, Mr Crofts, will not have that 
effect unless it is accompanied by a greater real spending power. A mere 
25  Crofts extended his criticism of Copland, though shifting from the accusation of bias to 
one of inhabiting an ivory tower: ‘May I put this in favour of Professor Irvine? I feel that he 
is an independent witness. I think his papers show that he has kept abreast of the position 
so far as economics are concerned, and I think he has the added experience over Professor 
Copland that he has practical business experience, and that is increased by the fact that it is in 
connection with banking. Therefore, I say that … he is more likely to be of value to the Court 
than a man who has simply made himself a teacher. Teachers get into a groove. They get the 
old masters, and they very seldom like to break away. It is particularly hard for them to break 
away, especially if they are in a university, where they have the textbooks year in and year out. 
They simply follow that line of thought.’ Beeby retorted: ‘I do not think that can be said of 
Professor Copland. He does not rely on textbooks. He writes his own’ (p. 2371).
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increase of wages without a corresponding increase of power to transfer 
real goods and services simply means an increase in prices; that is all. 
… But the point we have to deal with is an urgent present situation, 
and that is, in some way or other, to get our present export industries 
maintained. … There is no means of immediate adjustment. Professor 
Irvine and Mr Gordon Massey seem to assume that it is a simple thing 
to be done, but it is going to be a most laborious and lengthy process 
to substitute other industries for our wool and other export industries. 
… It is for that reason only that this proposed reduction of the basic 
wage calls for the most serious consideration. Without that, I should 
not think there was any real case made. A mere transfer of spending 
power from the wage earners to the present employers, unless it tends 
to prevent the further disastrous decrease of our present industries, 
and also tends to encourage the growth and creation of new industries, 
would, I agree, be injurious to the community, rather than beneficial. 
(pp. 2303–2304)26
It was on 8 January 1931—a week from the completion of the hearing 
and two weeks from the decision—and during Crofts’ submissions, that 
Dethridge alluded to the possibility of a decision affecting all wages, and not 
just the basic wage:
[I]f the Court does make an alteration in the basic wage, it will 
automatically in most cases, in the absence of very special circumstances, 
apply the alteration to all other awards of this Court which are in 
existence. That is the position. It may be that a better way to meet 
the situation, if any alteration in wages is to be made in view of the 
condition of the country, would be by a percentage cut on all wages, 
to be regarded as a measure to operate until things improve. It may be 
that would be a better way to go about the job which the Court has 
before it. Whether the further relief claimed in the summonses before 
26  In a later remark to Crofts, Dethridge appears to resile somewhat from his criticism of 
monetary solutions: ‘I may say that it is quite a relevant and legitimate argument for you to 
say that the unemployed here at the present time are not in that position through wages being 
too high but because of insufficient credit facilities. That is a legitimate argument which the 
Court will have to consider’ (p. 2331).
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us enables that to be done may be worthy of consideration. You may 
take it that, so far as the basic wage is concerned, if any alteration is 
made, it will be made in these proceedings as to all matters listed, but as 
to other matters not listed they will have to be brought up subsequently 
in separate applications. (p. 2349)
The ‘further relief claimed in the summonses’ referred to catch-all terms added 
to the primary applications, which called for reduction of the basic wage via 
the adoption of the C series index and the removal of Powers’ Three Shillings. 
Crofts evidently failed to appreciate the significance of Dethridge’s ‘hint’ and 
did not respond to it.
Mindful, no doubt, of the industrial and political pressures bearing 
upon him, Crofts came to a truculent, if forlorn, conclusion:
Not for ever are we going to come pleading to this Court not to reduce 
the basic wage. We are going to demand it and we shall resist to the very 
last, and we shall not have taken away from us what it has taken 40 years 
to obtain. We have been preaching arbitration—many of our comrades 
with greater ability than we in this Court tell us we are wrong—but we 
have taken some risks even in our positions in our attempts to show the 
workers of this country that arbitration is right. But I never thought 
that I would have to stand up here to defend the meagre basic wage that 
we have got after 40 years of struggle. (p. 2406)
L C Meagher, for the Victorian Chamber of Manufactures, responded 
to the union contention that the Court should not move unless and until 
other authorities took the steps which the situation demanded:
It is inconceivable to think that a Court such as this is, charged with 
one specific duty, namely the settling of disputes, should refrain from 
exercising its function if it is convinced that its function should be 
exercised. If it is convinced that the applicants in this case have made 
a good claim for the reduction of the basic wage by 10 per cent, surely 
it should not influence the Court one jot whatever any other authority 
charged with other duties sees fit to do or not to do. … It is also to be 
borne in mind in this connection that one, already, of the three things 
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suggested by Professor Copland has to all intent and purposes been 
done, that is to say the liberating of the exchange rate, and if this Court 
were to find that we have substantiated our claim for a reduction of the 
basic wage, then a complete half of Professor Copland’s rehabilitation 
scheme will have been carried out and the remaining duty will devolve 
upon the Government—the duty of balancing its Budget. (pp. 2426–
2427)
Meagher, the first of the employer advocates to address the Court, sought to 
downplay the employers’ initial reliance on the substitution of the All Items 
table for the All Houses index (confined to food, groceries, and rent):
I want to say, on behalf of the private employers, that we lay no great 
store by that particular table. If the Unions want the Court’s order … 
to exclude reference to that table, I do not see that we can have any 
very serious objection to it. If they think that that particular table is an 
integral part of our application … that is not so. If the Court thinks 
that our case has been substantiated, we are prepared to take an order 
from the Court in another form altogether, and it follows from what I 
have said about the things which have been grafted on to the Harvester 
standard since 1907 that there is a money amount quite sufficient for 
the purpose of the application which can be deducted from today’s basic 
wage without in any way infringing upon the Harvester standard as laid 
down by Mr Justice Higgins. … Your Honour the Chief Judge said that, 
under no circumstances, in these proceedings, would the decision of 
the Court order a wage which went below the equivalent of 7s a day in 
1907. (pp. 2429–2430)
Dethridge replied: ‘In substance, yes. We want to keep as near that as we can.’ 
The problem for Meagher was that in the initial arguments, the employers had 
relied upon (1) removing Powers’ three shillings and (2) substituting the C 
series for the A series index to justify their claim that the basic wage could be 
reduced by about 10 per cent without taking it below Harvester. The removal 
of Powers’ three shillings alone was not sufficient. If the substitution of indices 
were abandoned, how could the remainder of the reduction be effected within 
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the limit of Harvester? Meagher introduced a quite new consideration. The 
Harvester wage was 7 shillings per day. A worker in 1907 might not get 42 
shillings per week, because he might not have employment for 6 days. Since 
the time of Harvester, the Court had provided in its awards for weekly wages. 
This benefit had been assessed by Powers as having a value of 5 shillings per 
week—an estimate that had been endorsed by Quick and Beeby. Hence there 
was an amount of about 5 shillings that could be removed without going 
below Harvester. Crofts interjected (accurately) that the Harvester standard 
had been determined by Higgins as 42 shillings per week, though expressed 
as 7 shillings per day. That Meagher’s argument elicited no response from the 
Bench is probably a good indication that the Judges had lost interest in the 
Harvester benchmark and were focusing their attention almost exclusively on 
the economic aspect of the case.
F H Corke, representing various employer groups in New South Wales, 
sought to emphasise the pre-eminence of primary production:
There seem to be two Australian obsessions; one is the standard of living 
and the other, which is the considered policy of Australia which must 
not be disputed, is high protection. And we can hardly consider the 
position that has arisen in Australia without some reference to the effects 
of the tariff—as to the tariff reacting on arbitration and arbitration 
again reacting on the tariff … In considering this larger question we 
have to bear in mind, as so much has been said about world conditions 
and world finance, that this is the only country where wages are so 
completely regulated and, as I contend, which is the least able to bear 
it. … I submit that this country, being entirely dependent on primary 
products, should have avoided such a definite regulation of wages in the 
cities. (p. 2486)
The theories advanced by Irvine and others, said Dethridge, assumed 
that it was ‘a comparatively easy thing to substitute for the export industries 
we now have running … other industries which will supply the country with 
sufficient marketable production … to enable the wages which they think 
should be maintained to be maintained and paid’ (p. 2493).
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Corke regretted that the applications before the Court allowed for only 
modest wage reductions. The reduction should be at least 25 per cent. Better 
still would be a suspension of all awards for a definite time:
Then we would find the proper basis upon which we could carry 
on under the present conditions, something that the country could 
pay and yet absorb all the unemployed. It may be, and I think the 
Court would certainly hold that having found the basis by which all 
could be employed, we might have to build up again from that basis, 
and perhaps build up rapidly. But it would have the advantage of 
providing employment for all, and at the same time finding our real 
position. (p. 2543)
Dethridge disagreed:
That is very questionable, in my opinion. A very radical reduction 
of wages, in my opinion, would probably do more harm than good. 
We have to remember that any reduction to the wage earners in the 
aggregate hits the necessity industries, and a wholesale reduction of 
wages would close up ---
Mr Corke: It would temporarily disorganise everything, but ---
Dethridge C J: Undoubtedly it would, and one has also to recollect 
that the home industries are the larger part of our industries. They may 
depend for their very existence upon the continuation of the primary 
industries. They are secondary industries in that sense, and they cannot 
continue to exist unless we have some fundamental industries still in 
existence, but we have to recollect that, although that be so, a wholesale 
reduction of wages, more than that which is necessary for the sustenance 
of the fundamental industries, would lead to mischief. … we have to 
find the balance. Too great a reduction, to my mind, would not only 
lead to a mere temporary dislocation, but would lead to a permanent 
disabling of a great part of the industry of this country. (pp. 2543–2544)
Corke accepted that ‘what is in the mind of the Court and everybody 
else is 10 per cent’. This equated to 8 shillings, ‘and that, of course, is made 
up, we submit, by the 5 shillings and the 3 shillings addition’. The 5 shillings 
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was ‘the equivalent of the weekly wage’—the contention previously put by 
Meagher (p. 2545). At this point—in the second-last day of the hearing—
Drake-Brockman asked whether the wage reduction should be confined to the 
basic wage. ‘A great deal of your discussion’, he said to Corke, ‘and, certainly, 
the attitude of Professor Copland, was based on a reduction of wages rather 
than a reduction of the basic wage. What about dealing with it on some such 
lines as that, rather than on one section of the wage?’ Fraser pointed out that 
the original application was for the railways, where only the basic wage could 
be affected (because the award regulation of margins had been suspended) 
(p. 2546). Dethridge indicated some sympathy for Drake-Brockman’s implicit 
suggestion. When Beeby questioned whether the Court could go outside the 
limit of the claims, Corke invoked the ‘further relief ’ terms of most of the 
applications. In the ensuing discussion, Corke referred to the effect of the 
Court’s decision on women’s rates. Drake-Brockman said that if the case 
were confined to the basic wage, women would not be affected at all, ‘or it 
looks like that’. But if the order were for a general 10 per cent reduction, 
women would be covered by it. This comment led the representative of the 
Clothing and Allied Trades’ Union, to say that before there was any decision 
affecting women, he wanted to be heard; he had acted ‘on the assumption 
that the question of the female workers is not before the Court at present’ 
(p. 2548). This was an obvious point of natural justice which (to judge from 
the transcript) was ignored by the Court. The same point could have been 
made about margins, but the unions let it pass.27
The Commonwealth Government had publicly expressed its opposition 
to a wage reduction. This is the background to the following incident reported 
in the transcript:
Mr Crofts: I now desire to refer the Court to a statement in this 
morning’s Argus.
27  At the conclusion of the case, Crofts inquired whether it was open to the Court ‘to meet 
the desires of the employers in some way other than that asked for in their application’. 
‘Can the Court make an order reducing wages, say, by 10 per cent, without ---’. Dethridge 
interposed: ‘We have to consider the position. That is all I can say, Mr Crofts’ (2620).
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Dethridge C J: Oh, dear me ---
Mr Crofts: You have taken quotations from the other side, and I want 
to quote what the Prime Minister of this country has said.
Dethridge C J: I object. I prohibit you from going further. I forbid you 
to make reference to anything of that kind. Sit down! (His Honour here 
ordered the Court crier to bring a policeman.) If you do not sit down, 
I shall have you removed from the Court. Do you undertake not to 
proceed with the reference to the Prime Minister? Do you undertake 
not to proceed with the reference to the Prime Minister?
Mr Crofts resumes his seat. (p. 2553)
On the next and final day of the case, Dethridge spoke directly to Crofts:
If you attempt, as, in my opinion, you obviously were doing yesterday, 
to improperly influence this Court by calling attention to a statement 
by the Prime Minister concerning a matter which is in issue in this 
Court, the Court must object to it. … This Court has nothing to do 
with what any Minister of the Commonwealth, with what any person 
on the legislative side, or the Executive side of the community, might 
say. You must understand that. I do wish you would try to realise that 
we are here as Judges, and we must resist most strongly any attempt to 
coerce us on the part of the Executive of the country, either directly or 
indirectly. (p. 2603)
The Government did, however, appear as of right in the Court, its views 
being put by Fraser. His instructions were ‘to submit here certain arguments, 
and to make whatever observation the evidence renders necessary, against the 
present application’ (p. 2554). His submissions do not suggest that he was 
supported by significant expert advice. Rather, he seems to have attended to 
the evidence given in the Court and placed the best possible construction 
upon it from his client’s viewpoint.
Fraser argued that the Court could not take into consideration general 
unemployment. It was the Court’s function to settle disputes. In doing so, it 
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might take into account unemployment within the industry concerned, but 
not more generally. Drake-Brockman asked:
Supposing there were a dispute in the shipping industry which resulted 
in a cessation of work and that cessation of work brought about, not 
by strike but by absence of employment, unemployment in other 
industries, and there were repercussions from those other industries to 
yet other industries … could not the Court take into consideration the 
unemployment brought about by that dispute? (p. 2558)
‘I submit not’, replied Fraser. Dethridge pressed him:
Do you see where you are driven by your argument …? Supposing it 
to be established beyond a doubt that no sensible man could come to 
any conclusion other than that the basic wage is destroying industries 
wholesale, and leading to unemployment of an appalling nature. … 
On your argument or suggestion, this Court would have to disregard 
that effect of the basic wage, and still maintain it, let it go on doing its 
destructive work.
Fraser preferred ‘not to go as far as that’ (p. 2562). But he assented when 
Dethridge put it that, on Fraser’s understanding, the basic wage ‘cannot be 
decreased in any circumstances however injurious it may be shown to be’ 
(p. 2563). Beeby asked what provision of the Act led to this interpretation. 
Fraser answered that the legislature first made explicit reference to the basic 
wage in 1926. By then, the basic wage had a well-defined meaning in the 
Court’s practice, which the legislature implicitly recognised. ‘A recognition’, 
asked Dethridge’ ‘as meaning a wage irreducible by the Court?’ ‘Yes’, said 
Fraser (p. 2563). When Beeby put it that, on this view, the basic wage could 
not be increased, either, Fraser disagreed:
No, I do not suggest that as the meaning of the term ‘basic wage’ at all. 
It is the minimum below which we must not go. … But it does not say 
that we are prevented from going higher. (p. 2566)
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‘The Court’, said Fraser, ‘is not the remedy for all the ills of the body 
politic. The legislature has cognisance of the position, and of the decline in 
the national income, and of the Depression, and if the legislature considers 
that one of the operating causes is a high basic wage then the legislature can 
interfere’ (p. 2567).
In what was, in effect, an alternative submission, Fraser said that the 
burden of showing that a basic wage reduction was necessary rested on the 
employer applicants. ‘But what’, he asked, ‘do the applicants do?’
[T]hey put forward one claim, and one claim only, and that is Professor 
Copland’s scheme. He described his scheme in the article appearing 
in the Economic Record as a scheme that should be put into force as a 
whole; he said it was almost imperative that the whole scheme should 
be put into operation. (p. 2577)
The Court should not contemplate a wage reduction unless the applicants 
satisfied it that all other necessary steps to deal with the economic situation had 
been taken. Fraser did not acknowledge Copland’s statement from the witness 
box that the basic wage should be reduced even if the other recommended 
steps were not taken. Drake-Brockman noted a further problem with the 
submission:
Drake-Brockman J: If we were to follow on the lines of your suggestion 
that the onus is on the employers to show that everything else has been 
done that could possibly be done, before they are justified in asking that 
this Court should deal with the only element it can deal with, there 
are certain things to be considered. For instance, there are some people 
who say that the tariff should be altered; some say that there should be 
prohibition of imports. Others say that there should be complete free 
trade. Then we come to the question of exchange. Some people say that 
the exchange rate should be pegged at a high level; some say it should be 
at a low level, and some say that it should be free. Where do we get to? 
How are we going to decide that all the things that should and could be 
done have, in fact, been done, when we come to deal with the one and 
only factor we can deal with?
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Mr Fraser: It has been said in this Court that a reduction of this nature 
should be the very last resort; therefore, is it not necessary for the 
applicants to show first that all the other avenues have been explored?
Drake-Brockman J: But my difficulty is to know when we have come to 
the very last resort. (p. 2578)
During Fraser’s address, Dethridge put the view that the unemployment 
level was the issue which cut through all others:
Then I suppose you get back to this—and I think it comes down to 
this—that the main evidence the present wage level is too high—so high 
as to make industry unprofitable for any available market—is the high 
amount of unemployment. If you have a market available—and in this 
case it means partly the home market for home industries and partly, of 
course, the export market—and if the costs of industry are sufficiently 
low to give a reasonable chance of running industries at a profit to 
supply those markets, there will be no abnormal unemployment. That 
is the argument. And when you get down to a national position of this 
kind, it is practically the only argument—the only evidence that is of 
any use. It is true that unemployment may be due to other causes as 
well; but at any rate one knows that if you do have too high a wage 
level, make the costs of production too high for the available market, of 
course unemployment results. (p. 2574)
9.2.9 The decision
At the end of the hearing, Corke asked when the Court would give its 
decision. Dethridge replied: ‘We cannot say. Our minds are still in a state 
of great complexity. We cannot say now what is the wisest thing to do in the 
circumstances of this case. I will not say we are in a state of bewilderment, 
but we are still seeking some definite conclusion …’ (p. 2624). The Court, 
nevertheless, took just a week to finalise and publish its decision—testimony 
to its sense of urgency about the coming reduction.
The Court recognised that ‘a proposal to reduce wage standards, 
laboriously built up by organised labour during the last quarter of a century, 
454 Australian Wage Policy
naturally met with strenuous opposition’ (Basic Wage and Wage Reduction 
Inquiry 30 CAR 2, 8).
But however desirous a Court with wage fixing powers may be to 
maintain standards largely created through its instrumentality it cannot 
accept the principle enunciated that under no circumstances should 
there be reductions. In the past the Court has been compelled by 
economic circumstances to refuse to apply those standards to particular 
industries, and in some industries to reduce standards which previously 
it had prescribed. Always it has been necessary and always it will be 
necessary to entertain applications to vary awards on the ground of 
substantial change in economic conditions. (p. 8)
The essence of the crisis was the deterioration of the external accounts. 
A major aspect was the fall in the terms of trade:
All the theorising in the world cannot alter the fact that in goods we 
are at present receiving £40,000,000 worth per annum less than we 
received two years ago in exchange for our exports. To quote a simple 
illustration: before 1929, for 100 bales of wool or 1000 bags of wheat we 
received in exchange, say, 1000 boxes of tea; now, for the same quantity 
of wool we can only exchange 600 boxes of tea, or for the 1000 boxes 
of tea we are asked to provide 140 bales of wool or 1600 bags of wheat. 
(pp. 8–9)
This was the essence of the current account problem. But it was 
compounded by the capital account:
Before the present disturbance we were able to borrow £30,000,000 per 
annum for use in developmental and other labour-employing works. 
Now we cannot borrow money from abroad … It is true that this 
£30,000,000 per annum is not in the true sense of the term national 
income; it is true that ultimately we may be better off if public borrowing 
comes from internal wealth. But for the moment and for some time to 
come we have £30,000,000 less to spend, making, with the loss from 
fall in prices, a total of £70,000,000 as compared with 1928. (p. 9)
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The £70 million corresponded to what the economists saw as the 
primary loss. But, said the Court, the disaster did not end there.
Such a violent change in spending power reacted in all directions. It 
immediately reduced income derived from services, particularly those 
controlled by State railway and tramway authorities whose receipts 
declined rapidly and whose deficits increased month by month at an 
alarming rate. This with other declines in public revenue left the State 
and the Commonwealth Governments unable to balance their budgets. 
Grave governmental deficiencies created a general air of financial 
insecurity which increased the general stagnation. Then again the 
contraction of purchasing power traceable to a direct loss of income 
led to further decline in productivity. The first loss was added to by 
further losses the extent of which cannot be calculated. Opinions differ 
as to the actual money figure for these repercussions. Some economists 
are of opinion that they equal the original loss, but this probably is an 
exaggeration. It can be safely said, however, that for the moment they 
exceed 50 per cent of the primary loss making the reduced spending 
power of the community over £100,000,000, or in the vicinity of one-
sixth of the average national income of the preceding five years. (p. 9)
Some of the decline was ‘psychological in origin’. The prevailing 
uncertainty, the precarious state of public finance and falling prices were 
responsible for much of the commercial and industrial stagnation. ‘But taking 
the most optimistic view, it is clear that the bulk of the lost spending power is 
a harsh reality, and the restoration of the customary value of our productivity 
will be a long and laborious process.’ It was difficult, said the Court, to get the 
unions to accept this harsh reality (p. 11).
The Court referred to Irvine’s advocacy of a greater detachment of the 
Australian economy from the rest of the world. It was unimpressed, for reasons 
of both a long-term and a short-term character:
To achieve that ideal we must do without mineral oils, rubber goods, 
cotton fabrics, and many other commodities which we regard as 
necessaries, and must also repudiate our foreign interest liabilities … 
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Complete isolation may be desirable to some, but it is clear that its 
achievement means the adoption of all-round standards of living much 
lower than those now enjoyed. … However interesting speculation as 
to the future possibilities of the social order may be, none of this class 
of evidence faced the real problems of the moment. What is to be done 
immediately, even if temporarily, to meet the sudden reduction by at 
least one-sixth of the Commonwealth’s spending power? (p. 13)
Thus the Court’s perception was that the standard of living of wage-
earners had been sustained until recently by the combination of favourable 
export prices and high levels of external borrowing. This led it to ask whether, 
without these supports, the level of real wages could have been justified by 
productivity. It chose to pursue that question by a comparison of 1907 and 
1928–29. ‘We assume’ said the Court, ‘that Mr Justice Higgins in fixing the 
Harvester wage—and the generally increased wage following therefrom—took 
into account the productive activity per unit of the population at that time.’28 
There was other evidence that the 1907 standard was justified:
It has been claimed (probably correctly) that the 1907 standard was 
about 25 per cent higher than that which had ruled prior to that date. 
Had it been economically unsound it must have produced a large 
measure of unemployment, which does not appear to have been the 
case. (p. 17)
Thus the question to be considered was whether ‘productivity’ had moved 
favourably or adversely between 1907 and 1928–29.29 The Court commented:
Inspection of the official figures (Labour Report No. 20, p. 84) discloses 
that the index number for 1911 was taken as 1000. The relative figure 
for 1907 was 948, while the figure for 1928–29 was 937, which disclosed 
that the productivity per head of population for the last named year was 
slightly less than in 1907. According to the evidence before the Court 
the relative figure for the year 1929–1930 will be somewhere in the 
28  An assumption at odds with the realities of Harvester. See Chapter 3, Subsection 3.2.2.
29  The inference about the effect of the 1907 decision was simplistic. An obvious question, 
for example, is how many workers were affected by it.
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vicinity of 800, and for the year 1930–1931 may be expected to be even 
less. (p. 17)
The Court drew the inference that productivity had declined since 1907, 
leaving no buffer against the effects of the external problems. The index 
numbers were taken from a table in the Labour Report entitled ‘Estimated 
relative productive Activity in Australia for the years specified, 1871 to 1929’. 
In constructing them, the Statistician relied on estimates of the value of 
material production in primary and secondary industries. The next number of 
the Labour Report announced the discontinuance of these statistics because of 
their unreliability (see Chapter 1, Subsection 1.2.2).
The Court dealt at some length with arguments about purchasing power 
and (what would now be called) the propensity to consume.
One of the main arguments of the respondents against the proposed 
reduction was, as first put, based on the supposition that it would 
reduce the spending power of the community. This is plainly fallacious 
in that the reduction would leave the spending power of the community 
unaltered in quantity, although it would, as to such wage-earners as are 
still in employment, effect to the extent of the reduction a transfer of 
part of their spending power to their employers. But the argument as 
finally put was that this would result in the transferred spending power 
being exercised less beneficially to wage-earners in the aggregate and 
that it would lead to an increase instead of a decrease in unemployment. 
The argument in this form was advanced with such earnestness and 
evident sincerity that it calls for serious consideration … (p. 19)
In its ‘serious consideration’, the Court articulated (as Dethridge had 
done in earlier cases) a concept of balance between the beneficial and the 
adverse effects of higher wages—the former focusing on wage-earner spending 
and the latter on producer costs. All intelligent people accepted
the principle that the general wage-rate should be as high as the 
marketable productivity of the country permits, and that in a time of 
depression the last remedy to be sought is a lowering of that wage level. 
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They realise that in the home market of the most vital industries of the 
country, that is to say, the necessity industries, wage-earners provide the 
largest consumption, and that a forcing down of the wage level below the 
highest point which the country’s marketable productivity enables it to 
attain, tends to weaken those vital industries and to lower the welfare of 
the whole community. They accept the proposition that such a forcing 
down of the wage level must cause ‘under-consumption’ of the products 
of those industries and diminishes distribution of those products 
among the people who sorely need them. But they are also compelled 
to recognise that if a country attempts to force or maintain a wage level 
at a point higher than the country’s marketable productivity allows, 
there will be an irresistible tendency to ever-increasing unemployment 
with ever-increasing ‘under-consumption’ … If it is too high then a 
reduction, although causing an unfortunate transfer of spending power 
away from wage-earners now in employment, would act as a stimulus of 
general industrial activity, thus giving work to men now unemployed, 
with consequential benefit to all industries. (p. 21)
Other arguments about spending, advanced by witnesses, related to the 
adequacy of the supply of money. Some witnesses, said the Court, ‘advocated 
a system involving the distribution of “new money” to consumers, somewhat 
similar to that enunciated during the last ten years by Major Douglas and his 
followers’ (p. 22). The role of the financial system, and the relation between it 
and the government, were at the time the subject of intense political contest. 
The Court said:
Many eminent economists and statesmen to-day support the idea that 
the control of money should be a state function rather than a field of 
dividend-making. But banking reform is a matter beyond the province 
of the Court. It is, however, material for the purposes of this inquiry to 
examine the contention that our local banking policy has been the main 
cause of the present depression. … It was submitted that the banks, 
notwithstanding the prosperous run they have had since the war, were 
unnecessarily contracting credit, and were dictating the financial policy 
of enterprise all in the direction of forcing reductions of wages. … In 
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order to test this argument the Court secured from the Commonwealth 
Statistician an analysis of banking statistics between the years 1914 and 
1930 with a view of determining whether there had been any undue 
contraction of credits during recent years … (pp. 23–24)
The judgment contains a table, based on the Statistician’s analysis, which 
shows that the ratio of bank advances to deposits had substantially increased. 
‘It will thus be seen’, the Court said, ‘that during recent years, particularly the 
last two years, there has been no contraction of credits by the banks.’ Some 
witnesses had put forward the theory ‘that consumption of goods would be 
stimulated and industry revived by an increase in the volume of money in 
circulation, irrespective of the country’s productivity’. What these witnesses 
‘really meant’—though some disputed it—‘was that inflation of the currency 
would have immediate beneficial effects. On this dangerous controversy it is 
not the function of the Court to express personal opinions’ (p. 25). Here, the 
Court cited the evidence of Copland who ‘pointed out that whatever policy 
may be ultimately adopted on this issue Australia’s problem is not a mere 
monetary adjustment’. Copland had contended that
there has been a severe and, at present, irreparable loss of income. It is 
therefore all the more important that in the process of re-adjustment 
this loss of income should be given first consideration; monetary re-
adjustment may be made later. … The first step is the equitable 
distribution of the loss of income. Export producers, unemployed 
wage-earners, and recipients of profits from Australian businesses are 
bearing the main part of the burden at the moment. But the burden is 
too great to be borne by a few groups, comprising only a section of total 
producers. (p. 25)
Irvine, said the Court, differed from Copland ‘on one or two material 
points’. He saw it as ‘practically a question of life and death to stop deflation 
and initiate a movement in the other direction, that is, to re-trace our steps 
by way of a carefully guarded inflation’. The first step was ‘to make available 
to primary producers, manufacturers, and commercial businesses sufficient 
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credit to enable them to get going again’. Irvine’s position in this respect was 
not far removed from that of other witnesses:
There was almost unanimity in the opinions of witnesses that in 
some form banking policy should be changed, and that there should 
be a limited note issue. Professor Copland, Mr F A A Russell, KC, 
one time Lecturer in Economics at Sydney University, Mr Portus, 
of the Sydney University, Mr Dyason, by way of his contributions 
to economic literature, and many others are in agreement that if the 
risks of indiscriminate inflation can be avoided the position can be 
substantially assisted by a change in the banking policy, carrying with 
it abandonment of the attempt to maintain parity of exchange and a 
note issue for the sole purpose of facilitating some stabilisation of price 
levels. (p. 26)
The thrust of this evidence, which seemed to carry the Court’s implicit 
endorsement, was contrary to the orthodox stance recently urged by the Bank 
of England advisers, Niemeyer and Gregory, and presaged important elements 
of the forthcoming Premiers’ Plan.30
Although the judgment canvassed a wide range of issues and developed 
detailed arguments as to why a wage reduction was necessary, it was surprisingly 
light on the issues of quantum and method. For the former, the Court seems 
to have relied very largely on Copland:
Professor Copland admitted that wage reduction alone would by no 
means meet the situation, and attached great importance to stabilisation 
of price levels, reduction of the costs of Government, and a temporary 
departure from the effort which up to the time of his evidence had been 
made to establish exchange parity. But he was convinced that whatever 
else was done, there must be at least 10 per cent reduction in real wages. 
(p. 27)
30  In one of his Marshall Lectures of 1933, Copland said: ‘We have to turn to a semi-official 
body, viz. the Arbitration Court, to get the first authoritative statement of the case for a reduction 
in costs. It is well to remember, however, that the Court itself hinted that its acceptance of the 
policy of reducing money costs was to be regarded as part of a general policy embracing both 
deflationary and inflationary action’ (Copland 1934, p. 118).
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As to the form of the wage cut, the Court did briefly consider the role 
of the basic wage. It discussed the assumption of a family of five as the unit for 
which the wage was supposed to provide:
During the proceedings the Court stated, and still adheres to the 
statement, that the finding of what is known as the Piddington 
Commission was an accurate estimate of the cost of living of a unit 
of man, wife, and three children according to reasonable standards of 
comfort, and the application of later index numbers enables the Court 
to correct the estimate arrived at in accordance with present price levels. 
But the function of the Court is not merely to ascertain what is the cost 
of living of the predominant family unit. It carries the responsibility 
of fixing a basic wage for adults, single, married without children, or 
married with children whatever the number may be. Whatever the 
ascertained cost of living at a certain standard of comfort may be, the 
Court in fixing a wage must of necessity consider the productive capacity 
of the Commonwealth. A basic wage to provide for the needs of a man, 
wife, and three children, extended to all single men and to men who 
have no children, is admittedly beyond the capacity of industry. (p. 30)
If the basic wage were to persist as a component of the wage-setting system, 
‘national consideration of a system of child endowment appears to be the only 
method by which the wage can be equitably fixed’ (p. 31). We may note in 
passing the implicit repudiation of the stance of Higgins and Powers, who had 
rejected the Piddington finding about the wage required to support a family 
of five.
Consistent with the thinking which emerged toward the end of the 
hearing, the Court decided not to confront the issues before it in terms of the 
basic wage:
The Court refuses to make any variations in the basic wage or in the 
present method of calculation thereof without further inquiry, but after 
much anxious thought it is forced to the conclusion that for a period of 
twelve months and thereafter until further order a general reduction of 
wages is necessary. … The issue actually debated by the parties during 
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the proceedings, and to which the evidence and the arguments on the 
applications were mainly directed, was whether in the present condition 
of industry some such reduction was necessary. This issue was fought 
out regardless of the form of the applications. … [O]rders are now made 
for variation of the awards covered by the applications by the reduction 
of all wage rates therein prescribed by 10 per cent, for a period of twelve 
months and thereafter until further order … (p. 31)
The effect of these orders was that both the basic wage and margins were 
reduced by 10 per cent. This did not, however, constitute parity of treatment, 
because the nominal basic wage had been and continued to be subject to 
additional reductions in line with the decline of retail prices.
9.2.10 The aftermath
In response to the decision, the Labor Government tried to persuade the Court 
to defer the wage cut for three months, ‘on the ground that the Government, 
in consultation with banking authorities, is engaged in the formulation of a 
scheme to ensure that the burden of the loss arising from the decline on national 
income and spending power shall be equitably distributed over all sections of 
the community, and that the immediate enforcement of the Court’s order 
would embarrass the Government in completing its proposals for economic 
rehabilitation’. This was heard as an ex parte application 12 days after the main 
decision and decided on the next day (30 CAR 74). It was supported by an 
affidavit of the Attorney-General. Anderson outlined its terms:
The Attorney-General in his affidavit stated that the Government 
realised that wage reductions alone would not materially alter the 
existing situation; that many other changes must be made before 
economic stability could be restored; that the Government was then 
engaged on the details of a scheme which was primarily concerned 
with the reduction of unemployment and the maintenance of national 
solvency; that there must be a sacrifice by all persons in Australia, and 
that such sacrifice must be equitably apportioned and made concurrently 
in all cases; that the Government was collaborating with banking and 
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other authorities in a comprehensive scheme of economic monetary 
and financial rehabilitation; that any alteration of the wage standard in 
advance of the commencement of the operation of the policy indicated 
would have the effect of unbalancing such plan, creating an atmosphere 
of distrust and/or defiance, and rendering it extremely difficult, if not 
impossible, of execution. The Attorney-General could not, however, give 
the Court details of the proposed plan—consultations were proceeding, 
but had not reached the stage at which details of the proposals could be 
announced. (Anderson 1931, p. 120)
Having said that the application required ‘grave consideration’, the Court 
rejected it, stating that ‘any scheme dealing with present conditions must, in 
order to provide a remedy, comprise a reduction of wages such as has been 
ordered by the Court, and nothing has been adduced in this proceeding which 
leads the Court to the conclusion that delay in making that reduction will 
conduce to the success of such a scheme’ (p. 75). Less than three weeks later, 
the Government repeated the application, with the same outcome (30 CAR 
169). As it had done during the hearing, the Court asserted its independence 
of the executive government.
Subsequent decisions implementing the wage cut are discussed in the 
next chapter.

10.1 applyIng the cut
The decision to cut wages did not immediately take effect across the totality 
of the Court’s awards. Except for the applicants in the main proceedings, 
employers had to apply for the reduction clause to be inserted into their 
awards. Such applications were being made throughout 1931, and a set of 
applications was granted as late as January 1932. I do not know the numbers 
of workers subject to the wage cut at specific times, but clearly the process of 
enforcing it was protracted.
There were a number of instances in which the reductions in the price 
index took it below the levels allowed for in the existing adjustment tables. By 
inserting new bands of index numbers, the Court allowed the basic wage to fall 
below the previous minima. There were also cases where the Court was asked 
by employers to insert automatic-adjustment clauses into awards which lacked 
them. These were awards in which the adjustment clauses had been omitted 
by agreement. In one such case, for storemen and packers, Beeby refused to 
insert an adjustment clause on the ground that the agreed wage rates may have 
reflected the absence of an adjustment provision (Storemen and Packers’ case 
30 CAR 467). In another, about maltsters, Dethridge said: ‘The employers 
thought it convenient not to have the adjustment clause, and, throughout the 
last ten or eleven years, the parties, thinking it suitable for themselves, have 
done without an adjustment clause in their agreements or awards, and I do 
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not think that I should introduce one now to the detriment of the employees’ 
(Variation—Maltsters (Victorian Award) 30 CAR 702).
In a decision about banking, in July 1931, the Full Court said that at 
the time of the hearing which preceded the 10 per cent cut, the impact of 
the economic crisis on banks was unclear, and ‘the Court therefore deemed it 
advisable to reserve the applications for further consideration until the results 
of operations for the year ending 30th June, 1931, were known’ (Variation—
Bank Clerks’ Award 30 CAR 482). The position had since changed:
As the result of a Premiers’ Conference … a scheme for the economic and 
financial rehabilitation of the Commonwealth has been adopted. This 
scheme aims at a reduction of costs of Government to the extent of 20 
per cent, and includes substantial reductions of Civil Service salaries. It 
also provides for reduction of interest on Government securities and on 
future bank overdrafts, and imposes on banks the necessity of carrying 
increased holdings of Government stocks at lower rates of interest until 
a balancing of Commonwealth and State Budgets is achieved. Insurance 
companies and banks now carry over £100,000,000 of Government 
stock, and the reduction in rates of interest materially reduces their 
earning power. Such information as is available also discloses a noticeable 
fall in current accounts at banks and an increase in fixed deposits on 
which interest is payable. … Under the new circumstances the Court 
can see no valid reason why bank officers should not be included in the 
rule that all must participate in the effort to re-establish affairs on a new 
level. (pp. 482–483)
Although the 10 per cent cut was thus applied to bank clerks, the terms 
of the decision implied that it might not be imposed where the employers 
were still prosperous.1 This was confirmed in later decisions, some of which 
1  In September 1931, the Full Court made a similar decision for insurance (Variation—
Insurance Staffs’ Awards 30 CAR 484), but the High Court in November 1931 held that this 
decision was beyond its jurisdiction because the reduced salaries were below the amounts 
proposed by the employers when the underlying dispute came into existence. (Salaries had 
already been reduced by automatic adjustments of the basic-wage component.) In January 
1932, the Full Court set aside the salaries clauses of the award, the companies having 
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are discussed below. It was at odds with the concept of the wage reduction 
as a means of spreading the losses of the export sector across the community, 
confusing macroeconomic strategy with a focus on the financial position of 
the employer or the industry—a confusion which the Court had strenuously 
resisted during the main hearing.
The problems of the pastoral industry, which had already been 
considered in depth by Dethridge in mid-1930 (see Chapter 9, Section 9.1), 
were the cause of a Full Court decision of May 1931. This was on an employer 
application to suspend the award provisions for station hands or, alternatively, 
to reduce their wages by 50 per cent (Pastoral case 30 CAR 301). The Court 
noted that most station hands were not union members and therefore fell 
outside the coverage of the award, threatening the employment of the union 
members whose wages and conditions were set by the award.2 It accepted the 
‘manifest necessity for reducing in all directions the cost of production therein 
if the [pastoral] industry is to be maintained’. Although rural workers lacked 
amenities enjoyed by dwellers in towns, they had ‘the compensating advantage, 
especially valuable in bad times like the present, of escaping many of the 
expenses incurred by wage earners living there’. The Court was unwilling to 
leave station hands ‘without any recognised standard wage to serve as a barrier 
to some extent against possible sweating conditions’. But the crisis in ‘this vital 
export industry’, which had led Dethridge in July 1930 to reduce the shearers’ 
rates by 20 per cent, caused the Court to reduce the station hand’s rate also by 
20 per cent (inclusive of the general 10 per cent cut) (pp. 302–303).
By the end of 1931, the Court was making decisions about the application 
of the emergency reduction to particular employers, taking into account their 
specific circumstances and especially their power in the product markets. In 
the gas industry, the Court granted the reduction to some employers, but not 
to others. An employer, to succeed, had to persuade the Court either that it 
undertaken to apply the rates prescribed in them less 10 per cent (Variation—Setting Aside 
Insurance Awards 31 CAR 104).
2  Whereas workers in non-rural industries who were not covered by federal awards were 
likely to be regulated by State awards and determinations, rural workers were commonly not 
protected by State instruments.
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was in financial difficulty or that the benefit of cost reductions would flow fully 
through to consumers. Unless there were convincing evidence that ‘privileged 
and prosperous monopolies’ would themselves make no gain from a wage 
reduction, the Court would not grant it (Variation—Gas Employees Award 
30 CAR 770, 773). The Court also granted a union application to rescind 
the reduction for the Colonial Sugar Refining Company (Rescission of Wage 
Reduction—Colonial Sugar Refinery 30 CAR 780). Here, the consideration 
that weighed most heavily was that the skilled employees of the company 
who worked under the Court’s award had suffered the wage cut, whereas 
the unskilled workers under State awards had not. Dethridge and Drake-
Brockman said:
Except possibly to a small extent in South Australia and Western 
Australia no reduction of real wages as distinguished from adjustments 
to lower cost of living have been made by the State wage authorities 
or tribunals in the wages of the company’s employees not covered by 
federal awards. In consequence the employees under federal awards who 
comprise practically all the skilled men in the refineries, and who are 
in number much less than one-third of the total employees in those 
refineries, now receive wages, in many cases, little more than those of 
the unskilled labourers employed there … We think the necessity for 
the 10 per cent reduction of wages is by no means at an end, and that 
this necessity will very soon become apparent to State wage tribunals 
and others. When it appears that all and not merely a minority of the 
refinery employees of the company are to be called upon to share the 
sacrifice imposed by Australia’s shrinkage of income, steps may be taken 
for the renewed application of this Court’s orders. (p. 784)
10.2 the fIrst applIcatIon to cancel the cut
Early in 1932, unions applied to the Court for cancellation of the emergency 
reduction. The case was heard in March and April, but not decided until 
June—a delay that can be contrasted with the Court’s speed in January 1931. 
Using unemployment as a guide, we can now see that the decision came at the 
very depth of the Depression, for it was in the second quarter of 1932 that 
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Australia-wide unemployment (measured by trade union returns) reached its 
maximum of 30 per cent. ‘In the inquiry just concluded’, said the Court (in 
a unanimous decision), ‘there was no evidence of economic recovery. On the 
contrary, evidence disclosed that, during the year 1931, the further decline in 
national income and spending power was much greater than even the most 
pessimistic of economists had anticipated’ (Application for Cancellation—
Emergency Reduction of Award Rates 31 CAR 305, 315).
To a very large extent, the unions’ case was an attempt to rebut what 
the Court had said in January 1931. They tried unavailingly to turn the 
deterioration to their advantage. Their principal advocate, Crofts, said in his 
opening address:
What I am submitting to the Court is that there should be hardly any 
need for the unions to go further than to say to the Court ‘Your dictum 
has failed; you tried to do the right thing, we give you credit for trying 
to do the right thing, but you must acknowledge that something has 
gone wrong with the scheme’. … I think that the witness, Professor 
Copland, whose word was taken against so many experts, has proved to 
be wrong. (transcript, p. 35)
In a later reference to Copland’s 1930 evidence, Crofts said:
I asked him whether I could go to the men who are in work and tell them 
that, if they gave up 10 per cent of their real wages, their comrades, who 
were out of work, would be taken back into employment. He said: ‘No’. 
I asked ‘Why?’ He said: ‘I am not a prophet.’ I said: ‘You are a Professor, 
and you are telling this Court that if they reduce wages the men out of 
work will be taken back into industry.’ He said: ‘Not immediately. … 
It may come to something like a normal position in about 18 months’ 
time.’ I said: ‘Can I say that all the unemployed over a period of 18 
months will be re-absorbed in employment?’ He said ‘No.’ I said: ‘What 
will happen?’ He said: ‘Australia will be very fortunate if ever she gets 
back to the time when she has less than 10 per cent of her working 
population unemployed.’3
3  Crofts described Copland as ‘the Court’s witness’. Dethridge responded: ‘I think you are 
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Copland was unavailable to give evidence in this case. At the behest 
of the employers, the Court invited G L Wood, of Melbourne University, to 
be a witness. Wood had refused to give evidence for the employers, but was 
prepared to attend as an independent witness.4 The thrust of his evidence5 was 
that:
•	 The high-wage theory, propounded by economists such as G 
D H Cole and J A Hobson and commended by the unions, 
was inapplicable to Australia’s circumstances, partly because 
the share of labour in the national income was already high 
and partly because of Australia’s economic dependence on the 
rest of the world.
•	 Measures to restore the real purchasing power of farmers, 
including reduction of the domestic price and cost levels, 
were essential to economic recovery.
•	 The failure of the 10 per cent cut to achieve economic recovery 
was due largely to the continued high level of wages in New 
South Wales State awards.
The Court summarised the unions’ arguments as follows:
1. That the combined effect of periodic adjustments of the basic 
wage arrived at on data which do not correctly reflect the cost of 
living, of the 10 per cent reduction, and of greater intermittency 
making a mistake. The Court paid great respect to the evidence of Professor Copland and still 
does. It paid considerable respect to some of the witnesses called on your side, some of the 
men with more or less economic knowledge, but it exercised an independent mind, and we 
are not tyros in economic matters. … He was accepted as being an honest and capable witness 
and, having regard to the Court’s economic knowledge, other witnesses were not accepted as 
sound witnesses, although they had some economic pretensions’ (p. 46). Crofts was right. 
Copland was called as the Court’s witness, as were a number of other witnesses, including 
Irvine.
4  In asking the Court to call Wood, F P Derham (for the employers) acknowledged that 
‘all those Professors’ had signed a 1930 economists’ memorandum calling for measures that 
included wage reductions. Dethridge commented: ‘At that time, undoubtedly. I do not know 
whether Mr Melville was in it. I think he took rather stronger views than the others. He 
thought the cut would have to be greater than it was’ (p. 607).
5  Beginning at p. 845 of the transcript.
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of employment has been to bring the earnings of many employees 
below a bare living standard.
2. That the method of calculating and adjusting the basic wage is 
erroneous and unjust and should be revised.
3. That … industry can now carry at least the wage standards existing 
before those orders were made.
4. That monetary reform would be the most effective cure for 
recurring cycles of depression and would exclude necessity for wage 
reductions.
5. That the restriction of purchasing power resulting from wage 
reductions has retarded rather than assisted economic recovery.
6. That the distribution of sacrifice imposed by the depression has not 
been equitable, but so far has fallen most heavily on wage-earners.
7. That the orders for reduction have tended to increase rather than 
decrease unemployment, and that events subsequent to the orders 
support the original contention of employees that wage reduction 
was not necessary, and would not effectively contribute to economic 
rehabilitation. (decision, pp. 306–307)
The unions argued that the wage cut had driven households affected by 
it on to ‘near-starvation’ living conditions. They produced affidavits (read to 
the Court) which movingly described the hardships of the workers and their 
families. After hearing them, Dethridge remarked:
You make a very effective and feeling appeal … and I may say that 
each one of us here … cannot help but feeling sore hearted about it, 
but what is to be done? … It is not for want of sympathy that one does 
unpleasant and distasteful things; but whatever is done by people who 
have any human feeling is done to mitigate distress, however harsh the 
measures they have to adopt may appear to be to other people. Those 
who take those measures have also to take the misjudgement which 
follows. (transcript, p. 935)
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In the judgment, the Court spoke of the impossibility of providing for 
families of diverse compositions:
Any system of wage regulation which ignores the necessity of graduations 
of minima according to domestic responsibility must result in anomalies. 
Some will get too much and some too little. It becomes more evident 
every day that by means of child endowment or some other device the 
aggregate amount which industry can pay to wage-earners as a whole 
must be more equitably divided. (decision, p. 308)
The main issue was whether the pre-reduction wage standard was 
sustainable:
But whatever system of distribution of the nation’s income may be 
adopted … only that can be distributed which is produced. For this 
Court to fix a basic wage at an amount which would procure an average 
standard of living for wage-earners such as the Court would very gladly 
see prevailing, would be worse than futile if the nation’s income is not 
large enough to maintain the prescribed standard. However grievous 
the lowering of a customary average standard may be to those with 
heavy family or other responsibilities, and however painful it may be 
to this Court to have to declare that such a lowering is for the time 
being unavoidable, the Court must perform that duty, if, after full 
deliberation, it is forced to conclude that the occasion for lowering has 
arisen. (p. 309)6
The unions complained that the price index used by the Court to adjust 
the basic wage, comprising food and groceries and house rent, had exaggerated 
6  In the hearing, Dethridge said of the 1931 decision: ‘the position was that the income of 
Australia was not sufficient to enable the preceding wage to be maintained at that time, and it 
took into consideration the desirability of spreading the actual income not only amongst those 
who were then in employment, but also among other men who were looking for employment 
and who were unable to get it at the prevailing rate of wage. That is what the Court did. 
The Court did not intend to take a penny away from the wage earners. It intended to spread 
among the whole of the wage earners, as far as possible, that which was available for wage 
earners’ (transcript, p. 100). Responding to reasoning such as this, Crofts said that ‘it is not 
the function of this Court to give some of the wages of the men in work to men out of work. 
That is the function of the Government’ (p. 171).
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the fall in prices. On this issue, the Court heard evidence from Giblin, who 
was then the Acting Commonwealth Statistician. Giblin had already published 
a pamphlet, Wages and Prices, which defended the index against a variety of 
criticisms.7 The Court concurred in Giblin’s conclusions, as stated in the 
pamphlet:
(a) That the index for food and housing makes in general a fairly 
satisfactory measure of retail prices generally.
(b) That the index for food and housing if not always perfectly 
satisfactory for retail prices generally is still the best measure of 
them that can, in practice, be made.
(c) That the error in using food and housing as a general index of prices 
will be now one way, now the other, so that it will not accumulate 
to any serious amount in any moderate period of years.
The decision did less than justice to cross-examination of Giblin by H C 
Gibson. One of his contentions (which he had also argued in 1930) was 
that the direction from the Statistician to retailers to report the prices of the 
‘predominant’ grade of an item caused the index to fall with reductions in 
quality, which were occurring as households responded to lower incomes 
by more austere living. Giblin acknowledged the point, and said that the 
instruction to retailers had been amended, but argued that the reverse effect 
had applied in the 1920s, when incomes were rising, so that recent losses 
would merely have cancelled earlier unintended gains. Neither Gibson nor 
Giblin attempted to quantify the error.8
R F Irvine had written a statement, The Basic Wage, from which Crofts 
quoted at length. The thrust of his argument was that the source of the 
current economic problems was the monetary system and that the case for 
adjusting real incomes was contradicted by the unrealised productive potential 
of technology.9 Beeby commented during the hearing that some of Irvine’s 
7  This document was included, as an appendix, in the Labour Report, No. 21, 1930.
8  Transcript, especially p. 317.
9  The unions also called witnesses who ascribed the Depression to the malfunctioning of the 
monetary system and contended that higher wages would tend to offset it.
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statements were ‘as extraordinary as the evidence which Professor Irvine gave 
in the original case’. He added:
I argued that position out with Professor Irvine when he was in the 
witness box [in 1930], and he held to one opinion which I think is 
untenable, but he sticks to it still. His whole contention is monetary, 
that we get less in exchange for the goods which we send Home; but 
it is not monetary where a country relies on the export of its surplus 
products. … I am referring to our export of surplus goods, and we get 
less goods in exchange for them. (p. 84)
‘Mr Irvine’, said the Court, ‘thinks “that engineers and other technicians can 
double, treble, or even quadruple the output of ordinary necessities in a very 
short period.”’ This notion was espoused by a number of writers ‘whose ideas 
as to potential production seem to have been coloured by their familiarity 
with increase of production effected by modern methods in factories’ and 
who found the reason for the non-attainment of the productive potential 
in ‘an insufficient supply of monetary instruments’. Irvine, said the Court, 
seemed largely to have accepted the doctrines of Major Douglas. This was not 
the place for an exhaustive commentary on Douglas’ proposals ‘or any other 
cognate proposals for changes in the monetary system’:
But mention should be made of the fact that economic thinkers of 
eminence of diverse political and economic views, but all sympathetic 
with the claims of wage-earners for advancement, have rejected those 
proposals as fallacious. Mr J M Keynes, the famous authority on money, 
Mr J A Hobson, the high-wage advocate, Mr G D H Cole, a leading 
British socialist, and Messrs Foster and Catchings, prominent American 
economists, more or less discard the Douglas theory and its varied 
offshoots. (decision, pp. 311–312)10
10  Dethridge said during the hearing: ‘I think it would be very desirable if an economist of 
real standing like Keynes or Stamp and others did apply his very considerable understanding 
of economic principles to this Major Douglas suggestion and say what he has to say upon it. 
But they simply class it as unworthy of notice, call it the “Douglas heresy” and say nothing 
about it’ (transcript, p. 88). In The General Theory (Keynes 1936), Keynes did discuss the 
Douglas proposals.
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It might be true, the Court said, that the world Depression had a 
monetary origin, but Irvine overlooked the fact that the prices of Australia’s 
exports of primary products had fallen more than the prices of imports, 
depressing the real income of Australia.11
The Court was correct in pointing to the decline of the terms of trade, 
which had an obvious adverse effect on real spending power. We may wonder, 
however, whether too much was made of the point by economists such as 
Copland and Giblin and by the Court. Imagine that the prices of both exports 
and imports had fallen in the same proportion as the prices of exports, relative 
to the local price level. Could the Depression then have been averted or 
significantly mitigated? Without other adjustments, the competitive positions 
of both exporters and import-competing businesses would have been drastically 
eroded. The other adjustments might have been a depreciation of the exchange 
rate, a reduction of domestic money incomes (including wages), or both. If 
these fell short of the required levels, severe structural problems would have 
remained. It is doubtful that the Australian economy had the flexibility to 
absorb the price shocks coming from abroad without such structural problems 
emerging. To what extent the structural impact of the shocks was exacerbated 
by the terms-of-trade effect is unknown and probably unknowable. The 
cessation of foreign loans was, of course, an additional ‘imported’ cause of 
depression.
The Court attached much weight to the state of public finances. 
Commonwealth and State deficits had been funded by short-dated bank loans, 
including Treasury Bills held by the Commonwealth Bank, and the banks’ 
ability to lend for industrial and commercial purposes was correspondingly 
reduced. A persistent and important cause of the deficits was a fall in railway 
revenues without corresponding reductions of working expenses and interest 
charges. A rise in wages would increase the railways’ deficiencies. It was difficult, 
11  Referring to Irvine, Dethridge said: ‘The position is this. If anyone comes along and says 
“The ordinary rules of arithmetic are unsound,” and someone else comes along and says 
“the rules of arithmetic are sound, and two and two still make four,” the Court, I suppose, is 
inclined to accept the evidence of him who said that two and two make four and not four and 
a half ’ (transcript, pp. 246–247).
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said the Court, to get the union advocates to appreciate the importance of the 
government’s budgetary problems (p. 316).
The general economic situation was far worse, in the Court’s view, than 
it had been when the 10 per cent cut was ordered, despite some improvement 
in public finances due to the Premiers’ Plan. Under any economic order, 
Australia would depend for a long time on exports of primary produce. While 
low prices continued, it was imperative for costs to be brought to a level at 
which increased primary production was possible (p. 318).
The Court then discussed the ‘theory of high wages’, which ‘plays an 
important part in modern economics, and is supported by many distinguished 
economists’. ‘None’, it said,
can contest the broad theory that the more that is drawn from production 
by wage-earners, so long as sufficient is reserved for necessary capital 
and other requirements, the more prosperous a community becomes. 
Wages maintained at the highest possible level stimulate consumption, 
and steadily increasing consumption means increased employment with 
improving standards of living. (p. 318)
J A Hobson, a distinguished exponent of the high-wage theory, argued 
that depression was caused by excessive spending on investment relative to 
consumption. The Court said that Hobson’s version of the theory was disputed 
by (among others) J M Keynes in his Treatise on Money. Keynes saw the source 
of the problem in a deficiency of investment relative to saving and thought 
that this might be remedied by ‘a creation and issue of credit for purposes of 
industry to an amount equal to current uninvested savings’. Notwithstanding 
such disagreements, ‘most experts of any standing in the economic world agree 
that payment of the highest wages consistent with sufficient reservations to 
attract competent management, enterprise, and capital should be the aim of 
industry’. The old school of economists, ‘who preached low wages and long 
hours of employment as the inevitable foundation of industry’, were no longer 
heeded (p. 319). But the union advocates refused to recognise any relation 
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between wages as a cost of production and unemployment. Even if the high-
wage theory were accepted in its entirety, it might still be the case that existing 
standards were unsustainable.12
Not surprisingly, the unions argued that the continued reduction of 
employment demonstrated the futility of the wage cut. The Court’s response 
was to blame the State tribunals which had not followed its lead:
The 10 per cent reduction was not universally adopted. In Victoria 
except in some sheltered industries it was applied to Governmental 
services and was adopted by Wages Boards dealing with employees in 
key industries not covered by this Court’s awards. In the State of New 
South Wales the policy of the Government has been to prevent any wage 
reductions as part of a scheme of rehabilitation. In Queensland, where 
industrial conditions are mainly controlled by a State Tribunal, the basic 
wage has been reduced to £3 14s 0d per week as against this Court’s 
present minimum of £2 18s 6d. In South Australia the minimum has 
been fixed by the State Tribunal at £3 3s 0d per week as against this 
Court’s £2 19s 0d per week, and in Western Australia at £3 12s 0d 
per week as against £3 1s 9d. … The Court is still of opinion that the 
uniform adoption simultaneously in all States of a 10 per cent reduction 
in actual wage costs … would have had a marked effect on employment. 
… Hesitancy in its adoption can only make recovery slower and more 
painful. (p. 323)
Crofts had observed that the State tribunals which had set and maintained 
basic wages higher than the federal Court’s wage ‘know all the facts this Court 
knows’. Dethridge responded: ‘I take it that they know the economic facts, 
12  During the hearing, Dethridge put it to Crofts that, if the union argument were correct, 
‘it would be not only desirable to restore the ten per cent, but it would be desirable to increase 
all wages, all salaries (including those of judges) and all endowments in the nature of family 
endowments by one hundred per cent, because the spending power of the community would 
thereby be increased correspondingly. … Does not it seem to follow from your argument?’ 
Crofts retorted that, on the Court’s logic, wages should be reduced to nothing. ‘The answer 
to that’, said Dethridge, ‘is quite clear. Wages should not be brought down below the amount 
which the productivity of the country permits to be paid’ (transcript, p. 461).
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but they also know certain political facts. It is just as well to be frank. … This 
Court is independent of political influence’ (transcript, p. 121).13
The unions’ application was refused. ‘After the expiration of the present 
year’, said the Court, ‘circumstances may justify further consideration, 
particularly as to those who have no margins above the basic wage’ (p. 324). No 
reason was given for the hint of a possibly brighter future. We may speculate 
about a division of opinion within the Bench. One member—Beeby being the 
most likely—may have been uncomfortable with the generally negative tenor 
of the decision.
10.3 admInIsterIng wage restraInt 1932–33
The decision in the 1932 emergency reduction case required no follow-up 
action. The period between that case and the next general decision on the 10 
per cent cut was one of relative quiescence in federal wage setting.
In August 1932, Beeby dealt with applications by the Victorian 
Government for the removal of award terms that might impede the employment 
of men on relief works (see Suspension—Metal Trades’ Award—Unemployment 
Relief Work—Victoria 31 CAR 515 and subsequently reported decisions). 
Specifically, the Government wished to be able to employ all such workers 
at basic wage rates and to ration work. Beeby refused the former request. He 
accommodated the latter by suspending the operation of the awards so far as 
they applied to relief workers, but subject to the requirement that the hourly 
rates paid, including margins, accord with the weekly rates prescribed in the 
awards.
The Full Court in September 1932 refused to apply the 10 per cent cut 
to workers on the waterfront and in railway sheds in the Northern Territory 
13  Dethridge noted ‘the tremendous evil that does arise from those discrepancies; and we 
have thought that possibly by some joint action between the State tribunals and this Court 
something might be done to mitigate that evil. But there we are faced with the difficulty that 
in some of the States the tribunals are bound by State legislation, so that they are bound to 
take a particular course which may inevitably result in the wages being higher than those 
determined by this Court and, it may be, higher than are economically sound’ (transcript, p. 
660). I am unaware of any consultation between the Court and the State tribunals.
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(Port Darwin—Emergency Reduction 31 CAR 571). The reason given was the 
hopelessness of the employment situation in Port Darwin:
By far too many men are sharing what little work is available at Port 
Darwin, and no effort appears to have been made by those who employ 
labour to devise some scheme of organisation to meet the peculiar needs 
of the port. A reduction of the earnings of those who share the work 
… will make no appreciable difference to the people of the Northern 
Territory. The local unemployment problem and the unfortunate 
position of many men who cling to the town in the hope of restored 
prosperity call for decisive action before wage rates are reduced.
In the same month, the Full Court dealt with an application by the 
Transport Commissioners for New South Wales which can be attributed 
to a change of government in the State (Variation—Railway and Tramway 
Awards, NSW 31 CAR 579). The Court, in 1930, had limited its regulation of 
employment in railways to the basic wage and standard hours (see Chapter 9, 
Section 9.1). The New South Wales Railways Commissioners, at the direction 
of the recently elected Labor Government, withdrew their application for 
wage reductions which the Court, in respect of other employers, had met 
with the 10 per cent cut. After another change of government, the Transport 
Commissioners now sought the reduction. In the course of its decision, the 
Court commented on the argument of the unions that railway deficits were 
due to the existence of lines that had been constructed for developmental 
purposes. The Court accepted ‘that many of these lines should not be taken 
into account in estimating the final railway results’. But ‘even if the total cost of 
these non-paying lines in New South Wales were written off, and the interest 
on the balance of the borrowed money used in railway construction were 
reduced by 25 per cent, there would still be a deficit in railway revenue which 
could not be allowed to continue’ (p. 582). The majority of the employees 
were already covered by general awards, not specific to railways, in which the 
reduction was in force (though not observed while the Labor Government 
was in power). It was inevitable that the Court would grant the application: 
‘the balance of railway servants affected by these applications cannot expect to 
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escape the general lowering of standards which for the time being has become 
inevitable in all occupations’.
On the other hand, the Court (also in September 1932) cancelled the 
emergency reduction as it applied to the Bendigo Gas Company (Variation—
Gas Employees’ Award 31 CAR 636). No reasons were given, and we can only 
surmise that the decision reflected the financial condition and monopoly 
position of the company. On the same day, the Full Court gave its decision 
in a rubber industry case (Rubber Industry—Application to Vary Award 31 
CAR 638). The evidence, it said, indicated ‘a noticeable improvement in 
the financial outlook of the companies concerned’, but the recovery was 
insufficient to justify cancellation of the emergency reduction.
In December 1932, Dethridge finalised the new pastoral award 
(Judgment—Pastoral Industry 31 CAR 710). The evidence suggested that the 
cost of production of wool had fallen from about 11d per pound in 1930 to 
9d; but the price of wool had fallen also—from 8.36d in 1930–31 to 7.72d 
in 1931–32. Although the current price-cost relation was unsustainable in 
the long run, Dethridge favoured a measure of restraint in responding to the 
situation:
No possible reduction of wages in the industry will be sufficient in itself 
to replace the industry in prosperity, but wage-earners cannot escape 
some lessening of their share of the industry’s returns. At the same time 
we must remember that employers, because in prosperity they may 
have the chance of reaping high profits, have in adversity to carry a 
corresponding burden of loss. … No very great lowering of a previously 
attained standard of wages can be made suddenly, although in the long 
run no standard of wages can be maintained above the durable economic 
capacity of an industry. If that economic capacity is permanently 
lowered, the standard of wages must, of course, ultimately fall with it. 
But until it appears that there is such a permanent lowering and not 
only a depression, which, though severe, will probably disappear, thus 
leaving the way open again to profits, employers must be prepared to 
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pay wages somewhat above those that would accompany a permanent 
fixation of the industry upon the prices which prevail in the pit of a 
depression. (p. 713)
Dethridge made only minor changes to the prescribed wages, which had been 
heavily reduced in 1930 and 1931. The basic wage would be set on the basis 
of average prices in the year to September 1932 and remain fixed until March 
1934.
A case of some policy interest, also decided by Dethridge in December 
1932, was about an industry—food preserving—whose fortunes had evidently 
undergone some improvement (Variation—Food Preserving Employees’ 
Award 31 CAR 833). The case afforded Dethridge the opportunity to state 
unequivocally principles that were implicit, but perhaps less clearly articulated, 
in decisions of the Full Court. It was part of the union’s case for suspending 
the emergency reduction that the price index had exaggerated the fall in the 
cost of living. The argument involved a comparison of the All Items (C series) 
Index and the All Houses (A series) Index used by the Court. While it was 
true that the latter had fallen more than the former since 1929, it was possible, 
said Dethridge, that the All Houses Index was too high in 1929 and that what 
had since occurred was a correction. As the Full Court had done in June, 
Dethridge cited Giblin’s pamphlet as a reason to conclude that the index was 
satisfactory.
Dethridge then discussed the adjustment of wages to prices. He drew a 
distinction between price reductions that were due to increased productivity 
and those that were not. Clearly, the latter predominated in the Depression 
period. Dethridge said:
It is clear that some adjustment of wages to a great fall in the general price 
level is unavoidable where that fall is not due to increased productivity 
per head of a nation’s population. That price level expresses, roughly, in 
terms of money the contents of the flow of commodities from which 
the shares of wage-earners and employers are both drawn, and therefore 
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those shares must be measured in money proportionately to the 
measurement of those contents, that is to say, to the general price level. 
Whatever may be said of the principle of a basic wage fixed in relation 
to the cost of living, the system of adjustment adopted by this Court 
probably tends to produce a due relativity of wage level to price level, 
inevitable in the long run, with as little friction as any method that 
could be devised. I am not prepared to depart from a practice which has 
been so serviceable to the community. (p. 835)
This was an important statement, because it depicted the price level as a 
rough measure of capacity to pay and emphasised that aspect rather than the 
aspect of family needs. Where a fall in prices was due to greater productivity, 
different considerations applied:
But if the fall in the general price level is due to increased productivity 
of the community, it may not be just that the wage-earners who have 
contributed to that increase should, by having their wages reduced in 
accordance with the fall in prices, be deprived of a share in that increase. 
Mr Clarey referred to the report of the British Economic Commission, 
which expressed the opinion that the Australian basic wage fixed 
in relation to cost of living was wrong in principle for this reason, 
and because, as was thought, the wage-earners’ incentive to increase 
productivity was thereby destroyed.14 How far experience justifies this 
opinion is a question of difficulty for the consideration of which this is 
not an appropriate occasion. (p. 835)
Dethridge’s commentary on the adjustment of wages to prices has 
added interest because of remarks made by the Court in 1953 (at the time 
of abolishing automatic adjustments of the basic wage) to the effect that the 
adjustment system had become an anachronism in 1931, when the 10 per cent 
cut recognised the dominance of the capacity-to-pay criterion. There was an 
implication that the Depression-period Court had absent-mindedly continued 
automatic adjustments. It is evident that Dethridge saw the adjustment system, 
14  Dethridge should have said ‘British Economic Mission’ (see Chapter 13, Subsection 
13.1.2).
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which delivered large wage reductions during the Depression, as entirely 
consistent with the capacity principle.
The union put once more the familiar argument about wages and 
purchasing power. Dethridge noted that this argument had been fully 
considered by the Full Court, but again depicted the issue as one of balance:
For the best economic distribution of the national income, what is to 
be sought is the nearest possible approach to a state of balance, in which 
the wage level is as high as is necessary to enable the employed wage-
earners to provide their full proportionate part of the market for the 
community’s products, but is not so high as to put the prices of those 
products above the purchasing power of the other consumers who have 
to be relied upon to provide the remainder of that market. No one can say 
exactly what wages should be at any particular time to procure that ideal 
balance, but, broadly, inferences as to the necessary trends of wage levels 
may be drawn with reasonable safety. To determine precisely the utmost 
amount that can be paid as wages in an industry without destroying its 
power to continue to produce and sell its products is impossible, but the 
extent of unemployment does furnish some guidance as to when wages 
should be increased or decreased. (pp. 836–837)
Dethridge then turned to the condition of the industry before him, and 
the evidence persuaded him that it had undergone some recovery. ‘Where 
wages have been reduced because of depression in an industry’, he said, ‘it is 
fair that with a return of prosperity to that industry the wage-earners engaged 
therein should share in that prosperity …’ (p. 837). He had thought it proper 
to consult his Full Court colleagues, who agreed with his intended order. In 
respect of the basic wage, the 10 per cent reduction was cancelled, but Powers’ 
3s was removed. The effect was to raise the rate by 3s, or just under 5 per 
cent. For margins, the 10 per cent cut was replaced by one of 5 per cent. 
On the same day, the Full Court made a similar order for the glass industry 
(Variation—Glass Workers’ Award 31 CAR 844). These decisions confirmed 
the Court’s willingness to dilute the broad principle of the 1931 decision, 
which emphasised the spreading of sacrifice, with an industry-by-industry 
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approach whereby some workers fared better and (in the pastoral industry) 
some worse than the standard.15
Four days later, Beeby made an award for the wool and basil industry 
with no adjustment clause. He thought that there should be no further 
automatic wage reductions until the whole method of basic-wage fixation 
and adjustment had been reviewed. In saying this, he was not to be taken as 
expressing the opinion of the Full Court.
When the 10 per cent reduction was ordered I, personally, did not 
anticipate such serious further reductions as have resulted from changes 
in the Commonwealth Statistician’s index numbers. I therefore have 
arrived at the wage schedule not so much on a base rate with margins 
that are to be regarded as final as on consideration of the net earning 
power of individuals in the industry as now conducted. For this reason 
I have not included an adjustment clause, but reserve leave to either side 
to apply if there are further fluctuations in the cost of living or if the 
position of the industry materially changes. (Judgment—Wool and Basil 
Industry 31 CAR 846, 852)
10.4 the 1933 InquIry
In April 1933 the Court heard a further union application for the rescission 
of the 10 per cent cut. It gave its decision on 5 May (Application (No. 2) for 
Cancellation Emergency Reduction of Wage Rates 32 CAR 90).
In the preceding quarter, unemployment (calculated from the trade 
union returns) was 26.5 per cent, compared with 28.3 per cent a year earlier 
and 30 per cent at the peak, registered in the second quarter of 1932. On the 
evidence of unemployment, then, there had been a very modest improvement.
The Court, which had been unanimous in 1931 and 1932, now 
divided. Dethridge and Drake-Brockman gave a majority judgment, with 
Beeby favouring a slightly different outcome.
15  In February 1933, Beeby made a consent order for the Melbourne and Metropolitan 
Tramways Board, providing that any further reductions in wages due to price reductions 
would be offset by equivalent wage increases (Tramways’ Award—Variation 32 CAR 21).
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The unions again argued that the reduced level of wages left families 
in hardship; and Dethridge and Drake-Brockman once more spoke of the 
inequity of a system that rewarded the man with large family responsibilities 
no more than the single man. ‘But’, they said, ‘this Court cannot remedy that 
evil’ (p. 92). The unions also argued the inequity of subjecting workers under 
the Court’s awards to the reduction, when many other workers escaped it. 
Dethridge and Drake-Brockman, ‘while deploring the inequality of treatment, 
and realising that it results in a tendency on the part of wage earners to put 
themselves outside the awards of the Court and to seek a place under those 
of State industrial tribunals’, refused to remove the inequality ‘except so far 
as that removal is consistent with what we regard as a necessary adaptation of 
wages to the present industrial position of Australia’ (p. 93). They estimated 
that about a half of Australian wage-earners had been subject to the reduction. 
This estimate took into account the membership of federally registered 
unions—about one-third of all workers—and the predominant acceptance 
of the Federal Court’s lead by wages boards in Victoria and Tasmania (p. 98).
The Court was moving further from the notion of the basic wage as a 
‘needs’ wage and closer to an explicit recognition of the preponderant weight 
of economic criteria. During the hearing, Dethridge responded to a reminder 
that the Harvester basic wage was supposed to be ‘sacrosanct’ with the 
observation that ‘nothing is sacrosanct against the impossibility of fulfilment’ 
(transcript, p. 196); and when told of the hardships that wage-earners were 
experiencing, he replied:
Mere appeals to sympathy are not of much use. … Of course, the 
Court recognises as it has already said that the man on the basic wage, 
with family responsibilities, is suffering most extreme hardship. … but 
because the Court sympathetically recognises the painful position that 
wage earners are in, it would be absurd for the court to allow its eyes to 
be blinded by tears to the real facts. (pp. 201–202)
In a more direct repudiation of the Higgins legacy, Dethridge said:
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The judgments [of the South Australian Board of Industry] contain a 
number of good, sound dicta, in my opinion. … I do not know that 
the New South Wales Court has given the same attention as the South 
Australian Board to economic factors, that is to say, given attention to 
the unavoidable relationship of the basic wage to the production of 
the country. The South Australian Board does in fact indicate that you 
cannot divorce the basic wage from the marketable production of the 
country. I am afraid in this Court in the early days that inseparability 
was not emphasised as it might have been. The result is that there 
has grown up a kind of notion that the basic wage is independent of 
the actual production of wealth in the country. But it is not, and it 
never can be independent. However, there seems to be an idea that it is 
independent. (p. 356)
Though yet again rejecting union arguments about wage reductions 
and purchasing power, Dethridge and Drake-Brockman were a little more 
equivocal than the Court had been in 1931 and 1932.16 Not only did the 
union advocates argue for wage increases to increase spending power, ‘but they 
were able to find support for those views in the statements of some prominent 
employers, and in the judgments of some members of State industrial tribunals, 
and also what they regarded as support in expressions of some economists, 
written however in relation to world conditions and not to the special present 
conditions of Australia’ (decision, pp. 93–94). The majority Judges proceeded 
to state ‘why in our opinion this “purchasing” or “spending” power proposition 
lacks the cogency which by many people … it is supposed to have; [and] at the 
same time the extent of its real validity will be indicated’ (p. 94). The fallacy 
of the purchasing-power argument lay in its assumption that a reduction of 
workers’ spending power equated to a reduction in aggregate spending power:
16  During the hearing, Dethridge said to Crofts: ‘You can take it that I at any rate agree 
with you to this extent, that if you attempt to give the wage earners too small a share of what 
may be conveniently called the purchasing power, then the whole purchasing power of the 
community is reduced detrimentally to the whole community. If you attempt to give them 
too much you have the converse problem, so this Court, together with other tribunals, has 
to feel its way, so to speak, with doubt all the time as to whether what it is doing is the right 
thing’ (p. 31).
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If by awards of this Court we could effectively raise wages so as to transfer 
the whole profits, rent and interest to the wage earners, we would not 
increase purchasing power, but would only transfer it. Conversely, when 
wages are reduced, there is a transfer of spending power from those 
employees who suffer the reduction, but there is no reduction in the 
aggregate spending power.
The main cause of the prevailing lack of purchasing power was the depressed 
incomes of the primary producers, together with the cessation of foreign 
loans. Unless the spending power of the primary industries were increased, 
‘the purchasing power of the whole of Australia must continue lowered and no 
increasing of wages in factories, railways, shops or theatres will raise it’ (p. 95).
A hint of equivocation can, however, be found in the following passage:
But although a reduction of wages does not of itself diminish the 
aggregate of the purchasing power of the community it may possibly 
so affect the rapidity with which that power is exercised as to diminish 
the extent of the willingness to buy which is necessary for absorption of 
production. If the purchasing power which was transferred to employers 
by means of the 10 per cent reduction has been hoarded or allowed to 
be idle, or has not been promptly used directly or indirectly either to 
maintain or increase employment in some form somewhere in Australia 
or to cheapen such products or services of the factories, transport, 
shopkeeping, or amusement industries to which the 10 per cent applies 
as are required by the farming and mining industries, and thus make 
the lowered spending power of these two industries more effective, then 
to that extent the reduction of wages has been economically unsound. 
(p. 95)
Dethridge and Drake-Brockman’s acceptance of the possibility of hoarding was 
a concession relative to the stances that they (with Beeby) had taken in 1931 
and 1932. But they did not see it as one of practical importance.17 Any such 
17  During the hearing, Mundy asserted that the national income could be kept much 
closer to its pre-Depression level if internal production were sustained by the circulation of 
money. Dethridge commented: ‘That blessed term “Circulation of money” is like the blessed 
word “Mesopotamia”’ (transcript, p. 85). A little later, Mundy claimed that his position was 
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effects that may have followed the wage reduction were ‘negligible compared 
with the increased efficiency thereby given to the lessened purchasing power of 
the primary exporting industries’. The emergency reduction had not restored 
‘equilibrium’ between the purchasing power of the primary producers and the 
costs of Australian industries, but ‘has certainly brought us nearer to it’.
‘What signs’, asked Dethridge and Drake-Brockman, ‘are there of 
renewed prosperity?’ ‘All that can be said’, they tautologically answered, ‘is that 
the country has hitherto just succeeded in staving off an even worse industrial 
disaster than has been suffered’. The continued high level of unemployment 
was the strongest evidence of incomplete adjustment of outgoings to income 
and costs to markets. While favourable seasons had boosted production, this 
gain was far from offsetting the falls in prices: since 1928, wheat prices had 
fallen by 50 per cent; wool prices by 55 per cent; butter prices by 40 per 
cent; and mutton prices by 44 per cent. There was, in short, ‘no possible 
foundation for suggesting that alterations since 1931 justify any restoration of 
the reduction then made’ (p. 98).
Dethridge and Drake-Brockman thought, however, that the fall in real 
wages that had occurred exceeded what was intended in 1931:
It was not our intention to exceed a reduction of 10 per cent in the 
actual real wages existing before the fall of income, even though by 
reason of the use in adjustment of the All Houses Price Index Table and 
of the Powers’ 3s, the ‘basic wage’ element … may have come to exceed 
in its purchasing power that of the ‘Harvester’ 7s in 1907 in Melbourne.
They were now ‘seriously concerned with the question whether by the use in 
adjustment of the “All Houses” table that intended 10 per cent reduction of 
real wages may not since have been exceeded’. Whereas in 1932 the Court had 
accepted Giblin’s assessment that the All Houses Index provided ‘in general 
a fairly satisfactory measure of retail prices generally’, they now thought that 
supported by a number of economists whom the Court regarded as unorthodox. Asked to 
name them, Mundy mentioned Keynes. Dethridge said that he did not regard Keynes as 
unorthodox, adding that Keynes, whether orthodox or not, was ‘pretty sound’; and Beeby said 
that orthodoxy was ‘not always the test of truth’ (p. 96).
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it did not measure accurately the fall in prices since the end of 1929. The 
All Items (C series) Index—more comprehensive because of the inclusion of 
clothing and miscellaneous items—was to be preferred.18
Dethridge and Drake-Brockman accordingly adopted a formula which, 
in effect, took as its starting point the basic wages in the awards as they stood 
in the last quarter of 1929. These were then reduced for the movement in the 
All Items Index between the whole of 1929 and the first quarter of 1933. (This 
adjustment was applied to Powers’ 3s, as well as the Harvester equivalent.) 
The resultant amounts remained subject to the 10 per cent reduction. The 
immediate effect was to raise the six-capitals basic wage from 61s 8d to 64s 
2d—an increase of 4.1 per cent (p. 101). Subsequent quarterly adjustments 
were to be based on the same principle, that is, updating the wage in the fourth 
quarter of 1929 according to movements in the C series index by comparison 
with the yearly average for 1929. This arrangement lasted until the 1934 case 
(see below).19
The majority Judges left open the possibility that specific inquiry 
into individual industries might lead to further wage increases in those 
industries (p. 103). During the hearing, Dethridge had contemplated step-
by-step restoration of the wage cut, dependent on the conditions of particular 
industries:
A basic wage common to all industries can only be paid if industry as 
a whole can stand the payment of that wage. It does not matter what 
is laid down by any tribunal or any Court. In the past history of this 
Court, and also in connection with legislation governing State tribunals, 
an attempt has been made—and I am not condemning the attempt at 
18  Gibson repeated the contention that the Statistician’s reliance on ‘predominant’ prices had 
biased the index downward. This criticism, he said, had been accepted by the Statistician, who 
now sought prices of items of constant quality; but there had been no retrospective correction 
of the index. It may be that Gibson’s submission influenced the Court’s perception that the 
price index had exaggerated the fall in prices (transcript, p. 138).
19  Although the thrust of the majority decision about cost of living adjustments is accurately 
summarised above, the adjustment clause by which the Court gave effect to it was quite 
complicated.
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all—to prescribe a minimum living wage, and, of course, it is a very 
desirable thing to have a minimum living wage as high as possible for 
every wage-earner in the community. But an attempt has been made 
to introduce that principle, and, to some extent it has been successful; 
but it has only been successful up to now because the income from 
industry in the country has been able to pay it. If that income from the 
industry of the country had been unable to pay it it would not have 
been paid, and the attempt to pay it would have resulted in continually 
increasing unemployment. … As a matter of fact, it seems to me that 
that is the working principle which will have to be applied to industries 
as they become more prosperous than they have been recently. As soon 
as they can afford to pay the hitherto recognised basic wage, let them 
pay it. If they can afford to pay more, and they get on to some more 
satisfactory basis of assessment, let them pay it as long as the payment 
does not militate against the continuance of the necessary expansion of 
the industry. (transcript, p. 196)
Beeby began by deploring the chaotic situation caused by the divergent 
policies of the different tribunals:
The conflict between State and Federal Tribunals, the impossibility in 
the existing state of the law of securing purely national consideration of 
wage fixation, and the inability of tribunals to grade minimum wages 
according to the size of family units makes equitable fixation of a national 
minimum wage impossible. … The Court [in 1931] anticipated that its 
analysis of the economic situation … would, within a reasonable time, 
lead to similar declarations by State tribunals and result in universal 10 
per cent reduction of ‘real’ as contrasted with nominal wages. But after 
two years State tribunals (except Tasmanian Wages Boards) have not 
deemed it necessary to reduce wage standards, but have been content to 
make reductions only in proportion to the reduced cost of living. (pp. 
103–104)
A comparison of the federal basic wage (after an impending cost of 
living adjustment) and State basic wages for capital cities showed:
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In Melbourne, the federal rate was 58s 4d. This rate, said Beeby, was generally 
adopted by the wages boards.20In Hobart, the federal rate of 66s was also 
generally applied by the boards (p. 104). Beeby, like his colleagues, estimated 
that the 10 per cent cut applied to only about half of the industrial population. 
This was a ‘startling anomaly’, but he did not think it ‘sufficient reason for 
this Court to go back on its conclusion that a general reduction of standards 
by at least 10 per cent was, on the date of its original orders, and still is, 
unavoidable’ (p. 105).
The union advocates’ attack on the All Houses Index had crystallised 
his doubts as to whether that index accurately measured the fall in the cost of 
living. The time had come to abandon the adjusted Harvester standard. Beeby 
did not set out, as the majority did, an adjustment formula, but he proposed 
some basic-wage amounts slightly above those chosen by the majority. These 
rates would operate for six months or until further order, and the method of 
wage fixation would be the subject of further inquiry and conferences with the 
State tribunals.
In May and June 1933, the Full Court gave two unanimous decisions 
affecting railways and tramways. In the former of the two, it removed an 
existing limitation (presumably inserted by consent) which prevented the 
basic wage in New South Wales from falling below the State award level, 
and imposed the adjustment clause prescribed in the main case (Variation—
Railway and Tramway Awards, NSW 32 CAR 316). In the latter, the Court 
made a statement which may well have reflected discussion within the Bench 
arising from the different approaches in the main case:
We have given thought to the introduction of a less complicated system 
of adjustment based upon the ‘All Items’ Index Numbers only without 
20  Workers with children also received child endowment.
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reference to the ‘All Houses’ Index Numbers but fear that such a change 
would at present cause confusion in other directions. Some system of 
adjustment to fluctuations in cost of living is indispensable for a basic 
wage prescribed to provide a standard of living. When industrial affairs 
emerge from their present precarious condition into apparent stability 
so that a basic real wage may be re-assessed with some assurance that 
as so re-assessed it can be maintained, a simple system of adjusting that 
wage to changes in cost of living will have to be adopted by the Court.21 
(Award—Basic Wage—Commonwealth Railways 32 CAR 371, 380)
10.5 restraInt moderated
By the first quarter of 1934, unemployment fell to 21.9 per cent. Obviously, 
the economy remained severely depressed, but there were signs of slow recovery. 
The Court responded with sporadic and specific concessions to labour claims.
As noted in Section 10.9 below, the Full Court in June 1933 granted 
a 44-hour week for the textile industry. In the same decision, it refused to 
rescind the wage reduction.
In August, by consent, it cancelled the reduction for several companies 
bound by the Metal Trades’ Award: Australian Glass Manufacturers, Australasian 
Paper and Pulp, Australian Paper Manufacturers, and Cumberland Paper 
Board Mills and nine companies in the food-preserving industry (Variation—
Metal Trades’ Award 32 CAR 487). In September, the Court granted a union 
application to cancel the reduction in respect of the Adelaide Electric Supply 
Company (Variation—Metal Trades’ Award [Adelaide Electric Supply Co Ltd] 32 
CAR 514). It referred to and apparently accepted the union’s argument ‘that 
the saving of labour cost resulting from the wage cut seems to have resulted 
in a benefit mainly only for those interested as stock-holders in the concern, 
21  In September 1933, the Full Court varied the awards for New South Wales railways by 
adding Powers’ 3s to the basic wage. Powers had omitted this, by consent, in 1925 because of 
other benefits provided. The Court now felt that the value of additional benefits had diminished 
to such an extent as to justify observance of the standard wage provision (Variation—Railway 
and Tramway Awards, NSW 32 CAR 516).
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and that the financial position of the company is such that it can carry on and 
make reasonable profits notwithstanding the rescission of the wage reduction 
…’ (p. 515).
The Court, on the other hand, refused in September a union application 
for wage increases in the pastoral industry which would have reversed the 
various reductions that had been imposed in and since 1930. It acknowledged 
that there had been some increase in the price of wool, but regarded it as 
insufficient to justify the higher wages (Variation—Pastoral Award 32 CAR 
522). On the same day, it refused an application to vary the fruitpickers’ 
award so as to apply the decision in the main case. It accepted the employers’ 
contention that ‘the industry … is in such a critical condition that no increase 
whatever in labour costs can be carried’ (Variation—Fruit-Pickers’ Award 32 
CAR 525, 526).
I refer later to a handful of decisions about standard hours.
10.6 the wage cut rescInded
The exceptions made for specific industries generated a number of applications 
for the removal of the 10 per cent cut. In October 1933, the Court put some 
of these ‘on hold’ to await a general review early in 1934. In fact, the Court sat 
in December 1933. The hearing occupied 19 days, and the decision was given 
on 17 April 1934 (Basic Wage Inquiry 1934 33 CAR 144).22
10.6.1 The hearing
The nature and purpose of the basic wage
The whole tenor of the hearing indicated an expectation that the Court would 
not merely cancel the emergency reduction but would also put the basic wage 
22  In a decision of 9 February 1934, Dethridge said that the Court would soon decide what 
was to be done about the 10 per cent reduction and also about the basic wage. ‘It may be’, he 
said, ‘that the Court will put the basic wage, whatever the amount, upon a somewhat clearer 
basis as to the Statistician’s figures, and a simpler basis as to adjustment, than has been the case 
hitherto’ (Interpretation—Agricultural Implement Award 33 CAR 7, 8).
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on a new footing. There was sporadic discussion of the need for a basic wage, 
the principles underlying it, and the method of its adjustment.
Early in the hearing, the Judges expressed general agreement that they 
did not want any more family-budget inquiries: they already had the results of 
inquiries by Piddington and others (transcript, p. 6). There was, initially, some 
questioning of the automatic adjustment system. Dethridge said:
I am inclined to think, as I have already stated in judgments of the 
Court, that the more appropriate method of adjustment of the basic 
wage is one based upon what is known as the ‘All Items Table’ rather 
than upon the ‘All Houses Table’. Assuming that to be so—assuming 
that the all items table is the one which more accurately serves as a 
measure, one finds that there are discrepancies in the basic wage as 
between different capitals or different States. If we adopted the all items 
table, it would mean, apparently, that a re-adjustment of the wages as 
between the different capitals or States would have to be made. … and I 
may say also, it may be that it is an opportune moment for introducing 
a rather better system of adjustment than we have had. I am not at all 
sure—here again I speak for myself—that we have not made too many 
adjustments. I am not at all sure that the quarterly adjustment is not a 
source of embarrassment; that it harasses business people unnecessarily 
… (pp. 4–5)
After the hearing had proceeded for several days, Dethridge reverted to the 
question of automatic adjustments:
I have it in mind that possibly the best course is this: to have adjustments 
made once every six months, but to have those adjustments made upon 
the last preceding quarter’s figures. That has appealed to me, but I have 
an open mind upon it and I want to hear what can be said. By adopting 
that method, it appears to me that you do have the advantage of getting 
the most recent cost of living figures for the period you are adjusting 
for … and at the same time you do away with what may be—I have to 
hear you upon this—a too frequent adjustment by means of quarterly 
adjustment. (pp. 181–182)
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Beeby contemplated a larger departure from existing practice:
I was hoping to hear argument on another possibility to which I have 
been giving consideration: whether a better method would not be to 
abandon the mechanical adjustment and for this Court once a year to, 
as briefly as possible, survey the situation and declare the wage for that 
year.
Dethridge had thought of this but saw it as impractical. ‘It might be feasible’, 
he said, ‘for a Court acting in one State to have a yearly examination of the 
actual cost of living and so on, but for this Court to undertake the examination 
of the cost of living all over Australia would take all our time’ (p. 182). Beeby 
was not convinced: ‘Surely if this Court changed its principle and settled 
down to a new method the considerations as to whether or not there should 
be a variation ought not to be a very extensive matter once a year.’ P J Clarey, 
one of the union advocates, said that the unions wished to retain quarterly 
automatic adjustment, but proposed that no adjustment be made until the 
amount was at least two shillings. Dethridge was attracted to this. He said (on 
the next day): ‘I am inclined to think that if that were introduced, we could 
then adhere, generally speaking, to the quarterly adjustment because that in 
itself would diminish the necessity for such frequent adjustments … and, at 
the same time, as you say, would enable the basic wage to meet any sharp 
change in the cost of living’ (p. 204).
The issue of wage adjustment was further discussed later in the hearing. 
Beeby asked whether ‘until we get some traditional stability would it not be 
better for the Court, after having arrived at a basic wage, to have a short review 
every six months, and cut out the adjustments? … There may be some violent 
changes in the economic circumstances again calling for a reconsideration of 
the basic wage’ (p. 470). He thought that there were some industries in which 
the 10 per cent cut could be restored, ‘but the automatic universal system is 
a very difficult one to cope with’ (p. 471). Dethridge was reluctant to take so 
large a step:
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I may say that my present feeling is that we should as far as possible 
get at the basic wage which should be applied ordinarily, and should 
come to a decision as to whether the 10 per cent cut generally should 
be removed either wholly or in part, and, having announced what we 
regard as being the rule for the general application of that wage we 
should then call upon those concerned in any industry who wish to 
do so, to show cause why that generally should not be applied. I am 
inclined to think that that would meet the situation which my brother 
Beeby has in mind … My present view is that the Court should be 
slow to discard the principle of a basic wage to be used in ordinary 
circumstances. It is true that originally there was no statutory direction 
to the Court to adopt any such principle, or to arbitrate within the 
limits of any such principle; but the principle was adopted early in 
1907, and it has been recognised, in my opinion, by the Legislature in 
some later amendments. (p. 471)
Dethridge assured Crofts: ‘I think you may take it that I have not in my 
mind anything which will lead to the discarding or the abandonment, either 
ostensibly or otherwise, of the basic wage as the normal minimum wage for 
the adult male’ (p. 472). Beeby retreated somewhat from his suggestion:
I am not putting that forward as a practical proposal at present. All I 
am saying is that we have not reached the limit of schemes for wage 
regulation. If the system persists, and we could get some cohesion 
between those tribunals which fix wages, we could get a much better 
scheme than that which exists today. (pp. 472–473)
Crofts sought to rehabilitate the idea of the basic wage as a minimum 
sum for a family of five.23 He attributed the practice of birth control to the 
23  He found some support in a 1926 basic wage decision of Mr Justice Dwyer in Western 
Australia. ‘A wage which does not provide for three children’, said Dwyer, ‘should not be 
tolerated in a sparsely populated country such as this. We as a community are prepared to 
mortgage our resources to the extent of millions of pounds to bring in immigrants, and 
everyone agrees that an Australian baby is the best immigrant. We cannot be guided absolutely 
by statistics. Every man has not three children, neither has every man a wife, but every man 
who marries requires a whole wife of his own. If we award a wage by statistics, then we should 
fix it at a figure which would support only a decimal fraction of a wife, to be exact, .49. This 
would not be satisfactory, so we should refuse to have what might be called a bigoted regard 
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inability of workers ‘to bring up families in decency and comfort’, causing 
Dethridge to comment:
It is not so much the wages awarded by this Court that affects the rate 
of births. It is the general income of the community, speaking broadly, 
and the standard which that community chooses to adopt. In Australia 
hitherto the capacity of wealth-production has been, I might say, 
reasonably high, so that people have also adopted a comparatively high 
standard of living, and accordingly, taking it by and large, they have to 
cut their family according to the wealth of the community. … It comes 
back to this: it is the general wealth-production of the community, the 
income, in the broad sense of the word, and the standard which that 
community chooses to seek which brings about birth control. That is 
from the economic point of view. There may be other reasons for birth 
control, but that is the chief reason. (p. 35)
Two of the Judges—Dethridge and Drake-Brockman—later asserted 
the irrelevance of the family standard. There could be a high standard for 
a small family or a lesser one for a larger family. The following discussion 
ensued:
Dethridge C J: Cannot we cut this short? Mr Justice Higgins purported 
to fix a basic wage for a family unit of five which was in my opinion 
a low standard, but Mr Justice Higgins endeavoured to fix that which 
was the best possible standard for a family of five or a family of four 
or a family of three. He endeavoured to fix the best possible standard 
and that I think is the aim that we should make for. It then becomes 
somewhat trifling, if I may say so, to say that that is the standard for 
a family of five, or four, or three, it is the best possible standard. All 
this discussion as to the family unit is perhaps somewhat beside the 
question.
Mr Crofts: I desire to cut this question of the family unit short, but I am 
bound to point out the employees’ viewpoint. That family unit has not 
only been used by myself, but generally by those who have been sitting 
for statistics and award to each man enough to keep a whole wife’ (Dwyer quoted by Crofts, 
transcript, p. 34).
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in positions such as you are sitting in now. It has been declared from 
time to time that the basic wage provides for a unit of so and so.
Dethridge C J: I know that such declarations have been made, and 
I think it is just as well to say that I attach very little value to those 
declarations.
Clarey commented on the stagnation of the basic wage since it was set 
in 1907. ‘I think’, said Drake-Brockman, ‘you are overlooking the fact that, 
although the basis for the basic wage was established in 1907 there was in fact 
between 1907 and 1930 a general increase in wages taken as a whole of about 
ten per cent.’ Clarey—renowned for his open-mindedness—responded:
I can see exactly what Your Honour means. Probably that may have 
come about in this way that, the standard once having been established, 
it took some time before the effect of the standard was actually felt in 
the community. The Court decided in 1907 that the basic wage should 
be 42s per week, but that did not apply to all industries for a start. First 
of all the Harvester people secured it and then gradually, as industry after 
industry came before this Court, they also secured it. Then in Victoria 
under the Wages Board system a long period of time elapsed before 
finally that system reached the Harvester standard, so that from 1907 
to 1918 approximately speaking, slowly but surely the actual standard 
of living given to the workers was being brought into line with the 
Harvester standard and that, of course, is equivalent to saying that the 
amount given in wages has been increased.
There was, thought Drake-Brockman, a little more to the matter than 
this. He was speaking of wages in total, not just the basic wage. The increase 
‘was brought about partly by a great number of semi-skilled people going off 
the basic wage and getting a margin, and others getting more margin’ (p. 205).
Clarey pressed the Court to agree that there should be periodic inquiries 
so that the basic wage could be adjusted for rising productivity. The Judges were 
inclined to say that productivity was a matter for the Statistician to determine, 
rather than for the Court’s inquiry. Clarey explained that he was speaking of 
the translation of productivity movements into wages, which was a matter 
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for the Court. ‘It is better’, he said, ‘if we fix the basic wage now, to have that 
determine that standpoint and from now on measure our wage level, not from 
the 1907 standpoint, but from the 1934 standpoint, and every two years, say, 
make an investigation at the beginning of that year into whether industry can 
pay a higher wage’ (pp. 206–210). Clarey’s willingness to abandon ‘the 1907 
standpoint’ must surely have been a breath of fresh air. A little later, Dethridge 
declared: ‘We are making a fresh start’ (p. 265).
The employer representative, L R Mann, criticised the continuance of 
Powers’ 3s. As we have seen, the Court in 1931 did not adopt the original 
employers’ proposal to cancel it and to substitute the C series for the A series 
index, but instead simply reduced award wages by 10 per cent, leaving the 
Powers’ 3s as a component of the reduced basic wage. Mann was, no doubt, 
apprehensive of the Court deciding to cancel the emergency reduction without 
taking any step to offset any part of the resultant wage increases. The Court, 
he said, had dallied over a long period with the question of removing the 
Powers’ 3s. Its original purpose was no longer relevant (p. 464). Beeby thought 
that the original purpose had long ago ceased to be the reason for maintaining 
the 3s. ‘The Court continued the Powers 3s because they thought the general 
prosperity of industry justified them in paying something more than the bare 
basic wage.’ Dethridge agreed (p. 465).
The partial recovery
Unemployment, though it had fallen somewhat, remained a potential 
barrier to higher wages. Clarey argued that the Court should treat as 
normal unemployment of about 10 per cent. ‘Your suggestion, said Drake-
Brockman, ‘is that for the purpose of reckoning the effect of the depression on 
unemployment we should not take the figure 25.1 per cent but 25.1 less 10 or 
thereabouts.’24 Clarey agreed:
I suggest, first of all, that unemployment is always with us, and when we 
speak of the unemployment being 25.1, at the very best we could not 
24  Recorded unemployment was 25.1 per cent in the third quarter of 1933. This, apparently, 
was the most recent available statistic. In the first quarter of 1934, the percentage was 21.9.
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reduce that to, say, 8.7.25 The chances are that because of our improved 
methods of production and greater supervision, the lesson we have 
learned during the last three years, the number of people employed in 
any given industry will not be the same as in the past in the production 
of certain commodities. Assuming that 10 per cent will always be 
unemployed, it is only 15 points above that when we say 25. …Your 
Honour has crystallised what I desire to submit …
‘Somewhat the same sort of thought has gone through my mind from time to 
time’, said Drake-Brockman, ‘—that that is the proper way of looking at it’ 
(p. 154).
The hearing took place at a time of a substantial recovery in the price 
of wool. J W Allen, the General Secretary of the Graziers’ Association of New 
South Wales, provided the following statistics of the price per pound (pp. 
294–295):
According to Allen, the depreciation of the exchange rate accounted for 3.12d 
of the recent value. He attributed the remainder of the increase to a poor 
season. Evidence given by A J King, a Director of the Victorian Wheatgrowers’ 
Corporation, indicated that there had been no improvement in the price of 
wheat (p. 412).
Mann told the Court that there had been an improvement in building 
activity. This, he said, was due partly to the investment locally of funds which 
might otherwise have been transferred abroad, especially in city buildings. 
25  The average of 1923–29.
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Low interest rates had encouraged investment in suburban properties. But in 
the case of suburban dwellings, low wages had been a major factor:
I am dealing here with actual facts, and not with rates prescribed in 
awards. It is to some extent regrettable, because it has enabled some 
proportion, at any rate, of sweating to take place. But in suburban 
dwellings … the award rates of this Court were avoided by gangs 
engaging as contractors. … The unemployment was such in the 
building trade that no awards could hold it, and people contracted out 
of the awards … (p. 426)
Recently things had improved and ‘the award rate has been gradually 
approximated’ (p. 427).
When Mann produced statistics showing a fall in the ratio of bank 
advances to deposits, Dethridge said that this showed that people did not 
want credit:
Business people and others do not want to borrow money; they prefer 
to leave the deposits in the banks; but that may indicate this: that the 
community is not spending much—that the people who have been in 
the habit of borrowing money from the banks have ceased to spend 
money, and therefore have not borrowed money from the banks. That 
being so the power to spend should be transferred to the wage earners, 
because they will spend more money and thus balance consumption 
with production. That is an argument which might have been put, 
although I am afraid it was not put in that form before on previous 
occasions, but it might still be put. (p. 441)
This was a surprising comment in the face of repeated union claims in earlier 
cases that wage reductions would reduce spending. Dethridge then referred to 
the views of J M Keynes:
Keynes says that the investing classes are not investing; they are not doing 
what they should do to balance production with consumption. If they 
were doing what they ought to do they would take the benefit of all the 
capital which is being bound up in bank deposits, and spend it …. and 
once you have more spending the world is cured. If the investing classes 
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are not doing it then somebody else must do it. Let the Government 
step in, and as soon as the Government steps in and starts spending, 
that will inevitably cause a certain amount of movement in business, 
and encourage other people to take their part in getting hold of the 
available savings and spending them. That is Keynes’ argument. I quite 
agree, however theoretically sound that argument may be, spending by 
Government has not had a very encouraging history. … That, I take 
it, is the reason why in Great Britain in the present time Mr Keynes 
suggestion has not been accepted. They think that the spending by 
Governments which he advocates would be more than counterbalanced 
by all kinds of evils. (pp. 442–443)
Employer resistance
W C Myhill, for the New South Wales employers, claimed that ‘the time is 
not ripe for a general restoration of the 10 per cent; [and] that it should not be 
restored even in individual industries, because restoration of the 10 per cent in 
any particular industry gives the employees in that industry an advantage over 
their fellow workers’ (pp. 575–576). Dethridge commented:
There we are faced with the position that, in some industries, outside 
the Court altogether, employers have restored the full 10 per cent. The 
flour millers restored the 10 per cent, including the Powers’ 3s, and 
there are other instances of a similar kind. … The position is that, in 
those industries, the employers have thought that they could afford to 
restore the full 10 per cent. The flour millers apparently thought so, 
and the paper millers … I think are in the same position. The banks—I 
do not know how far they have gone in making the full restoration—
only lately have they thought the position enabled them to make some 
restoration of their salary rates. There we are faced with restorations of 
that kind.
Drake-Brockman added that the Commonwealth Government had restored 
part of the cut to the public service. Dethridge continued: ‘The importance of 
those things is this: They were not brought about as the result of direct action. 
… Those wages have been granted by employers, presumably because they 
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felt that the economic position justified that restoration. That is where the 
importance of them presents itself ’ (p. 576). Myhill replied that the employers 
in question were either monopolies or in sheltered industries (p. 576a).
Myhill described the relief from award standards that had been provided 
to primary producers:
With the primary producer we find that generally they are exempt 
from the awards of this Court, possibly with the exception of shearing. 
If we take wheat, or butter, or the production of eggs or honey, and 
other primary products such as those, we find they are exempt from 
the awards of this and other Courts, so that from the point of view of 
actual production, taking wheat as an illustration, the actual production 
of that wheat is no more costly in Australia than, say, in the Argentine, 
but the farmer’s trouble starts as soon as he has to transport his wheat. 
That is where his costs come in. He has to pay for transport and other 
essential services. (p. 583)
Myhill might have added to ‘transport and other essential services’ goods 
manufactured in Australia under award wages and conditions and with the 
help of the protective tariff.
Carolan said that the Victorian Railways Commissioners had ‘explored 
every avenue of bringing costs closer to the revenue, and every channel for 
increasing the revenue, and they depend upon the Court to refrain from adding 
to their difficulties by withdrawing the relief which the Court granted’ (p. 
525). The Court would appreciate ‘that the Railway position has a dominating 
influence upon the financial position of the State’. Carolan described the 
jumbled arrangements for wage-fixing in the Victorian Railways. Some of 
the employees were entirely under the control of the Court; some had their 
wages controlled by the Railways Classification Board; and some depended 
on the Court for the basic wage and the Board for margins. A few grades, 
such as bricklayers, plumbers, and masons in the building trade, were covered 
by Victorian wages boards, and in respect of the conditions the Railways 
Classification Board covered practically the whole field. The Board has adhered 
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strictly to Court standards on wages; but the Commissioners gained some 
benefits in respect of conditions (p. 526).
State and federal standards
There was some, though not extensive, discussion of the disparate treatment of 
wage-earners under Commonwealth and State awards. If the State tribunals—
perhaps subject to legislative direction—would not follow the Court’s 
lead, was it fair that workers under Commonwealth awards be placed at a 
disadvantage? Drake-Brockman referred to the fact that although the Court 
had reduced wages by 10 per cent, average wages had risen slightly in real 
terms. (Presumably he was referring to the Nominal Wage index.) This led 
him to comment:
Now, obviously the other tribunals who operate in this industrial 
sphere, and all of the Legislatures of Australia, disagreed with what we 
had done; and the thing that worries me is, why should this small and 
diminishing number … continue to carry this load, when nobody else 
will distribute it evenly in every other sphere in Australia in this regard. 
(p. 678)
Crofts presented the issue starkly: 
Other wage fixing tribunals and parliaments have decided differently. 
In New South Wales, there have been three Parliaments, two National 
and one Labor, in office since this Court took away the 10 per cent, and 
they have had the right to alter their Act to allow their Court to fall in 
line with this Court’s judgment, but they have not done it. They have 
said, in effect, ‘No, we are not prepared, and the electors have told us 
that that we are not to give our wage fixing tribunal the opportunity of 
doing what the Federal Arbitration Court has done.’ Two Governments 
have been in power in Western Australia, and they have not altered 
the Act. In Queensland, a Nationalist Government did not alter the 
Act. South Australia has had a National Government which has not 
attempted to influence the Court, so that this Court is not only running 
up against a section of employees in this country who can see others 
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getting better treatment by other tribunals, but it is running up against 
the Governments which have said, ‘This thing shall not be done’. 
(p. 814)
Geographical divergences
A vexed issue in this case was geographical differences in the basic wage. It 
related to both differences between capital cities and regional differences within 
States. Adoption of the C series index would entail some alteration of inter-
capital differences, generally in the direction of ‘flattening’ them. (Although 
the Court in 1933 adopted the C series index, it was applied to the wage levels 
in force in 1929. Hence 1929 disparities were preserved.) The items in the 
A series index—food, groceries, and rent—differed more as between cities 
than did clothing and miscellaneous items included in the C series. Dethridge 
observed that the Sydney rate would fall and the Adelaide rate rise if the index 
were changed (p. 605). Apart from the effects of changing the index, Dethridge 
did not contemplate any revision of inter-capital differences:
I am not sure that it is suggested by anyone, or is going to be suggested 
by anyone, that the Court should lay down a rigid rule, either that 
differential rates will be adopted in future, or that there should be a 
flat rate adopted in future. I do not know what Mr Wright [for South 
Australian employers] is going to suggest—whether he is going to 
suggest that there should be a general practice of differentiating the 
basic wage in the various States according to their local index numbers. 
All I have to say is that he is not at all likely to succeed. That would 
involve a departure from the practice of the Court, which it had acted 
upon until quite recently, in its latest award; and so, if he is going to 
suggest that, he has not much hope … We are inclined to think that we 
should leave the question of differential basic wages and flat basic wages 
to be dealt with in each case as it comes before the Court. (p. 607)
Wright said that ‘we in SA are extremely concerned at the possibility 
of the loss of the relative advantage between our rates and Melbourne’. The 
following exchange ensued:
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Dethridge C J: What you are asking for, in substance, is this: That there 
should be maintained in permanence a different basic wage, that is a 
lower basic wage, in Adelaide than in any other place. … The position 
in Adelaide is that at present, speaking in round figures, the basic wage 
is somewhere about 3s less than Melbourne. Is that correct?
Mr Wright: Yes.
Dethridge C J: Now, taking the All Items index figures … that difference 
of 3s in favour of Adelaide as against Melbourne deprives the Adelaide 
wage earner of commodities to the value of 3s per week. It may be that 
the ‘poverty’ of Adelaide as compared with the ‘wealth’ of Melbourne 
necessitates some differentiation of wage payment in Adelaide. It may 
be that is unfortunately the case: but if that is the case, let that be 
recognised and let it be said that Adelaide cannot afford to pay the 
same basic wage, real purchasing power, as Melbourne … It may be 
… that the way to approach that position is this: that the basic wage 
for Adelaide for some time to come be 3s less in real value … than 
that of Melbourne; that after the expiration of some particular time 
it should become 2s less; that after the expiration of another time it 
should become 1s less, and after still another time become the same in 
real purchasing power as that of Melbourne. It may be that something 
of that kind should be done, but at any rate if that were done it would 
recognise and state the real reason for the distinction between the basic 
wage in Melbourne and that of Adelaide, and it would get away from 
any glossing over of the position by a lot of juggling … with figures. 
(pp. 632–633)
Dethridge noted that the State basic wage in Adelaide (set by the Board 
of Industry) was above the federal rate. Wright acknowledged this, but 
commented: ‘When you take into consideration that this Court almost 
invariably awards payment for 10 days a year for holidays and a sort of optional 
six days for sickness, there is not much difference between State and Federal 
awards there’ (p. 636). Dethridge said later: ‘Beyond a doubt, if the All Items 
table is applied, that is going to result in a flattening out of the wage between 
States, as far as the basic wage is concerned. There is no doubt about that. And 
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if the principle of the basic wage is to be maintained at all, such flattening out 
is called for by justice’ (p. 665A).
Intra-state differentials were the subject of submissions on behalf of 
Victorian country employers, who were concerned that the change of index 
would obliterate or reduce differences between regional and metropolitan 
rates. ‘It may be said’, their representative (Derham) contended,
that the C series, or any series the Court adopts, does not show a 
difference between cities and provincial towns, but there are some 
considerations which do not appear in cold print differentiating the 
country cost of living and the city. For instance, generally speaking, 
the houses are better: that is, they are not so congested and are on large 
blocks, whereas, for living purposes, they are just as good in the country 
as in the city. (p. 611)
Moreover, said Derham, the country worker paid no fares to work; and ‘there 
is not the same opportunity of spending money in those places, such as trips 
to the seaside and trips out of town, as in the city’ (p. 612). And the country 
employer faced higher costs for transportation and city representation. He was 
asking for ‘a fixed differential lower rate for these towns irrespective of what 
the cost of living figures actually amount to’ (p. 615).
Clarey told the Court that the unions did not favour a flat-rate basic 
wage for the capital cities; but they ‘would be prepared to accept a flat rate 
for a State provided that the flat rate was the rate determined for the capital 
city, and further provided that in certain areas where, because of peculiar 
circumstances the cost of living is very much higher than in Melbourne, those 
expensive country district areas should not be brought down to the Melbourne 
level’ (p. 754). He cited Yallourn as a country town where high living costs 
called for a basic wage above the metropolitan equivalent. Dethridge referred 
to and defended the Court’s refusal to enforce a higher basic wage in a town—
Mildura—where the cost of living was above that of the capital:
As you know, the Court at Mildura almost invariably adopts the 
Melbourne figure when dealing with ordinary industry. It is recognised 
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that the cost of living on the Statist’s figures would be rather higher 
than the Melbourne rates, but invariably the Court has said that, on the 
whole, the Melbourne index number should be acted on for Mildura, the 
reason undoubtedly being that it is thought undesirable to put too great 
a wage cost on a place like Mildura. … In the fruit picking industry, of 
course, wage costs cannot be made very high. I had to deal with that two 
or three years ago and considered the position very carefully. If you were 
to put on a wage cost, prescribed rates of wage for the men engaged in 
fruit picking such as were suggested by the local index figure, it would 
have been disastrous. So the Court in the past has not acted with a rigid 
adherence to the index figures in places like Mildura and, I think, in 
one or two other places. … and I must confess, in the case of Mildura 
certainly, the Court acted with great commonsense. (p. 759)
‘spreading the burden’
During his final reply, Clarey spoke of the goal of ‘spreading the burden’, 
which had actuated the Court since 1930. He thought that the Court would 
now realise that the task was too big for it: ‘It is a job that requires the full 
powers and responsibilities of the Governments of Australia in order to see 
that the burden is spread equally amongst those who are in a position to help’ 
(p. 741). Clarey elicited from Dethridge this reflection on the Court’s role:
Yes, that may be so, but you must not overlook the fact that Governments 
have to rely upon the citizens of the country for the means of doing what 
has to be done. It is a question of money. They can do nothing unless 
they can levy upon the community for the means of doing what has to 
be done. The power that the Government has to levy depends upon 
what those upon whom the levy is made have to give, and what they 
have to give depends upon what they make out of the industry in which 
they are engaged, and what they make out of the industry in which 
they are engaged depends upon the costs of production in that industry, 
and the costs of production in that industry depend upon, amongst 
other things, the wages that have to be paid in it, and the wages that 
have to be paid in it depend to a fairly considerable extent upon what 
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is prescribed by this Court. So you have the power of the Government 
to assist the primary producer dependent upon the wages prescribed 
by this Court. … It is like the house that Jack built. Ultimately you 
get back very largely to what this Court does. So while this Court feels 
that it is not desirable to make in wage rates any changes which do 
not appear to be clearly necessary, nevertheless changes in wage rates 
may become necessary for the purpose of bringing about the object we 
have been discussing, that is, the helping of the primary producer. … 
(p. 741)
Beeby and Drake-Brockman agreed.
Female wages
The unions, anticipating a decision that would raise the basic wage, asked the 
Court to consider its implications for females and sought a decision that the 
minimum female rate in any award be not less than 60 per cent of the male 
basic wage. Although there was no female basic wage in the Court’s awards, the 
lowest rate set for women could, by arithmetic, be expressed as a percentage of 
the male basic wage. There was, however, no mechanism whereby the women’s 
wage would rise or fall with the male basic wage. Hence, as the male wage rose 
or fell, the percentage that the minimum female rate bore to the basic wage 
moved in the opposite direction. In some of the State jurisdictions, female 
basic wages were explicitly provided and usually varied by the tribunal when 
it altered the male rate.
Drake-Brockman had recently made a new textiles award. The minimum 
female rate was equal to just under 54 per cent of the basic wage. ‘But’, he said, 
‘that was only an accident. I went into the matter pretty carefully, examined a 
whole lot of budgets, got costs of what actually these women, in Melbourne 
at all events, paid for board and lodging, and so on; in fact I did a lot of 
work on it.’ Wright, representing South Australian employers, was apparently 
apprehensive that the Court might adopt a percentage similar to that in textiles:
I am not unmindful of the fact that comparatively recently the Court 
has given consideration to this matter in the textile case … We consider 
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that the system of the percentage wage for a female is very defective, 
yet we realise that the Court must have some regard to the relationship 
between the male and female wages, and I am afraid that we are not 
in a position to suggest any alternative to a percentage fixation until 
the Court feels disposed to conduct some sort of inquiry into the 
requirements of women workers, such as has been done in the case of 
State tribunals … There has, as far as my knowledge extends, been only 
one thorough investigation by this Court into the subject, and … it 
appears probable that in that case His Honour Judge Drake-Brockman 
did not purport to fix a female wage as a percentage of a male wage. 
It of necessity bore a percentage relationship to the male wage, but I 
think I can demonstrate to the Court that that percentage did not really 
represent the percentage that my friends, the union advocates, have 
suggested. (p. 620)
The minimum female rate set by Drake-Brockman was, said Wright, equal to 
53.6 per cent of the basic wage. This, however, included a 2 shillings holiday 
allowance, with which Wright disagreed. If that were excluded, the percentage 
would be 51.3. Wright recounted decisions of the South Australian Board 
of Industry presided over by Jethro Brown and Raymond Kelly wherein the 
female basic wage was set below 50 per cent of the male rate; in December 
1931, the percentage was exactly 50 (pp. 625–629).
Crofts, on the other hand, had studied the records of 26 Victorian wages 
boards:
The Court will find that in the majority of cases the female percentage 
is above 55 per cent of the male rate and it goes as high as 80 per cent 
in the tobacconist trade, and in the jewellery trade there is an equal rate 
for males and females. In the electrical trade the female percentage is 65 
per cent of the male wage, for storemen and packers it is 57 per cent, 
for charworkers it is 87 per cent, for cigar makers it is 62 per cent, for 




The Court’s decision was delivered on 17 April (33 CAR 144). There were 
majority and minority judgments.
Dethridge and Drake-Brockman took first the question of the status of 
the basic wage:
Although the fixation of a general basic wage is not a necessary part of the 
Court’s activity and was not adopted until 1908, it has proved of value 
as a starting point to work from in the settlement of industrial disputes. 
It has been recognised by the Legislature … as a constant element in 
the practice of the Court, and is now almost invariably incorporated 
by parties in their claims. A statement was made during the hearing 
that this Court, unlike State Industrial Courts, is free to abandon the 
principle of a basic wage if it so thinks fit. This is true, but no sufficient 
reason for taking that course was suggested. (p. 147)
The two Judges turned then to the question of the criterion by which 
the basic wage should be fixed: ‘the cost of living of a labourer’s family’ or 
‘national productivity’. They continued:
Inasmuch as the source of all wages is the national productivity, and 
inasmuch it is just that the share of wage-earners as a whole should be 
proportionate to the national productivity for the time being, the latter 
proposition is theoretically the sounder. But its practical application 
is full of difficulty, and the working out of a feasible scheme, even if 
possible at all, would probably take years in normal times. In the present 
precarious position of industry no such scheme could be successfully 
devised and applied. In 1925, a commission, consisting of Mr J T 
Sutcliffe and Professors Mills and Brigden, investigated the question 
of adjusting wages according to variations in productivity, and made a 
report to the Queensland Industrial Court recommending a scheme. 
No action was taken upon the report. Hitherto Australian Industrial 
Courts have substantially assessed their basic or living wage on the cost 
of living of a family unit … In the long run, if due consideration be 
given to economic conditions, this process will probably give a resulting 
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basic wage in amount fairly close to that which would be indicated by a 
method founded on national productivity. (p. 147)
A notable aspect of this passage is the implication that it is desirable for the 
wage-earners’ ‘share’ to be proportionate to national productivity. That was, 
in principle, the premise of the Queensland Economic Commission (which 
complicated its prescriptions to take account of problems of measurement and 
timing). The juxtaposition of ‘share’ and ‘national productivity’ makes sense 
only if the latter is conceived to be a money amount. That is, the wage would 
rise or fall with the price of the product as well as the quantity produced. 
The Economic Commission was clear on this point, and it is also implicit 
in the assumption of Dethridge and Drake-Brockman that adjusting wages 
for movements in the cost of living will, ‘if due consideration be given to 
economic conditions’, give a result that approximates the setting of wages 
according to national productivity.
Moving to a discussion of economic conditions, Dethridge and Drake-
Brockman said:
There has undoubtedly been some improvement in the industrial 
position of the Commonwealth during the last year. The price of wool 
has substantially increased and there is a rise in some minor products. 
But our other substantial exports, wheat and butter, cannot realise 
payable prices abroad and the dried and canned fruits export trade is 
meeting with such keen competition that its condition is perilous. The 
government finances of the States are still far from being in a satisfactory 
condition, chiefly because of railway deficits. It is not necessary to 
discuss in detail these conditions which are now matters of general 
public knowledge. The position may be summed up by saying that there 
is now an increase of confidence among the community resulting in 
freer expenditure and some increase of investment in industry, but that 
former prosperity is far from being restored. Unemployment though 
decreasing is still very great. (pp. 147–148)
The question to be faced was whether the signs of recovery warranted a change 
in wage rates. Having posed the question, Dethridge and Drake-Brockman 
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decided that the 10 per cent reduction would cease to operate. At the same 
time, however, there would be a change in the method of fixing the basic wage 
which would lessen the increase in wage levels.
The majority judges reviewed the notion of the basic wage as a family 
wage. They claimed that Higgins in 1907 had been ‘compelled to accept a hazy 
opinion then prevalent that the number in [an average labourer’s] household 
was about five’. He appeared ‘to have concluded that inasmuch as labourers’ 
households of average size had in fact somehow been maintained upon the 
wage of 7s a day paid by reputable employers in sheltered industries, he could 
reasonably take that amount as being sufficient to provide for a family unit of 
five’ (pp. 148–149). Subsequent investigations had revealed that on average the 
dependants supported by the worker were fewer than four. The average family 
of a married worker contained about 2.8 people. ‘But whatever the family unit 
adopted by a wage-fixing body’, said Dethridge and Drake-Brockman,
the power of that body to endow that unit with any desired standard 
of living depends on the productive capacity of the community as a 
whole. With few exceptions the determinations of industrial tribunals 
shows that this limitation has been realised—though perhaps it has not 
been sufficiently acknowledged by them. Generally speaking, however, 
it may be said that the outcome of this realisation is that the basic or 
living wage prescribed would have been about the same in amount, 
regardless of the size of the family unit ostensibly adopted. The larger 
the family assumed as the unit, the lower the possible standard of living 
prescribed, the smaller the family assumed, the higher the standard 
prescribed. (p. 149)
Having thus called into question the relevance of the family, Dethridge 
and Drake-Brockman immediately rehabilitated it:
This suggests that the adoption of a family unit is not necessary, and 
that what should be sought is the independent ascertainment and 
prescription of the highest basic wage that can be sustained by the 
total of industry in all its primary, secondary and ancillary forms. That 
no doubt is the object, but the adoption of something like the real 
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average family as the unit to be provided for is not without its use in 
the attainment of that object. There is no clear means of measuring the 
general wage-paying capacity of the total industry of a country. All that 
can be done is to approximate, and one of the methods of approximation 
is to find out the actual wage upon which well situated labourers are at 
the time maintaining the average family unit. We may be pardoned 
for saying that Mr Justice Higgins very wisely used this criterion in 
the Harvester case. Moreover, if the average size families of such well 
situated labourers have become accustomed to enjoy, and do actually 
enjoy, a certain standard of living in our community, it may reasonably 
be assumed that such a standard for all labourers is probably not beyond 
the capacity of industry in general to provide. Therefore in determining 
the amount of a living or basic wage, there is sound economic warranty 
for the ascertainment of the real average family unit and of the cost 
of providing something like the standard which such families of well 
employed labourers have already reached. (pp. 149–150)
Despite the risk that the wage set might be too high, the highest possible 
level of wages should be sought for economic as well as humanitarian reasons. 
The Judges here returned to the notion of ‘balance’ which had been articulated 
in earlier decisions, especially by Dethridge:
For economic welfare total production must be substantially balanced 
by total consumption, and balanced as promptly as possible. If so-called 
savings are quickly spent upon industrial enterprises, this spending helps 
to balance consumption with production just as effectively as if the wage-
earners had taken a larger share and no savings had been made. But if 
savings … are not used speedily, then the necessary prompt balancing 
of production and consumption is not achieved. Economically, the 
community might be better off if the savings had not been made and 
the wage-earners had received more in wages and had spent it. To this 
extent the purchasing power argument for the maintenance of wage 
rates is valid. A wage level fixed too low may be as detrimental as one 
fixed too high. (p. 150)
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It was possible (though there was no satisfactory evidence on the 
point) that the benefit of the 10 per cent cut had been less than it might 
have been—‘that the transferred spending power was not used by employers 
or capitalists quickly or abundantly’. The cut had helped many industrial 
concerns ‘to weather the economic blizzard, thus preventing unemployment 
from becoming greater than it actually was’ (p. 150). Moreover, the Court’s 
practice in adjusting the basic wage to prices had ‘rendered to the community 
during the recent calamitous industrial crisis the very valuable service of a large 
part of the required adaptation automatically’ (p. 152). The present challenge 
was ‘to estimate, as nearly as we can, what level of wages will promote the 
active exercise of spending power, and at the same time avoid chilling the now 
slightly rewarmed industrial courage’ (p. 150).
The earlier adjustment of the basic wage by the All Houses Index had 
caused differences between the States which were excessive when compared 
with cost of living differences indicated by the All Items Index. Dethridge 
and Drake-Brockman readjusted the amounts for the six capitals by use of the 
latter index, producing a Six-Capitals amount of 65s. The Melbourne wage 
of 64s was identical to the Harvester equivalent. Before the decision, the basic 
wage was subject to the 10 per cent cut, which now ceased. The increase was 
partially offset, however, by the abolition of Powers’ 3s, which ‘is not in our 
opinion now justifiable’. Because of the condition of the local economies, the 
basic wages for South Australia and Tasmania were subject to deductions of 
3s and 2s respectively. These deductions would expire in June 1935. In net 
terms, the Six-Capitals basic wage was raised by 1s 3d, or just under 2 per 
cent. The basic wage for non-metropolitan towns in each State was to be 3s 
below the respective capital-city amount. Future quarterly adjustments would 
reflect movements of the C series index, subject to the requirement that the 
minimum adjustments be 2s.
The majority decision allowed State legislatures to reduce the wages 
paid to employees of transport authorities where like reductions were imposed 
on other State employees. The judges said:
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Employees in general of the State can fairly claim that the State 
legislature should not require them to make sacrifices out of proportion 
to those required of the rest of the community. And if the legislators 
demand more from State employees than the community thinks is 
fair, the legislators responsible may be ejected from office. But should 
the State legislature think fit to reduce or make a reduction from the 
remuneration generally of the employees of the State, those engaged 
in its transport services have no moral claim to escape a reduction 
or deduction equal in degree to that imposed generally upon other 
employees of the State in similar grades. All that they are entitled to is 
that they be treated no worse. (p. 158)
Dethridge and Drake-Brockman also decided that no orders would be 
made for various sectors. In some cases—bond stores, felt hatters, Victorian 
marine stores, Launceston tramways, and some municipal employees—there 
had been no adjustment of wages for the reduced cost of living. The Court’s 
order stated generally that the cancellation of the reduction did not apply 
where the wage had not been subject to cost of living adjustments. The 
pastoral industry was excluded, because the matters at issue were wider than 
the restoration of the 10 per cent and remained to be heard. Fruit-growing 
was excluded because of the critical state of the industry. No explicit reasons 
were stated for excluding printing at Broken Hill and mining at Mount Lyall.
Beeby agreed that a ‘fresh declaration’ was necessary, but disagreed with 
his colleagues’ methods and the results. He concurred in the cancellation of 
the emergency reduction. He would also have set basic wages for the various 
locations below the levels that the mere rescission of the cut would have yielded, 
but the amounts would have been slightly above those set by Dethridge and 
Drake-Brockman.
In his opinion, the economic position was much better than it had been a 
year earlier, but the recovery was ‘not sufficient or permanent enough to justify 
belief that the Commonwealth can get back to pre-depression standards’:
We still have more than 20 per cent of our population unemployed or 
depending for bare existence on relief works. The prices offering for base 
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metals are barely sufficient to meet costs of production. The prices which 
we can obtain for two of our main lines of export—wheat and dairy 
produce—are lower than in 1931, and difficulty in finding markets for 
our surpluses have increased. Economic nationalism hampers exchange 
of our surpluses for other goods far more than in 1930. On present 
indications, unless world co-operation improves, we will have to greatly 
reduce our exports of foodstuffs, and primary producers will have to rely 
more and more on local markets. Unless local consumption is greatly 
increased production will probably of necessity be reduced. Until there 
is some indication of stabilisation of price levels by international action, 
Australia’s position remains precarious. (p. 165)
Beeby proceeded to question the efficacy of the 1931 order. Data for 
manufacturing showed that the wage share of value added had fallen from 
54.6 per cent in 1927–28 to 50.2 per cent in 1932–33. Had the reduction 
of the wage-earners’ share contributed to recovery? If the transfer of spending 
power caused an immediate and commensurate increase in investment or in 
consumption from non-wage incomes, the employee class would benefit from 
reduced unemployment. On the other hand, the money transferred might be 
used to reduce debt or simply be hoarded. In that event, there might be no 
adequate offset to the reduction of wage-earner spending. What were the facts?
Of course immediate spending of the saved wages was not and could not 
be expected. It is impossible to estimate whether at the present time the 
amount transferred to employers is being spent on commodities or is 
being re-invested but the indications are that it is not. The most reliable 
test is unemployment. At the height of the depression the proportion of 
unemployed was about 30 per cent. Today it is approximately 22½ per 
cent. But the absorption of unemployed up to a few months ago was 
entirely due to expenditure of public money on relief works. Within 
recent months revival of activities in the building trades and the motor 
and some other industries has undoubtedly reduced unemployment. 
Higher wool prices have appreciably increased national income and 
re-established a measure of confidence. But it is extremely doubtful 
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whether reducing the real wages of a section of the workers materially 
contributed to the partial recovery of the past year. (p. 168)
Beeby still accepted ‘the broad theory that reductions of real wages do not 
reduce total spending power but only transfer it from one group to another’, 
but the experience of the past three years convinced him ‘that in times of 
economic panic and uncertainty such transfer is not conducive to recovery 
unless it be part of a planned scheme of re-organisation which guarantees that 
the transferred amount is either immediately spent on commodities or re-
invested in labour-employing concerns’ (p. 168). In other countries, notably 
the United Kingdom and the United States, reduction of real wages was out 
of favour; and ‘the universal trend of economic thought from low wage to 
high-wage theories and to shortening working hours as one of the remedies for 
unemployment should be closely considered by a national tribunal exercising 
quasi-legislative functions’ (p. 169).
In 1931, said Beeby, the Court had taken ‘a leap in the dark—at the 
time apparently a very necessary leap’. But now there was ‘a little more light’.
Full cancellation of the 10 per cent reduction order would not be 
an admission of error. It would only be proof that this Court at all 
times will act as it thinks just in circumstances existing at the time of 
its decisions and on consideration of results flowing from previous 
decisions. (p. 169)
In terms of wage outcomes, Beeby’s difference from the majority was 
slender. He agreed with the abolition of Powers’ 3s. The Six-Capitals basic 
wage awarded by Beeby would have been 66s, rather than 65s, the difference 
being due to larger increases in Brisbane, Adelaide, and Perth. He supported 
the special provision to enable the States to impose lower wages in the railways.
Dethridge and Drake-Brockman appended to their decision the 
following paragraph:
By the courtesy of Beeby J we have been able to read in advance his 
judgment herein. His comments upon the judgment and order of 
1931 … and the adjustment order of 1933 are of course intended to 
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indicate only his own present opinion thereon. Inasmuch, however, as 
the judgment and order of himself and us making the reduction was 
unanimous, we think we should make it clear that these comments are 
not intended to indicate, and in some respects do not indicate, our 
present views on the subject. (p. 160)
Evidently, they did not ‘buy’ Beeby’s equivocal repudiation of the 1931 
decision.
Three years later, the Court (similarly constituted) estimated that the 
effect of the 1934 decision on the basic wage was to restore its real value to 
that of the Harvester basic wage, exclusive of Powers’ 3s (Basic Wage Inquiry 
1937 37 CAR 583, 585). Inasmuch as it is possible to compare real wages over 
a period of 27 years, this was probably an accurate assessment.
Cancellation of the emergency reduction had the effect that margins 
were generally restored to their monetary levels as at the beginning of 1931 
and, in most instances, their pre-Depression amounts. With prices having 
fallen by more than 20 per cent, this represented a substantial real increase. I 
have referred, in Subsection 8.2.1, to statistical evidence of a change in wage 
relativities favourable to higher-paid workers. This, of course, was a partial 
reversal of the compression of relativities in the two preceding decades by 
reason of the reluctance of the Court and State tribunals to adjust margins 
for increases in the price level. The Court took no specific decision about 
female rates. Since the rescission of the 10 per cent cut applied to them, their 
nominal value was restored to pre-Depression levels, except where they had 
been reduced by decisions specific to particular awards. Both because the 
(male) basic wage had fallen heavily in nominal terms and because its real 
value was not fully restored by the 1934 decision, this implied some narrowing 
of the gender pay gap.26
26  Between December 1929 and December 1934, the average nominal wages of males 
fell by 19 per cent. For females, the corresponding reduction was 17.7 per cent. Though 
it is surprising that the difference between the two reductions was not greater, it is to be 
remembered that most females worked under State awards and determinations. Under some 
of these, female rates were subject to the same proportional reductions as male rates.
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10.7 contInuIng cautIon
In the remainder of 1934, the Court’s decisions were a mixture of continued 
restraint and mild relaxation.
Ten days after its decision on the 10 per cent cut, the Full Court delivered 
a decision about wages in the pastoral industry (Variation—Pastoral Award 33 
CAR 503). As we have seen, wage reductions imposed in this industry were 
more severe than the general 10 per cent cut. The relevant orders were now 
rescinded, but the Court adopted a new set of arrangements for the basic 
wage of station hands, reflecting the Court’s opinions that (a) living costs for 
pastoral workers were 10 to 15 per cent below those of town workers, and (b) 
there should be greater uniformity in wages than in the generality of industries. 
There would be a single rate for all locations. For adjustment purposes, the 
index would be the ‘30 towns’ average of the ‘C series’ index, but there would 
be no alteration of the wage unless the price index indicated a change of 4s 
or more. The amount of the basic wage so calculated would be subject to a 
constant deduction of 8s. Initially, the uniform rate was 60s.
On the same day, the Full Court gave its decision on an application by 
the Mount Lyall Mining Company for a basic wage below the regular amount 
and for retention of the 10 per cent cut in margins. The Court granted the 
former, but not the latter. In explanation of the lower wage, the Court said 
that it could not disregard harsh economic facts:
Copper production in Australia is doomed unless world conditions 
change. The Court feels that it is better to let the working people 
engaged in copper production know that their means of livelihood 
are perilously endangered, and not to hold out any hopes of an early 
restoration of old wage rates. (Variation of Awards—Mount Lyall Mining 
Operations 33 CAR 517, 519)
Dethridge, in May, dealt with a union application affecting margins in 
the railways (Interim Award—Railways, South Australia 33 CAR 531). The 
Court in October 1930 had set aside the railways awards except in respect 
of the basic wage and standard hours, leaving the Railways Commissioners 
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(subject to direction or influence by State governments or regulation, in 
Victoria, by the Railway Classification Board) to determine other terms of 
employment, including margins. Before the setting-aside, the margins had 
been as determined by Quick in an award of March 1930. These had partially 
replaced the margins set by agreement in a 1926 award. After the setting-aside, 
the practice of the Commissioners had been to observe the margins set by 
the Court, but with a deduction of 10 per cent. The unions now claimed the 
restoration of the 1930 margins, but their claim was resisted by the Railways 
Commissioner for South Australia. They had succeeded in getting employer 
consent to the consequent increases in other States, and this may have forced 
Dethridge’s hand:
I am now asked to make an interim or provisional award only—not to 
make a final determination whether the margins should continue to be 
as prescribed by Sir John Quick D P, a matter which will have to be left to 
the Judge who makes a new award upon them. As to the margins agreed 
to in 1926 I should say that there is a very strong presumption that they 
should continue. The others may be less defensible, but nevertheless 
were prescribed after very full investigation by the deputy president, and 
have just been acceded to by the Commissioners of New South Wales 
and Tasmania. … For the Commissioner, however, great stress was laid 
upon the financial position of the South Australian Railways, and in 
view of this the recently devised clause enabling general public service 
reductions to be applied to Federal award rates should certainly be made 
applicable. (p. 533)
Beeby gave two decisions about the spreading of available work. In June, 
he extended a provision of the Metal Trades Award allowing the payment of 
wages on an hourly basis, so as to accommodate relief work. ‘The unemployment 
problem’, he said, ‘still continues, although it appears to be gradually abating; 
but money is still being spent in large sums on relief work, and I propose to 
extend this order for a further twelve months in the hope that the renewal 
of this application will then be unnecessary’ (Variation—Metal Trades Award 
33 CAR 596, 597). In December, Beeby dealt with the rationing of work 
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in the Adelaide tramways (Variation—Tramway Employees’ Award 33 CAR 
1071). ‘One of the things with which I have been most pleased all through the 
present industrial crisis’, he said, ‘has been the readiness with which working 
men, rather than have their mates placed on the unemployed market, have 
agreed to rationing, and the Adelaide tramway men have not been behind 
others in that regard.’ But now the union sought to have rationing abolished. 
The choice that Beeby had to make was ‘whether I should ask these men, who 
have done a big service in the past in accepting rationing, to continue a little 
longer, in the hope that a change may come, or have 64 of them placed on the 
unemployed market’. In rejecting the latter option, he noted particularly the 
slight recovery of South Australian industry.
In July, Dethridge revisited the familiar issue—dating back to the early 
years of Higgins’ regime—of a request by a particular employer (in this case a 
maltster) for wage relief to help overcome its financial problems (Variation—
Liquor Trades Award (Maltsters Section, NSW) 33 CAR 636):
Assuming for the moment that if the bulk of the malting industry in New 
South Wales were in a similar financial difficulty there would be good 
reasons for reducing wage rates as proposed, it does not follow that this 
application by a single concern comprising only a small proportion of 
the industry should be granted. This Court has never except by consent 
in such a case prescribed for such a concern lower wage rates than those 
prescribed for the industry generally, nor, conversely, has it prescribed 
higher wage rates than the general rates for a single prosperous concern. 
(p. 637)
Dethridge did not comment on the relation between this decision and the 
Full Court’s decision in the Mount Lyall case. On the face of the matter, they 
seem difficult to reconcile. If he had discussed the question, Dethridge might 
perhaps have referred to the significance of the Mount Lyall company, both as 
a component of the copper mining industry and in the region, compared with 
the relative unimportance of a single maltster. The Mount Lyall decision seems 
to be at odds with the stance of Higgins in the Broken Hill case of 1909, but 
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Powers had breached the principle of that case in the Moonta and Wallaroo 
case of 1921 (see Chapter 6, Subsection 6.1.2).
Several notable decisions were given in December 1934, reflecting 
perhaps the Judges’ wish to ‘clear the decks’ before the summer vacation.
In one of these, Dethridge made a new award for gold mining in 
Victoria (Judgment—Gold-Mining Industry (Victoria) 33 CAR 1106). With 
the departure from the gold standard and the depreciation of the Australian 
pound against sterling, the price of gold rose well above its pre-Depression 
level. But the industry’s condition remained problematic. Dethridge said:
The search for gold has been stimulated in Victoria, as elsewhere, by its 
present high price, and mining enterprise has become lively, but that 
enterprise has not yet gained a commensurate reward. Except in one or 
two cases gold is not yet being obtained in quantities nearly sufficient 
to give a profit. … Investment has become somewhat brisk with a very 
beneficial increase of employment in the industry. The claimant union 
says that the investors are at heart gamblers, and that they should not 
be allowed to gamble with underpaid workers as their pawns. Quite 
true! The probable lack of success in a mine does not justify sweated 
wages, but it is also true that wages can only be usefully prescribed 
at such amounts as the average returns of the industry can maintain, 
while permitting some profit here and there to the lucky investors. 
The court in determining the amounts of wages must act according to 
these governing limits; on the one hand maintaining wages at the worst 
not very much lower than those prevailing in other industries of the 
community, and on the other refraining from prescribing wages so high 
that only the rare exceptionally fortunate venture can pay them and 
carry on. Similar comments apply to conditions of employment other 
than wage rates. (p. 1107)
Dethridge rejected a union claim for an additional 6s per week to be paid 
to workers in profitable mines, consistent with a differential previously 
granted by Powers (see Chapter 6, Subsection 6.1.2). The Court, so far as it 
considered at all the wage-paying capacity of an industry, should act upon its 
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average capacity (pp. 1108–1109). Some relaxation of restraint was evident 
in Dethridge’s grant of 3s a week to labourers working underground. These 
workers already enjoyed a 44-hour week, whereas surface employees worked 
48 hours. A 1928 agreement had given miners a 9s margin. Dethridge raised 
the margin to 12s, maintaining the 9s differential between the miner and the 
labourer. Because of the fall in the basic wage since 1928, the proportional 
relativity between the miner and the labourer was significantly increased.
In another December decision, Drake-Brockman took a more guarded 
approach to pleas for special treatment of the railways than had characterised 
earlier Depression-period decisions. This decision was about the wages of 
locomotive enginemen in Victoria, Tasmania, and South Australia (Judgment—
Locomotive Enginemen 33 CAR 1033). Representatives of the Railways 
Commissioners had urged Drake-Brockman to take into account the state of 
railway finances in the three States. He was unconvinced:
Railways are not business concerns but are provided to run, in a very 
large measure, for the purpose of opening up and developing the 
country. This part of the reason for their existence has created very large 
taxable assets in both the State and Federal spheres. For this reason, 
when considering the question of railway finances, it is necessary to 
look beyond the railways themselves; first of all to the State finances; 
ultimately to the general conditions of the finances of Australia as 
a whole. I am encouraged in this attitude of mind by reason of the 
fact that the federal Parliament has accepted the principle of partial 
responsibility for the deficit of necessitous States such as South Australia 
and Tasmania whose financial difficulties are in a very large measure 
due to railway deficits. Having these views in mind I have no hesitation 
in rejecting the plea of the Commissioners that wages for railway 
employees should be put on a low basis reflecting the finances of the 
several systems when viewed alone. (p. 1036)
The felt-hatting award contained no automatic adjustment clause 
and was one of the awards in which the 10 per cent remained in force. In 
December 1934, the Full Court rejected a union application to remove the cut 
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(Variation—Felt Hatting Awards 33 CAR 1150). In response to an employer 
application, it reduced the basic wage from 77s 5d (after the 10 per cent cut) 
to 69s (but added 3s for lost time).
The Full Court acceded to an application of the Sydney Harbour Trust 
Commissioners for an award provision allowing them to make deductions in 
wages equivalent to those applied to other State employees (Award Variation—
Sydney Harbour Trust 33 CAR 1075).
10.8 wage relatIvItIes
There were few attempts in the Depression period to alter margins for skill. 
In federal awards, margins were subject to the 10 per cent reduction, but 
otherwise were generally unaltered. These arrangements could be expected to 
increase the relative rewards of the more skilled workers. It was, of course, the 
reverse of what had happened in earlier years, when the margins of the more 
skilled workers rose much less, in proportional terms, than the basic wage. 
The general implication was that periods of rising wages tended to enhance 
the relative position of the less skilled and periods of falling wages to improve 
the relative position of the skilled. This simple generalisation must be qualified 
by recognising that between 1907 and 1930 margins had been granted to 
many categories of workers who initially had been treated simply as basic-
wage earners.
There were few commentaries on relativities. During the hearing of the 
1932 application to rescind the 10 per cent cut, there was some discussion 
of the matter. Crofts remarked that, apart from Powers’ 3s, there had been 
no advance in the basic wage relative to the Harvester standard, and that 
the worker had gained little benefit from pre-Depression prosperity. Drake-
Brockman replied that a valid comparison should take into account the many 
grants of margins to workers who in 1907 would have received only the basic 
wage. ‘That’, he said, ‘has come out of prosperity.’ Dethridge thought that 
unskilled workers had, before the Depression, gained at the expense of the 
more skilled. This trend might now have gone into reverse:
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It is gradually getting back to the old relationship with the cost of living 
falling, but the skilled worker I think can say that he has not had a 
prosperity allowance or an increase of wage with any supposed increase 
in productivity. I have always regarded that as being an undesirable 
position. Assuming for a moment that the amount which can be paid 
out of the total production of the country to the wage earners is limited 
to a particular amount, the more the unskilled workers take out of that 
share the less is left for the skilled workers. It may be that has been the 
position in this country. (transcript, pp. 474–475)
In general, however, the issue of wage differences was subordinate to 
the larger concerns about wage levels. The widening of differentials was a by-
product rather than an intended consequence of these concerns.
10.9 hours and leave
Nor did the times lend themselves to advances in non-wage terms of 
employment. There were few serious applications for them and correspondingly 
few decisions. I have discussed in Section 9.1 decisions of the Court in 1930 
about working hours and leave—decisions reflecting the Court’s pessimistic 
view of economic conditions.
Dethridge in October 1931 dealt with an employers’ application 
affecting ‘front of the house’ employees in picture theatres (Variation—
Theatrical Employees Award 30 CAR 675). The existing award provided that 
a weekly employee should have one free night (after 6pm) per fortnight, but 
the employers now asked that the employee be required to work every night. 
Refusing the application, Dethridge said:
The employees concerned are women and girls whose working hours are 
48 per week with a long daily stretch of hours. I am convinced that the 
cessation of the night off would tend to reduce the zeal and efficiency 
of these employees while at their work … While recognising that the 
picture theatre industry is suffering severely from the depression, and 
that every reasonable reduction in labour-cost is essential in order to 
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maintain it to as great an extent as possible, I am not convinced that if 
the variation were made there would be any net reduction of labour cost 
sufficient to give real support to the industry. (p. 676)
Dethridge did, however, reduce overtime rates from time-an-a-half to time-
and-a-quarter. He reduced travelling allowances by 10 per cent (p. 677).
In a decision of December 1932 about employment in the 
Commonwealth Railways, Drake-Brockman said that all parties to the dispute 
had asked him to make provision for annual leave and that some of the unions 
had sought long service leave (Judgment—Commonwealth Railways Dispute 
31 CAR 815). Despite the parties’ partial agreement, Drake-Brockman was 
reluctant to endorse either proposal:
I have decided to continue the existing practice as to annual leave until 
the end of the financial year only and have directed that thereafter this 
subject shall be a matter for managerial determination. My reason for 
taking this course is that annual leave is a matter of privilege. If provision 
for it is placed in the award it ceases to be a matter of privilege and 
becomes a matter of right and so a factor the value of which must be 
assessed in the fixation of wage rates. For the same reason no provision 
is made in the award for long service leave. (p. 822)
In June 1933, the Full Court granted a 44-hour week in the textile 
industry (Variation—Textile Workers’ Awards; Standard Hours and Basic Wage, 
Textile Industry Disputes 32 CAR 470).27 It was influenced by the prevalence 
of 44 hours in New South Wales; the fact that most of the employees were 
female; and the impracticality of a longer working week for males. Moreover, 
the financial condition of the industry had improved—more so in the woollen 
section than in cotton. It had benefited from a higher tariff imposed in 1929. 
In the following December, the Full Court refused to extend to males the 44-
hour week prescribed for females working in the rope and cordage industry. 
An application for reduced hours would be dealt with at ‘a more appropriate 
time’ (32 CAR 764).
27  The 44-hour standard already applied in the clothing trades.
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The Full Court in June 1933 also made orders affecting standard 
hours in New South Wales railways and tramways (Standard Hours—Railway 
Employees—New South Wales 32 CAR 491).28 Dethridge and Drake-Brockman 
outlined the complex history of the matter:
Of those employees engaged in the kind of work done by the members 
of the Australian Railways Union, the greater part belong to that union 
and are covered by the award for that union made by this Court. A 
considerable number, however, are not in that union and are covered 
by State awards or enactments which prescribe in effect a 44 hour 
week. Notwithstanding that a 48 hour week has been prescribed by the 
award of this Court, the NSW authorities have ever since 1925 except 
during one rather short period conceded a 44 hour week to all railway 
employees covered by this Court’s award, thus putting them on the 
same footing as to hours as that of employees covered by State awards 
or enactments. This was the position until 16th April, 1933, when the 
authorities required all the employees to work the hours prescribed by 
awards applicable to them, and thus caused that section of employees 
covered by the award of this Court to revert to 48 hours while the 
uncovered section continued to work only 44 hours. (p. 493)
Similar prescriptions had applied to the Electrical Trades’ Union and the 
Australian Timber Workers’ Union. Virtually all tramways employees belonged 
to the Australian Tramway Employees’ Union and had been put on to 48 
hours. These facts entailed ‘a present disparity of working hours among similar 
employees which is absurd and likely to lead to friction and disturbance in 
the work to be done’ (p. 494). But New South Wales could not be considered 
in isolation. The Court was concerned with railways and tramways in several 
States ‘and a decision of this Court directly or indirectly affecting the standard 
hours of working in one State is certain to be regarded as a precedent for each 
of the other States’. Neither the nature of the work nor the financial condition 
of the employer justified a 44-hour week and the award provisions for 48 
hours were not altered.
28  The reasons were given in August.
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The union submissions included a contention that a general shortening 
of working hours was now appropriate. This proposition, said Dethridge and 
Drake-Brockman, could not appropriately be debated in the context of the 
immediate case. Nevertheless they added:
Material prepared by the International Labour Office and others 
relating to this thesis was furnished to the Court and is of much 
interest. It all goes to show, however, the great difficulty and danger of 
action in that direction by one country alone, and also the enormous 
obstacles to international co-operation. That consumption of products, 
and consequently production and trade, would be stimulated by such 
a shortening is very doubtful. Whether production has become so ill-
balanced by reason of modern methods as to make a shortening of 
working hours necessary in order to spread or ration employment is 
another question. If nations become more and more self-contained 
this may become inevitable, but its corollary is that wages also will be 
rationed. Both employment and wages will then be spread more evenly 
but also more thinly. (pp. 495–496)
Dethridge and Drake-Brockman thought that it would be possible in the 
future to reduce hours so as to lessen the hardships of workers’ lives. But the 
scope for reduction was restricted by the requirements of ‘economic safety’, 
the limits of which were ‘somewhat narrowly fixed ultimately by (1) Australia’s 
large dependence on exports of primary products and (2) the aim to preserve 
a reasonably high standard of living for its citizens’. Beeby reflected on the 
Commissioners’ vacillation about working hours, corresponding to the varying 
policies of State governments. The appropriate response, in his view, was for 
the Court to strike out of its awards all provisions about working hours so far 
as they related to New South Wales, leaving the matter to the State Industrial 
Commission. If the Court were to continue to prescribe hours, tramway 
workers on footboard cars should not be required to work more than 44 per 
week (p. 498).
The Full Court in February 1934 dealt with applications by the Electrical 
Trades’ Union for extension of the 44-hour week (Variation—Metal Trades 
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and Electricians’ Awards 33 CAR 56). The claim succeeded in part. ‘Employees 
engaged in process manufacturing’, the Court said,
are in our opinion as much entitled to a shortening of their hours 
of labour as many others in factory occupations who have already 
obtained it. Similar comment is justified in the case of electrical fitters 
and mechanics or wiremen who have as great a claim to the shortening 
as those in the metal and building trades. … But we do not think a 
sufficient case has been made to justify us in reducing the ordinary 
working hours of any of the other classes of employees covered by the 
application … (p. 57)
There was no discussion of economic or industry issues.29 On the same day, 
the Court decided by majority (Dethridge and Beeby) that the standard week 
of male workers in the rubber industry would be reduced from 46½ to 44 
(Variation—Rubber Workers’ Award 33 CAR 60).
In October and November 1934, Dethridge refused two union 
applications—both for carters and drivers—for annual leave. He said that the 
claim for employees such as retail milk carters would be strong if industry were 
more prosperous, but under present conditions he would not be justified in 
granting it (Judgment—Carters and Drivers’ Award 33 CAR 857, 871). Carters 
and drivers in oil stores already enjoyed one week’s leave, which had been 
conceded ‘a year or two ago’ by the employers because of the irregularity of 
working hours. The union now claimed a second week. Dethridge expressed 
reluctance to make a decision which might discourage employers from 
voluntarily granting leave. He had granted higher penalty rates to discourage 
irregular hours and did not feel that he could increase the amount of leave 
beyond that granted by the employers (Judgment—Carters and Drivers (Oil 
Stores) 33 CAR 965, 966–967).
The Full Court in December 1934 made several decisions about 
working hours. Carpenters and joiners in mixed industries were to have a 
29  Railways were initially reserved from this decision, but in May 1934 the Court rejected the 
Commissioners’ attempt to delay its application (Variation—Electricians’ Award—Standard 
Hours, Railway Employees 33 CAR 521).
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44-hour week, unless they were employed in conjunction with timber mills 
(in which case the 48-hour week would continue) (Variation—Carpenters 
and Joiners’ Award 33 CAR 1085). The Court granted the 44-hour week in 
tanning (Variation—Tanning Award 33 CAR 1143), the glue and gelatine 
industry (but with provision for 176 hours to be worked over four weeks) 
(Variation—Saddlery (Glue and Gelatine) Award 33 CAR 1145), and in felt 
hatting (Variation—Felt Hatting Awards 33 CAR 1150). In the tanning case, 
the Court said that it had reached its decision after ‘anxious consideration’, 
but it had regard to the unpleasant working conditions and ‘the general trend 
towards the shortening of working hours of wage earners’ (p. 1144). In a 
decision for coachmaking (Variation—Coachmakers and Metal Trades’ Awards 
33 CAR 1089), the Court recalled that in 1929 it had refused a 44-hour week 
because of economic conditions, but that Dethridge had said that he would 
support the shorter week if the parties were to intimate their acceptance of 
piecework. No such intimation had been given. The industry was now brisk, 
with plentiful employment; and in the American industry, hours had fallen 
from 48–50 in 1929 to 40. Proceedings for a new award would be before the 
Court early in 1935 and the 44-hour week would not be implemented until 
the new award was made. It would be a term of the award that any union 
sanction against a member on piecework would be nugatory and a breach of 
the award (pp. 1091–1092).
10.10 state polIcIes
There were, in the Depression years, significant differences between the 
decisions of the Federal Court and those of the State tribunals in four of the 
States: New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia, and Western Australia. 
These differences affected principally the basic (or living) wages and, to a lesser 
degree, working hours.
The statistical relation between federal and State basic wages is 
summarised in Figure 1.4 and discussed in Chapter 8 (Subsection 8.4.4). In 
none of the States—New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia, and 
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Western Australia—wherein local tribunals prescribed basic or living wages 
was there a straightforward adoption of federal policy.
In the Depression years, New South Wales attracted the severest criticism 
for maintaining State-fixed wages at too high a level, undermining the effects 
of the Commonwealth Court’s policies. Because of the size of the New South 
Wales economy and labour force, its divergent policies obviously had a bigger 
effect on national aggregates than did the policies of smaller States. But Figure 
8.7 suggests that similar criticisms could also have been directed at the wages 
policies of Queensland, South Australia, and Western Australia.
The New South Wales story is closely related to the vagaries of State 
politics and the composition of the State Tribunal, as Sheldon recounts:
Due to an unpredictable combination of legislative design, government 
policy, and judicial strategy, the Living Wage did not change between 
December 1929 and August 1932 and, in fact, no hearings or adjustment 
process occurred. Knowing that such inquiries would result in Living 
Wage reductions, Piddington [as President of the State Commission] 
struggled against holding them. This brought him into conflict with 
Bavin [the Premier until October 1930] (and his judicial colleagues) 
but into harmony with a Labor government that also worked to stymie 
any possibility of such an inquiry. Under Piddington’s influence, the 
Commission rejected calls for a further Living Wage inquiry on the 
pretext that the government was proposing legislation to reshape 
New South Wales industrial relations institutions. Labor’s bill failed, 
but [Premier] Lang successfully either cowered or out-manoeuvred 
Piddington’s judicial colleagues to ensure that the Commission would 
not investigate the Living Wage. Steady money wages meant rising real 
wages. (Sheldon 2007, pp. 256–257)
After the defeat of the Lang Government, the Commission was reconstituted 
(Piddington having already resigned). In August 1932, the tribunal reduced the 
living wage by 15 per cent—a lesser reduction than the preceding cumulative 
fall in the Commonwealth wage. Thereafter it made half-yearly declarations 
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which broadly corresponded with movements in the cost of living (Sheldon 
2007, p. 257).
In Queensland, a non-Labor Government was in office from early 1929 
until June 1932. It replaced the Board of Trade with an Industrial Court and 
immediately suspended rural industry awards; and in 1930, it removed other 
groups, including miners, public servants, and railway employees from the 
arbitration system. After the return of a Labor Government, many of these 
groups were restored to coverage (Sheldon 2007, p. 267). The State basic 
wage had been set at 85s in 1925 and remained at that amount until August 
1930. The Court in March 1930 refused an application for a reduction, citing 
a provision of the State Act which forbade the fixing of a wage below the 
Harvester standard. There was a reduction of 5s in August 1930, a further 
reduction of 3s in December 1930 and another reduction, also of 3s, in July 
1931. These were the only changes during the Depression period. The total 
reduction of 11s between December 1929 and December 1934 compared 
with a fall of 18s 6d in the Commonwealth wage for Brisbane over the same 
period.
The South Australian living wage was set by the Board of Industry, 
which comprised a Judge, two employer representatives, and two employee 
representatives. This structure effectively made the judge the arbiter of the 
living wage. The Board was empowered to declare a living wage as it saw 
necessary, subject to a minimum interval of six months between declarations. 
The living wage was constant at 85s 6d between July 1925 and October 1930, 
when it was reduced to 75s A further reduction, to 63s, was made in August 
1932. The wage remained at this level until late 1935. In the two years from 
the end of 1929 to the end of 1931, the living wage, set by the State Tribunal, 
fell by 22s 6d, while the Commonwealth basic wage for Adelaide was reduced 
by over 30s. Over the next three years, the State-fixed wage was unchanged, 
while the federal counterpart increased by about 7s.
In Western Australia, the State basic wage was set by a tripartite Court 
of Arbitration presided over by a Supreme Court Judge. The Court had been 
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required to make annual declarations, but a 1930 amendment to the legislation 
(secured by a non-Labor government) provided for quarterly reviews whenever 
the State Statistician indicated a change of 1s or more in the cost of living. 
These reviews were discretionary: adjustments were not automatic. A Financial 
Emergency Act, passed in 1931, provided for all-round wage reductions of 18 
per cent. This was repealed after the return of a Labor Government in 1933. 
The basic wage had been constant after 1926 until June 1929, when it was 
raised by 2s to 87s. Between the end of 1929 and the end of 1931, the fall in 
the State-fixed basic wage for Perth was 9s; the Commonwealth wage fell by 
over 20s. In the next three years, the State wage fell by a further 2s 6d, while 
the federal wage increased by about 6s.
Typically, the State tribunals resisted the kind of economic ‘management’ 
on which the Commonwealth Court embarked, and in the 1934 hearing before 
the Federal Court Crofts dealt at length with State pronouncements which 
seemed at odds with the Commonwealth decision. The Queensland Court 
showed considerable scepticism about any beneficial effects of wage reductions 
on unemployment and, indeed, lent some support to the purchasing-power 
argument typically invoked by the unions. In October 1932, for example, it 
published a statement of ‘Opinions of the Court’, which read in part:
The Judge and Mr Ferry [employee member] have agreed to adjourn 
the application of the employers for a reduction of the basic wage until 
a date in February next to be fixed.
Meanwhile an effort will be made to secure further information as to 
the probable effect of a general reduction of wages on employment, 
with a view to enabling the Court to discharge with greater certainty its 
statutory obligation to consider the economic effect on industry. If more 
definite information is not forthcoming, the Judge thinks the Court 
may have to consider the necessity of taking those risks to which Mr 
Brigden refers but which the Judge thinks are not warranted at present.
It is not contested that a reduction of the purchasing power of the wage-
earners as a whole will increase unemployment. But, as Mr Brigden 
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points out, a reduction of the basic wage by, say, 3s means that 4,116 
additional men must be employed at the reduced wage to keep the 
aggregate fund at the present level. Mr Wallace [employer member] 
thinks—sharing Mr Brigden’s apparent optimism in this regard—that 
while such a commensurate increase in employment may not be a 
reasonably probable result of a reduction in the basic wage, a reduction 
will probably stem the tide of increasing unemployment; but the Judge 
and Mr Ferry cannot concur in such a conclusion. (transcript, p. 79)
Mr Justice Dwyer, in the Western Australian Court, in June 1932 noted 
the State Act’s definition of the basic wage: ‘A sum sufficient to enable the 
average worker to whom it applies to live in reasonable comfort, having regard 
to any domestic obligations to which such worker would be ordinarily subject.’ 
He continued:
It seems to me to follow from the foregoing that it is not our present 
duty to consider, whether as a general scheme of industrial regulation 
or otherwise, the rehabilitation of the financial system of the Australian 
States or over-production in industry or interstate competition or other 
cognate matters. Questions, therefore, dealing with the balancing of the 
national ledger, the difference between our exports and imports, the 
alternation [sic] of the rate of exchange, though very interesting, are 
outside the scope of this inquiry, or only remotely connected with it. … 
With regard to the 10 per cent reduction claim, this may be disposed of 
summarily by stating that there is no power in this Court under the law 
as it stands to ascertain a standard of living and then deduct or add ten 
or any other percentage. (transcript, pp. 44–45)
The South Australian Board of Industry, in June 1930, said (presumably 
in the words of Acting-President Kelly):
The Board cannot choose any one or more of the remedies or initiate 
any of the methods of adjustment advocated by economists. Its 
function is circumscribed by Statute. It has to take the facts as it finds 
them and is charged with the clear and single duty of providing for 
the average employee, as already defined, a wage sufficient to meet the 
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normal and reasonable needs—normal and reasonable in view of all the 
circumstances existent of time and place.
The provision of such a sum is the sole purpose of its declaration. The 
remedy of economic ills, the rehabilitation of declining industries, the 
elimination of unemployment, these are matters with the attainment 
of which the Board is not charged. The desirability of their attainment 
may indeed be relevant in the discussion of what are the average 
employee’s reasonable needs when the State is in the throes of industrial 
and financial depression, when an increasing proportion of the citizens 
are suffering unemployment. But when that is said, all has been said. 
(transcript, p. 98)
Thus the Board of Industry, though eschewing the opinions of 
economists, contemplated some elasticity in setting the living wage by allowing 
that the ‘reasonable needs’ of employees might be affected by the state of the 
economy. Although the prima facie estimate of the cost of living was 13s 5d 
per day, the Board declared a wage of 12s 6d. It referred to evidence that the 
fall in prices was greater than indicated by the official statistics and that the 
community was adjusting its standards to changing realities by (for example) 
retaining clothes for longer use. It spoke also of ‘the need for economy on 
the part of all sections of the community, including employees receiving the 
living wage’ (transcript, p. 99–100). In April 1933, Kelly noted some signs 
of economic improvement and said that he had ‘come to the conclusion that 
justice and expediency require that no special contraction of the normal and 
reasonable needs of the living wage earner should now be enforced on the 
ground of that stringent need for economy which existed during that period’ 
(p. 106).
In Victoria, there was no State-declared basic wage. The common 
assumption, however, is that the wages boards generally adopted Federal 
Court decisions. On a broad view, this is true, but the position was somewhat 
‘messy’. In the 1934 Federal Court hearing, Clarey analysed the deliberations 
of the boards:
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Altogether in Victoria the Wages Boards that have been created total 
182, but of those Boards 9 have made no determination. … Of those 
Boards in force—173—several have made determinations many years 
ago which have never been altered … They are the Brewers, Flour, 
Ham & Bacon Curers, Meat Preservers, Soap and Soda, Candlemakers, 
Flour (Country), Malt, Miners (Coal), Starch, Enginedrivers (Mining), 
Glassworkers, Marine Store, Miners (Gold), and Tie Makers. Some of 
those determinations were made as far back as 1913–14 … and must be 
disregarded. That brings the total number of Boards in operation at the 
present moment down to 158. Of those 158 determinations 27 have 
been in force for three months or less … 15 determinations have been in 
force for over three months but less than 6 months … 15 determinations 
have been in force for more than 6 months but not more than 9 months 
… 8 determinations have been in force for 9 months but not more than 
12 months … 27 determinations have been in force for more than 12 
months but not more than 18 months … 11 determinations have been 
in force for 18 months but not more than 2 years … 55 have been in 
force for more than two years … (transcript, p. 175)
Thus, although Boards may generally have followed the Commonwealth 
Court’s awards, there was often a substantial delay in their doing so. In 1934, 
the situation described by Clarey was corrected by the passage of a new Factories 
and Shops Act. This required the wages boards to adopt Commonwealth award 
rates wherever applicable and empowered the Secretary for Labour to adjust 
wages according to cost of living index numbers without convening the wages 
boards (Sheldon 2007, p. 262).
As to Tasmania, the Labour Report (no. 25, 1934, p. 87) stated: ‘There 
is no State basic wage fixed by any authority in Tasmania, but Wages Boards 
follow, to a large extent, the rates of the Federal Court and adjust wages in 
accordance with variations in retail price index numbers.’ It made essentially 
the same statement about Victoria, however, and the kind of ‘compliance’ 
with federal determinations described by Clarey may also have obtained in 
Tasmania.
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10.11 conclusIon
The year 1934 saw some signs of relaxation of the Commonwealth Court’s policy 
of reducing and holding down labour costs. There was a modest improvement 
in economic conditions as indicated by the rate of unemployment. But there 
was still a distance to travel. The Judges may well have sensed that they had 
taken the policy of restraint to its practical or equitable limit, given especially 
the failure of State tribunals to recognise the federal Court’s leadership.
Was the policy of reduction of labour costs sound in the Depression 
context? The question does not lend itself to a ready answer. The issue has to 
be approached with full regard to the enormity of the economic forces that 
that bore down on Australia in these years. A presumption that reducing the 
price of labour takes advantage of downward sloping demand curves is an 
insubstantial contribution to the debate. For a given industry, it may be true; 
but when the reduction in pay is widely spread, the contrary effect of reduced 
purchasing power may well be significant. Moreover, the deflation of prices, 
to which falling wages contribute, was very likely to depress demand. The case 
for cutting wages has, rather, to be embedded in an overall understanding of 
the need for structural adjustment, brought about by the catastrophic fall in 
export prices and the drying-up of capital inflow.
The economists—Copland, Giblin, Dyason, Shann and others—were 
essentially correct in their diagnosis of the problems. They were correct in 
identifying the inevitability of an overall reduction of real incomes. They were 
right, too, in arguing for a sharing of the burden so that it did not remain 
wholly with the exporters and the industries that had depended on capital 
inflow. Primary export industries were fundamental to the structure of the pre-
Depression economy. The collapse in their income-generating capacity might 
in the long run be offset by restructuring the economy, but in the short term the 
case for policies to aid their survival was strong.30 Depreciation of the exchange 
30  Dethridge said during the 1933 hearing: ‘Let us be frank about it: if the primary industries 
go crash, there is nothing to sustain the secondary industries, and they will go crash, too. That 
is the difficult situation we are in. It is not a simple situation such as these gentlemen—who, 
I see, are Bachelors of Science and Bachelors of Medicine—think it is. It is most astonishing 
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rate was the least painful method of adjustment. The Australian pound was 
devalued from parity with sterling to 1.25 Australian pounds to the pound 
sterling, and this entailed a larger devaluation against the US dollar.31 If the 
devaluation had been greater, the need for internal price and wage adjustment 
would have been less. The reasons for resistance to a larger devaluation are 
a topic that lies outside the scope of this study. Income adjustment was a 
difficult alternative, for two reasons.
First, what was required (because of the reduction in the real GDP 
and the cessation of foreign loans) was reduction of real incomes, and not 
merely money incomes. Policy acts directly on money amounts. To affect real 
incomes, it depends on the leverage that fixing money incomes exerts over 
real incomes, that is, the ‘stickiness’ of prices. In an economy with a large 
tradeable sector, leverage certainly existed, but the necessary reductions of 
money incomes exceeded considerably the loss of real income. With money 
illusions rife, this was a difficult process. Resistance to wage reductions was 
inescapable. Explicit decisions to reduce wages inevitably generated hostility. 
When reductions were mandated by automatic adjustment provisions, they 
gave rise to arguments about the accuracy of the price index.
Second, inasmuch as the reductions were successfully resisted in respect 
of some incomes, either other sectors had to bear larger reductions or the relief 
to the export and capital-importing sectors would not occur. As we have seen, 
the 10 per cent cut imposed by the Federal Court was not followed in several 
of the State jurisdictions; and some State tribunals showed a reluctance even 
to match the fall in prices. There was no overall reduction in the real value of 
prescribed wages. What might be said for the Court’s action is that, without 
it, real wages would probably have risen, making the process of structural 
adjustment even more difficult than it was.
how many men with scientific and engineering training, like Major Douglas and others, think 
that the world can be cured by their panaceas. It is not to be done in that easy fashion’ 
(transcript, pp. 56–57).
31  For most of 1931, the sterling exchange rate was at 1.3 Australian pounds to the pound 
sterling.
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There has been some debate about the reasons for the downward rigidity 
of real wages in Australia (see, for example, Gregory, Ho and McDermott 
(1985), and Sheldon (2007)). Gregory et al. (1985, pp. 13–19) reject the 
‘standard’ explanations, which ‘were first put forward by Giblin (1931) 
and have been repeated by Hancock (1972) and Schedvin (1970)’.32 Those 
explanations relate to the divergent policies of federal and State authorities, 
lags in the adjustment of the basic wage to falling prices and the stability (in 
nominal terms) of margins. (Federal award margins were subject to the 10 per 
cent cut, but not to indexation.) Gregory et al. contend that the stability of real 
wages shows that the market rejected the policies of the wage-setters. A major 
difficulty with their argument is that the wage data used by all participants in 
the discussion, including Gregory et al., are about institutionally prescribed rates 
of pay. It is conceivable that ‘the market’ set actual rates that were significantly 
different.33 But since the available data describe formally prescribed wages, it 
is entirely appropriate to relate them to the practices of the institutions which 
set them. Hence the explanations for real-wage rigidity proposed by Schedvin 
and Hancock are apposite.34 Figure 1.4 in Chapter 1 and the analysis of State 
policies in the previous section of this chapter indicate the importance of the 
States’ failure to act upon the Court’s decisions.
The principal arguments against the endeavour to cut real wages by 
reducing money wages were those that ran in terms of ‘purchasing power’ and 
the ‘circulation of money’. These arguments, as we have seen, were always 
presented by union advocates and repeatedly discussed by members of the 
Court. The unions were supported in the 1930–31 case by R F Irvine and 
32  Giblin did not, in fact, discuss the issue—at least, not in the reference cited by Gregory, 
Ho and McDermott (1985). This is not surprising, because at the time Giblin would not have 
known the future course of real wages.
33  In the circumstances of the Depression, the ‘market’ was surely more likely to have set rates 
below rather than above prescribed rates. Little evidence exists about avoidance of the awards. 
I have referred above to Mann’s comments during the 1934 basic wage case hearing about 
under-payment in the building industry.
34  Little weight should be given, however, to the lags in basic wage adjustment. Their effect 
was far outweighed by the use of A series index for adjustment purposes (see Chapter 8, 
Subsection 8.4.4). In relation to the C series index, the real basic wage fell substantially.
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various union witnesses. J M Keynes, in the article which appeared in a number 
of Australian newspapers in 1932, also lent some support to the purchasing-
power argument (see Chapter 13, Subsection 13.1.5). J B Brigden, one of the 
founders of the profession of economics in the 1920s, became Director of the 
Queensland Bureau of Industry and Statistics, and in that capacity furnished 
reports to the State Industrial Court. In the 1933 hearing before the Federal 
Court for restoration of the 10 per cent cut, Crofts cited a 1931 report by 
Brigden, who said:
While the Federal Court asserted that wage reduction ought to be the 
last resort, it has been adopted as the first resort, and it has accomplished 
none of those things which it was expected to do. It will be contended 
that if wage reduction has failed to reduce unemployment, it is because 
the reductions have not been sufficiently drastic. On this point that 
noted economist Mr J M Keynes states, ‘The advantages to employers of 
a general reduction of wages are not as good as they look. Each employer 
sees the advantage to himself of the reduction of wages which he himself 
pays, and overlooks both the consequences of the reduction of incomes 
of his customers, and of the reduction of wages which his competitors 
will enjoy. Anyway, it would certainly lead to some injustice and violent 
resistance, and it would greatly benefit some classes of incomes at the 
expense of others. For these reasons, a policy of contraction sufficient 
to do any real good may be quite impracticable.’ (transcript of the 1933 
restoration hearing, p. 175)
As we saw in the previous section, the Queensland Court itself held 
the view that the State basic wage ought not to fall with the decline in prices 
because of the adverse effect of wage reductions on spending.
To pursue the matter at greater length would take us into issues of 
macroeconomics that lie beyond the limits of analysis supportable by the 
available data. For the purpose of this study, the important fact is the realisation 
by the Court and others, including the emerging band of professional 
economists, of the Court’s role as an institution of economic policy. A 
recognition that wage levels and employment conditions were constrained 
542 Australian Wage Policy
by economic circumstances had for many years been implicit—and often 
explicit—in decisions of the Court. But despite the episode of the Piddington 
report, there had remained a certain ambivalence about the relation of the 
economy to the basic wage. The 10 per cent cut was certainly an affirmation of 
the significance of economics. That might conceivably have been interpreted 
as a temporary response to an exceptional circumstance; but the 1934 decision 
went far to enshrining the dominance of economic criteria.
11.1 pre-1937 Issues
After the four, virtually annual, basic wage cases of the Depression years, 
there was no further application for a general review until 1937. The interval 
may have reflected union priorities for raising margins and for resuming the 
movement toward a general 44-hour week, as well as a judgment about the 
likely attitude of the Court toward the degree of economic recovery.
There were, however, cases dealing with subsidiary issues.
11.1.1 geographical differences
There had emerged over the years of basic-wage prescription a diverse set 
of basic-wage rates as between localities. In most awards, the rates applying 
in the capital cities corresponded to the price relativities indicated by the 
Statistician’s index numbers. The substitution of the C series for the A series 
index altered these relativities, the principal change being a rise in the relative 
wage in Adelaide. There were, however, awards wherein uniform basic wages 
applied across States. Textiles were an example. The reason for uniformity 
in these awards was interstate competition in the product markets. For non-
metropolitan areas, the Court had applied various deviations from the strict 
index-related rates, usually in recognition of economic difficulties of non-
urban producers. In 1934, it adopted a rule that basic wage rates in country 
The basic wage in the recovery
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areas would be equal to the amounts indicated by the price index minus 3s. 
This was in recognition of disadvantages—associated especially with transport 
costs—of country employers competing with metropolitan firms.
In November 1934, the Full Court observed that where a provincial city 
was conveniently served by a port there might be no justification for the lower 
wage; and accordingly, in May 1935, it raised the Newcastle and Port Kembla 
basic wages to the Sydney level (Variation—Metal Trades and Carpenters and 
Joiners’ Awards 34 CAR 642, 643). In July 1935, the Court said:
In giving its decision in the recent Port Kembla and Wollongong 
case the Court intimated that, because of what it regarded as sound 
economic reasons, only in very exceptional cases would a basic wage be 
prescribed for a provincial place higher than that for the metropolis of 
the State concerned, even though the index number for the provincial 
place was higher than that for the metropolis. It now confirms that 
statement. (Variation—Metal Trades and Timber Workers’ Awards 34 
CAR 817, 819)
The issue of interstate differences was bedevilled by the existence of 
different practices in different awards. In some, the capital cities’ basic wages 
differed in accordance with the respective levels of the price index. In others, 
there might be a uniform basic wage corresponding to the six-capitals average 
of the price index. Though there was no firm rule, the latter was most likely to 
occur where employers in the different States were in significant competition 
with each other, as in textiles. Dethridge discussed the issue in September 
1935 in connection with a possible coverage of Queensland by a commercial 
printing award. The employers wanted the basic wage in the award to be the 
six-capitals amount, then 66s. At the time, the basic wage for Brisbane set by 
the State tribunal was 74s. It was fair to assume, said Dethridge, that the basic 
wage in a federal award for printing would be 66s. The Brisbane employers, 
he continued,
have a substantial reason for desiring to be placed on an equal footing in 
respect of labour costs with their competitors in other States—a reason 
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which is likely to become still more cogent in the future. … Where 
considerable interstate competition prevails as in these commercial 
printing and allied industries now in question, there can be no doubt 
that the federal jurisdiction should operate if an interstate dispute of 
substance is shown to exist. (Judgment—Commercial Printing 36 CAR 
738, 740–741)
In November 1935, the Full Court confronted objections from South 
Australia to the imposition of a uniform basic wage. The Food Preservers’ 
Union and the Commonwealth Jam Preserving and Condiment Manufacturers’ 
Association had reached partial agreement about an award for food preserving. 
This included a flat-rate basic wage of 75s, which would not to be subject to 
adjustment before June 1937. (At the time, the six-capitals basic wage was 69s 
6d.) The Court set out the issue in dispute:
Mr Wright, who appeared for respondent employers engaged in the 
industry in South Australia, objected to the proposed award chiefly 
because of the proposed flat base rate of 75s per week and stated 
that his clients desired that the wage rates should be founded upon 
the Court’s basic wage to be assessed and adjusted from time to time 
for each metropolitan or provincial district upon the relevant index 
number. … [T]he dispute so far as concerned with the base rate 
came before the Full Court. The Government of the State of South 
Australia then sought and obtained leave to intervene for the purpose 
of objecting to the prescription of a flat base rate for South Australia 
in common with other States. It presented criticism of the action of 
the Court in prescribing a flat basic wage in the textile workers award 
of 1933 and of the views expressed by this Court when making that 
award. Unemployment in South Australia is a very serious problem, 
the capacity of primary industry there to absorb unemployed persons is 
small, the natural conditions there for secondary industry are generally 
poor, and therefore this Court should in its awards allow employers 
in that State who are competing with employers in other States the 
benefit of any advantage that may be derivable from discrepancies in 
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the money amounts of this Court’s basic wage for the different States. 
So ran the argument, which in an appropriate case would deserve very 
serious consideration. (Judgment—Food Preserving Industry 35 CAR 
481, 483–484)
But the argument, the Court thought, was inappropriate to the current case. 
Flat rates had operated in the industry’s awards since 1924, except that until 
1932 there were lower rates for some Victorian provincial districts. In December 
1932, the employers consented to the removal of the differentiation within 
Victoria. South Australian employers did not then object to the uniform rate. 
‘Until now’, said the Court,
South Australian employers have made no attempt to obtain a 
differential basic wage, although for a considerable part of the time 
since 1924, this Court’s basic wage for Adelaide was substantially lower 
than that for other places covered by the award. We see no reason at 
present for departing from the practice long established in the awards 
for this industry of a flat rate wage. (p. 484)
Though the point was not much discussed, it seems that the Court 
equated ‘fair competition’ between employers with equal money wages rather 
than equal real wages. Where the competition was intense, it was likely to 
apply a flat-rate basic wage, typically based on the six-capitals figure.1
11.1.2 employers not subject to the 10 per cent cut
We saw in Chapter 10 that some employers either were excluded from the 
10 per cent reduction or had it reversed before the 1934 decision. In 1931, 
unions had successfully applied for the exclusion from the cut of the Colonial 
Sugar Refinery (CSR), chiefly on the ground that the great majority of the 
Company’s employees, covered by a State award, were not subject to the 
cut. This exclusion meant that the CSR workers subject to the federal award 
received a basic wage comprising the Harvester equivalent plus Powers’ 3s. In 
November 1935, the Full Court dealt with a dispute as to whether that form 
1  If the award applied to only some States, the flat rate might be the average for those States.
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of basic wage should continue or be replaced by one consistent with the 1934 
decision. The Court opted for the latter. The unions, it said, claimed
that the company is very prosperous, that the saving of wage cost which 
will result from substituting the new basic wage will only be about 
£8,000 per year, which is a trifling amount compared with its enormous 
operations, and that the saving of this amount will have only a negligible 
effect upon either the price of sugar to the consumer or the price paid for 
cane to the grower. All this is true, but the Court must act on consistent 
principles in respect of its basic wage. The mere fact that an employer is 
very prosperous and wealthy does not justify discrimination against him. 
Such discrimination has always been regarded by this Court as unsound 
and inexpedient in general, but possibly an exception should be made in 
the case of a prosperous monopoly where the prescription of a bonus in 
addition to the basic wage may perhaps be justified. (Variation—Metal 
Trades and other Awards, re Basic Wage Colonial Sugar Refining Co Ltd 
and Jam and Food Preserving Companies 35 CAR 504, 505)
The issue as to whether a company bonus should be awarded as an 
addition to the basic wage was avoided by a finding that CSR was not a 
monopolist in the relevant sense. An award prescription of such a bonus would 
have been a novel step.
11.1.3 Provision for ‘keep’
The principle had long been accepted that the basic wage should be reduced 
when the employer provided ‘keep’. But there was always a potential for 
disputation about the amount of the reduction.
This issue arose in November 1935 in connection with maritime 
awards. The decision warrants notice because of the Court’s use of the finding 
of the Royal Commission on the Basic Wage in 1920. The unions contended 
that the Commission’s assessment of the food requirements of a family of 
five as £2 6s should be related to its overall ‘basic wage’ of £5 15s 8d, which 
contrasted with the then-prevailing basic wage of only £4 14s. The food 
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allowance, said the unions, should be reduced in proportion to the difference 
between the actual basic wage at the time of the Royal Commission and the 
recommended amount. The £2 6s would then be replaced by £1 17s 10d. 
The male breadwinner’s share of the food requirement, according to the Royal 
Commission, was one-third, and a third of £1 17s 10d was 12s 8d. Applying 
the price index to that amount led to a weekly food ‘bill’ for the male worker 
of 8s 3d. This, said the unions, was the amount by which the seaman’s wage 
should be reduced because of the provision of food. The Court disagreed, 
maintaining the deduction at the higher amount of one-sixth of the actual 
basic wage:
There is no reason to suppose that the actual expenditure of a wage 
earner in October, 1920, upon food for a family unit of five was not on 
the average about the amount found by the Commission to be sufficient 
for the food constituent of its proposed basic wage. The amount which 
was found by the Commission to be desirable for a basic wage was 
higher than the prevailing basic wage mainly by reason of the increase 
or inclusion of other items than food. (Judgment—Deduction for ‘Keep’ 
and Basic Wage—Maritime Awards 35 CAR 442, 444)
Implicit in the Court’s reasoning was an assumption that the generosity 
of the Piddington ‘basic wage’ was not due to an all-round liberality in the 
amounts allowed for different kinds of spending, including spending on 
food. Rather, it was the result of the Royal Commission’s allowance for other 
items. In other words, the Court assumed that the actual basic wage in 1920 
consisted of 46s for food plus 48s for all other items, whereas the Piddington 
‘basic wage’ consisted of 46s for food plus 70s 8d for other items. This, in 
fact, was substantially correct, though the unions may have seen it as sleight 
of hand. The sum allowed by Higgins for food and rent, adjusted by the price 
index, slightly exceeded the amount computed by the Royal Commission. The 
difference between the Harvester and the Piddington standard did reside in 




The Harvester case, the Court’s refusal in 1921 to adopt the Piddington 
standard, the 1922 decision to introduce the system of automatic adjustments, 
and the decisions of 1931, 1934, and 1937 were the major mileposts in the 
evolution of basic-wage policy—and a fortiori wage policy at large—before 
World War II. We turn our attention to the last of these.
The unions applied for award variations to raise the basic wage. They 
asked that the C series index number 1000 be equated to 93s instead of 81s, 
as it then stood.2 They also applied for a female basic wage, to be set at 60 per 
cent of the male rate. The applications were heard in May and June 1937, 
and the Court delivered its decision on 23 June (Basic Wage Inquiry 1937 37 
CAR 583). The data presented in Section 8.2 of Chapter 8—especially the 
unemployment data—suggest that the case came six to 12 months before the 
peak of the economic revival. The principal issues in the case were whether 
the economic recovery justified full restoration of losses previously sustained 
by basic-wage earners; whether some additional increase might be justified to 
counter an incipient investment-driven boom; and the amount of the increase 
consistent with the Court’s findings on these two subjects.
11.2.2 expert evidence: W B Reddaway
At the inception of the hearing, Crofts, for the unions, asked whether the 
Court intended to call any economic expert as a witness. Crofts, no doubt, was 
mindful of the role played by Copland in 1930–31. This inquiry produced the 
following exchange:
Dethridge C J: The difficulty about the Court endeavouring to select an 
economist is this: there are economists and there are economists. The 
man I think is an economist my learned colleagues may think is not an 
2  The six-capitals index number for the March quarter was 864. For 1000 = 93s, this implied 
a basic wage of 80s. The actual wage was 70s. Hence, the unions were seeking a 10s increase, 
not 12s as was commonly said.
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economist. Any man selected as an economist may not be regarded as an 
economist by the gentlemen on the other side. Nowadays it is a matter 
of fancy, and I think it is unlikely that the Court will take upon itself the 
function of selecting any economist to assist. … Do not misunderstand 
me … If you desire that some witness should be called as an expert and 
it appears that that witness would prefer to be called by the Court, so as 
to appear to be quite impartial, then the Court will certainly consider 
calling such witness. … Personally I should welcome any suggestion of 
that kind from either side.
Mr Crofts: If this side suggested an economist and the Court accepted 
him as the Court’s witness, or an impartial witness, it might be suggested 
that he was not impartial. To obviate that, I suggest that if the Court 
wants the assistance of an economist it should itself ask the University 
to send along a man.
Dethridge C J: I think I know the reply the University would give. 
They would say ‘It is not our job.’ … I think the best thing for you to 
do if you desire to have an economist or any expert witness who dislikes 
being called by either side is to submit his name to us. It need not be 
submitted in public. Then we will consider whether we should make 
him our witness. That applies to both sides. (transcript, p. 7)
Dethridge invited the parties to see the Court in chambers.3 The 
discussion and any negotiations that may have ensued are unreported. Three 
days later, however, Dethridge announced: ‘We have a gentleman coming 
from the University tomorrow to give evidence at half past ten. He is being 
called as a witness by the Court’ (p. 171).
The gentleman was W B Reddaway. A Cambridge graduate who had 
been supervised by Keynes and was subsequently employed at the Bank of 
England, Reddaway held a two-year appointment as a Research Fellow at the 
University of Melbourne (Millmow 2003; Hancock 2004).4 He had been in 
3  Beeby interposed: ‘So long as you do not impose any Douglas Credit people upon us, we 
shall be glad to have an economist’ (p. 14).
4  Reddaway’s appointment was funded by Giblin, drawing on his fee as a member of the 
Board of the Commonwealth Bank.
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Australia for about 15 months.5 In all probability, he had been recommended 
to the Court by Giblin, Copland or Wood. Before he commenced his evidence, 
Dethridge said to him:
You understand, Mr Reddaway, you are being called as the Court’s 
witness, identified with neither side? … You know the subject matter 
of this proceeding. The Court considered that it would be advisable 
to have the assistance of some trained mind … and, that being so, we 
thought it desirable to have you as a witness. Your expression of views 
will be framed by yourself absolutely. (p.172)
Reddaway prefaced his evidence with this explanation:
I have prepared a memorandum in writing on what I thought would 
be the most useful points for an economist to deal with. I have shown 
this memorandum to Professors Giblin and Copland and to Dr Wood 
of the University, and they have authorised me to say that it represents 
substantially their views also. So that anything that appears in writing 
here really represents the unanimous opinion of the principal members 
of the Economic Staff of the University. (p. 172)6
At the beginning of his statement, he called for an increase in the basic 
wage:
The case for a revision of the basic wage must rest primarily on the 
increased prosperity of the country, which enables employers to pay a 
larger amount. The Court is in effect faced with the converse position 
to that which led it to decide on a reduction in 1931, and all economic 
arguments then advanced in favour of a reduction should now7 be 
5  In cross-examination (by S C G Wright), Reddaway was asked: ‘Can you say that you 
have had any specialty study, or has it been general research work which you have done?’ He 
replied: ‘I have been working on this sort of problem, the current position of Australia.’ ‘With 
particular reference to wages?’ asked Wright. Reddaway answered: ‘With particular reference 
more to the question of checking a boom, and the general measures for dealing with the 
situation.’
6  In its decision, the Court spoke of ‘an able economist called as a witness by the Court—
Mr Reddaway—who, as well as his own opinion, voiced that of eminent economists of the 
University of Melbourne, well acquainted with Australian conditions …’ (p. 587).
7  The transcript has the word ‘not’ rather than ‘now’, but that is inconsistent with the terms 
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reversed and used in favour of an increase. The national income has 
risen so much as to require some increase in the basic wage. (p. 173)
Reddaway declined to nominate the amount of the increase: he 
postulated that the Court might think that increased prosperity justified an 
increase ‘between x shillings and y shillings’. Within such a range, the Court 
should be influenced by ‘the urgency of the worker’s need for a higher income’.
It was sometimes argued, said Reddaway, that Australia’s prosperity and 
its capacity to pay wages were now less than before the Depression by reason 
of the cessation of overseas loans. That argument, he told the Court, was 
fallacious:
The effect of overseas borrowing was that men were employed in what 
was virtually export industry. They were producing public works of 
various sorts, and although these were not physically exported, yet 
the same immediate effect was obtained by exporting corresponding 
Government obligations. … When the borrowing ceased this particular 
export industry was, of course, extinguished. The immediate effect was 
disastrous, because the Australian economy could not be re-adjusted in 
a day. But if time were allowed for adaptation, then there need be no 
permanent fall in employment, and the effect on consumption should 
be quite small. Previously men had been producing public works for 
export, and obtaining manufactures in exchange; they had now to be 
transferred to other export industries, or to producing manufactures in 
Australia. Once this was done there would only be a loss of consumption 
in so far as the new occupations were less productive; and of course any 
loss on this account might be more than offset by improved efficiency 
in other industries. (pp. 173–174)
The adjustment process was virtually complete:
The new method of manufacturing the goods in Australia (instead of 
importing them in exchange for the equivalent of public works) may 
not yield quite such good immediate results; we see this in the fact the 
new industries receive protection, so that £100 will generally not buy as 
of the statement and is obviously a mistake.
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much of their products as it would of imports. But this is a comparatively 
small matter, representing a loss of real income of perhaps £5 millions; 
it has been much more than offset by increased efficiency in production 
as a whole which has been secured since 1929 … [w]hilst there is a very 
large item to be entered on the credit side, in the fact that there is no 
longer a risk of sudden dislocation due to a restriction of loans. (p. 174)
Reddaway discussed at some length the issue of railway finances. It was 
possible that these might ‘be used as an argument for a smaller, rather than a 
larger, increase in wages’. The relevance of railway statistics, said Reddaway, 
was limited to two aspects: the usage of the railways was roughly correlated 
with the general level of activity; and it affected the budgetary position (but 
‘we must be careful to avoid counting both a railway deficit and a budget 
deficit which includes it’). There were two reasons why the railways might 
be in deficit at a time when higher wages were justified. One was that much 
railway construction had been undertaken for non-commercial reasons:
It may have been justified as a means of developing the country, but 
it should no more be expected to cover its loan charges than should 
investment in school buildings. Moreover, the railways have not always 
been run on commercial lines, unduly low freights have been charged 
for political reasons, and insufficient provision made for depreciation; 
there is obviously no reason for fixing wages at a level which will permit 
5 per cent to be earned on lines neither constructed nor run on a 
commercial basis. (p. 175)
The other, and ‘more fundamental’, reason was:
Railways have proved a bad investment in Australia, as they have in 
other countries, largely because of the growth of road competition. … 
Where they are in private ownership this has meant either a drastic 
reduction of capital, or simply the passing of dividends on a great 
part of it. The Australian owners (that is, the general taxpayers) must 
similarly recognise that their investment has proved a bad one, and will 
not return them the anticipated 5 per cent. They cannot expect wages 
to be held down to a level which will cover up their mistakes. (p. 175)
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The relationships between the railways and the Treasuries should be 
revised and the existing maladjustments ‘should have no influence on the 
relationship between the railways and their employees; still less should it affect 
the general basic wage’.
Turning to the financial condition of the farmers, Reddaway argued
that with export prices at present levels the farmers’ financial difficulties 
mostly arise out of the excessive prices at which they bought their land. 
If they had paid for it in cash they would simply have found they had 
made a bad investment, and would naturally have had to take the 
consequences in getting little return on their capital. In fact they largely 
borrowed the money, so that when their equity margin disappeared, 
they were immediately in difficulties. This created a grave social 
problem, but it is not one which should or can be rectified by adjusting 
wages … Wages only affect the current position and this is for the most 
part satisfactory; sale prices are about at pre-slump levels, whilst money 
wages and the cost of living are considerably lower. (p. 176)
Next, Reddaway considered ‘foreign competition and the balance 
of payments’. In the case of exports, the position was clear-cut: the rise in 
export prices had left the exporter ‘in a position to meet a very substantial 
rise in costs’; and the relation of prices received to costs was decidedly more 
favourable than it had been before the Depression. Moreover, the efficiency of 
the export industries had increased under the stimulus of lower prices. Hence 
there was ‘little danger of export production being reduced because of the rise 
in costs’ if wages were raised; and there would be ‘a margin of safety to cover 
a considerable fall in export prices’. In the case of industries competing with 
imports, the ‘margin of safety’ might be less. But foreign producers in many 
cases were ‘so busy meeting the swollen demand in their local market that they 
are unable to compete for more export business’. In recent years, production 
in competition with imports had expanded greatly, even when demand was 
depressed; now that demand had increased, it seemed unlikely that producers 
would be put out of business by a small rise in relative costs. Since costs were 
rising overseas, ‘they should be able to stand an appreciable rise in Australian 
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wages’ (p. 177). Thus Reddaway dealt with the positions of both exporters and 
import-competitors by asking, and answering in the affirmative, the question 
whether or not the producers in question could survive an increase in costs. We 
might have expected an eminent economist to pose the question in terms of 
‘more or less’ rather than ‘either/or’. A rise in wages, one would think, should 
make the positions of both exporters and import competitors less favourable 
than if there were no rise.
The witness statement then has a section headed ‘Prevention of 
an Unhealthy Boom’. The real income of the community was increasing 
substantially, bringing with it a potential problem:
A part of this increase is going to labour in the form of wages to those 
previously unemployed, but if the wage rates are not increased, then 
the greater part will be concentrated on profits and rents. Business will 
be very profitable and many people will be anxious either to start new 
enterprises or expand existing ones. Up to a point this is of course an 
excellent thing, but it is capable of producing a most unhealthy boom 
if carried to excess, particularly when unemployment has been reduced 
to normal. Moreover, it is always accompanied by a rapid rise in the 
price of existing assets, such as land or ordinary shares, because people 
compete for those sources of high profits. Not only does this mean some 
undesirable speculation, but it will cause trouble if there is a subsequent 
decline. (p. 177)
This process, said Reddaway, was already at work in both the rural and the 
urban sectors. ‘A rise in real wages’, he said,
would be extremely valuable as a restraining influence both on the 
price of existing assets and the excessive construction of new ones. Of 
course other controls are needed as well, but a rise in wages is almost 
indispensable, if we are to maintain a steady level of prosperity and 
avoid an unhealthy boom. … A rise in wages would curb the rise in 
profits in existing businesses, and might reduce men’s estimates of 
future profits from new ones by a greater amount. These are largely 
influenced by the continuous rise in demand which has been associated 
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with the period of recovery. Such a great expansion cannot be expected 
to persist beyond the point where full employment is reached; men must 
cease thinking in terms of rapid recovery, and adjust their estimates to 
a condition of steady progress. But this changed outlook will not be 
secured automatically—rather will optimism feed on itself. Hence the 
great advantage of a rise in real wages, which will not only raise the costs 
of construction, but also forcibly direct attention to the improbability 
of ever-rising profits. (p. 178)
In his conclusion, Reddaway returned to the amount of the increase. 
At the minimum, it should be large enough to restore the real basic wage 
to its 1929 level. But ‘in view of the desirability of checking the boom and 
securing a distribution of income which would help to preserve the present 
level of prosperity I think a somewhat higher figure would be much more 
satisfactory—say two or three shillings higher’. If the Court were deliberating 
between a higher and a lower amount, ‘then my opinion as an economist is 
that the higher is preferable, not only on humane grounds, but in the general 
interest’.
The expedience of a wage increase to avert a boom had been the message 
of a lecture given by Copland on 23rd April. L R Mann, one of the representatives 
‘of employers generally’, had attended the lecture. He referred to it in his 
cross-examination of Reddaway (p. 246). The evidence does not disclose 
whether the idea of raising wages to combat a boom originated with Copland, 
Reddaway, or someone else. A reasonable conjecture is that Reddaway was 
its principal author, but Copland had certainly lent his considerable support 
to it.8 ‘I cannot speak as to what he said in his lecture’, said Reddaway in 
cross-examination, ‘but I can say this, that when I submitted my first draft 
of my evidence to him for comments, and so on, I had not then written any 
conclusion, and he wrote, as a memo, “I suggest that you end up by saying 
very much on the lines of what I finally said”’ (p. 247).
8  The idea was mentioned several times by the Judges before Reddaway entered the box. No 
doubt Copland’s lecture received publicity. I cannot say whether the proposal was ‘in the air’ 
before the lecture.
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On the next day, Reddaway made a statement to the Court. In it, he 
said:
There was also one matter yesterday with regard to Professor Copland’s 
views on the question whether wages should be raised to meet increases 
in productivity or merely to check a boom. I referred this matter to 
Professor Copland and he asked me to read out the comment which he 
actually wrote when I submitted my first draft to him. … This is what 
he wrote:
On page 2 you virtually say that the problem is not whether a rise 
should be granted but how great the rise should be. The argument that 
follows suggests that the rise should be little more than the bare amount 
required to restore wages per head to the 1929 level. That, however, is 
a general inference the reader or the Court would have to make. You 
do not come down in any way decisively on one side or the other. I 
suggest that you might tie up the whole argument by saying something 
like this: ‘On the whole, there is a case for restoring the real wage to the 
1929 level on the grounds of restored income. In view, however, of the 
desirability of checking investment and encouraging consumption so 
that the present level of prosperity may be long lived, the case for raising 
wages a little above the 1939 level is very strong’.
Professor Copland gives that as being his views—views with which I am 
in agreement. (pp. 332–333)
Mann challenged Reddaway’s attitude to foreign borrowing. Reddaway 
agreed that the sudden cessation of loans before the Depression had had a 
disastrous effect, ‘and even if you allow time for adaptation, there may be 
some increased wage-paying power if you borrow rather than if you produce 
manufactures in Australia’; but ‘in view of the long time that has elapsed I 
should say that is scarcely worth considering’ (p. 230).
Questioned about the continuance of relatively high unemployment, 
he replied:
On the matter of the unemployment figures, I do not think I should 
accept them as conclusive evidence partly because they are not very 
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good figures to follow [and partly] because the general tendency is for 
unemployment to rise the world over owing to certain rigidities, and 
that is what one would expect, in considering that sort of percentage.
‘You share the opinion’, said Dethridge, ‘that what may be called the normal 
rate of unemployment, assuming something like a steady prosperity continued 
over a number [of years], shows a tendency to increase on account of those 
rigidities?’ ‘Yes’, said Reddaway. ‘I do not think it is wholly undesirable, 
because workmen have greater reserves and so are able to wait for a better job 
rather than scramble for anything that may be going’ (p. 243).
Mann asked whether Reddaway agreed with Copland that it was time 
for a substantial reduction of internal government borrowing. ‘Yes’, he replied, 
‘for the same reason that I want an increase in wages to check a boom.’ The 
unemployment which this might cause would be countered partly by increased 
consumption and partly by the increase in private investment. ‘The reason 
one is so anxious to cut down public works is that private investment may 
become too big’ (pp. 255–256). Mann suggested that a wage increase might 
cause a boom in the consumption industries. Reddaway agreed that it would 
cause increased production of consumption goods: ‘That is what economic 
activity is for. The existing equipment will be used to the full, and some extra 
equipment will be put up.’
Dethridge interposed: ‘Assuming the wage is not increased, then you 
anticipate there will be over-confidence amongst investors, and they will 
proceed to invest their money in superfluous capital equipment?’ This, said 
Reddaway, was very likely: ‘In general, they will put up factories in such large 
quantities that unless, as the factories are put up, you rapidly engineer more 
spending power, they will prove to be redundant when they have been put up.’
Mann asked: ‘With regard to the damping down of the boom, the 
suggestion in England is that it should be done by an increase in taxation?’ 
‘That is certainly one way’, said Reddaway, ‘and I dare say it might be a better 
way than by raising wages; but in this Court we are considering wages’ (p. 
257). A very helpful element in checking the boom would be the securing of 
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a budgetary surplus—‘You have to attack a boom on all fronts’ (p. 258). On 
the other hand, a rise in interest rates would be a very poor way to check a 
boom—‘If it does anything at all, it is likely to produce a lot of other troubles 
in the way of loans, and attractive high rates of interest, which are unfortunate’ 
(p. 261).
Another employer representative, C H Grant, asked whether Reddaway 
would support a wage increase even if it were proved that the ‘effective’ [real] 
basic wage was at the same level as in 1928–29. Reddaway replied that he 
probably would, ‘because my conclusion is based mainly on the current 
position, rather than on a comparison with 1928–29 … If the current income 
has increased over the last year or so, I should still advocate an increase in the 
basic wage for those grounds’ (pp. 266–268). The main reason why industry 
could pay better wages was ‘to be found in the improvement in terms of trade, 
and also in better reorganisation of [the] economy’ (p. 273).
Reddaway told Wright, representing ‘South Australian employers 
generally’, that the ‘right’ basic wage could be determined ‘within a margin of 
error of 5 per cent’. This led to the following exchange:
Dethridge C J: Perhaps you will allow me to follow you more closely 
in that. Supposing you had no past history at all of the state of 
industry except that coming within the last three years, and you were 
asked to make an estimate of what is the basic wage in your opinion, 
approximately, what factors would you take into account? --- … The 
main factor to take into account would be the rise in export prices in 
the last three years, and the progressive adjustments of the system to 
what has been a major shock. I do not know whether I should take three 
years particularly.
It does not matter much what the period is, you can take one year if you 
like; you go back to the beginning of that year and you say ‘I find that 
the basic wage at that time was so-and-so’? --- Yes
And then I suppose you would say ‘Since the beginning of the year there 
have been certain changes … And as a result of those changes I think 
the basic wage should go up, or possibly, down’? --- Yes, I think that 
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would be so. One uses past history, otherwise it would be so exceedingly 
difficult to work it out.
It would be practically impossible? --- It would be impossible.
So I thought. Then in the present case you have the advantage of a 
longer history? --- Yes. I think back to about 1927 is helpful. I do not 
think there is any great use going back beyond 1927.
I agree with you. I think all the rest is too ancient and you need not 
bother about it. So that going back to 1927 you start with your basic 
wage at an ascertainable amount … And you make a certain presumption 
about that amount at that time; and you assume that as it existed the 
presumption is that it was something about the correct thing? --- Yes, 
Your Honour.
And then you look at subsequent stages from their starting point and 
say, ‘Now, do those changes indicate a rise or a fall as being desirable in 
the basic wage’? --- That is really what it comes down to.
And that is substantially the way in which you have approached the 
problem here? --- Yes, Your Honour. I found that, as compared with 
1928 or 1929, a lot of the factors are very similar, and the level of 
export prices is very much the same, and although borrowing has ceased 
I find according to Mr Melville’s investigations that has been very nearly 
compensated for and I also find that profits were high in 1928–29, and 
possibly too high, and that there is a risk of looking at more recent 
history giving boom development, and for that reason one chooses a 
level rather higher than 1928–29 than lower. (pp. 277–278)
Reddaway said that the current equivalent of the pre-Depression 
standard should be calculated by use of the C series index. Copland, in his 
lecture, had shown that, on that basis, the current basic wage was 5 per cent 
below the 1928 level. ‘In effect I said “We want 5 per cent higher plus a bit 
more.” … I ought to emphasise once more that my figure of 2s or 3s higher was 
for purposes of illustration’ (pp. 282–283). In response to a further question 
from Wright, Reddaway proposed that ‘the increase, supposing it was in this 
year, should be done in two steps’ (p. 284). (This, in fact, is what happened.)
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Wright asked what would be the best way of adjusting the basic wage to 
changing conditions. Reddaway replied:
Well, for short run adjustments I see no objection to the present method 
of following the C series; but I think one must recognise that any real 
wage that is fixed may have to be altered at comparatively short intervals 
and there should be a general determination, or perhaps I should say re-
determination, of the starting point at intervals of not more than three 
years; and if there was some special reason for wanting to change owing 
to something happening beyond the normal, then there would have to 
be a difference. (pp. 285–286)
Although he agreed with Wright about the importance of export prices, he 
rejected a suggestion that the wage should be reviewed at six-month intervals 
because of the fluctuations of export prices,
because if you left the whole price system of a country fluctuate in 
accordance with export prices you would meet with greater disparities 
in all sections. … The people in an export industry know that they 
are in an industry where the returns fluctuate, and if they enter that 
industry of their own accord then it is only natural that they should take 
the first shock of changes both upwards and downwards. … If there are 
indications that export prices were going to be low or high for a number 
of years then that would be one of the main reasons I would have in 
mind for having an adjustment of the basic wage. I do not think it is 
good for a temporary adjustment at all. … (p. 286)
When Wright suggested that exporters needed more opportunity to 
recover the losses that they had sustained in earlier years, Reddaway responded:
My answer to that is that there has been a loss in the Depression, and 
you cannot get away from that loss. You might as well propose that 
the basic wage should be raised to make up the leeway, that the wage 
earners failed to receive in those years of the depression—that amount 
which they would have received if the 1929 conditions had continued. 
You cannot do it; that is my answer. … If the settler cannot pay his 
current expenses, leaving out all consideration of mortgage or interest 
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or anything of that nature, if he cannot manage, then he obviously 
should not be there. (p. 287)
In his memorandum of evidence, Reddaway referred to the growth in 
national income. Wright asked him whether he relied for his measurement 
on ‘the Sutcliffe method’ which involved the use of the Statistician’s estimates 
of value of production in primary and secondary industry, to which were 
added percentage amounts to allow for the product of the rest of the economy. 
Reddaway answered:
I did not take the Sutcliffe method, because I think the Sutcliffe method 
is very full of dubious hypotheses, and that the figures when produced 
are worth less than looking at general indications. … I prefer to look 
at such things as employment, export prices, sales tax, wool and so on, 
and then form a general impression, rather than to mislead myself into 
thinking for a more accurate method than I have. … [T]he Sutcliffe 
method is not a good one. The difficulty with it is that it assumes a 
constant relation between things which one knows are not constant. 
(pp. 290a–291)9
Dethridge put it to Reddaway, who agreed, that ‘the basic wage can 
only be fixed proportionately to the productivity of the country’. Dethridge 
continued: ‘It does not matter what the family’s needs may be?’ Reddaway 
replied: ‘That is what you must go by, that is what you give them. The other 
is only a way of persuading yourself that one is better than the other when 
frankly you do not know which is which.’ ‘At least’ said Dethridge, ‘we are 
getting a clear statement upon that’ (p. 292).
W J Home, for the Cities of Hobart and Launceston, asked Reddaway 
how a wage increase would be paid—‘out of surplus profits?’. ‘It will be paid’, 
said Reddaway, ‘in some cases by higher prices which will be met finally 
through the higher prices received from outside the system in the form of 
9  Dethridge commented that in England and the United States of America attempts had 
been made to measure the national income. Reddaway responded: ‘Yes, and Mr Colin Clark 
is one of the latest exponents in England; he is coming to Australia very shortly, and I daresay 
he will produce some better way for Australian conditions’ (p. 291).
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higher export prices. Part will be paid out of the reduction in costs which arises 
from working capacity and part out of profits.’ Hume put it that many semi-
governmental bodies, including municipalities, had no profits or surpluses. 
‘Yes’, said Reddaway,
it may be that there will be a case for a higher rate, although in a great 
many cases the result of greater prosperity will be that their collections 
will be better and the rateable values will be raised. … If it is necessary 
to raise the rate, then there will be an extra amount of money collected 
from the taxpayers to meet it, but they will have higher incomes as a 
result of greater prosperity, and to some extent it will fall on the wage 
earners themselves.
When Dethridge asked about the source of the greater prosperity, 
Reddaway named two sources: higher export prices and ‘the re-adjustment 
of the economy from the shattering blow it received at the beginning of the 
slump’. Dethridge continued: ‘Not a greater prosperity due to wage increase?’ 
‘No, not due to the wage increase’, replied Reddaway (p. 331). The point 
was of some importance to Dethridge, who had consistently resisted union 
contentions that higher wages would generate increased production and 
employment.
On the issue of the competitive capacity of local industries, Reddaway 
said (in answer to Wright) that ‘by taking the wage costs relative to 1928 
in a common currency, you find that money wages in Australia have fallen 
relatively to those of Great Britain, expressed in local currencies, and on top of 
that you have the 25 per cent exchange. … There is the question of the tariffs 
as well’ (p. 335).
Asked by Wright to elaborate on the concept of an ‘unhealthy boom’, 
Reddaway explained:
If you get beyond a certain rate of expansion, nearly always there is 
trouble ahead, and it may come from a variety of reasons. It may come 
because prospects have been over-estimated, and when these factories 
come into production there will be found an insufficient demand for 
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their products. I give an illustration of what the excess may be due to … 
where I say there are two principal dangers in such a situation, firstly, 
room for development beyond particular lines of activity which are now 
very considerable, and that a number of independent people may decide 
to construct their own factories and blocks of flats, imagining that they 
are the only people to benefit by the activity demanded. … If you reach 
the state of nearly full employment, and investment is still expanding, 
that is almost certain proof that it is becoming excessive. (p. 337)
Asked whether conditions were now ‘in disequilibrium’, Reddaway 
replied that ‘if wages are not raised now we shall get unfortunate results’ (p. 
338).
11.2.3 The employers’ counter
The principal rebuttal of Reddaway’s evidence was a statement read to the Court 
by F P Derham. The statement was entitled ‘Considered Views of New South 
Wales Employers Represented by Mr F P Derham’. It was obvious to all that 
the ‘considered views’ of the employers were, in fact, written by an economist as 
a critique of Reddaway’s evidence. This anonymous economist, by not giving 
evidence, avoided cross-examination. His identity is a matter for conjecture. 
The most likely contenders, in my view, are Leslie Melville and J B Brigden. 
The ‘Melbourne group’ surrounding Copland can be excluded. Melville, from 
Sydney, was likely—to judge from previous utterances—to be unsympathetic 
to union aspirations. His role as economist at the Commonwealth Bank—
then government-owned and functioning as a nascent central bank—would 
be a reason for anonymity. Brigden was still Director of the Bureau of Industry 
in Queensland and, on that account, may have preferred not to be identified 
as an employers’ spokesman. His views had, however, shifted in an anti-union 
direction and he may have been willing to do what he could to assist the 
employers. Of the two, Melville appears the more probable ‘candidate’, but is 
no ‘sure thing’.10
10  An ‘outsider’ in the race is Sutcliffe, then manager of a textile company.
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The expert said that Reddaway’s evidence was likely to impress the 
Court,
as the case for higher wages has never been presented to the Court in 
arguments of such refinement. Abandoning altogether the view adopted 
by Trade Union advocates at earlier inquiries, that wage increases would 
foster recovery by sustaining and augmenting purchasing power, Mr 
Reddaway assumed that a substantial wage increase would prove a 
brake upon enterprise, and claimed that this is necessary to prevent the 
development of an unhealthy boom. His suggestion is that unless wages 
are raised substantially the recent improvement of economic condition 
will be followed by speculative tendencies, and ‘general over expansion’, 
to be followed by a slump. (p. 855)
But certain questions had to be considered:
1. To what extent do depressions in Australia result from unhealthy 
developments in the internal economy, and to what extent are they 
initiated by overseas influences?
2. Is there any evidence that the present progress of recovery is 
producing conditions which are likely to cause depression here, 
independently of world developments?
3. In the event of another depression, is a high wage level likely to 
diminish its effects upon Australia or to render them worse?
4. If a wage increase can slow up the present rate of recovery, is there 
not a danger that too great an increase in wages will itself produce 
the depression which Mr Reddaway’s advice is designed to avoid?
‘A consideration of these questions’, said the expert, ‘tends to undermine Mr 
Reddaway’s argument which, at first glance, appears so plausible.’
The economic improvement which had occurred was due largely to the 
combination of higher export prices and good seasons, and reversal of either 
of these favourable trends ‘would be sufficient to initiate another depression, 
and no present wage policy can prevent such an event’. Reddaway was right to 
say that the absence of government borrowing abroad contributed to stability, 
566 Australian Wage Policy
but he neglected the inflow of foreign capital on private account. A check to 
that inflow ‘would tend to produce a slump in Australia in the same way as 
interruption of oversea borrowing has done in the past’. It was reasonable to 
suppose ‘that the next depression in Australia, like those of 1890 and 1930, 
will be caused principally by the impact of a world depression rather than by 
reaction from a local boom’. Reddaway himself, ‘in his evidence before the 
Royal Commission on Monetary and Banking Systems, stressed the fact that 
Australia is a “dependent economy”’ (p. 855).
It could not be denied, said the expert, that the effects of an external 
slump would be made worse by unhealthy internal developments. But the 
evidence of an incipient boom was lacking. Profitability had not regained 
the 1928 level. The recovery of share prices, though due partly to increased 
profits, had ‘been aided by growing confidence in the security of investment 
in Australian enterprises among people who preferred during the depression to 
invest in Government bonds, and by the importation of capital’. And scarcity 
of labour in some trades ‘does not indicate a state of over-expansion, but reveals 
the effects of the depression upon apprenticeship and training generally’:
This is a world-wide problem. But the scarcity will be alleviated as the 
increased number of boys now in training under the new system become 
qualified. One difficulty is to obtain a sufficient number of youths to 
undertake apprenticeship, and it is submitted that a substantial increase 
in the basic wage for unskilled labour is likely to perpetuate this situation 
and help maintain the scarcity of skilled labour.
The current level of construction of capital assets was due to the 
depreciation and non-replacement of capital during the Depression. It was due 
also to the expansion of import-replacing industries because of the decline in 
foreign borrowing and the depreciated exchange rate. ‘These’, said the expert, 
‘are not unhealthy tendencies—they are essential to recovery, and in any case 
this construction will diminish as the industries become established.’
When the next depression came, higher wages might afford no 
protection. Workers might have better reserves ‘in the form of clothing, savings 
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deposits and the like’ and therefore be better able to survive reduced incomes. 
But they would also have more liabilities ‘in the form of mortgaged homes 
and goods bought on time payment’ (p. 858). Australia’s reserves of gold and 
foreign currencies were now much depleted by comparison with their 1929 
level. This would make it more difficult to withstand an imported depression. 
The foreign reserves needed to be increased, and this required fewer rather 
than more imports.
The speed at which imports will rise depends partly upon wages policy. 
A large increase in the basic wage is likely to stimulate imports in two 
different ways. In the first place, it raises the costs of local manufacturers 
relatively to foreign competitors, and renders the tariff and present 
exchange rate less effective in protecting local industry. In the second 
place, the increased wages lead wage earners to direct more of their 
demand towards imported wares, especially in view of the tendency of 
prices of local goods to rise, owing to the increase in labour costs. At 
the same time a larger increase in wages would involve a rise in costs 
to exporters, so that the increase in imports would not be offset by a 
commensurate increase in exports. … It would appear, therefore, that an 
unduly large increase in the basic wage would check the establishment 
of adequate international currency reserves and leave the Australian 
economy in a less secure position in the event of adverse developments 
overseas. (pp. 858–859)
Several Melbourne academics, ‘including Professor Copland, Professor 
Giblin and Mr Reddaway’, had recently issued a manifesto in favour of freer 
world trade. A large wage increase ‘would be likely to create conditions which 
would make it difficult for [Australia] to take part in a general reduction of 
tariff barriers’.
The expert did not explicitly advocate a zero wage increase. It was 
difficult, however, to estimate the amount of increase ‘which would slow up 
the process of recovery to such an extent as to turn it directly into depression’. 
There was already a tendency for wages to rise faster than award rates, as 
employers competed for skilled labour. This natural rise in the ruling rate for 
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skilled labour might itself be sufficient to slow up the process of recovery and 
to keep it conformable to the available resources. ‘[T]he greater the rise in 
the basic wage, the greater the danger that a sharp check to recovery will be 
imposed.’
The employers’ expert concluded:
Mr Reddaway says ‘It may seem strange for an economist to be preaching 
the need to curb investment’. The latest book on ‘The Trade Cycle’, 
by Mr R F Harrod, contends that any sudden curb upon investment 
during recovery must cause a depression, because recovery itself has led 
in the capital producing trades to the expansion of equipment to a level 
at which it can only be fully employed so long as investment continues 
at a high level; and even continues to expand. Mr Reddaway agrees 
that we do not even want to have a smaller amount of investment than 
before, but pleads for “restraint” lest we have too much. According to 
the economist, we seem to be between the devil and the deep blue sea. 
A sudden fall in investment, due to large a rise in wages costs, would 
plunge us back into the sea of depression. On the other hand a certain 
rise in wages is said to be necessary to prevent the devil from leading us 
on to the peak of a boom, from whence he would push us into the same 
sea. The points elaborated above, however, suggest some doubts as to 
whether the devil really exists. (pp. 860–861)
11.2.4 Reddaway returns
On the next day, Dethridge announced that Reddaway was in the Court 
and wished to comment on the expert’s statement. He would do so from the 
witness box.
Reddaway did not wish to make debating points: ‘I have too much 
respect for the economist whose influence I rather fancy I see inspiring certain 
parts of it.’ He pointed out that the expert had almost entirely limited himself 
to one aspect of Reddaway’s evidence—the case for a wage increase to avert a 
boom:
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There is one thing I should say right at the start: this memorandum deals 
almost entirely with the arguments which I advanced, not for giving an 
increase in wages at all, but for giving a bigger one than one would do 
merely on the state of the prosperity of the country. I said at the start 
of the evidence on the case for a revision, that the basic wage must 
rise, primarily on the increased prosperity of the country, which enables 
the employers to pay a larger amount. … A boom is an argument for 
going a little further than one would do on the current situation. I think 
it perhaps may be helpful to put this in more in perspective—what I 
would do if I were actually fixing the wage. I did not consider it my 
province to do so before, but since considerable publicity has been given 
to my figure of 2s or 3s, which was purely illustrative, I should like to 
do so now, particularly as on a closer examination I feel I should have 
preferred to have written 1s or 2s, rather than 2s or 3s. (p. 865)
‘The objective’, said Reddaway,
is to fix the highest wage which will not cause unemployment by 
destroying the entrepreneur’s incentive to produce. The figure can 
only be estimated by looking to the past and allowing for changes and 
expected future developments. At present we can usefully make two 
approaches, one by comparing the present conditions with those of the 
immediate past, and a second by taking the last more or less ‘normal’ 
year before the slump. (p. 866)
Beginning with the latter criterion, Reddaway said that external conditions 
were remarkably similar to those of 1928. Export prices were a little higher, 
import prices virtually unchanged. The cessation of public overseas borrowing 
was ‘offset by increased home production of manufactures’. ‘Since productivity 
has improved and the basic wage paid in 1928–29 had not been increased for 
some years it appears conservative to say that industry could pay the same real 
wage now as in that year’. (Reddaway provided no evidence of the increase in 
productivity.) Turning to the immediate past, Reddaway discerned ‘a very great 
improvement in the terms of trade with other countries and in the readjustment 
of the national economy to the dislocation of the slump’. There was ground 
for ‘a considerable rise in real wages on grounds of increased prosperity and 
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income, quite apart from the need to check the boom’. To restore the real basic 
wage to its 1928–29 level required an increase of about 5s, or 7 per cent: ‘I 
would say that the improved position of industry justifies an increase of about 
this amount, but to avoid sudden dislocation would suggest that it be given 
in stages’ (p. 866). To check a boom and to secure ‘a distribution of income 
which would help to preserve the present level of prosperity’, a somewhat 
higher figure would be justified.
Dethridge asked whether increases in margins should be taken into 
account in assessing the scope to raise the basic wage. This, replied Reddaway, 
would be ‘a little hard on the basic wage earner, unless it is proved that there 
is some reason why margins were too low in 1928–29’ (p. 867). Dethridge 
said that the reason why the Judges had been raising margins was indeed that, 
in their view, ‘the time had come when they should be restored to something 
like the same proportion as had existed in days gone by’ (p. 867a). Reddaway 
commented that this might have to be taken into account as one of the factors 
that had changed since 1928–29; but so too should the fact that labour had 
become ‘less obstructive’, as was evidenced by the statistics of strikes (p. 868).
Reddaway moved to the expert’s arguments about the boom:
The writer of this memorandum apparently took my advocacy of higher 
rates as a means of dealing with a boom, solely in its negative aspect, 
and solely from the point of view of reducing the amount of capital 
construction. That is very far from what I had in mind. I am not sure 
whether I made it clear, but there are two aspects on this question 
of wages and booms. First of all, you want to restrain the amount of 
investment but secondly, most important, you want to ensure that 
what investment there is would be justified so that the factories, which 
you are putting up this year, and which will come into operation next 
year … will be found to meet with an adequate demand. If it is found 
not to meet with an adequate demand, while possibly investors may 
manage to struggle along, the incentive to investment would be very 
materially reduced, even disastrously reduced, so that investment would 
then fall off. This memorandum also refers to Mr Harrod’s book on 
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the Trade Cycle. It was actually that book which crystallised my own 
ideas on the means of making consumption rise hand in hand, so to 
speak, with investment. If you raise wages, you will also to some extent 
reduce investment now, but you will also provide a basis with which to 
justify that investment when the factories and so on come into use. (pp. 
871–872)
This was a more complex and subtle version of the anti-boom argument than 
Reddaway had offered in his opening statement. He contended that Australia, 
with its wage-fixing machinery, was in the fortunate position of being able 
to adjust real wages so as to tame the trade cycle—a facility enjoyed by few 
other countries. ‘Mr Harrod’, he said, ‘took a rather pessimistic view, that 
in a country without any means of stepping up real wages in this way, there 
was nothing to do about it, and that is why he thought the trade cycle was so 
inevitable’ (p. 872).
Though depressions came from outside, it did not follow that internal 
policies had no role in ameliorating their effects. Wage policy, judiciously 
used, was a significant instrument of control:
The last depression was met partly by a cut in wages. If you refuse to 
apply wholeheartedly a reversal of that policy when you get into a boom, 
with favourable export conditions, then it is going to be a lot harder for 
the authorities generally to induce labour to give way again … should 
there be a move for a cut in wages. I would say that a demonstration 
that this is not a one-way traffic, but a two-way traffic, would increase 
the probability of Australia meeting any subsequent depression from 
overseas in an orderly manner. … I feel that it is important in the 
interests of social rest as opposed to unrest that this Court should be 
prepared to take the lead in an experiment upwards, in the same way as 
it took the lead in an experiment downwards. (p. 873)
It was important, as the expert had contended, to attend to the balance 
of payments. But London funds were expected to rise by £10 million in the 
year. This afforded ‘a certain margin’, and ‘I would not want to keep down the 
real wage in order to increase London funds at a rate of more than ten millions 
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a year’ (p. 874). Reddaway thought that a wage increase of the order that the 
Court might grant would have little effect on exports. As to import-competing 
industries, it was not easy to generalise, but average money wages in Australia 
had fallen since before the slump by something like 17 per cent. On top of 
that was an exchange depreciation of 25 per cent, so that, in competition with 
Great Britain, there had been a sizeable shift in trading conditions favourable 
to the Australian producer.
The debate between Reddaway and the anonymous expert was a rare 
explicit discussion of the counter-cyclical role of wage policy. It was true, 
as Reddaway observed, that the Court’s 1931 decision was an endeavour to 
ameliorate the downward phase of the imported cycle. The expert was correct 
in pointing out the inconsistency of the unions in opposing the reduction but 
now embracing the counter-boom advocacy of Reddaway and his Melbourne 
supporters. His argument against Reddaway turned on the non-existence and 
the unlikelihood of the apprehended boom. Was there, in fact, an actual or an 
incipient boom? Butlin’s estimates of the real GDP indicate increases of 4.7 
per cent between 1934–35 and 1935–36; 4.4 per cent between 1935–36 and 
1936–37; and 6.2 per cent between 1936–37 and 1937–38 (Butlin 1961, 
p. 462). In the same years, gross private investment grew (in real terms) by 
15.3 per cent, 8.7 per cent and 16.0 per cent (p. 463). Haig’s estimates show 
an increase in the real GDP of 6.1 per cent between 1934–35 and 1935–36; 
3.0 per cent in the next year; and then 7.1 per cent. These numbers seem to 
support Reddaway’s position. On the other side may be set the unemployment 
percentages. Unemployment among trade union members was 9.7 per cent 
in the second quarter of 1937. It fell to 8 per cent in the first quarter of 1938 
and thereafter increased. Of course, these percentages represent an enormous 
improvement since the depth of the Depression. But is 8 to 10 per cent 
unemployment consistent with a boom? We must, I think, conclude that the 
evidence for a boom is mixed.
The issues generated by Reddaway’ evidence dominated the hearing, 
but there were subsidiary topics.
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11.2.5 geographical variations
At the beginning of the hearing, Crofts told the Court that the unions were 
seeking flat-rate amounts within States (but not between them). The flat rate 
for a State would be the capital city amount as calculated from the price index, 
but if the index showed a higher amount for any non-metropolitan town, the 
latter should be adopted for the town. This claim was not seriously entertained. 
Toward the end of the hearing, Dethridge made the statement:
Up to now, nothing has been adduced before the Court to induce it 
to change its opinion that there should be a differentiation between 
the basic wage for the metropolitan area, and maybe in certain other 
specified areas, and the same kind of basic wage for industries carried on 
in the provinces. That is to say, the principle which the Court indicated 
in its 1934 judgment, which so far as that is concerned was unanimous, 
is to continue a differentiation of about the same amount as was then 
made. … It may shorten proceedings if that is indicated now. (p. 834)
Some New South Wales employers sought the elimination of interstate 
differences so as to equalise competitive opportunities. This request was not 
strenuously pressed and seems to have fallen on deaf ears.
The principal subject of contention was the request of the South 
Australian Government, railways, and private employers to be excluded from 
all or some of the wage increase which the Court might grant.11 One argument 
was that the cost of living in Adelaide was less than the index suggested. This 
argument was supported by the evidence of Gilbert Seaman, a statistician 
in the audit department and a Bachelor of Economics of the University of 
Adelaide.12 Seaman did not dispute the accuracy of the index numbers. His 
contention was that citizens of South Australia did not require the same 
quantities of goods and services to achieve a standard of living equal to that 
11  The case of the South Australian Government and employers was somewhat weakened by 
the fact that the living wage declared by the State Board of Industry was slightly above the 
federal basic wage for Adelaide.
12  Seaman later became the Under-Treasurer of South Australia. He gave evidence in major 
post-war wage cases.
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of other cities.13 Adelaide citizens, he said, needed less electricity and shorter 
carriage by public transport than citizens of other capitals; and he estimated 
the ‘saving’ as 1s 3d per week. Beeby chided the counsel who was leading 
Seaman for ‘piling up matter on a very small issue, whether or not there is 1s 
3d too much for the basic wage in South Australia’ (p. 716). Dethridge later 
said (to different counsel): ‘You are now assuming that the Seaman thesis is 
established, but the Commonwealth Statistician has told me that that is not 
so. … He has told me that, at the present time, the C figures do, so far as any 
index figures can, as between Capital cities, fairly represent the purchasing 
power of money’ (pp. 819–819a). This did not squarely deal with Seaman’s 
point, trivial though it may have been.
A second argument was that a basic wage increase would drive the State 
budget into deficit. This was the subject of evidence by the Under-Treasurer, 
R R Stuckey. At the time, the budget was showing a small surplus. Stuckey 
explained that this had been achieved only by the special grants from the 
Commonwealth, made on the recommendation of the Commonwealth 
Grants Commission. Without these grants, ‘the annual deficits shown in the 
State accounts would have been of such dimensions that the State, from its 
own resources, would have been unable to cope therewith, and would have 
been placed in a position where default was inevitable’ (p. 685). The argument 
appeared to have little impact. Crofts put it to Stuckey that if a wage increase 
placed the South Australian Government at a disadvantage relative to other 
State governments, the Grants Commission would protect the State (p. 707). 
And Dethridge said: ‘Supposing we put up the basic wage, which means that the 
South Australian government will have to find more money somehow or other 
in order to keep up its services, then you might expect, as Mr Crofts suggests, 
that the Commonwealth out of its revenue would increase its subsidy’ (p. 709). 
13  ‘My memorandum does not in any way make an attack upon the index numbers as such. 
… It is the recognised practice amongst all statistical authorities that they adopt a common 
regimen in all cities. It is also recognised that necessary consumption to maintain the same 
standard of living may differ between cities, and if that necessary consumption to maintain 
that similar standard does differ between cities, the index numbers computed upon a common 
regimen cannot give an absolutely correct comparison between towns at any one time’ (p. 
715).
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Stuckey’s reply to both was that the Grants Commission’s recommendations 
were just recommendations, which the Commonwealth might or might not 
accept. Clarey spoke of the implications of Grants Commission assistance:
Having received that assistance, we cannot have those State Governments 
coming to this Court and asking the Court in addition to give the 
further advantage of a relief by the postponement of any ruling this 
Court may give in relation to the basic wage. In other words, I suggest 
to the Court that the South Australian Government is asking for it both 
ways. It gets the assistance because of its alleged financial position, and 
its difficulty in competition with other States because of federation, but 
having got that assistance it then uses it as a reason why the wage should 
not be increased. (p. 936)
The third argument was that South Australian industry needed assistance 
by way of limitation of any wage increase that the Court might award. In 
Wright’s words:
In regard to the position in South Australia in particular, I submit 
that the situation calls for some modification of any decision which 
the Court may base upon the average of all Australian conditions … 
on account of its conditions generally being below the average of all 
Australia …We feel that we are deserving of some concession from this 
Court compared with the more highly developed States. The Court 
recognised that disability in 1934, and gave us a measure of relief. It was 
temporary, and it has since gone, but I feel that it did have the effect of 
helping us to weather the storm better than we could have done, if we 
had had to take the full effect of the new wage standard in 1934. (pp. 
817–818)
Counsel from South Australia spoke of the danger of the motor-body industry 
being lost to other States. Beeby intimated that he had some sympathy for this 
argument.14
14  ‘There is only one feature of South Australia’s position which appeals to me, that is, 
what expense can this Court avoid by its action in encouraging a disturbance of the present 
organisation of industry, that is, encouraging the transfer of major industries from one State 
to another, and that is giving me concern. If the motor industry in South Australia is put 
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11.2.6 The female minimum wage
There was, at this time, no general basic wage for females working under 
federal awards. Some State awards did provide for female basic or living wages. 
In those federal awards that recognised the employment of women, there was, 
of course, a minimum female rate, typically between 50 and 55 per cent of 
the male basic wage. Unions with female members now sought a decision by 
the Court to raise the minimum female rate to 60 per cent of the basic wage. 
Outlining the claim, Crofts said:
We have stressed time and time again that the amount allotted to females 
is insufficient, in view of the class of work that the females are called 
upon to do, in view of which the amount sometimes should be equal to 
the male rate. Apart from that, we feel that the female wage, which is 52 
per cent or 53 per cent of the male rate, generally is insufficient to give 
females a proper standard of living, particularly when they have to live 
away from home. (p. 23)
Dethridge, quite early in the proceedings, expressed the opinion that 
this claim was not ‘a basic wage matter’. None the less, he proceeded:
The Court should not go below a reasonable minimum to pay to 
women, who have not to carry the responsibilities of a family, such 
as the basic wage men are presumed to have in the ordinary course of 
events. It may be that things are altering and that women will have to go 
out to do the work, while the men stay at home and occupy themselves 
usefully in housework and minding the children. In that event, of 
course, women should get the basic wage, while the wage of the men 
should come down according to our present day custom. I think the 
tendency is towards an equality of wages as between men and women; 
but it is a very slow moving tendency. I will not live to see it, but that 
will be the ultimate outcome in our Western society, if it continues to 
exist. (pp. 69–70)
on exactly the same footing as in other States, there is a possibility of that industry being 
transferred to the other States, and that does concern me’ (p. 936).
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The unions called in support of their claim Muriel Heagney, then 
employed in New South Wales by the Queensland Tourist Bureau but 
previously (in her words) ‘secretary of the unemployed girls’.15 Heagney cited 
a number of instances where both federal and State awards and determinations 
had fixed minimum female rates above the normal proportion of the basic 
wage. She summarised in two points the arguments for raising the proportion:
•	 ‘[W]omen are entering industry in ever increasing numbers 
and are qualifying for many occupations that were closed to 
their predecessors, consequentially it is essential that in the 
interest of the community unfair competition between the 
sexes must be eliminated through the enforcement of equal 
occupational rates for persons of either sex’; and
•	 ‘Women’s definite social needs and obligations must be 
recognised and provision made for the normal pleasures of 
women young and old, so that they may not be debarred 
through poverty from participating in the amenities of life 
whether they be social or educational. The prominence given 
to “lipstick” and “cigarettes” in newspaper publicity during a 
recent cost of living case in New South Wales had a derogatory 
effect on uninformed public opinion and is resented by the 
great mass of women workers whose wages are affected’ (pp. 
371–371a).
Beeby remarked that Heagney was really arguing for equal pay, whereas 
the unions were seeking only 60 per cent. Dethridge then made a comment 
which illustrates the problems confronting those who tried to persuade the 
tribunals to move toward equal pay:
15  Her entry in the Australian Dictionary of Biography reads: ‘Alarmed at the plight of jobless 
women during the Depression, Heagney, in 1930, formed the Unemployed Girls’ Relief 
Movement which established sewing centres where women worked for unemployed families 
in return for a relief allowance. She also set up a jam factory. To counter propaganda against 
employment of women in the 1930s, she undertook a survey for the Victorian branch of the 
Open Door Council and published Are Women Taking Men’s Jobs? (1935); the book made 
equal pay a serious national issue, but brought no practical results.’
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You approach this question, it appears to me, chiefly from the point of 
view of needs—what the woman wage earner needs for maintenance, 
and, it may be, for the maintenance of dependants that she has—but 
the chief point of view which I am glad to see has been brought into 
prominence in this Inquiry, in a way never before accomplished in any 
basic wage inquiry, is this: What is the wage-paying capacity of industry? 
Mr Reddaway, who gave evidence which was most admirable in every 
way, plainly showed that wage paying depends upon economic capacity, 
and that, unless there is economic capacity, any attempt to meet the 
needs of wage earners by increasing wages is doomed to absolute failure. 
That point of view must not be lost sight of in connection with women 
workers. If women are put upon the same basis as male workers, then 
the question arises, can industry pay them the same rate? That depends 
upon the rate which is common to both. … That is to say, the male 
wage may have to come down, in order that the female rate may be 
brought up to the level of the male wage. Now you see the ugly position 
the community is in when dealing with any proposition that women’s 
wages should be the same as men’s. I think I may say here that, having 
regard to the increasing employment of women in industry … the trend 
is towards equal payment of both sexes, and that equal payment may be 
a very desirable thing. I am inclined to think it is a very desirable thing, 
but it can only be brought about … by making the wage level common 
to both sexes consistent with economic capacity, and, also, it can only 
be brought about by some extremely difficult social arrangements in 
respect of the married women and children. … Here, fortunately, as 
my brother Beeby points out, we are only asked to give what is called a 
basic wage for women—a minimum wage, I prefer to call it—of 60 per 
cent of the man’s basic wage, so that we are not faced with the frightfully 
difficult problem which equal wages will present to the community. 
(pp. 372–373)
Beeby—perhaps to counter the negative tone of Dethridge’s remarks—added: 
‘And, in support of the 60 per cent, I can only say that yours is a most admirable 
statement.’
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While Heagney was in the box, there was some discussion of events 
in New South Wales in the previous year. On the application of the State 
Public Service Federation, the Industrial Commission had conducted a special 
inquiry into the male and female basic wages in State awards. It had separately 
investigated the two amounts and arrived at a declaration which entailed a 
female basic wage equal to only 51.4 per cent of the male rate. The previous 
practice had been to award a female rate equal to 54 per cent of the male wage. 
The decision had been overturned by legislation, which prescribed a ratio of 
54 per cent.
Heagney referred to the practice of some textile firms of putting women 
on piece-rates and, when output increased, reverting to time rates with an 
expectation that the higher output would be maintained. Drake-Brockman 
was sympathetic:
They have attained their speed by first of all having piecework to 
encourage them to the speed, and then they expect the same output for 
the ordinary weekly pay. If they do not get the same output, the girls get 
put off. It is one of those wretched expedients which has been adopted 
in the clothing trades—where there is more dishonesty in this sort of 
way than in any other industry, I think.
When an employer’s representative complained that ‘Miss Heagney makes a 
general statement which reflects on the industry’, Drake-Brockman replied: 
‘She could make very much stronger statements on some in the industry. I will 
not be at all surprised if I am making some of them myself before very long’ 
(pp. 388A–388B).
11.2.7 The amount of the increase
What alteration of the basic wage, if any, was now desirable? Three main 
considerations were debated in the hearing:
•	 the need for an increase to restore the real value of the basic 
wage to its pre-Depression level;
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•	 the ability of the economy and industry to pay more than the 
present wage; and
•	 the expedience of adding something to the wage so as to avert 
an imminent boom.
The union representatives, especially Crofts, sought to argue that 
a succession of decisions by the Court had cheated the workers of their 
‘entitlements’. The Harvester standard was itself deficient because it provided 
inadequately for the needs of a worker’s family. Powers’ 3s had only partially 
redressed the deficiency. Then the decisions of 1931, 1933, and 1934, taken 
together, had left the basic wage below the Harvester equivalent. One element 
in the unions’ complaints was the substitution of the C for the A series index. 
They told the Court that they did not seek to reverse this change because 
that would inevitably delay the proceedings and any wage increase that might 
emerge from it. Dethridge denied that the substitution of indices had lowered 
the standard:
We adopted the C figures not for the purpose of lowering the basic wage 
at all. We adopted the C figures because, according to experts, and the 
report of the basic wage commission presided over by Mr Piddington, 
that was the proper measure to have. … The way I feel about it is this: 
supposing we put the basic wage up to the full extent that you suggest, 
then I still think that we should apply the C figures, and not the A 
figures. (pp. 11–12)16
Dethridge also rejected the comparison with Harvester:
We cannot measure the present basic wage with the Harvester basic 
wage of 1907 because the C index numbers are not there for the earlier 
period, and therefore it is not easy to make a comparison. However, 
what I gather is that, in this inquiry, we are asked to arrive at what we 
think is the highest basic wage which industry can stand. It does not 
matter what the past history is … If we can stand a basic wage higher 
than the Harvester wage, good. I do not care how much higher it is if 
16  He might have added, but did not, that the basic wage had been increased in 1933 because 
the C series index had fallen less than the A series index.
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we can stand it. That is the point, past history is not important. …The 
measuring instrument is one feature; the basic wage is another. Let us fix 
the highest basic wage we can, and then let us consider what is the best 
measuring instrument to provide for fluctuations in the cost of living. 
(pp. 13–13a)
Later, Dethridge seemed to resile a little from this stance:
If the present basic wage in real commodities is worth less than the 
original Harvester wage without the Powers’ 3s, as you suggest, I say that 
it is a matter which calls for the most serious consideration. I go further 
and say, although not with the same emphasis, that if the present basic 
wage is less in real value than the Harvester wage plus the Powers’ 3s, 
that also calls for serious consideration. What more do you want? … 
I thought it was obvious that if the A series, plus the Powers’ 3s, were 
applied now, you would get 6s more than you are getting under the C 
figures. That speaks for itself, but how far you fall short of getting the 
equivalent in real value of the original Harvester wage, or the original 
Harvester wage plus the 3s, is not clear. It depends on the correctness of 
the A figures on the one side, and the C figures on the other side as the 
measuring rod. (pp. 39–40)
Later again, Dethridge became terse with Crofts (as he often did). When 
Crofts spoke repeatedly about the workers’ ‘entitlements’, he told him: ‘You 
are not entitled to any more than Australia can give you. If Australia has not 
got it to give you, then you are not entitled to it’ (p. 67). This was a recurrent 
theme through the hearing. But the issue whether the basic wage was below 
the pre-Depression standard, let alone Harvester, was not wholly put aside. 
Dethridge asked rhetorically:
Is it suggested—I want to know this because it is going to be important—
that the present day real basic wage … is 5 per cent lower than the real 
basic wage before the Depression? If that is suggested, I want it shown. 
If it is contradicted, I want to have that shown also. … I may say this; 
I realise there may be great difficulty in satisfactorily establishing it one 
way or the other. I cannot help feeling that on the past, on what we heard 
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the other day about our index number, and until quite recently, neither 
set of index numbers was a very satisfactory guide. I am afraid one has 
to come to some such conclusion. I think the method of calculating that 
has been improved very much since the census of 1933, but in respect 
of prior years, I am very doubtful. (pp. 755–756)
The following exchange took place within the bench:
Drake-Brockman J: I do not think those comparisons matter very 
much. What we have to determine now is what we can pay now, and 
not what could have been paid in 1928 or 1929.
Dethridge C J: Except that the amount of unemployment at a past time 
as compared with the amount of unemployment at the present time, 
in relation to prevailing wages at each of those times, may be of some 
assistance to us.
Drake-Brockman J: In that connection, that quotation … from what 
Professor Copland said at that time calls for consideration, namely that 
probably we got a little ahead of ourselves in the matter of wages, and 
that that was reflected in the unemployment.
Dethridge C J: I am not satisfied that that is correct. Unemployment 
figures are unsatisfactory, as we know, and it seems to me to be doubtful 
whether until the slump began in 1929, or late in 1928, there was 
anything more than the unavoidable amount of unemployment. … If 
that is so, it would indicate that the real wage at that time was about 
right. Then, if we compare present day conditions with the conditions 
today [sic], what do we get? In that way, past history is valuable in order 
to make a comparison. But we have to be certain that our index figures, 
whichever set we use, give a fair measuring instrument. I am doubtful 
about the A index figures, and I am a little doubtful about the C index 
numbers during those years, so it makes a comparison rather difficult. 
… But, assuming that we could make an accurate comparison, then the 
real wage at the present day should not be less than it was during that 
five years period [before the Depression]. It may even be that it should 
be a little more. (pp. 780–781)
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Reddaway’s advice, as we have seen, was that the Court should restore 
the real basic wage to its pre-Depression level and add a little to inoculate the 
economy against an investment-led boom.
The employers generally gave the impression of recognising the 
inevitability of an increase but seeking to minimise it. Their principal 
contention was that producers who had been devastated by the Depression 
needed more opportunity to repair their fortunes.
11.2.8 The decision
The Court, echoing Reddaway, summarised the principal issue in these terms:
The application was made mainly on the ground that since 1934 
economic recovery as reflected in increased productivity and national 
income and the restoration of the level of export prices had been 
great enough to justify more than full restoration of the basic wage 
operating at the time the 10 per cent reduction was made. In the main, 
restoration of productivity and of national income to the 1929 level 
notwithstanding alterations in the economic structure was established. 
The Court in effect was confronted with the converse position to that 
which led it to decide on a reduction in 1931 and it was contended that 
‘all economic arguments then advanced in favour of a reduction should 
now be reversed and used in favour of an increase’. (Basic Wage Inquiry 
1937 37 CAR 583, 585)
The Court observed that the employers’ expert ‘did not dispute that 
there should be some rise in the wage level but sought to discount the facts 
and theories applied thereto on which Mr Reddaway based his contentions’. 
The opinions of experts were not conclusive.17 ‘But those offered in these 
proceedings by Mr Reddaway unchallenged as they were by any other 
economist willing to disclose his identity were more impressive than usual’ 
(p. 589).
17  A point made with some vehemence by Dethridge during the hearing. Dethridge also 
denied that he had followed Copland’s advice in 1931 (transcript, p. 803).
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The Court found that both rural industries and manufacturing had 
fully regained their pre-Depression levels of activity. Public finances had vastly 
improved:
States still have budgetary difficulties to contend with mainly owing 
to deficits in railway undertakings. These difficulties have been taken 
into account in fixing the railway rates as hereafter appear. Increases of 
revenue which keep pace with general increase in prosperity, provided 
due economy is shown and there is no undue haste in remitting 
emergency taxation, should before long enable governments to pay 
their way. (p. 586)
The financial condition of business had steadily improved since 1934, 
and recent rises in share prices suggested that the improvement was likely 
to continue. The employers’ representatives, however, had contended that 
the prosperity was unlikely to endure; and the rise in export prices and the 
growth of import-replacing manufacturers might be transitory. This, said the 
Court, ‘may or may not be true’. But ‘the upward trend since 1935 has, on the 
whole, brought the Commonwealth to at least pre-depression levels with the 
advantage that it does not now rely on a large expenditure of overseas public 
borrowings’ (p. 588).
Reddaway’s statement, the Court said, was ‘an endorsement of the 
theory that one of the causes of cycles of depression is a recurring lack of 
balance in the application of the money income received by the members of 
the community’ (p. 590). Whether Reddaway welcomed this characterisation 
of his evidence is unknown. The Court’s elaboration of the ‘theory’, in terms 
of achieving a distribution between wage-earners and capitalists that generated 
an appropriate flow of expenditure, was pure Dethridge: he had articulated the 
notion frequently on transcript and in published decisions. It accorded with 
the views of J A Hobson, with whose writings Dethridge and Beeby were both 
familiar. But the Court also adopted Reddaway’s argument for discouraging 
excessive investment and thereby averting a subsequent slump.
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The Court’s conclusion—reached ‘after grave consideration’—was 
that ‘the present degree of prosperity in the Commonwealth and the existing 
circumstances of industry make desirable appreciable increases in the basic 
wage’ (p. 593). But it did not follow that the increases granted should be 
uniform.
The principle of equality in commodity value was appropriate for a basic 
wage, the main policy of which was to secure a particular standard of 
living for wage earners whatever might be the conditions of the industry 
or the district in which they were engaged. The establishment of such 
a standard was thought to be socially desirable. Even though some 
industries might find it difficult to provide the wage, it was nevertheless 
deemed to be better to impose upon them that wage standard, and if 
they could not naturally sustain it, either aid them in some other way or 
let them perish. The standard of living aimed at must always be limited 
by the productivity of the country generally and therefore inasmuch as 
the Court cannot differentiate between the wage earners according to 
their dependants, the basic wage earner with a large family must often 
suffer and see his family suffer lamentable deprivations. So far as the 
basic wage is imposed for the purpose of providing for fundamental 
needs it should be substantially uniform in real value. But where an 
addition is to be made to the basic wage because of prosperity which 
may not exist to the same degree nor at all in some States, there is not 
the same reason for uniformity in the addition. (pp. 593–594)
The ‘needs’ basic wage (that is, the existing basic wage, subject to cost-
of-living adjustments) would be preserved, but there would also be loadings 
‘because of present prosperity and of stabilising reasons’. These would not 
be adjusted for price movements. The loadings would be at two levels—a 
higher level for New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland and a lesser one 
for South Australia, Western Australia and Tasmania. The Court commented 
particularly on the position of South Australia:
South Australia financially is the weakest of the States and has only 
one highly developed manufacturing enterprise, motor body building, 
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established in the days when a lower wage level to some extent balanced 
the disadvantages of distance from the eastern market.
The result of imposing a basic wage which would bring South Australian 
wage costs to the same level as those of other States would probably 
accelerate the tendency to concentrate the motor industry in one of the 
eastern capitals. The Court is anxious not to take any action which of 
itself may disturb the present distribution of industrial activity amongst 
the States.
In the South Australian Railways it also seems likely that too high 
a rise in wage costs would probably result in curtailment of services 
which must outweigh benefits of increased nominal wages. Similar 
considerations apply to Tasmania and Western Australia.
The special attention paid to railways was at odds with Reddaway’s advice.
The loadings granted were:
For country districts, the existing differential of 3s below the relevant 
metropolitan rate was retained. The wage increases would be phased, with half 
coming into effect on 1 July and the remainder on 1 October. The existing 
ratios of minimum female rates to the male basic wages should continue. The 
average increase in federal award rates caused by the decision was about 5 per 
cent. Over the three quarters from the second quarter of 1937 to the first 
quarter of 1938, real award wages (federal and State) rose by about 4 per cent. 
The ‘Reddawage’ decision was probably the major source of this increase.
If the nominal basic wage is deflated by the C series index, and the 
six-capitals numbers are used for the calculation, the increase granted by the 
Court was not sufficient to restore the real basic wage to its pre-Depression 
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levels (see Figure 8.9). The increase granted therefore fell short of the amount 
which Reddaway’s reasoning seemed to imply.
The Court reported that the Commonwealth Statistician had expressed 
to it a concern that his role was being misunderstood: because the basic wage 
was varied with the price index, there was a perception that the Statistician was 
fixing wages. He suggested that the Court publish its own index, based on the 
Statistician’s index numbers. It accepted this advice. It also acceded to a union 
request that the basic wage be adjusted to the nearest 1s, instead of 2s.18
11.3 sequel
Dethridge, in September 1937, dealt with an application to raise all rates in 
the award for journalists with metropolitan daily newspapers. This was not 
strictly a basic wage matter, because the rates prescribed in the award were 
total amounts. An increase of 9s was sought, however, on the basis that the 
basic wage had risen through automatic adjustments by 4s since the making of 
the award and by a further 5s as the prosperity loading. Dethridge granted an 
increase of 5s. The parties had agreed in 1934 that rates would not be adjusted 
in line with movements in the basic wage. Dethridge presumed that they 
had taken into account their estimate of likely basic wage movements. The 
prosperity loading, however, had been granted ‘by reason of the unexpected 
prosperity of the community and for other economic reasons, namely to 
ensure a stable progress or, at any rate, not an excessive speculative advance’. 
The parties would not have anticipated it. It seemed ‘not unreasonable’ that
although it will not make very much difference to many of them, having 
regard to their rates of pay, they should share in this unexpected increase 
of the community’s prosperity. I think I may assume that, generally 
speaking, the newspaper industry, and the employers in that industry, 
will benefit by that prosperity just as other business undertakings have 
18  In June 1937, the Full Court considered the basic wage in the pastoral award. It noted 
‘that all parties concerned in the industry prefer the present method of estimating the future 
average amount of the basic wage and of avoiding adjustment for an inconsiderable change 
in the cost of living’. It therefore set a ‘needs’ basic wage of 72s (2s above the current indexed 
level) and a loading of 5s (Variation—Pastoral Awards 37 CAR 666, 667).
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benefited. (Variation—Journalists’ (Metropolitan Daily Newspapers) 
Award 38 CAR 238, 241)
In October 1937, the Full Court reconsidered the basic wage in the 
fruit-picking industry—for long a ‘basket case’ among the industries regulated 
by the Court (Variation—Fruit Pickers’ Award 38 CAR 352). Employers had 
in 1931 sought a reduction of wages because of depressed conditions generally 
and specifically in the industry. This led to a cut of 7½ per cent (over and 
above the 10 per cent) in the basic wage, which was still in force in 1937. 
The Court was now asked to rescind the reduction and to increase the basic 
wage. It cancelled the special reduction and set basic wages for various districts 
which were, in nominal terms, less than the Melbourne basic wage by amounts 
ranging from 1s to 4s. The differences reflected approximately the relative 
levels of the C series index. In future, the district rates would be adjusted by 
the Melbourne C series index and thus be permanently below the Melbourne 
rate.
The Court in April 1938 again confronted issues about interstate 
differences in the basic wage. It did so in dealing with the textile award 
(Variation—Textile Workers’ Award 39 CAR 114); and the same issue arose, 
with the same outcome, for the clothing trades (Variation—Clothing Trades’ 
Awards 39 CAR 126). In the main basic wage case, some South Australian 
employers had signalled that they wished to argue later for full account to be 
taken of the lower level of prices in their State. The applications now before 
the Court sought to apply this principle to textiles. The existing flat rates, said 
Dethridge and Drake-Brockman, were due mainly to the existence of keen 
interstate competition:
The Court recognised that the adoption of this flat rate would involve 
the receipt by wage-earners in one State or place of a real basic wage 
somewhat less than that which the Court considered proper for that 
State or place, and the receipt in another State or place of a real wage 
somewhat greater than the Court’s real wage for that State or place. But 
it then thought that the existence of strong interstate competition in 
an industry would justify a flat money wage … The fact that in some 
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awards the parties had agreed to adopt a flat basic wage also inclined 
the Court to adopt it in the Textile awards. … In substance [the South 
Australian employers] ask that the then current awards should be varied 
and that the impending awards be framed so as to prescribe a basic 
wage for Adelaide based on the Adelaide index number with the South 
Australian loading of 4s instead of that based upon the five capital cities 
index number with the five capital cities loading of 5s and a provincial 
basic wage of 3s less for other places in South Australia. (pp. 115–116)
The Court was divided. Dethridge and Drake-Brockman were in broad 
agreement with the employers. For the needs basic wage, the appropriate 
policy normally was to set an equal real wage in different places:
Inasmuch as the basic wage is in theory awardable to all adult males 
without regard to the presence or absence of any peculiar merit in any 
of them, presumptively it should so far as is reasonably practicable 
be awarded by the Court equally for all, that is, should be of equal 
real value to each of the wage-earner recipients in purchasing power 
and not merely of equal money amount. … At best not more than an 
approximation to equality in any two or more areas is possible. But in 
view of the disparity in cost of living in different places the assessing of 
the money amount of the basic wage so as to give this approximately 
equal real wage is thought to be juster than awarding a flat money basic 
wage. (pp. 117–118)
Interstate competition was not irrelevant, but its implications required 
consideration:
Competitive power depends upon the presence of human ability and 
other natural resources the amounts of which as between one area and 
another are subject to constant change. To deprive one area of part 
of its higher competitive power and to add to the lower competitive 
power of another area is a process which could not be well performed 
by any legislative body and certainly not by this Court. For instance, 
to attempt by means of differential rates of wages and conditions to 
equalise competitive conditions for steel making in New South Wales 
and South Australia would be plainly absurd. No one would suggest 
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that the real needs wage should be raised in New South Wales because 
coal is produced there, or should be lowered in South Australia because 
coal has to be imported. But the cheaper supply of food and shelter in 
South Australia for men in industry is economically the same kind of 
competitive advantage for that State as the cheaper supply of coal in 
New South Wales for machines in industry is for the latter State. (p. 
119)
The 1937 loadings had been awarded, said Dethridge and Drake-Brockman, 
‘because the Court thought that industry generally could sustain the additions 
and considered that the wage earners are fairly entitled to any such sustainable 
additions; and partly to help in checking what then appeared to be a likely 
imminent boom and consequent slump’ (p. 121). The lesser amounts set for 
some States, including South Australia, had not been devised to assist those 
States to compete with other States, but were awarded in recognition of their 
lesser prosperity. It was not the Court’s function to assist one State to compete 
with another. As the prosperity loadings were not a reflection of living costs, 
it was appropriate that in competitive industries they be equal. Hence the six-
capitals loading should apply.19
Beeby strongly disagreed:
From my experience I know that State fixations of wage rates and 
conditions in industries subject to interstate competition had always 
been influenced by this lack of facilities to create uniformity. When 
the Federal Court was created this weakness in the system of industrial 
regulation was the subject of public agitation. It was one of the ‘grievances 
19  Dethridge and Drake-Brockman did not proceed to make orders in favour of the South 
Australian employers, because there were no applications from other States. ‘The Court’, 
they said, ‘has indicated the principle, and parties can apply as they see fit’ (p. 122). In two 
other decisions given on the same day, Dethridge and Drake-Brockman preserved identical 
money rates: in food preserving, because of the prevalence of piece-rates, and for theatrical 
employees, because of the existence of numerous rates for different kinds of work. They said, 
in the latter case: ‘With so many rates ranging through small and large amounts the resulting 
inconvenience would far outweigh any benefit to the parties from an attempt to equalise in 
all the States and districts concerned the purchasing power of such rates’ (Variation—Food 
Preservers’ Award 39 CAR 131; Variation—Theatrical Employees’ Award 39 CAR 134).
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to be remedied’ when the federal legislature decided to exercise its 
power in the field of industrial regulation. That exercise of power was 
mainly to create an authority which could control industrial conditions 
from a national as opposed to State points of view. This interpretation 
of federal legislation is borne out by a long series of decisions of this 
Court. … In effect the Court is now asked to over-ride these decisions 
and declare that interstate competition should not be considered in the 
making of awards. (p. 122)
Beeby was unfair to his colleagues. If the goal of equalising wages and conditions 
were accepted, the question remained whether the wages to be equalised 
were money or real amounts. The majority did consider that question; Beeby 
avoided it.
In August 1938, the Full Court dealt with claims for a new award in 
the pastoral industry in circumstances where the industry’s prosperity had 
diminished since the main basic wage case (Judgment (Standard Hours and 
Basic Wage)—Pastoral Industry 39 CAR 607). Employers sought the removal 
of the prosperity loadings; the union asked that the station hand’s rate be 
increased to the level of the basic wage for shearers.
The employers’ case was based on the combination of a low average 
price of wool, competition from artificial substitutes, and drought in parts 
of New South Wales, South Australia and Western Australia. The cumulative 
effect of these evils was so great in the Western Australian pastoral industry 
that the Court felt ‘compelled to suspend in the new award until further order 
the prosperity loading for that section of the industry’ (p. 609). In New South 
Wales and Western Australia, however, there were areas that were not drought-
stricken and where removal of the loadings was not warranted. Areas which 
were drought-affected were contiguous to drought-free areas and the removal 
of the loadings was ‘not practicable’. In relation to the union claim, the Court 
recalled that in 1931 it had reduced the station hands’ rate by 20 per cent, 
‘expressing the view that no index numbers could be relied upon as a guide to 
the cost of living of such employees and that in such employment they gained 
some advantages which urban workers did not receive’. In 1934, the Court 
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set the station hand’s rate 8s below the shearers’ basic wage; and in 1937 it 
granted prosperity loadings of 5s to shearers and 3s to station hands. Refusing 
the claim, the Court said:
If the pastoral industry were at present in a flourishing condition, the 
relation of the station hands rate to that of other pastoral employees 
might deserve reconsideration, at any rate in respect of the prosperity 
loading, but in view of the difficult conditions in which the industry is 
now being worked, the Court does not think it would be for the benefit 
of station hands themselves to increase their existing rates in any of the 
States. (p. 610)
This was the last significant basic wage matter before the outbreak of 
war.
11.4 state polIcIes
Four of the States—New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia and 
Western Australia—continued to rely predominantly on quasi-judicial 
industrial tribunals. In Victoria and Tasmania, wages boards remained the 
authorities with the primary capacity to set the terms of employment. Save 
for possibilities of appeal to industrial courts, the wages board system did not 
lend itself to centralised policy-making. In Victoria, however, the Factories 
and Shops Act 1934 required all wages boards to adopt federal award rates 
where applicable in all determinations. It also provided for the Secretary 
for Labour to make adjustments of wages according to cost-of-living index 
numbers, without convening the Boards, if the determinations included 
adjustment clauses (Labour Report, No. 29, 1938, p. 80). Tasmanian wages 
boards, like those of Victoria, were commonly thought to have conformed 
closely to the lead provided by federal awards.20 Whichever system operated, 
State governments could by legislation impose procedures and outcomes on 
20  Heyward (1936, p. 110) wrote: ‘Where there are Federal Awards covering part of the 
field it has for some years been the policy of Wages Boards to avoid the evils of overlapping 
by adopting the Federal Award as their determination. The same result would follow if the 
Federal Award was a common rule.’
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the tribunals. They commonly did so. For example, as previously noted, the 
Industrial Commission of New South Wales in May 1936 increased slightly 
the male basic wage and reduced the female basic wage. The Labour Report 
records that ‘strong protests made to the Government against the reduction 
in the female rate resulted in an amendment of the Industrial Arbitration Acts, 
providing for the female rate to be 54 per cent of the male rate or £1 17s 6d 
retrospectively as from the date of the original declaration’ (Labour Report, No. 
27, 1936, p. 88).
The failure of the New South Wales Industrial Commission to adopt the 
10 per cent wage cut of 1931 had been a source of concern to the Federal Court 
and to economists. For several years, wages were higher and hours shorter for 
workers under New South Wales awards than for those who were covered by 
the Federal Court’s awards. In respect of pay, this problem had ceased to exist 
by the end of 1934, with the cancellation of the 10 per cent cut and wage 
reductions in New South Wales awards leaving federal award workers slightly 
better paid than their State counterparts. The most important development, 
however, was the decision of the New South Wales Government, in response 
to the 1937 federal basic wage decision, to discontinue the system of periodic 
review of the State basic wage and to adopt the federal basic wage (including 
automatic adjustments).
Queensland, since the early 1920s, had maintained employment 
standards well ahead of those embodied in federal and other State awards 
and determinations. Its ability to pursue this policy, while maintaining low 
unemployment, was generally attributed to the prosperity of its primary 
industries, which differed in composition from those of the southern States, 
and especially to the federal government’s protectionist measures for the 
sugar industry, which prohibited imports and imposed a levy on Australian 
consumers that was used to subsidise exports. Figure 1.6 in Chapter 1 shows 
that in the later 1930s the State basic wage in Brisbane remained ahead of the 
federal wage, but the gap narrowed significantly as the Commonwealth basic 
wage was increased. Figure 8.7, in Subsection 8.3.2 of Chapter 8, shows that 
594 Australian Wage Policy
real wages in Queensland, previously well above those of other States, moved 
closer to the levels elsewhere in the later 1930s.
South Australia maintained the procedure whereby a living wage was 
declared at intervals of at least six months by a Board of Industry comprising 
a judge and four Commissioners. The living wage was not automatically 
adjusted. Late in 1937, the Board increased the basic wage from £3 9s 6d to 
£3 14s, equal to the federal basic wage for Adelaide.
In Western Australia, the Court of Arbitration was required to declare 
before 14 June of each year a basic wage to operate from 1 July. A 1930 
amendment to the Act provided for quarterly adjustments by the Court, when 
an official statement supplied by the State Government Statistician showed 
that a variation in the cost of living of one shilling or more had occurred. 
The Court’s obligation to make an annual declaration remained. In 1938 it 
granted an increase of almost 7 per cent in the real wage.
12.1 wages above the basIc wage
During the Depression, the Court had left margins for skill virtually constant 
as money amounts, save for the operation of the 10 per cent cut. Cancellation 
of the cut in 1934 meant that most margins were restored to their pre-
Depression levels. Since the basic wage had fallen along with prices, the net 
effect was to increase the relative level of margins. As the Depression receded, 
the Court moved gradually to an even more generous treatment of margins, 
and there is no evidence that it was restrained by the widening of relativities 
that had occurred almost fortuitously in the years 1929–34. The change in 
approach had two main aspects: (1) a willingness to increase margins due to 
a view that economic necessity had hitherto compelled the Court to keep 
them too low and that industries were now able to bear higher wages; and 
(2) a resumption of the practice of assessing margins on the basis of the work 
performed. These two sources of change were not entirely separate: in some 
cases both were at work. It will, nevertheless, be convenient to discuss them as 
distinct processes.
12.1.1 The move to higher margins
The Court’s willingness to approve higher margins was due partly to a general 
relaxation of wage restraint and partly to a conviction that more highly skilled 
Other aspects of wage policy 1935–1939
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workers were underpaid. All of the judges, to varying degrees, invoked both 
reasons for granting increases.
Metal trades (1)
Beeby in April 1935 gave the first of several decisions about a new metal trades 
award (34 CAR 449). (He had been hearing the case since July 1934.) Looking 
back on the period since 1930, when he had made the consolidated award, he 
said that ‘economic changes of profound significance’ had occurred:
When making the award the Court realised that critical times were 
ahead, and sought to reorganise industrial considerations in such a way 
as to encourage the development of new industries without reducing 
opportunities for employment of skilled mechanics. At that time 
Australia’s main competitor, Great Britain, had by amalgamation of 
plants and by the extension of mass production methods reduced costs 
of production to an extent which enabled her to undersell Australian 
manufacturers in their own market. The position had become so critical 
that some change in Australian methods was imperative if we were to 
find work even for the reduced number of artisans then employed. The 
Court therefore introduced provisions for mass production methods, 
but continued existing conditions for ordinary engineering operations. 
After five years the wisdom of this change has been established. 
Manufacture of machinery and electrical appliances and metallic 
articles by mass production methods has greatly increased, and, as 
anticipated, while these methods have added to the ranks of unskilled, 
semi-skilled and junior labour, they have largely increased opportunities 
of employment for skilled mechanics as die and tool makers, machine 
setters and makers of machinery used in repetitive processes. (p. 452)
A major contributor to the improved state of the industry was the 
increased tariff. The industry was likely to expand further. In 1930, Beeby 
said, he had been convinced that the margin for the skilled artisan was too 
low, but was deterred by economic conditions from increasing it. The tariff 
revisions had begun to affect the demand for skilled workers in 1933–34, 
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and the market outlook for these workers was now strong: ‘Turners, fitters, 
electrical fitters, first grade machinists and some others just now can pick 
and choose employment’ (p. 453). There were fewer skilled men in the metal 
trades than in 1930, but the opportunities for employment were greater.
What should the tradesman’s margin be? In Harvester, Higgins had fixed 
a tradesman’s wage of 10s per day, compared with 7s for the unskilled labourer. 
The Harvester ratio would be restored by fixing a margin of 28s per week. 
But the Court had ‘abandoned the idea that the Harvester standard was an 
irrevocable starting point’:
It is now accepted that wage fixation and standards of living are largely 
controlled by changing economic circumstances and that in these days 
of economic fluctuation and uncertainty principles adopted during 
periods of comparative stability cannot apply. The Court can only feel its 
way to the best conclusion under circumstances of the moment relating 
to particular industries. Common action of all judges as to the base rate 
is of course provided for by Statute. But in dealing with margins and 
conditions of labour awards cannot be standardised. The nature of the 
work done, the financial position of the industry, the extent to which 
the industry is protected from overseas competition and many other 
matters must be considered. (p. 454)
The judges of the Court, said Beeby, were agreed that wages should be 
the highest that industry could afford to pay, ‘but unfortunately the Court is 
not in possession of complete statistical data to enable it to give reasoned effect 
to this truism’ (p. 455). Beeby increased the skilled tradesmen’s margins by 3s to 
27s. This increase was ‘within the margin of safety’. Beeby declined, however, 
to disturb the margins of ‘the bulk of labour employed.’ He commented:
Various unions of employees in urging that the margins of other groups 
should be proportionately increased evidently did not give proper 
consideration to the reasons stated by the Court for proposing to grant 
any wage increases. The Court did not come to the conclusion that 
the general improvement of the industry was sufficient to justify an 
all round increase in wage rates. It did, however, think that there had 
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been sufficient recovery to justify the long postponed re-adjustment of 
margins for skill. (pp. 455–456)
A selection of the margins prescribed in the new award was:
Beeby refused an application by the South Australian Government for a 
general exemption of the State from the increases in margins; but he excluded 
the South Australian Railways (in future to be dealt with by Drake-Brockman) 
and continued a partial exemption for sheet metal in South Australia ‘after 
perusal of the balance sheets of Simpson and Co’ (p. 456).
Bank officials
Dethridge in July 1935 varied the bank officials’ award (Variation—Bank Officials’ 
Award 34 CAR 843). ‘During 1935’, he said, ‘the position of the banking business in 
Australia shows signs of progressive improvement’. It was ‘closely approaching a degree 
of prosperity, lower than that enjoyed in the period before the recent depression, but 
sufficiently high and stable to ensure a profit adequate for the enterprise and capital 
by or for whom it is carried on’. The award did not contain an automatic adjustment 
provision, but the basic wage in force at the time when it was made had been used 
in setting the sixth-year rate for a bank clerk (assumed to be 21 years of age). An 
emergency decision in 1932 had suspended salary increases for all clerks who were 
already above the sixth-year rate. Dethridge now reduced the sixth-year rate from 
£180 to £175—a modest recognition of the fall in the nominal basic wage 
since the award was made—but removed the suspension of increases after the 
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sixth year. He thus restored the full benefits of the incremental salary scale to 
clerks receiving more than the basic wage.
Motor bodies (1)
A new award for motor-body building was made in December 1935 
(Judgment—Motor Body and Coach Building Industry 35 CAR 599). The 
previous award had been made in 1927. Reviewing the industry’s financial 
position, Beeby said:
The confidential information supplied discloses that up to the beginning 
of the depression the industry was profitable. Then for nearly three years 
heavy losses were sustained by most of the employers who, however, 
were able to survive by using their reserves. In 1934 the industry began 
to revive and has become re-established with astonishing rapidity. Some 
of the balance-sheets disclose meagre profits since recovery began. 
These results however are not traceable to wage costs, but to limited 
turnover and unprofitable contracts in a market which has become 
more competitive. I doubt if any employer would have shown much 
better results on lower wage costs. So far as it is possible to judge, results 
for the current year will be much better and without some economic 
disturbance of universal effect, the industry will soon pass the peak year 
of 1926–1927. (pp. 609–610)
Beeby had ‘no hesitation’ in granting to tradesmen the 3s increase awarded 
in the metal trades, but ‘found it impossible to continue tradesman’s rates 
for some processes for which they are now paid’. Union representatives had 
realised the inevitability of some declassifications; but as they could not make 
admissions, ‘the unenviable task of devising a new wage code for the industry 
became my responsibility’ (p. 610).
Agricultural implements
In making a new award for the manufacture of agricultural implements, Beeby 
in April 1936 noted that employers had opposed any alteration of margins set 
by Deputy President Quick in 1925. A perusal of Quick’s reasons suggested 
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that he had been influenced by the requirement for the industry to pay a 
basic wage which included Powers’ 3s: in the absence of that requirement, he 
would have granted higher margins. The position had changed since 1925 and 
further information was now available:
Foreign competition is not so serious. The Australian amalgamation of 
H V McKay Pty Ltd with its chief competitor Massey Harris Pty Ltd 
(except as to dairying appliances) has given local manufacturers better 
command of the market. The preferment, even at higher prices, given 
by some farmers to foreign imports is dying out with realisation that 
the quality of Australian manufactures is equal to that of imported 
machinery. … The disparity in direct wage cost compared with 
American and Canadian competitors has been greatly modified, if not 
eliminated. By further improvements in methods and by reason of the 
reduced basic wage, direct wage cost, as related to selling prices, in mass 
production plants has been reduced to approximately 15 per cent of 
total costs. In 1934 the Tariff Board, after a lengthy inquiry into the 
working of the industry, published information which was not available 
in 1925 and disclosed that wage cost was not the main determinant of 
selling price. (Judgment—Agricultural Implement, etc Industry 36 CAR 
39, 41–42)
Beeby decided that, in general, the margins prescribed in the metal trades 
should apply in this award. He adopted the 27s tradesman’s rate. He also 
raised from 3s 6d to 5s an allowance for lost time due to seasonal fluctuations.
Commercial printing
In April 1936, Dethridge determined several matters referred to him by the 
parties who were negotiating a new award for commercial printing (Judgment—
Commercial Printing 36 CAR 738). These included the margin for hand 
compositors. This had been fixed at 24s by Webb in 1925 and maintained at 
that level (subject to the 10 per cent cut) by Coneybeer in a new award made 
in 1932. The employers now sought a reduction to 16s, but in the hearing 
made it clear that a continuation of 24s was acceptable. The union pressed 
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for a margin of 30s. Dethridge judged that, although the special qualifications 
required of the compositor had not changed since 1925, he now had ‘to use 
those qualifications under rather greater stress and with quicker decision than 
formerly’ (p. 743). In searching for the suitable margin, he discussed the issue 
of comparisons between industries and skills:
There is no doubt that this Court and other industrial tribunals have, 
in assessing margins for one kind of skilled craftsmen, been unable to 
avoid being influenced by the margins prevailing at the same time for 
other classes of skilled craftsmen and have tended to fix one amount for 
those margins unless there is an obvious disparity in the special capacity 
requisite. In assessing margins I think I should take into consideration 
margins being paid to skilled craftsmen in other industries, while at 
the same time giving due weight to differences in economic and other 
conditions. (p. 744)
The unions had stressed Beeby’s recent decision to raise the metal 
tradesman’s margin to 27s. Dethridge concluded ‘that an increase of the hand 
compositor’s margin from 24s to 27s would be justifiable if the industry be in 
what may be regarded as a normal state’. In his opinion it had ‘about recovered 
ordinary prosperity’, and he awarded 27s (p. 745). He referred to a recent 
decision by an Industrial Board in Western Australia (upheld by the State 
Court) which fixed the hand compositor’s margin at 30s:
The decision seems to have been influenced somewhat by the then 
existing prosperity of the industry. It is not sound in principle in my 
opinion that an addition to a marginal wage intended to remain as a 
permanent standard should be made because of what may be a passing 
wave of prosperity. Such a permanent addition should not be made 
unless there is ground for feeling assured that it can be maintained for 
a considerable time in the future throughout the economic fluctuations 
of the industry. If an addition to wages is to be made because of unusual 
prosperity it seems desirable that it should be expressly made for a limited 
time or until further order so that its temporary nature is understood. 
Such temporary additions are probably better left to negotiations 
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with individual employers rather than imposed by ordinance upon all 
employers alike whether prosperous or struggling. (p. 745)
There may well be a hint here that, in Dethridge’s view, the 27s 
tradesman’s margin was a standard that the Court should not exceed.
Carpenters and joiners
Similarly, in July 1936 Dethridge raised the margin for carpenters and joiners 
from 24s to 27s (Variation—Carpenters and Joiners’ Award 36 CAR 324). The 
employers had opposed this on the ground that the skill required of a metal 
trades craftsman exceeded that of the carpenter or joiner. Dethridge rejected 
fine distinctions, discerning a ‘tendency in the long run towards equality 
of wage rates of craftsmen of various kinds’. He referred to this decision in 
September 1936 in relation to ships’ carpenters and joiners (Variation—Ship 
Carpenters’ Award and Agreement 36 CAR 460). The real point, he said,
was that the work of carpenters, broadly speaking, is on the same grade 
as that of other skilled tradesmen generally, and that carpenters had 
not yet got back to the relative position occupied by skilled tradesmen 
compared with unskilled workers. That was the main reason why the 
increase was given, not only in connexion with carpenters, but in 
connexion with other apprenticed craftsmen as well. I thought, and I 
am inclined to think that my brother Beeby also thought in regard to 
work of a similar order in the Metal Trades, that the day had now come 
when the skilled worker in the apprentice class should be restored to 
something like the superiority in rates which he formerly enjoyed. … 
I see no reason why the increase in margin which I recently prescribed 
in connexion with carpenters generally should not be extended to ship 
carpenters. (pp. 460–461)
Motor bodies (2)
Dethridge also raised some margins at the sub-tradesman level. In October 
1936, he reviewed the rate for the second-class panel beater:
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The margin of 12s, having regard to the dexterity required for the 
removal of such warping or denting as there is, is somewhat on the low 
side. I think it is more than mere repetitive filing, and work requiring 
some dexterity and judgment, which is hardly covered by the margin 
of 12s at present being paid. I think the present classification is not 
appropriate for this particular class of work, and what is necessary is a 
new classification to cover it … One cannot compute with mathematical 
exactness a margin, but an estimate by comparison with other work has 
to be made. I propose to fix a margin of 17s per week for the work in 
question. (Variation—Motor Body and Coach Building Award 36 CAR 
525)
Storemen and packers (wool stores)
In the same month, Dethridge adjusted margins for storemen and packers 
in wool stores (Judgment—Storemen and Packers (Wool, etc, Stores) 36 CAR 
565). Since 1920, there had been a minimum industry rate of 3s above the 
basic wage. This was originally set by consent and was continued in a new 
award made by Dethridge in 1928. He was now persuaded by ‘much evidence 
and a number of inspections of the operations in concern’ that the industry 
minimum should be raised to 4s above the basic wage (p. 568). He also granted 
modest increases in specific margins.
Actors
In a decision of November 1936, Dethridge altered the award rates for actors 
(Judgment—Actors 36 CAR 673). Rates of pay and conditions set in a 1929 
award had been abandoned by agreement in 1932. Lower rates and longer 
hours were then adopted. Actors Equity now sought a reversion to the 1929 
terms. Opposing this, the employers contended that the ‘live show’ business 
was still depressed. There was no doubt, said Dethridge, ‘that the people in 
Australia who seek theatrical entertainment have largely abandoned their 
former demand for “live shows” and seek other kinds of distraction’ (p. 674). 
Any increase in rates was attended with some risk, but those set in 1932 were 
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very low. Dethridge had decided to increase them; but the new amounts would 
be ‘below the present day equivalent of the rates prescribed in my award of 
1929’.
Builders’ labourers
Drake-Brockman in January 1937 noted that hitherto awards for builders’ 
labourers had provided a uniform margin for all who worked under the awards. 
The union had now abandoned the principle of uniformity. Drake-Brockman 
adopted a two-tier structure. A higher classification, with a margin of 12s, 
would be created ‘on the same basis as to margins as assistants to tradesmen 
under other awards of this Court’. The other classification ‘comprises men 
who at different times perform work varying in value from that of base wage 
workers up to tradesmen’s assistants and a flat rate of 6s per week appears to 
me to fairly meet the general average value of the work performed by them’ 
(Judgment—Builders Labourers 37 CAR 5, 7).
Tally clerks
In February 1937, Beeby made a new award for tally clerks on the waterfront 
(Judgment—Tally Clerks 37 CAR 164). Tally clerks previously had a casual rate 
of 2s 6½d per hour—the same rate as for waterside workers. Beeby thought 
that the correct approach was to disregard the waterside workers’ award and to 
fix ‘a marginal addition to the basic wage on consideration of the experience, 
training and knowledge required and the circumstances under which the work 
is done’. He awarded, without explaining the choice of amount, a margin of 
£1, added to the six-capitals basic wage to give a total of 88s. (The casual rate 
for waterside workers was set on the basis that they could expect 30 hours 
work in a week, implying a notional wage of 75s.)
Metal trades (2)
Also in February 1937, Beeby delivered his decision on a union application to 
vary the Metal Trades award by further increasing margins (Variation—Metal 
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Trades’ Award 37 CAR 176). This decision preceded the 1937 basic wage 
inquiry. Much evidence had been tendered to demonstrate the improvement 
in general economic conditions over the previous two years. That evidence, 
said Beeby, was more appropriate to a basic wage inquiry and he confined his 
attention to the metal trades group of industries:
In this area the evidence submitted disclosed marked recovery. Nearly 
all important firms are now working to full capacity; unemployment 
has steadily fallen until today employers have difficulty in obtaining 
skilled men. Competition for the services of high grade mechanics is 
keen and a substantial number of employees are paid more than the 
award rates. Some employers, particularly in the moulding section 
of the industry, owing to pressure which is inevitable when labour is 
scarce, have agreed with the union to pay increased margins. Nearly all 
manufacturers are now making profits, the recovery of some of them in 
this regard being beyond the expectations of 1935. Notwithstanding 
tariff revisions resulting from the Ottawa agreement employers at 
present seem able to meet foreign competition and imports are relatively 
less than in 1929. I therefore feel free to adjudicate on the merits of the 
applications without, as in the past, being oppressed with the fear of 
imposing an extra wage cost that may materially reduce manufacture 
and opportunities for employment. (pp. 182–183)
Beeby recounted that in 1921 Higgins had made the first attempt to 
bring the major sectors of the engineering industry within a single national 
award. In doing so, Higgins had fixed a margin of 36s for tradesmen on a 
basic wage of 84s. ‘I have never acceded’, said Beeby, ‘to the contention that 
the 1921 award made by Mr Justice Higgins was an extravagant over-valuation 
of the relative value of the work of skilled and unskilled workmen.’ Whether 
it had been justified in the economic circumstances of the time was a question 
on which he expressed no opinion. Looking back at his own 1930 award, he 
said:
The award made on that occasion was mainly directed to a reclassification 
of callings to permit freer use of mass production methods in 
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manufacture. It was not an award made for a normal industry able to 
meet foreign competition. It was largely of an experimental nature and 
introduced, particularly into the engineering trade, provisions for the 
subdivision of labour which had always been strongly resisted by unions 
of employees. For that reason I never regarded the 1930 award as a 
reasoned determination of value of skilled and unskilled labour in a 
normal industry or as a final settlement of other important conditions 
of employment which affected earnings. (p. 181)
He raised the tradesman’s margin by 3s to 30s.1 In 1935, when Beeby 
increased the margin from 24s to 27s, he deferred action on margins below 
the tradesman level. He now increased these lower margins by a uniform 3s. 
Only the labourer, who remained on the basic wage, received no benefit from 
this decision.
There were two cautionary terms to the decision. One was to provide 
for a review after six months (after the outcome of the anticipated basic wage 
case was known). The other was to indicate that the increases in tradesmen’s 
rates should not be generalised to other awards:
I have never agreed that margins for skill should be uniform in all 
occupations. Some callings call for more intensive training and more 
knowledge than others. Independent investigation of different industries 
is necessary in assessing margins for degrees of skill, knowledge and 
experience. My decision in this group of industries is not therefore to 
be taken as an opinion that margins in all industries should be similarly 
assessed. I have always regarded skilled mechanics engaged in metal 
manufacture and in the generation and supply of electric light, heat and 
power as entitled to somewhat higher margins than those working in 
wood and other fabrics. While routine work in all skilled occupations 
may for purposes of wage assessment be similar, the metal turner and 
fitter and the electrician must acquire knowledge and exercise precision 
appreciably greater than usually required. (p. 183)
1  The six-capitals basic wage at the time was 78s. Thus the tradesman’s rate was fixed at 1.38 
times the labourer’s rate. In Harvester, Higgins set a tradesman’s wage of 10s per day—1.43 
times the labourer’s rate of 7s.
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This clearly conflicted with Dethridge’s reluctance to differentiate between 
apprentice-based trades. It may have been because of Beeby’s caution that his 
1937 decision for the metal trades did not generally flow to other industries, 
but it is also likely that Dethridge and Drake-Brockman thought that Beeby 
had gone too far. I return below to this matter.2
Drake-Brockman, in March 1937, applied Beeby’s decision to metal 
trades grades within the Victorian railways (Variation—Metal Trades’ Award, 
Victorian Railways 37 CAR 209). He noted the improved financial performance 
of Victoria’s railways and was even more impressed by the better budgetary 
position of the State government. Evidently feeling liberated from financial 
constraint, Drake-Brockman moved to a commentary on wage differences:
I have been impressed from time to time with the fact that since 
industrial tribunals were established in Australia, there has been quite 
a considerable tendency to level up the wages of the unskilled and the 
semi-skilled without a corresponding improvement in the wages of 
skilled employees. The general tendency has been to bring them nearer 
together in amount. I think that this is regrettable, and it is desirable if 
possible to restore, as far as can be done, the relative payments that were 
paid for the skill of the types of employees concerned. (p. 210)
In May 1937, he had to decide whether to apply the Beeby increases to 
the South Australian Railways (Variation—South Australian Railways Metal 
Trades Grades Award 37 CAR 431). The union application for higher margins 
was opposed by the Commissioner for Railways on the grounds of adverse 
railway and State finances. But Drake-Brockman recalled that in 1935 and 
1936 he had refused to allow the union to present evidence in support of claims 
that went beyond the terms of the general metal trades award. He may well 
have caused the union to understand that matching any movement in metals 
would be a formality. ‘Accordingly’, he said, ‘I think that I cannot refuse the 
2  Beeby did not refer in his judgment to the existence of over-award payments in the metal 
trades. But it is known that over-award payments of 3s were common (see Chapter 8, Section 
8.1).
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application of the unions for corresponding increases to those recently granted 
by Judge Beeby in the Metal Trades industry generally’ (p. 433).
Metal trades (3)
In August 1937, Beeby returned to metal trades issues, consistent with his 
limitation of the February decision to six months (Variation—Metal Trades 
Awards 38 CAR 328). The Full Court had increased the basic wage (in New 
South Wales, Victoria and Queensland) by 3s in July, with a further increase 
of 3s to take effect in October. ‘The main point for consideration in these 
proceedings’, said Beeby, ‘is whether the wage level which will be reached 
in October next will be beyond the capacity of the industries involved.’ The 
employers did not contend that it would, but were apprehensive of the future, 
foreseeing an increase in import competition from British producers. Beeby 
was unmoved: ‘I do not think that the Court should reduce wage levels merely 
in anticipation of some future possible change in economic circumstances’ (p. 
331). It is unclear what might have happened in the basic wage case that would 
have caused him to reverse or modify his February decision about margins.
Textiles
Beeby made a new award for the textile industry in December 1937 
(Judgment—Textile Workers 38 CAR 791). In doing so, he took a more 
conservative position than for the metal trades. Textiles had made reasonable 
progress since the Depression, but there was evidence of a reduction of 
employment over the previous few months. This evidence ‘was sufficient to 
justify the [employers’] contention that the granting of claims resulting in 
serious increase of production costs might retard future progress’. Beeby found 
it impossible
to entertain seriously the union’s claim for all-round increases in wage 
rates on top of the recent basic wage fixation. As the commodities 
produced are used by all classes of the community retail prices largely 
control consumption. The industry is one of those in which an 
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appreciable rise in retail prices inevitably results in reduced consumption. 
Articles of every-day clothing, usually, can be made to last a little longer 
if prices are increased. The two main determinants of prices are cost of 
raw material used and wage cost. The former has been on the up grade 
for the past two years while the wage level has been raised by the Full 
Court’s recent basic wage fixation. (p. 793)
In this case, then, the basic wage increase emerged as an obstacle to 
increases in margins. ‘The marginal allowances for skill and experience’ 
appeared to Beeby ‘to be on the low side.’ Average earnings, however, were 
augmented by piecework. Beeby’s main concern was for ‘the small groups of 
employees in all mills who must of necessity work on time rates, and therefore 
on the margins prescribed can earn very little above the basic wage’. Machine 
processes which required no long period of training could not carry margins 
much above the basic wage. But the employees performing these tasks became 
more valuable with experience. Some, but not all, employers recognised this. 
‘I therefore sought’, said Beeby,
some way of securing an allowance above marginal rates for experience, 
and in the draft minutes submitted a proposal that certain groups 
should be paid an experience allowance. From the comments made, 
after further reflection I fear that the proposal might not achieve the 
purpose in view. The industry is so competitive that many employers, 
particularly in slack times, would probably give preference to employees 
of shorter experience. … I with reluctance have decided that the extra 
cost of the proposed allowance for experience at present cannot be 
imposed. I, however, commend to employers the wisdom of a wide 
extension of merit increases to married men on low margins. If this 
advice is unheeded, I will entertain application for allowances for 
experience after these awards have been in operation for twelve months. 
(pp. 793–794)
We may note the irony of Beeby’s concern about ‘married men on low 
margins’ in a predominantly female industry.
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Glue and gelatine workers
In April 1938, Beeby made a new award for the glue and gelatine industry 
(Judgment—Glue and Gelatine Workers 39 CAR 104). There was only one 
respondent: Davis Gelatine (Aust) Ltd. The work—often wet—had serious 
disabilities which had not been fully recognised in pay rates:
When margins were fixed in 1934 the Commonwealth was emerging 
from the depression and as Davis Gelatine (Aust) Ltd was finding 
difficulty in securing markets for its products I deliberately refrained 
from imposing any increased wage cost which might materially affect its 
operations. On this occasion I am freed of this restraint. The company 
with an expanding business now carries only normal stocks and is 
prosperous. I think that considering the disabilities of the work and 
the responsibility which at times rests on most of the employees there 
should be a minimum margin of 6s … with maintenance of the grades 
above that margin as in the existing award. This means an all-round 
increase of 3s per week. (p. 105)
The highest margin under the new award was 8s. With the basic wage 
increase and the higher margins, the workers employed by Davis enjoyed total 
wage increases during a ten-month period of 9s, or more than 12 per cent.
Boot trade
Beeby made an award for the boot trade in September 1938 (Consolidated 
Award—Boot Trades 39 CAR 940). Wages in this industry, originally set by 
Higgins, had long been depressed by foreign competition, which was now 
alleviated (and could be countered further) by tariffs:
The fear that increased wage costs would directly lead to increased 
importations undoubtedly influenced the learned judge in not bringing 
wage rates more into line with those of other skilled trades. Assuming 
that importations can now be kept within reasonable limits and that any 
increase in local prices is not sufficient to reduce consumption, there is 
no reason why workers in this industry should not begin to emerge 
611Keith Hancock
from the backwash into which they were forced twenty years ago. … I 
do not think that the danger of influx of foreign products is sufficient to 
deter the Court from prescribing what it deems to be proper wage rates 
and conditions of employment for the industry, and feel confident that 
the Tariff Board will recommend such tariff re-adjustments as may be 
necessary. (pp. 946 and 948)
The principal impediment to profitability in the industry was, not 
foreign competition, but ‘excessive competition between factories’; and ‘the 
Court can and does say that living standards of employees should not be 
depressed because of business methods for which they are not responsible’ 
(pp. 949 and 950). I refer in the next subsection to Beeby’s evaluation of the 
work in this industry.
Furnishing
In October 1938, Drake-Brockman dealt with a union application for an all-
round increase of 3s in margins in the furnishing trades (Variation—Furniture 
Trade Awards 39 CAR 1051). In 1928, when he had classified the employees 
in the industry, he awarded to some of the classifications margins equal to 
those of tradesmen in the metal trades. These classifications continued to have 
a margin of 24s, which Drake-Brockman now increased to 27s. That, as we 
have seen, was the tradesman’s margin in the metal trades set by Beeby in 
1935. Drake-Brockman did not adopt, or even comment upon, the margin 
of 30s set by Beeby in 1927. He refused any increase to workers on margins 
below 24s.
Stonemasons
Dethridge in November 1937 confronted explicitly the question whether 
the 30s margin in metals should be applied to another trade—in this case 
stonemasons (Judgment—Stonemasons (Victoria and South Australia) 39 CAR 
1129). He acknowledged that the craft required apprenticeship of five or six 
years. The Stonemasons’ Society sought a margin of 30s, but the employers 
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contended that it should be 27s—‘the amount now assessed for carpenters in 
this Court’s award’. Dethridge continued:
In my opinion the margin for skill should not be assessed only upon 
a judge’s comparison of the degree of skill in question with that of 
another vocation—he must also consider the question whether the 
proposed amount of any marginal wage will tend seriously to prevent 
the community from purchasing the products of that skill. If it is likely 
to have that effect that objection outweighs any opinion he may have 
that the skill in question is so high as to make the proposed amount 
desirable. Inasmuch as the mason’s craft is one of about a five-year 
apprenticeship prima facie the margin should not be less than 27s per 
week. But I am not satisfied that it should be assessed at a higher rate 
than that of the carpenter. … More important than my opinion as to 
skill is the likely decline in the demand for mason’s work. The present 
economic position in Australia indicates that we are about to suffer a 
decline in building activity particularly of that class in which masons are 
required. Already stone work is subject to the keenest competition from 
substitutes. In the monumental section of the industry also demand 
seems to be falling and cheaper moulded substitutes are displacing the 
mason’s work. For these reasons I think that I should not assess the 
mason’s margin for skill at more than 27s per week. (p. 1130)
Dethridge here advances two reasons for rejecting the 30s standard: (1) 
the doubtful market prospects for the products of the stonemasons’ work; 
and (2) the carpenters’ rate of 27s. He makes no direct comparison, in either 
respect, with metal tradesmen. There is a strong suspicion that Dethridge (and 
probably Drake-Brockman) disagreed with Beeby’s second round of metal 
trades increases. There was no possibility of appeal from the decision of a single 
Judge about margins, and the only available way of indicating disapproval was 
to decline to follow his decision.
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Rope and cordage
In June 1939, Beeby made a new award for rope and cordage workers 
(Award—Rope and Cordage Workers 40 CAR 347). The industry had last been 
reviewed in 1935, when ‘employers produced balance sheets which convinced 
me that at that time appreciable additions to wage costs were inadvisable’. The 
position had improved, the employers now tendered no balance sheets, and ‘I 
was free to regard the industry as one which had regained normal prosperity’. 
Beeby could therefore ‘increase marginal allowances and female and junior 
wage rates to the level which I would have established four years ago but for 
financial reasons’. The margins set ranged up to 22s, but there was no explicit 
discussion of the amounts chosen.
12.1.2 Work value
In the less-constrained circumstances of the later 1930s, there was a return 
to the practice of identifying the ‘worth’ of particular jobs, especially on 
a comparative basis. I have already referred to some decisions wherein 
commentary on the nature of the work performed was combined with an 
assessment of the economic condition of the industry concerned in justification 
of increased rates. Beeby, for example, took both factors into account in his 
metal trades decisions.
Tanning
In February 1935, Beeby made a new award for the tanning section of the 
saddlery industry (Judgment—Saddlery Industry (Tanning Section) 34 CAR 
111). In the existing consent award, made in 1928, there was an industry 
margin of 1s 6d, justified by the wet and offensive conditions of work and the 
irregularity of employment. The unions sought to increase this to 6s. Beeby 
granted an industry margin of 3s 6d. This reflected the requirements of the 
work:
The specialised processes which have superseded the work of curriers 
are by no means purely mechanical. In many of them the machine is in 
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reality a tool of trade, the product of which depends on the manipulation 
of the operative. While no high measure of skill may often be necessary, 
experience increases the value of the operation. I have always acted on 
the principle that the operative, even when on a purely mechanical 
machine, should get some margin above the basic wage. When the 
machine is not purely mechanical, but is a tool of trade, margins should 
be fixed according to the judgment and experience which the operative 
requires to give a satisfactory output.
Rope and cordage
Beeby, in his judgment of May 1935 about the rope and cordage industry, 
commented on the idea of relating margins to experience. He noted that there 
was little turnover of labour in the industry:
I have always considered that long service, if it is widely prevalent in an 
industry, should be considered in fixing margins, but find it difficult to 
arrive at any principle of assessment. If margins are graded according 
to years of service the jobs of old hands might become insecure. Then 
again employers who might be inclined to recognise long service are 
afraid that concessions voluntarily made may be used against them 
in application for all-round wage increases. I think it unwise to state 
any fixed amount as an extra wage for increased value of labour arising 
from long service, but in fixing margins have taken this feature of the 
industry into consideration. (Award—Rope and Cordage Workers 34 
CAR 355, 356)
Bus and tram drivers
In May 1935, Drake-Brockman considered the relative pay of bus drivers and 
tram drivers:
With regard to the drivers of the buses, I am impressed with the fact 
that they are called upon to exercise slightly more skill and undergo 
slightly more strain, and are under the necessity of taking appropriate 
cautions for the protection of the public who ride in the buses, in a way 
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slightly different from that which is imposed upon the driver of a tram. 
(Variation—Tramway Employees’ Award 34 CAR 447, 448)
Tram drivers had a ten-year incremental scale. Drake-Brockman decided that 
the bus driver’s wage should correspond to the maximum wage of tram drivers.
Engine drivers and firemen
In June 1935 Beeby dealt with margins for engine drivers and firemen 
(Judgment—Engine Drivers and Firemen 35 CAR 1). He was unwilling to 
treat the existing margins simply as a platform to be raised in response to 
improvement in trading conditions. Those margins had come about, in part, 
because of the union’s exercise of the bargaining strength conferred on it by 
the strategic role of its members:
The union being dissatisfied with Sir John Quick’s [1924] award, under 
the able leadership of their late secretary, Mr Gibson, adopted a clever 
campaign of isolating employers. Apart from the slight improvement 
of conditions secured, particularly in Victoria, as the result of strikes, 
various firms were induced to make agreements rather than have 
trouble with a small group of their employees who held key positions. 
The actual wage cost involved was small when compared with total 
wages paid. Employers were evidently willing to pay extra rates to secure 
contentment in their engine-rooms. The union undoubtedly made the 
best of this strategic advantage … These agreements, while they must 
be considered in arriving at a common award, cannot be accepted as a 
deliberate assessment by the parties of the status of engine-drivers in the 
industrial world or of the value of their labour. (p. 4)
The engine-driver’s work had, in fact, been simplified by improvements 
of equipment: automatic lubrication, automatic feeding of fires and 
improvements in the construction of engines and their auxiliaries had lessened 
the work done. In terms of the skill and training required, existing margins 
‘would appear to be liberal’. But the work also carried significant responsibility 
for the protection of both life and property. There was agreement that the 
margins of some of the lower grades ought to be increased.
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High-tension linesmen
In July 1935, Drake-Brockman granted increased margins to high-tension 
linesmen, taking into account their skill, the risks of their work, and experience:
It is true that they have not been apprenticed to any particular trade, 
and that they have acquired their knowledge, which is admitted to be 
very considerable and useful, in the ordinary course of their occupation. 
It is admitted on all sides that there is a considerable hazard attached to 
their occupation, and in my view the degree of skill required in the work 
itself and the hazard inseparable from a great deal of that work, entitles 
them to a higher rate of pay than is provided for other linemen. I think, 
moreover, that the value to the department of these men substantially 
increases with increasing experience, and, to some extent, I propose 
to recognise that and to make provision for it. I intend, therefore, to 
include in my award provision that these men on first appointment as 
linemen shall receive 3s 4d per day by way of margin, and that after 
twelve months they shall receive 4s 4d per day. (Variation—Metal Trades 
Victorian Railways’ Award 35 CAR 118, 119)
Thus the high-tension linesman’s margin was equal (after a year’s experience) to 
26s per week—fractionally below the normal rate for apprenticed tradesmen.
Motor bodies (1)
In the motor bodies’ case of 1935, discussed in Subsection 12.1.1, Beeby 
was asked to grant an allowance of 5s in recognition of intermittency of 
employment in the motor body and coach making industry. In his decision, 
given in December 1935, he refused this claim, distinguishing between types 
of intermittency:
Where, owing to fluctuations in trade, some employees in an industry 
are dismissed until trade revives, it is impossible to provide them with a 
full year’s earnings by an increased rate applying to all. If the employees 
are expected to stand by and immediately answer a call to resume work, 
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as in the knitting section of the textile trade, a lost time allowance 
should be made. But that does not occur to an appreciable extent in 
this industry. As in the metal, building and most other trades, hands 
are from time to time shortened and men must seek other employment. 
This loss of time and earnings for which workmen are not directly 
responsible is a social injustice which can only be remedied by some 
form of unemployment insurance, and not by granting increased wage 
rates to those whose employment is continuous as well as to those who 
lose time. (Judgment—Motor Body and Coach Building Industry 35 CAR 
599, 602)
Beeby also rejected an attempt to reclassify tasks so as to reduce margins 
in recognition of the ‘assembly-line’ nature of the work:
Observations on inspections convinced me that specialised processes 
‘on the chain’ were entirely different from assembling as defined in 
the Metal Trades award. The difference arises when tools of trade are 
used. The employers’ proposed classifications which would in the end 
de-grade great numbers of tradesmen to the ranks of superior process 
workers have therefore been rejected. (p. 609)
Agricultural implements
Similarly, in April 1936, Beeby decided that the provisions of the award for 
agricultural implements should be aligned with those of the metal trades 
award:
I see no reason why the Metal Trades award, with certain variations to 
meet peculiar circumstances, should not be applied to this industry in 
the two States [Victoria and South Australia] in which disputes exist. 
The industry is a manufacturing one in which skill has been modified 
or eliminated in many processes by modern mass production methods. 
But as in motor body building, skill of varying degrees is necessary in 
many processes. (Judgment—Agricultural Implement, etc Industry 36 
CAR 39, 44)
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In so deciding, Beeby overturned earlier findings that tradesmen’s work in 
argricultural implements demanded less in skill than ordinary metal trades 
work (see Chapter 6, Subsection 6.2.2).
Motor bodies (2)
Dethridge in October 1936 reviewed the margin of ‘dent-knockers’ under the 
motor body and coach building award. The margin for the second-class panel 
beater, or dent-knocker, was too high for work performed in connection with 
garnish moulds. That was one side of the picture. On the other side,
I do not think the work can fairly be called vyceman’s work …The mere 
fact that the article, during some of these operations, or part of these 
operations, has to be fixed in a vyce, does not bring it appropriately into 
the class of vyceman’s work as generally understood. … But at the same 
time the work is not only filing or hammering. … A certain amount of 
experience and dexterity are required to get rid of the warping, if I may 
call it so, in the metal, and to get the material to the proper shape after 
removing that warping, or bending, or whatever it may be called. The 
margin of 12s having regard to the dexterity required for the removal of 
such warping or denting as there is, is somewhat on the low side. I think 
it is more than mere repetitive filing, and work requiring some dexterity 
and judgment, which is hardly covered by the margin of 12s at present 
being paid. (Variation—Motor Body and Coach Building Award 36 CAR 
525, 526)
What was required was a new classification: ‘One cannot compute with 
mathematical exactness a margin, but an estimate by comparison with other 
work has to be made. I propose to fix a margin of 17s per week for the work 
in question.’
Radio employees
Drake-Brockman in March 1937 made the first award for professional radio 
employees. ‘The work and operations of the several radio stations concerned 
varies considerably’, he said. ‘I have therefore classified the stations into four 
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groups and provided rates of pay for technical staffs varying in accordance 
with the station classification which I think meets the requirements of the 
circumstances indicated and the differing degrees of skill and responsibility 
involved’ (Judgment—Professional Radio Employees 37 CAR 215, 216). For 
each category of radio station there would be three grades—technician in 
charge, technician, and control-room operator.3 The margins ranged from 
75s for the technician in charge in grade A stations to 30s for control-room 
operators in grade D (p. 219). The decision contains no discussion of the 
actual amounts chosen.
Aircraft manufacture
In July 1938, Beeby made an award for another ‘new’ industry—aircraft 
manufacture. The award prescribed higher rates than those prevailing in the 
metal trades. Fitters, for example, were awarded a margin of 33s (Judgment—
Aircraft Manufacturing 39 CAR 512). In June 1939, Beeby varied the award 
(Variation—Aircraft Industry Award 40 CAR 471). The Civil Aviation Board 
provided for examination of employees after two years on aircraft construction. 
Employees could then be licensed to certify the airworthiness of fuselages, 
engines, instruments, and electrical equipment. Tradesmen so licensed were 
awarded a margin of 45s.
Timber workers
When Dethridge made the timber workers’ award in April 1937, most of the 
award had been settled by agreement—a far cry from the experiences of the 
1920s, when timber workers were at the heart of industrial disputation. The 
union had sought a general industry addition of 3s, but Dethridge did not 
think this justified. The union then argued for a 3s margin for block stackers, 
orderman’s assistants, yard labourers, pullers out on machines, and employees 
in vats and steaming chambers. ‘I think’, said Dethridge, ‘that block stackers 
are required to use a slight degree of skill and care which entitles them to a 
3  ‘Technician-in-charge’ was not included for the lowest category of stations.
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small margin of 2s, but that none of the others are so entitled’ (Judgment—
Timber Workers 37 CAR 273, 277). An increase from 21s to 24s in the margin 
of some machinists was made largely so as to conform to margins prescribed 
in the furniture trades and motor body and coach building awards of the 
Court. Those machinists who set up their machines received an increase of 
6s to 8s, ‘because I think any setting up of such machines deserves the higher 
amount’. Other changes were made ‘because they appear to me to be fair in 
the circumstances and a similar comment applies where no change is made’ 
(pp. 278–279).4
Woolclassers on stations
Woolclassers working on stations were outside the Court’s awards until July 
1937, when Dethridge set rates for them (Judgment—Woolclassers 38 CAR 
68). In the awards for textile workers and wool stores, margins of 21s and 
18s, respectively, applied to woolclassers. But the woolclasser on a station was 
different in that he was ‘vested with much greater responsibility and is also 
required to exercise a considerable degree of supervision over other employees’:
He is entrusted with the duty of so classing and separating the component 
parts of the clip as to make its get-up attractive at the wool sales. And 
he has to so arrange the work of the employees under him—the pickers-
up, fleece-rollers and pressers—as to facilitate the procuring of the most 
satisfactory get-up. The satisfactory performance of these functions 
depends entirely upon his own judgment cultivated by such an amount 
of training and experience as will enable him to make his decisions 
speedily and accurately. It is conceded that his work is important. 
One evidence of this is that the important wool broking firms for the 
purpose of assisting them in arranging their wool sales obtain reports 
4  In December 1937, Dethridge fixed margins in the timber workers’ award in relation 
to the production of sporting goods. ‘Some of the margins’, he said, ‘have been assessed 
by the parties in negotiation. The others are assessed by myself endeavouring to maintain a 
fair relative proportion having regard to my estimate of the skill, etc, involved’ (Variation—
Timber Workers Award (Re Sporting Goods) 38 CAR 686, 687).
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from woolclassers concerning the clips classed by them and also make 
suggestions to them about the future classing of particular clips. (p. 69)
The rates were fixed per thousand sheep shorn, precluding an exact identification 
of a margin; but the guaranteed minimum earnings of woolclassers on stations 
ranged from £7 5s to £8 5s (p. 78). For the times, these were high wages, 
implying that Dethridge gave much weight to the aspects of responsibility 
outlined in his decision.
Road construction
Dethridge drew the line against margin ‘creep’ in a decision of July 1938 about 
road construction (Judgment—Road Construction, etc Workers 39 CAR 859). 
In doing so, he rejected any presumption that all basic wage work was or 
should be equal. A strong appeal had been made for a margin for ‘the pick and 
shovel man’. Dethridge commented:
It is true that he has to work exposed to the wind and sun and his 
toil is more arduous than that of other adult males who receive the 
same basic wage as he gets. But a man of average strength can do pick 
and shovel work without any training, and he has not to exercise any 
judgment or responsibility or incur unusual risk or work in noxious 
surroundings. Some definite attribute of this kind must exist to justify 
a margin in the practice of the Court otherwise awards would abound 
with inconsistencies. It is true that some unskilled work less arduous 
than that of the pick and shovel man is awarded the same basic wage by 
the Court, but this is because the basic wage is adopted as a minimum 
not as a measure of the relative value of different sorts of unskilled work, 
but for reasons of general social welfare. (p. 864)
Such a policy was, of course, implicit in the decisions of Higgins and 
Powers, but it had been eroded during the 1920s by the spread of small margins 
paid to workers of low skill. The ‘pick and shovel man’ must have been close 
to the limiting case. Had a margin been conceded, the basic wage would have 
retained little credibility as an actual wage in payment.
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Bank officials
The relation between the basic wage and ‘skill’ was also considered by Piper in 
a decision about banking published in June 1938 (Judgment—Bank Officials 
29 CAR 1012). As we have noted, Quick had structured the incremental scale 
for male bank clerks so that the 21-year-old clerk received the basic wage (at 
the time of the award). Did this imply that the 21-year-old clerk had no skill?
In Sir John Quick’s judgment there is neither a discussion of nor a 
finding on the question whether the bank clerk of 21 years of age has 
acquired any skill or not. But his wage seems to have been fixed on the 
assumption that at that age he has not sufficiently mastered the duties 
which he may be called upon to perform during his career as a bank 
clerk to be called ‘skilled’. It seems a necessary conclusion from the close 
relation of their wages that this Court has found that the clerk at 21 
years of age has attained only the same degree of ability in his vocation 
as that possessed by any unskilled navvy in an industry in which brawn 
and muscle earn the wage rather than brain and hands. In other words 
this Court has acted on the principle that a bank clerk of 21 years of 
age is unskilled. If this conclusion is not correct one would expect to 
find that the adult bank clerk would have been given a higher minimum 
wage than the unskilled navvy. … I realise of course that an unskilled 
navvy if suddenly called upon to perform the duties of a bank clerk of 
21 years of age would be unable to perform them with any degree of 
efficiency, but on the other hand, the same result would follow if the 
bank clerk were suddenly called upon to do the work of the navvy. Both 
require a certain amount of knowledge and ability in their respective 
spheres. … The basic wage is designed to protect all classes of unskilled 
adult employees irrespective of the type of unskilled work they have to 
perform or of the industry in which they perform it. (pp. 1024–1025)
Piper did not consider—in this case it was unnecessary for him to do so—the 
position outlined by Dethridge in the Road Construction case: that ‘unskilled’ 
workers receiving the basic wage need not be equally unskilled.
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Batteries
In his August 1937 review of the metal trades award, Beeby referred to the 
specific case of wet-battery making, which he had excluded from the increased 
margins awarded in the previous February. In the interim, he had thought 
about the reasons, related to health, which had originally caused him to award 
these workers more than process workers under the award:
I was satisfied then that the element of actual danger had been removed, 
but in spite of that the occupation was unhealthy. It was not a mere 
fancied unhealthiness, but a definite atmosphere which kept the men 
a little below par and compelled them to take special precautions to 
maintain ordinary health. For that reason, I decided they were entitled 
to margins substantially above those of ordinary process workers. 
(Variation—Metal Trades Awards 38 CAR 328, 334)
Beeby could now see no reason why the wet-battery margins should not be 
increased to preserve the previous relation with the margins of process workers.
Boot trades
Beeby, in his decision of September 1938 for the boot trades (discussed in 
the previous subsection), compared the skill requirements of this and other 
industries:
It was not disputed that bootmaking is a skilled trade—skilled in 
the sense that knowledge of the qualities of materials used and high 
manipulative ability acquired by years of experience is necessary in most 
of the processes. … On inspection I was impressed by the candour of 
some large employers of labour. One stated voluntarily that the trouble 
in the trade was that its margins had always been too low. With wage 
rates nearer those of other skilled trades a better type of workman would 
have been attracted to the industry. … From the employees’ point of 
view boot manufacturing has always been the Cinderella of skilled 
trades. … Trades in which skill is only manipulative cannot, of course, 
be on the same footing as those which also call for mental effort, such 
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as engineering, electrical and carpentering. But boot operatives, with 
justice, claim that at least they should be on a higher level than the 
ordinary run of semi-skilled workers. (Consolidated Award—Boot Trades 
39 CAR 940, 945–946)
For 27 years there had been a flat marginal rate in the award (then 12s), 
and the union wished to preserve the flat-rate principle. The employers, on the 
other hand, asked the Court to impose ‘an elaborate classification of margins’, 
which Beeby rejected:
The employers’ claim … sought to impose on the Court the impossible 
task of assessing the comparative value of almost every process. Where 
a product in course of manufacture passes from one trained operative 
to another, where all processes call for the same speed and vigilance and 
where most of the processes are entrusted to tradesmen or apprentices, 
such refinement of classification would be both unjust and impracticable. 
… Relative value of work could not be determined by mere observance 
of processes. (p. 950)
Beeby concluded that due recognition of levels of skills implied that, for 
some tasks, margins would have to fall. The minimum margin would be 9s; 
the maximum (and predominant) margin, 18s (p. 950).
Rubber
We have noted in passing various instances of Judges fixing margins without 
providing more than superficial explanations of the amounts chosen. Another 
example is Drake-Brockman’s decision of November 1938 about the rubber 
industry (Judgment—Rubber Workers 39 CAR 1098). He pointed out that the 
parties had not reached agreement about margins. The following is, in its 
entirety, his commentary on the amounts prescribed:
These margins have been fixed by me. They do not embody very 
substantial departure from the margins heretofore obtaining. The 
few alterations in the amounts now made should bring the respective 
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margins into a better relationship inter se having regard to the skill 
necessary for the performance of the respective operations concerned. 
(p. 1099)
The margins set were thus a product of previous practice and unexplained 
judgments about the need for modification.
Health inspectors
In December 1938, Piper increased the salaries of health inspectors because 
of the increased demands of their positions (Judgment—Health Inspectors 39 
CAR 1301). The control of public health had become more rigorous; the work 
of prevention of disease and limiting its spread had become more onerous; 
Harold Piper
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and the public, whose conscience on health matters had been aroused, was 
becoming more reliant on the inspectors. ‘It is not claimed’, said Piper, ‘that 
health inspectors in fact work longer hours than formerly but I think that the 
present position may be summarised as follows—that compared with 1927–
1928 the health inspectors have been given a more prominent place in the 
public life of the community and this entails greater responsibility, greater 
preparation for the position, a wider knowledge and further study in matters 
pertaining to health’ (p. 1309).
Train drivers
The relative job requirements of drivers of electric and steam trains were 
considered by Drake-Brockman in February 1939 (Variation—Locomotive 
Enginemen’s Award 40 CAR 65). The existing margins of steam train drivers 
were higher than those of electric train drivers, but the union wished to 
raise the electric drivers’ margin to the level of the steam drivers’. On several 
previous occasions, Drake-Brockman had refused such requests ‘because I 
have not been convinced that the same measure of skill has been required 
by the electric train driver as has been required by the steam locomotive 
driver’ (p. 65). Moreover, he had been influenced by the stated attitude of the 
Victorian Railways Commissioners about the recruitment of the two kinds of 
drivers, which implied that less skill was required to drive electric trains. The 
Commissioners, however, had not acted on this basis. Rather, their recruitment 
practice implied that the electric train driver ‘did in fact require the skill and 
particularly the road sense that is required by the steam locomotive engine 
driver’. For this reason, he proposed to raise the electric train driver’s margin 
to equality with the steam driver’s (the margin would be 4s per day in the first 
year, rising to 8s in the sixth (p. 66)).
Meat
In May 1939, Beeby made a new award for the meat industry (Judgment—
Meat Industry 40 CAR 192). Among the issues to be determined was the 
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margin for general butchers working in shops. The existing margin was 18s 
6d, including allowance for clothing. The union sought a margin of 27s plus 
a clothing allowance of 7s 6d. In Beeby’s view, the work was not such as to 
merit the margin paid to skilled mechanics. But it was definitely skilled work:
Employers who gave evidence were almost unanimous in their opinion 
that it took from four to five years to turn out a reasonably competent 
general butcher. In cutting without waste—getting the maximum 
quantity of saleable meat from a carcass and making the final product 
attractive—more skill and longer experience are necessary than is 
popularly supposed. In addition to this a majority of employees are 
called on to act as salesmen and for that period to purchase, launder and 
maintain white coats and aprons. (p. 193)
Beeby awarded 24s for shopmen and 21s for butchers not required to serve 
(inclusive of allowance for clothing and knives).
Summary
The members of the Court, freed to some extent from economic restraints, 
resumed in this period the traditional practice of evaluating jobs by processes 
of comparison—both vertical and horizontal. With few exceptions, however, 
there was little attention to the nature of the wage structure that the Court 
had produced. The exceptions included Beeby’s concerns about the relative 
position of the tradesman and Drake-Brockman’s more broadly expressed 
regret about the degree of compression of relativities. In neither case was 
there a consideration of underlying economic forces which may have tended 
to render earlier relativities obsolete. The Act, the method of procedure and, 
perhaps, the lawyer’s mind did not lend themselves to the raising of issues 
relevant to the demand and supply for different levels of skill. Attention to 
‘work value’ in terms of the characteristics of jobs militated against a broader 
policy of wage relativities.
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12.1.3 The aggregate impact
It is impossible to quantify precisely the contribution of higher margins to the 
increase in wages in the pre-war years. The following calculations, however, 
may throw some light on the matter. The Labour Report provides data of 
the rates applying for particular occupations. I have selected eight low-wage 
occupations, and compared the rates applying on 31 December 1934 and 31 
December 1939.5 The comparison is limited to Melbourne to minimise (but 
not eliminate) complications arising from the operation of State awards and 
determinations. Over the five-year period, the (unweighted) average increase 
in wages for these jobs was 11s 11d. The average increase in Victoria, for all 
occupations covered by the nominal wage index, was 14s 9d (Labour Reports, 
No. 25 (1934), pp. 149–158; No. 30 (1939), pp. 57 and 167–176). A tentative 
inference is that increases in the basic wage accounted for about four-fifths of 
the overall rise in wages, with higher margins representing the balance.
12.2 standard hours
As we saw in Section 10.5 of Chapter 10, the question of working hours 
returned—to a limited degree—to the Court’s agenda in 1933 and 1934. In 
the next five years, the piecemeal transition to the 44-hour week gathered 
pace. A significant impetus to this process, at least in the earlier years, was the 
operation of the shorter week in New South Wales State awards.
An early case involved railways. Drake-Brockman, in March 1935, gave 
a decision for the daily paid general grades in the New South Wales railways 
(Judgment—Daily Paid General Trades, New South Wales Railways 34 CAR 
209). The unions and the railways had been negotiating the terms of awards, 
but had reached a deadlock on the matter of hours. Ordinarily, a decision 
about hours would be reserved to the Full Court, but the parties had agreed 
to Drake-Brockman acting as a private arbitrator and undertook to accept his 
5  The occupations are: sawmilling labourers; agricultural implements—labourers; aerated 
waters—packers; confectionery—storemen; pastrycooking—carters; textiles—general 
labourers; tanning and currying—linemen and yardmen; railway porters (minimum).
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decision. He decided that in the awards concerned the working week should 
be reduced from 48 to 44 hours. He was much influenced by the fact that two-
thirds of the railway employees already worked a 44-hour week under State 
awards. The difference between awards was a cause of serious discontent (pp. 
210–211). But he also took note of an improvement in the financial outlook. 
The railways’ deficit had decreased from £4.5 million in 1931–32 to £1.5 
million in 1933–34. The continuing, but smaller, loss led Drake-Brockman 
to say:
When considering railways finances it is impossible to altogether 
divorce them from the finances of the State because railway services are 
in a very great measure created for the purpose of development, and 
have not to any extent been provided or run as business enterprises. In 
the circumstances, it is almost inevitable that they should be run at a 
loss, and that that loss should be borne by the State Treasury. (p. 212)
The State deficit had fallen from £14 million to £3 million, despite a £6 
million reduction of taxes. Financial stress was no longer an insurmountable 
obstacle to the reduction of hours. In the following July, Drake-Brockman 
(acting again as a private arbitrator) granted the 44-hour week to daily paid 
workers in the New South Wales tramways. There were, he said, about 2000 
people whose hours were regulated, ‘half of whom have been working 44 and 
the other half 48 hours a week which, of course, is absurd’ (Award—New 
South Wales Tramways Daily Paid Grades (Australian Railways Union) (Other 
than Traffic Section) 34 CAR 744).
The Full Court in June 1935 granted the 44-hour week to coachmakers 
employed by the Commonwealth Railways. The case of plumbers and 
carpenters working for this employer was more complex, leading to a mixed 
outcome:
In the other railway systems of the various States the practice as to the 
working hours of these tradesmen is fixed, as to carpenters, by Federal 
or State awards, and as to plumbers by State awards or determinations. 
No consistent principle can be found governing the hours for 
these tradesmen working in connexion with the railways. On the 
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Commonwealth railways covered by this award, when working outside 
they frequently collaborate with men working a 48-hour week, and we 
think this fact is important so far as outside work is concerned. On the 
other hand, when working in the Commonwealth Railways Workshop, 
their conditions seem to be substantially similar to those of other 
workshop employees who have a 44-hour week. For the purpose of this 
particular award we think the working week of these tradesmen should 
be 44 when working in the workshop and 48 when working outside. 
(Variation—Commonwealth Railways Award 34 CAR 688, 689–690)
On the next day, the Full Court awarded 44 hours to woodworkers in 
New South Wales ‘because in the furniture-making industry in New South 
Wales 44 hours is the prevalent working week and has been very largely 
assented to by the employers in that trade’ (Variation—Timber Workers’ Award 
34 CAR 692).
In December 1935, the Full Court delivered a number of ‘hours’ 
decisions on a single day. It granted the 44-hour week to gas industry workers 
(Variation—Gas Employees’ Awards and Agreements 35 CAR 684), adult males 
in the rope and cordage industry (Rope and Cordage Award—Variation (Hours) 
35 CAR 693) and furniture trades workers (Variation—Furniture Trades’ Award 
35 CAR 699). In the case of timber workers, the Court was of the opinion that
no substantial distinction can be made between [their] work and 
other work for which the Court has prescribed a 44-hour week. The 
question to be determined therefore is whether any reduction of the 
working hours prescribed by this award should be made having regard 
to existing financial considerations. … [Financial documents provided 
to the Court] show that the industry has suffered greatly during the 
depression. That it is now improving but has as yet on the whole only 
a very moderate degree of prosperity. We think that there will probably 
be some increase in its welfare but the prospect is not such as to warrant 
a present reduction of the ordinary working hours from 48 to 44 per 
week. Some reduction can, however, in our opinion, be made without 
imperilling the stability of those engaged in the industry. We have 
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concluded that the proper order here is that the award be varied so as 
to substitute a 46-hour week for the present 48. (Variation—Timber 
Workers’ Award 35 CAR 696, 697)
Further consideration would be given to hours in this industry after two years. 
The Court also decided that the nature and condition of the work of employees 
in agricultural implement manufacture ‘entitle them to a shorter week at 
least as much as any other section of the metal trades industry to which the 
reduction has been allowed’, but its consideration of the financial position of 
the industry led it to conclude that it could not, ‘without serious risk of injury 
to the parties concerned’, reduce hours below 46 per week (Standard Hours—
Agricultural Implement, etc Industry 35 CAR 707, 708).6 In South Australia, 
the 46-hour week for workers in the agricultural implements industry would 
come into effect in March 1938. The Court returned in October 1937 to the 
question of standard hours in agricultural implement manufacture. It now 
decided to reduce the working week to 44 hours with effect from March 1938, 
except in South Australia, where the 46-hour week was to take effect in March 
1938 and 44 hours would apply from March 1939.
Having ‘given careful thought to the evidence as to the nature of the 
work of railway employees and also as to the financial position of the South 
Australian Railways’, the Court refused to reduce hours below 96 per fortnight.7 
(Variation—Railway Daily Paid Grades Award (South Australia) 35 CAR 686)
The Full Court in January 1936 dealt with an application by the 
Electrical Trades’ Union seeking the 44-hour week for those of its members 
covered by the metal trades award who did not so far enjoy it. It undertook 
a case-by-case examination of the various classifications of workers, with the 
implication that there needed to be something about the work to justify the 
shorter hours. In the case of linesmen, for example, it said:
6  The reduction was deferred until 1 July 1936, except for South Australia, where it was 
deferred until 1 July 1938. Early in 1936, the parties to the railways’ award in Tasmania 
agreed to reduce hours from 96 per fortnight to 44 per week (Award—Daily Paid and Salaried 
Grades, Tasmanian Railways 35 CAR 766, 767).
7  For some employees, even the 96-hour fortnight constituted a reduction of hours. This 
reduction was deferred until 1 July 1936.
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If linesmen were required to work upon the standards or poles 
substantially the whole of their time, there would be no question that 
the 44-hour week should be allowed. The evidence shows that probably 
they do not average more than 6 hours a day upon the standards. Some 
portion of their time is spent upon preparatory work, and a portion 
in travelling to or from the job. All of them have to do some work 
close to high tension wires but the proportion of such work varies 
greatly; such work is nerve racking and adds weight to the claim for 
the 44-hour week. The relative amounts of live-wire work will probably 
increase with increasing congestion of service. Efforts to reduce time 
spent in travelling and in preparatory work will tend to become more 
successful. On the whole we think the case for a 44-hour week for the 
linesman has been established and the award will be varied accordingly. 
The same working hours will be prescribed for the linesman’s labourer. 
(Variation—Metal Trades Award 35 CAR 718, 720)
The impression suggested by this and other decisions is that while the nature 
of the work remained a relevant consideration, it would be a less exacting 
criterion than hitherto.
In December 1936, the ‘nature-of-the-work’ criterion was discussed in 
a case about wool stores (Standard Hours—Storemen and Packers (Wool, etc 
Stores) 36 CAR 736). The parties had debated the effects of the 1927 metal 
trades decision, wherein Dethridge, as the deciding Judge, had limited the 44-
hour week to classifications for which the conditions of the work warranted 
a reduction of hours below the norm of 48 per week. The Full Court did not 
think it necessary ‘to expatiate upon this point’ and took note of the gradual 
spread of 44 hours. Since 1927,
the Court has admitted other elements in some cases as a justification 
for reducing ordinary working hours to an average of 44 per week, 
among them being unusually disagreeable circumstances of the work. A 
considerable part of the work done by the employees here in hide and 
skin stores is offensive and monotonous. In the wool stores however it is 
questionable whether the intrinsic nature and surroundings of the work 
is such as to establish any special claim to a shortening of working hours. 
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But the 44-hour week is already worked by a considerable number of 
these classes of employees in Australia as well as by an increasingly 
great number of other wage earners whose work is certainly not more 
arduous nor deserving of greater leisure that that now in question. This 
consideration cannot be ignored. … On the whole we think a case is 
made for the provision of an average 44 hour week … (p. 737)
In March 1937 the Full Court reduced to 44 hours the standard week 
in the saddlery, leather, and canvas industry. A difficulty had been created 
by a High Court decision excluding South Australian employers from the 
underlying dispute. Employers in other States objected to the competitive 
advantage that the South Australians would enjoy if the 44-hour week were 
granted. The Court acknowledged the problem but nevertheless acceded to 
the union’s application (Variation—Saddlery, Leather and Canvas Workers’ 
Award 37 CAR 234).
Dealing in June 1937 with an application to vary awards for railway 
workers in Victoria and South Australia, the Full Court (delivering judgment 
on the same day as it published its basic wage decision) referred again to the 
history of the 44-hour week:
In 1927 the Court delivered judgment in what has come to be known 
as the main hours case and therein laid down certain principles which 
have been accepted as a guide in the granting or withholding of reduced 
working hours. Between 1927 and 1933 no applications for reduction 
were granted on account of the depressed condition of industry in 
Australia. Since 1933 many successful applications for reduction 
have been made to the Court. The principles laid down in the main 
case have been elaborated and extended in subsequent decisions and 
to some extent the Court has been influenced by the general trend in 
Australia towards a uniform working week of 44 hours. In all cases dealt 
with by the Court the financial condition of the industry concerned 
has been taken into account and in certain cases where the financial 
condition was doubtful, the decrease asked for has been withheld—or 
postponed—even though the working conditions comply generally with 
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the principles that have guided the Court in this regard. (Variation—
Victorian and South Australian Railways Awards and Agreement 37 CAR 
937, 938)
In response to the railway employers’ plea of financial incapacity, the 
Court reiterated the argument (by now blessed by Reddaway in the basic 
wage case) that the developmental purposes of railways made normal financial 
criteria less relevant, but it took into account the budgetary conditions of the 
States. These had improved, but (especially in South Australia) were still not 
fully satisfactory. The Court was
convinced of the desirability of establishing, as soon as practicable, 
uniformity as to hours in each railway system considered separately. 
The Court therefore determines, in principle, that the hours of railway 
employees in the States of Victoria and South Australia shall be 44 
per week or 88 per fortnight. Having regard, however, to the financial 
conditions already touched on, and having regard also to the altered basic 
wage provided for in a judgment delivered to-day, and to the necessity 
for allowing sufficient time for the States concerned to make necessary 
financial adjustments, the Court makes the following orders … As to 
the South Australian railway employees concerned in these proceedings, 
other than steam engine drivers and firemen, the introduction of the 
44-hour week or 88-hour fortnight is indefinitely postponed. As to 
Victorian railway employees concerned in these proceedings, other 
than steam engine drivers and firemen, the 44-hour week or 88-hour 
fortnight shall come into operation as and from the commencement of 
the first pay period after the 1st day of January, 1938. (p. 939)
Also on the same day, the Court published its decision about standard 
hours of wool and basil workers (Variation—Wool and Basil Workers’ Award 37 
CAR 959). The Court had refused applications for shorter hours in December 
1934 and November 1935. The noxious nature of the work justified a reduction 
of hours, but the Court had refused to take any action that might increase the 
tendency to send abroad skins for treatment and wool for scouring. Since 
the earlier decisions, the danger of contraction of local production had, if 
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anything, increased. The Court therefore refused a reduction of hours. It 
returned to the matter in October 1938 (see below).
In September 1937, the Full Court refused a reduction of hours for 
engine drivers and firemen not employed on shift work (Variation—Engine 
Drivers’ and Firemen’s Award 38 CAR 303) and granted a reduction to 
municipal employees (but with effect from the following January) (Variation 
of Award—Municipal Employees 38 CAR 306). In neither case did the Court 
give explicit reasons for its decision.
In a decision of November 1937 about shift workers employed by 
the State Electricity Commission in Victoria, the Court made a somewhat 
complicated alteration in working hours. In essence, it reduced the standard 
hours from 48 to 44, but provided for a week of 43 hours and 5 minutes if 
the shifts included Sundays unless the employer provided at least one week 
of annual leave (Judgment—Engine Drivers and Firemen (State Electricity 
Commission of Victoria) 38 CAR 641, 643). Since the employer had already 
provided two weeks leave voluntarily, the practical effect of the decision seems 
to have been limited to the introduction of a 44-hour week.
In November 1937, the Full Court revisited working hours in the 
timber industry (Variation—Timber Workers Award 38 CAR 644). As we have 
seen, it had in December 1935 reduced hours in this industry from 48 to 
46. This was to operate for a period of two years, which was now near to 
expiry. Financial information supplied by the employers caused the Court 
to have some doubt about a further reduction of hours in the bush-milling 
section of the industry, ‘but after weighing the considerations for and against 
the introduction of the 44-hour week we have concluded that the better 
course in existing circumstances is to make the reduction from 46 to 44 hours 
throughout all the sections covered by these awards, the reduction to come 
into effect on 1st January, 1938’ (p. 645). It will be recalled that Higgins had 
granted the 44-hour week to timber workers in 1921. The 48-hour week was 
partially restored in 1929. The process of moving from a 48-hour standard to 
one of 44 hours in this industry had indeed been tortuous.
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The Full Court gave several decisions in April 1938 reducing hours to 
44 per week in the South Australian Railways with effect from 1st October (for 
example, Variation—Engine Drivers and Firemens’ Award (South Australian 
Railways) 39 CAR 198). It also introduced the 44-hour week in the glass, 
aerated waters, and yeast and vinegar industries (Variation of Award—Glass 
Workers 39 CAR 211; Variation of Award—Liquor Trades (Aerated Waters 
Section) 39 CAR 212; Variation of Award—Liquor Trades (Yeast and Vinegar 
Section) 39 CAR 213). Few reasons were given. In the aerated waters decision, 
the Court said that there was some risk of damage to the industry, but ‘we 
cannot overlook the fact that in New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania 
they are working 44 hours per week’.
Drake-Brockman, presumably acting with the employer’s consent, in 
May 1938 adopted a recommendation of the Victorian Railways Classification 
Board that the hours of shunters, leading shunters, signalmen (1st class), 
and signalmen (special) be reduced to 84 per fortnight (Variation—Railway 
Employees Award, Victoria 39 CAR 258).
In a brief decision of May 1938, the Court applied the 44-hour week to 
the meat industry (Variation—Meat Industry Award 39 CAR 274).
Dethridge in July 1938 commented on the position of road construction 
workers in South Australia (Judgment—Road Construction, etc Workers 39 
CAR 859). Thier work had hitherto been regulated by State awards. Although 
Dethridge thought that State regulation should continue, working hours 
presented a special problem. In every part of the Commonwealth except South 
Australia, the 44-hour week now operated for road construction. If longer 
hours were to continue in South Australia, the ‘discriminating contrast’ was 
likely to cause friction. ‘I think’, said Dethridge, ‘that until the 44-hour week 
is adopted for these employees in the service of the State of South Australia, 
this Court’s award should apply and that State is accordingly bound in respect 
of ordinary working hours’ (p. 860).
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A further union application for a 44-hour week for wool and basil 
workers led to a Full Court decision of October 1938, wherein the Court 
concluded, somewhat grudgingly, that the time had come to make the change:
In 1934, 1935 and 1937, the Court dealt with similar applications by 
this Federation and while stating that the nature of the work was such 
as to make the proposed reduction desirable felt compelled to refuse 
it because of the difficulty experienced by the industry in coping with 
foreign competitors. That difficulty still exists; it is not improbable that 
in this industry the adoption of the 44-hour week will lead to a loss of 
business for employers and a loss of employment for employees. But 
the Federation, though warned by the Court of this danger, is so averse 
to working a 48-hour week while the 44-hour week prevails in other 
industries that it disregards this risk. Since the Court’s decision of 23rd 
June, 1937, the members of the Federation in New South Wales were 
able to bring such pressure upon employers in that State that in August, 
1937, the 44-hour week was adopted and has ever since continued in 
operation. There seems to be no doubt that since August, 1937, in this 
industry the drift of business away from New South Wales employers 
and employees to foreign employers and employees has increased. … 
So long as the 44-hour week continues in New South Wales this Court 
cannot expect that in other States this industry can be treated as an 
exception to the prevailing standard of 44 hours for work of the kind 
in question even though the industry may be unable to maintain itself 
with the 44-hour week. Whether we grant or refuse the 44-hour week 
the industry will meet trouble. We think that in the long run the lesser 
evil for the industry will be the reduction of the ordinary working week 
to 44 hours, the reduction to come into operation on 1st January, 1939. 
(Variation—Wool and Basil Workers Award 39 CAR 1056, 1057)
This was but one of a number of cases in which the momentum toward 
shorter hours, gathering strength case by case, became a telling factor in the 
Court’s decisions.
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Beeby (now Chief Justice) in March 1939 made an award whereby 
porcelain enamelling in Victoria and South Australia came under an award 
of the Court for the first time. In New South Wales, he said, men engaged as 
dusters and dusters’ assistants worked between 36 and 40 hours per week; but 
in Victoria they worked 48 hours. ‘Their hours’, he said, ‘will now be 44 per 
week and I will ask the Full Court to decide whether there should be a further 
reduction’ (Judgment—Oven, Stove, Bedstead and Fender Making 40 CAR 104, 
109). In May, on the other hand, he refused a 44-hour week in the ham and 
bacon section of the meat industry in a decision that savours of punishment 
for past industrial misbehaviour:
Employers complained that margins were considerably in excess of 
those originally prescribed and had been forced up to their present level 
by direct action in defiance of awards of this Court, first by 6s per week 
and later by another 2s 6d per week. When employees resorted to direct 
action employers agreed to pay this extra wage under circumstances 
which suggest that the industry could carry higher wages than those 
awarded and the additional rate has persisted both by agreement and 
award up to the present. At a later stage, a further addition of 2s 6d 
per week was secured by employees in Victoria. Employers disputed 
the justice of this addition but to avert industrial trouble during the 
busy season it was awarded by Mr Commissioner Coneybeer. Without 
comment on the action of the Commissioner I think it would be unjust 
to load employers with the extra cost of a 44-hour week as well as the 
last increase in wage rates. (Judgment—Meat Industry 40 CAR 192, 195)
The Full Court (Beeby, Piper, and O’Mara) in May 1939 revisited the 
hours worked by engine drivers and firemen. These workers typically had the 
role of supplying steam or power to the industries of their employers; and it 
had been the practice of the Court to fix hours of work that matched those 
of the industry concerned. In cool stores, most workers were employed for 
44 hours, but men engaged in the delivery of ice worked 48 hours and the 
employers argued that a 44-hour week for the engine drivers whose work 
was necessary for the supply of the ice would disturb their operations and 
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cause considerable expense. ‘The expense involved in such a change’, said the 
Court, ‘is not sufficient to justify denial to engine drivers of the now generally 
accepted standard 44 hours. … In order, however, to facilitate the rostering of 
shiftmen the hours are fixed at 88 per fortnight with a direction that not more 
than 48 hours shall be worked in any one week’ (Variation—Engine Drivers 
and Firemen’s (Cool Stores) Award 40 CAR 276, 277).
In June 1939, the Full Court, similarly constituted, dealt with the working 
hours of Victorian tramways’ employees (the matter having been referred by 
Drake-Brockman) (Variation—Tramway Employees’ Award (Melbourne and 
Metropolitan Tramways Board) 40 CAR 306). Beeby and O’Mara said that 
the main arguments advanced in support of a reduction were ‘that this Court 
has extended 44 hours to most industries including railway traffic services 
and that most similar services in Australasia had adopted the 44-hour week’ 
(p. 307). In opposing a reduction of hours, the Melbourne and Metropolitan 
Tramways Board had invoked its financial position. Beeby and O’Mara noted, 
however, that the Board’s deficits arose from ‘extraneous obligations imposed 
on the Board by the Act’, namely, making payments to the Queen’s Memorial 
Infectious Diseases Hospital Board, the Metropolitan Fire Brigades’ Board, 
and certain municipalities (pp. 309 and 312). The Board’s finances compared 
‘not unfavourably with those of public utilities to which a 44-hour week has 
been applied’ and did not justify the withholding of the shorter working week. 
They granted an 88-hour fortnight, to take effect in October (p. 315). Piper 
agreed with this outcome.
In June 1939, Drake-Brockman made a new award for the coal 
industry (Judgment—Coal Mining Industry 40 CAR 367). The background 
was a strike lasting for more than six weeks in September and October 1938. 
During the strike, the unions were informed that once work was resumed, 
the Court would promptly deal with all matters in contention which were of 
an industrial character. Hours were among them. Drake-Brockman said that, 
while the Act reserved to the Full Court the function of varying hours, there 
was ‘no limitation imposed which prevents the Court from fixing the hours of 
work of employees in an industry’. He declared that there were no standard 
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hours in the industry, no hours having ever been fixed by the Court. After 
discussing, with some sympathy, a union argument that shorter hours would 
lead to more employment, he stated that this was not a reason for his decision:
The small reduction in hours made by the awards issued herewith is not 
made with any intention of correcting unemployment; but because of 
the nature of the industry and of the conditions under which the majority 
of employees in it are compelled to work. All work underground is hard 
and hazardous. Superimposed on the hard and dangerous character of 
the work is the constant fear of these men of contracting lung diseases 
… In similar cases in other occupations the Court has considered that 
a complete absence from dust-laden atmosphere for as long as possible 
in each week was the best means available to it to reduce the risks of 
contracting silicosis and other lung infections. I propose to follow the 
same reasoning in this case. I have as a consequence provided that there 
shall be no work underground on Saturdays and Sundays except for 
essential services and safety of mines. (p. 378)
The decision was to award, for underground work, a 40-hour week to 
be worked over five days. The case for shorter hours above ground was ‘not 
so strong’, but as some employer witnesses supported uniformity of hours in 
the industry, Drake-Brockman provided for a general 40-hour week. This was 
later reviewed by the Full Court which, by majority (Beeby and Piper, with 
Drake-Brockman dissenting) limited the 40-hour week to underground work 
(Variation—Coal Mining Industry Awards 41 CAR 37, 47, 49).
The Full Court (Beeby, Piper and O’Mara) in August 1939 published 
two decisions which effectively announced that the 44-hour week was now 
the norm. In one, relating to carters and drivers, Beeby and O’Mara said that 
the employers had resisted the reduction of hours because of their financial 
position. ‘It was urged’, they said,
that a decrease in hours would result in increased costs which could not 
be passed on, particularly in the case of master carriers in competition 
with owner drivers, who escape any regulation of hours. The evidence 
on this point was fragmentary and unconvincing. Such competition 
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undoubtedly exists, but it was not proven to be great enough to justify 
refusal … of the now usual standard. (Variation—Carters and Drivers 
Awards 40 CAR 524, 525)
Piper, in a longer judgment, discussed the submission of S C G Wright, 
counsel for the South Australian respondents, who claimed that since 1927 
the Court had observed a concept of ‘equation of leisure’. This concept 
was implicit in the judgment of Dethridge in the Main Hours case. Piper 
acknowledged that Dethridge did say:
A just standard of hours of labour in industry is that which places the 
workers in all industries on what is really, and not merely superficially, 
the same footing in point of leisure. Inasmuch as in some industries 
the day’s work deprives the workers of opportunity and capacity for 
enjoyment more than in others, the number of hours to be worked 
must vary accordingly to secure general fair treatment. (p. 527)
Thomas O’Mara
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Dethridge’s position had prevailed, not because it was a shared view of the 
Court but because of the divergent positions of Beeby and Lukin. Because 
of this division, Dethridge’s approach was adopted for some time. Piper 
continued:
But after 1933 and with the change in the constitution of the Court 
other factors gradually came to be taken into consideration. Beeby J 
had never at any time approved of the test of the equation of leisure as 
the only ground for granting reductions though at times he applied it. 
Drake-Brockman J has never stated expressly his approval of it as stated 
by Dethridge C J in 1927. After a very careful and full consideration 
of the decisions of the Court since 1933 I do not think it can be said 
that the Court has recently acted on the doctrine of equation of leisure 
as laid down in 1927. … With regard to the nature of the work the 
Court, including Dethridge C J, particularly in the last two or three 
years, has granted many applications in which the work has not been 
like that of a factory worker on concentrated repetitive work. Gradually 
the reduction has been extended … (p. 538)
In Piper’s view, ‘the doctrine of the equation of leisure had been discarded 
by this Court by the end of 1938’. The Court had ‘adopted the 44 hour week 
as the standard for industry under its control’ and would grant it unless 
satisfied that special circumstances existed. Two such special circumstances 
were implicit in ‘the reasonable applicability test and the economic principle, 
and I do think that the Court has or should cease to take them into account 
or under proper circumstances refuse to apply them’ (p. 539). He was not 
persuaded by the attempt of the principal employers’ counsel to plead that 
a general deterioration of economic conditions warranted refusal of the 
union application. The Court might ‘be faced with the necessity of giving 
consideration to the present wage cost in industry’; but this was not a ground 
‘for refusing to bring this industry into line with general existing standards 
with regard to hours’ (p. 540).
In the other decision published on the same day, for storemen and 
packers, it was Beeby and O’Mara who wrote at length (Standard Hours—
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Storemen and Packers (General Stores) 40 CAR 544). The award before them 
applied to South Australia and Tasmania; in all other States, the operative 
awards prescribed a 44-hour week. Reviewing the history traversed by Piper in 
the carters and drivers case, Beeby and O’Mara said:
The doctrine of the equation of leisure was never adopted by a majority 
of the bench as the only or as the main test to be applied, and we do 
not consider the Court obliged to regard the decision in which the test 
was first promulgated as being more than persuasive. The question now 
before the Court is the same as that under consideration in 1927 only 
to the extent that a shortening of the 48-hour week is sought. In other 
respects the situation is vastly different. Circumstances have changed, 
and what Dethridge C J felt was ‘fraught with danger to the workers 
themselves’ and Lukin J regarded as ‘spelling retrogression’ has taken 
place, namely, a general shortening of the 48-hour week, and with such 
change has gone the need for relying on any original doctrines stated by 
individual judges.
We are forced to the conclusion that the ultimate conclusion reached by 
the Court was that the 44-hour week should be accepted as the standard 
for Australian industry with such exceptions as special circumstances 
demanded. A declaration to that effect is now explicitly made by the 
Court. (pp. 548–549)
Thus after 12 years of case-by case change—sometimes halting, 
sometimes accelerated—the 44-hour week was declared to be the standard 
for federal awards. Deviations were possible, but required special justification. 
Significantly, Beeby and O’Mara added: ‘The mere fact that a reduction of 
hours will involve employers in extra costs is not sufficient to justify refusal of 
this now accepted general standard’ (p. 550).8 It was with this standard that 
Australia, 19 days later, entered World War II.
8  On the same day, the Full Court deferred a decision about the introduction of the 44-hour 
week for tugs, lighters, dredges, etc because it had been told that a reduction of standard hours 
would have no effect except to increase overtime payments. It thought that a decision about 
hours should await a full review of the award by a single judge (Variation—Merchant Service 
Guild Award 40 CAR 553).
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It would be easy, however, to exaggerate the reduction of working hours 
during this period. Under some State awards, notably in New South Wales and 
Queensland, the 44-hour week was largely achieved during the 1920s; and it 
was partially achieved under federal awards after the metal trades decision of 
1927. The Commonwealth Statistician’s statistics of nominal hours of labour 
were, like the data of nominal wages, based on the provisions of awards and 
formal agreements.9 Chapter 8 noted that average hours of adult males at 
the end 1929 and the end of 1934 were virtually identical: 45.34 and 45.36 
respectively. At the end of 1939, they were 44.29. By States, the reductions in 
male hours over the five years and the averages at the end of the period were:
Thus New South Wales and Queensland, the States with the smallest 
reductions, remained the States with the shortest working weeks, confirming 
that in those States the reduction of hours had largely been accomplished by 
1934 (and in fact by 1929).
In the 1930s, unions were developing a campaign for a 40-hour week. 
The 1937 Congress of the ACTU gave its support to this campaign (Hagan 
1981, p. 102; Beever 1985). In 1936 the International Labour Organisation 
adopted a Convention in favour of a 40-hour week. To the embarrassment of 
the government, its representative, Sir Frederick Stewart, voted in favour of 
the resolution (Beever 1985, p. 4). The 40-hour week was not, however, an 
objective that was seriously pressed in the Arbitration Court, possibly because 
9  The hours data exclude two industry groups—shipping and agriculture—which are 
included in the wage data. The Statistician stated that in the two excluded groups ‘working 
hours have not been generally regulated by industrial tribunals’. See, for example, Labour 
Report, No. 30, 1939, p. 66.
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unions were aware that the prospects of success were negligible, except in 
industries with special characteristics.
12.3 recreatIon leave
Since Higgins’ time, the Court had generally adopted the practice of providing 
in its awards for paid public holidays.10 It did not award annual leave (except 
when the parties agreed to it) unless the work had some adverse feature for 
which leave might be an offset. There was, however, a significant range of 
employment, largely in the public sector, where the employers had voluntarily 
conceded annual leave. In April 1936, Dethridge described the ‘state of play’:
This Court has frequently been asked to award annual leave on full pay 
but has hitherto not done so except in cases where employees have to 
work on Sunday, or suffer some other deprivation by reason of isolation 
or other cause, or in cases where such leave has become the custom 
generally by the practice of most of the parties concerned. The State 
awards and registered agreements in New South Wales appear to follow 
substantially the same practice, but with some extensions to other 
cases of limited extent. In Queensland and Western Australia the State 
awards in general frequently provide for paid annual leave. In Victoria, 
South Australia, and Tasmania paid annual leave in private employment 
seems to be rare in factories. In all the States, employees of the State or 
of State instrumentalities or municipalities obtain annual leave on full 
pay, whether or not they have to work on Sundays. In all the States 
employees of banks receive some such leave, and so also do most shop 
employees. (Judgment—Commercial Printing 36 CAR 738, 746)
Dethridge then proposed a cautious change of policy:
Unless an industry is finding difficulty in maintaining itself, in my 
opinion the institution of paid annual leave is a very desirable boon 
for employees. … The introduction of annual leave with pay should 
not however be made in an industry unless at the time there is a 
10  A typical provision was for holidays on New Year’s Day, Easter (three days, including 
Saturday), the Sovereign’s Birthday, union picnic day, Christmas Day, and Boxing Day.
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reasonable certainty of stable prosperity in the industry. As a remedy 
for unemployment it would, like the reduction of weekly working 
hours, almost certainly be valueless, and it might indeed be harmful. 
… [The commercial printing] industry has I think recovered from the 
depression, but its restoration is recent and may not be lasting. … I 
have decided to prescribe annual leave for a week with full pay for the 
employees in this industry, but to defer its operation until the expiration 
of a year from the commencement of the award. The prescription will 
then begin to operate unless the employers concerned satisfy a judge 
of the Court that the financial position of the industry then will be 
such that such operation will imperil the maintenance of the industry. 
… I think there should be at least six months service before any right 
accrues. In the Soviets the right does not accrue until the worker has 
worked five and a half months in the same undertaking. (p. 747)
Initially, Dethridge’s attitude was at odds with that of Drake-Brockman, 
who saw annual leave as a ‘privilege’ which employers might grant but which 
should not be awarded except by consent. As we saw in Section 10.9 of 
Chapter 10, Drake-Brockman had articulated this view, in a Commonwealth 
Railways case, in December 1932. He reasoned that since the wages awarded 
to different groups of workers did not take into account benefits such as 
leave, those benefits ought not to be part of the Court’s normal agenda. His 
distinction between entitlements and privileges was set out in a decision of 
March 1936 about Tasmanian railways:
I propose to do what the parties ask in this regard. I point out, however, 
that there are many provisions in the agreement which I have indicated, 
from time to time, I will not include in railway awards. Many matters 
I regard as matters of privilege, to be granted or withheld by the 
Commissioner or the Parliaments of the States concerned, and not 
to be ordered by the Court. Long-service leave is one such matter. I 
am glad to see the employees get such leave and the Commissioner 
consent to it, but it is not a matter which this Court awards. Where the 
Commissioners agree to it, and the Parliaments are willing to provide 
the money involved, I do not propose to omit the agreed provisions from 
647Keith Hancock
a consent award. … Such matters as long-service leave and free passes 
over the railways are not taken into account when assessing wages, and 
therefore should not be included in adjudicated awards. Railway wages 
are assessed on the same basis as the wages of all other wage-earners 
in the community who do not enjoy free passes over the railways or 
long-service leave. (Award—Daily Paid and Salaried Grades, Tasmanian 
Railways 35 CAR 766, 767)
In another decision of March 1936, Drake-Brockman stated his opinion that 
‘the question of annual leave is not a matter that should be determined by this 
Court, particularly since this Court does not take it into account when fixing 
margins for employees’ (Interim Award—Railway Employees—South Australian 
Refreshment Rooms, etc 35 CAR 793, 794).
Despite Dethridge’s innovation in the commercial printing case, 
movement was initially slow. Beeby, in making his award for the textile 
industry in December 1937, made a modest provision for leave. He explained:
Chief Judge Dethridge in his Printing trades award made provision for 
a week’s holiday on full pay to come into operation at a future date. 
State tribunals in Queensland and New South Wales are also moving 
cautiously in the same direction. The justice of the claim of industrialists 
to a concession largely enjoyed by all other sections of the community 
cannot be disputed. The granting of such claims however depends on 
the financial condition of the industry concerned. In this industry I 
think the time is opportune for a holiday concession. (Judgment—
Textile Workers 38 CAR 791, 796)
Beeby’s ‘concession’ was to prescribe a ‘break’ from Christmas Day to New 
Year’s Day, but to delete two of the listed public holidays. The net effect, he 
said, was to provide two days of extra leave.
In June 1938, Dethridge convened a Full Court to consider the award of 
annual leave in commercial printing (Variation—Commercial Printing Award 
39 CAR 553). He explained: ‘Inasmuch as constant service leave in such a 
case as the present is an innovation in the practice of the Court, I thought it 
desirable to ask my colleagues to sit with me upon this application.’ Speaking 
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for himself, he said that the material and arguments before the Court had ‘not 
changed my opinion expressed when making this award that such leave should 
be prescribed where it is feasible nor have they satisfied me that the economic 
position of the industry is such as to justify a postponement of the operation 
of the leave provision’. But he was prepared to consider an application to vary 
the award by inserting a clause similar to that in the textiles award. Beeby 
agreed: ‘I think that leave on full pay … is desirable and its extension should 
be continued, subject to the economic circumstances of the industry in which 
application is made.’ Drake-Brockman also concurred, making no reference to 
‘privileges’. Dethridge subsequently varied the award so as to allow employers 
to meet the leave requirement by granting the days between Boxing Day and 
New Year’s Day (p. 555).
Dethridge, in his decision of July 1938 about road construction workers, 
said that annual leave was ‘a great boon which tends in the long run to the 
better and smoother carrying on of operations’ (Judgment—Road Construction, 
etc Workers 39 CAR 859, 865). The award provided a week’s leave in addition 
to public holidays. Drake-Brockman, in September 1938, prescribed 14 
days leave for professional radio employees. This appeared from the evidence 
to accord with the existing practice of country radio stations (Award—
Professional Radio Employees (Broadcasting) 39 CAR 597). In November 1938, 
Drake-Brockman prescribed a period of leave for rubber workers ‘over the 
normal Christmas period’. Employees required to work during that period 
were to have a week’s leave at some other time (Judgment—Rubber Workers 39 
CAR 1098, 1100, 1109). Beeby, on the other hand, in May 1939, refused an 
application for annual leave for retail butchers:
I regret being forced to the conclusion that the industry is not one 
in which a full week’s holiday should be universally awarded. The 
disturbance of the business of small shops in which contact between the 
customer and the shopman is essential would be too great. Then again 
the margin of profit at present is too low to justify imposing the extra 
cost on all employers. A studied proposal, made when the industry is 
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more prosperous, to secure annual leave in shops in which more than 
a certain number of employees is employed will be considered in the 
future. (Judgment—Meat Industry 40 CAR 192, 195)
Thus there were relatively few arbitral decisions about annual leave. 
It was frequently provided by agreement. There are, however, no available 
statistics that indicate its prevalence.
12.4 female rates
Between 1935 and 1939, decisions about the relative wages of females and 
males were rare. The few exceptions included the following:
•	 In August 1935, Dethridge set new rates for female clerks 
under the Municipal Officers Award for Victoria (Award—
Municipal Officers (Victoria) 35 CAR 133). Under the previous 
award, the rates ranged from £75 per annum for girls aged 
less than 17 to £160 for women who were 22 years or older. 
These rates had not been subject to reductions for falling 
prices. Dethridge rejected the employers’ proposal that they 
be reduced in proportion to the fall in the basic wage, because 
part of the wage (unspecified) could be seen as a margin. But 
the rates ‘must come down to less than they were when the 
current basic wage for males was £4 12s’. The basic wage had 
fallen by 24 per cent. The new award prescribed a range for 
female clerks from £60 to £150 — reductions of 15 per cent 
at the minimum and 7 per cent at the maximum.
•	 The Full Court in November 1935 approved a ‘flat’ basic 
wage (not varying by location) of 75s in the food preserving 
industry. The female minimum would be 41s (54.7 per cent of 
the basic wage) (Judgment—Food Preserving Industry 35 CAR 
481). In December 1937 the Full Court varied this award 
along lines agreed by the parties. The award now provided, for 
males, ‘a flat basic wage of £3 11s (assessed on the combined 
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index number for Sydney, Melbourne, Adelaide, and Hobart) 
plus a constant loading of 5s and an industry allowance of 2s’. 
The corresponding amounts for females were 39s, 2s 9d, and 
1s 3d—a total of 43s (55.1 per cent of the male minimum) 
(Judgment—Food Preserving Industry 37 CAR 833).
•	 In the basic wage case of 1937, the unions sought minimum 
rates for females equal to 60 per cent of the basic wage. The 
Court, however, was content to indicate that female minima 
should rise so as to maintain existing proportional relativities 
with the basic wage (see Chapter 11, Subsection 11.2.6).
•	 In June 1938, Drake-Brockman varied the award for 
Tasmanian railways by prescribing a rate of 39s 6d per week 
for ‘buffet attendants (female)’. He said that there should be 
no margin for this classification. In setting the rate, he had 
‘taken into account the value of the food and other privileges 
provided for them by the Commissioner’ (Variation—
Tasmanian Railways Award 39 CAR 415).
•	 Making an award for rope and cordage workers, Beeby, in 
June 1939, said that improvements in the fortunes of the 
industry enabled him ‘to increase marginal allowances and 
female and junior wage rates to the level which I would have 
established four years ago but for financial reasons. … The 
minimum wage payable to females has been fixed at 54 per 
cent of that of males and a morning rest period has been 
awarded’ (Award—Rope and Cordage Workers 40 CAR 347).
There was, so far as I am aware, little or no commentary in the Court’s 
decisions on the rationale for unequal wages for males and females, although 






Wage regulation, at its inception, was neither blessed nor opposed by 
professional economic opinion, because there was none. At the beginning of 
the 20th century, Australian economics was close to non-existent. Those few 
people in other disciplines—such as philosophy, history and law—who had 
interests in the subject scarcely merited description as ‘economists’ (La Nauze 
1949; Goodwin 1966).1 Two decades would elapse before a significant group 
began to form. The first appointees as academic economists seem to have been 
R F Irvine and E O G Shann. Irvine, after lecturing part-time for several 
years, moved from the State Public Service to become Professor of Economics 
at Sydney University in 1912. His economics were unorthodox. In 1922, at 
age 61, he resigned his Chair (under pressure).2 Although he remained active 
until the 1930s, Irvine was completely disregarded by the newly emerging 
mainstream.3 As we have seen, he was the principal ‘expert’ witness relied upon 
1  In the 19th century, the economist Stanley Jevons spent time in Sydney as assayer of the 
mint. La Nauze (1949) discusses the economic thought of Jevons and of W E Hearn, a 
Professor of Law at Melbourne University, and David Syme, editor of The Age.
2  A brief biography of Irvine is provided by McFarlane (1964). Irvine’s successor in the 
Sydney Chair of Economics was R C Mills.
3  McFarlane (1964, p. 18) says that he advised E G Theodore, the Treasurer in the Labor 
Government, and assisted with speeches delivered by Theodore in 1931. In 1933 Irvine 
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by the unions in the 1930–31 basic wage case. Though treated courteously by 
the Court, he failed to counter the evidence of Copland. Shann was appointed 
Professor of History and Economics at the University of Western Australia in 
1912. He was apparently an effective teacher of economic principles, but not 
until the late 1920s did he emerge as a participant in wider economic debate.4 
Herbert Heaton, an economic historian of note, had an appointment in adult 
education at Adelaide in the late 1910s and early 1920s, but had no apparent 
impact on economic thought in Australia.5
The British Association met in Sydney in 1914. Papers about wage 
determination were presented to the economics section (and subsequently 
published in the Economic Journal) by George Beeby (1915), F W Eggleston 
(1915), and F A A Russell (1915). Beeby spoke of ‘the tendency … for the 
regulation of details steadily to increase, and each year industrial regulation 
has become more complex and inelastic’ (p. 323). He believed that the 
existing system obstructed efficiency, ‘mainly owing to fixing standard rates 
instead of minima, and to the failure of our Courts to popularise payment 
by results with reasonable safeguards against sweating or undue “speeding 
up”’. Apprenticeship was discouraged by union-imposed restrictions and by 
the high wages prescribed for apprentices, which caused employers to rely 
on immigration as a source of skilled labour (p. 326). Beeby looked forward 
to a time of fewer regulations, ‘which will amount to the prescribing of a 
universal bare living standard, below which there will be no competition for 
employment’. He believed that, when this occurred, ‘the old economic forces 
will again come into play, and that education, with the maintenance of easily 
accessible tribunals for arbitration, will lead to industrial peace far more rapidly 
published privately The Midas Touch (Hassal Press, Adelaide), criticising orthodox remedies 
for economic depression. I have not seen this book; but it was sympathetically reviewed by 
Foenander (1934).
4  For a summary of Shann’s career, see Snooks (1991).
5  He did, however, publish an account of basic wage prescription, observing that ‘for nearly 
thirty years the Australian experiments in wages regulation have attracted the attention of 
students of economic problems the world over’ (Heaton 1921, p. 309). Heaton later published 
an Australian version of his well-known textbook (Heaton 1925). This contains a (largely 
descriptive) account of the wage-fixing system.
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than the compulsory laws with which we have been experimenting’ (p. 328). 
Eggleston was a major figure in Australian social science in the first half of the 
century.6 His paper had some economic content, discussing the possibilities 
and the realities of adjusting income shares by wage regulation. Russell’s had 
none. He was Chairman of the New South Wales wages boards and described 
the development of wage-fixing machinery in New South Wales.7
The Australian tribunals (especially the Victorian wages boards) 
attracted a good deal of notice from abroad. Among the visitors who came 
to learn about them were the Americans Clark (1906; 1909), Hammond 
(1913), and Sells (1924); and the Britons Aves (1908) and Rankin (1916).8 
Of these, Rankin provided the most ‘economic’ appraisal of conciliation and 
arbitration. Though prepared to concede a moral case for legal intervention to 
counter ‘sweating’, she was otherwise hostile to the system. The state, in her 
view, had no legitimate role beyond facilitating the ‘higgling’ of the market.9 
Commentators from afar included Alfred Marshall, who did not necessarily 
condemn the Australian innovations but resisted their translation to Britain:
And the proposal that a minimum wage should be fixed by authority 
of Government below which no man may work, and another below 
which no woman may work, has claimed the attention of students for a 
long while. If it could be made effective, its benefits would be so great 
that it might gladly be accepted, in spite of the fear that it would lead 
to malingering and some other abuses; and that it would be used as a 
leverage for pressing for a rigid artificial standard of wages, in cases in 
which there was no exceptional justification for it. But, though great 
improvements in the details of the scheme have been made recently, 
6  He was later knighted. Among the offices that he held was the (inaugural) chairmanship of 
the Commonwealth Grants Commission (1933–41).
7  Russell, like Irvine, gave (pro-union) evidence in the 1930–31 basic wage case (see Chapter 
9, Subsection 9.2.7). By then he was a King’s Counsel. Beeby commented favourably on his 
earlier encounters with Russell.
8  Sidney and Beatrice Webb, during their visit to Australia in 1898, learnt something of the 
Victorian wages boards, commenting that ‘by far the most interesting institution in Victoria 
is the fixing of a minimum wage by law in certain sweated trades’ (Austin 1965, pp. 78–86). 
I thank Professor William Brown, who brought this to my notice.
9  See also Chapter 3, Section 3.1.
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and especially in the last two or three years, its central difficulties do 
not appear to have been fairly faced. There is scarcely any experience 
to guide us except that of Australasia, where every inhabitant is part 
owner of a vast landed property; and which has been recently populated 
by men and women in full strength and health. And such experience is 
of but little use in regard to a people whose vitality has been impaired 
by the old Poor Law, and the old Corn Laws; and by the misuses of the 
Factory system, when its dangers were not yet understood. A scheme, 
that has any claim to be ready for practical adoption, must be based 
on statistical estimates of the numbers of those who under it would be 
forced to seek the aid of the State, because their work was not worth the 
minimum wage. (Marshall 1961, p. 715)
Paul Douglas, the renowned American labour economist (later a United 
States Senator), published in 1923 an article about ‘Wages Regulation and 
Children’s Maintenance in Australia’, but this had little economic content. 
It was an account of the development of minimum wage prescription with 
special reference to social issues such as the assumed size of families (Douglas 
1923).
There are few examples of economic ‘advice’ or opinion about wage 
policy before about 1923. George Knibbs, the first Commonwealth Statistician, 
was a physicist and educational administrator. We saw in Chapter 3 that in 
1920 he was asked to advise Prime Minister Hughes whether the country 
could afford to act on the finding of the Piddington Commission about the 
basic wage needed to provide fair and reasonable living standards. He said that 
it could not. This, perhaps, was economic advice. The head of the Labour 
and Industry Bureau in the Statistician’s Office was J T Sutcliffe, who did 
contribute to economic thought—with emphasis on measurement—in the 
1920s.10
10  Sutcliffe left the Commonwealth Public Service for the Queensland Public Service in 
1924 and entered private industry as General Manager of a textile company in 1927. This 
information was supplied to me by the late Ian Castles, former Australian Statistician.
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The most important single step toward the emergence of an Australian 
economist was the appointment of D B Copland to the University of Tasmania 
in 1917. Copland, a New Zealander, became Professor of Economics in 
Tasmania in 1920, moving to Melbourne in 1924. From the early 1920s until 
World War II, he was a key figure in virtually all economic debate in Australia. 
From being unnoticeable at the beginning of the 1920s, the body of mainstream 
economists grew rapidly in influence, importance and sophistication. In a 
talk that he gave in 1950, Copland said of the influence wielded by pre-war 
economists: ‘That this influence was considerable will be generally admitted, 
though many people may doubt whether the chief participants had much 
claim to be considered economists of distinction in the classical sense or were 
more than highly skilled opportunists in respect of their public activities.’ The 
changes that came over the economic scene in the late 1920s and early 1930s
afforded the economists unusual opportunities for going over the 
trenches in the grand manner to occupy positions that had hitherto 
been beyond their reach. This they did with an air of confidence that is 
sadly lacking in these more buoyant days of full employment when one 
would have thought that the world was the economist’s oyster; they did 
it with something of a missionary zeal, always a dangerous attitude of 
mind, and they did it with a more or less united front. (Copland 1950, 
p. 1)
When Copland left Tasmania in 1924, he was succeeded in the Chair of 
Economics by J B Brigden, who was to be a major ‘player’ in Australian economic 
debate.11 L F Giblin, whose role in formulating Depression policy was central, 
moved to Melbourne University in 1929, as the first Ritchie Professor, from 
the post of Government Statistician in Tasmania. Thus Tasmania contributed 
to the economic debate several of its principal participants (Coleman, Cornish 
and Hagger 2006).
Because the various tribunals were so conspicuous a feature of the labour 
market, it is not surprising that the economists, in their analyses of the Australian 
11  Some seven years older than Copland, Brigden had been a Lecturer for the University of 
Tasmania at Queenstown since 1922.
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economy, assigned them—and especially the Commonwealth Court—an 
important role. We might expect that there would have been antagonism, 
in principle, to interference in the market; but little of that was expressed. E 
O G Shann’s pro-market preconceptions would undoubtedly have led him 
in this direction. I have not found an explicit call by Shann for abolition of 
the Arbitration Court, and he joined with other economists in advocating a 
Depression strategy that assigned an important role it.12 Overtones of hostility 
to the system are obvious in An Economic History of Australia (Shann 1930), 
which has a chapter on ‘The Origins and Extension of Wage-Fixing’. Shann 
wrote with a fervour that is typical of converts from the Left to the Right. ‘In 
1907’, he said,
a Judge of the High Court of Australia presiding over a Federal 
Arbitration Court, took high moral ground in claiming for the workers 
a wage independent of supply and demand. A glow of idealism warmed 
what had seemed a class egoism. (p. 375)
Referring to the post-1913 adjustment of the basic wage for prices, Shann 
wrote:
Thus through all the vicissitudes of war and post-war prices, those 
who drew the basic wage were secure of their real wages, of the normal 
needs of the average employee regarded as a human being, so far as the 
Harvester judgment covered those needs. It may be hard to regard that 
average as divine, but it has certainly been placed, so far as laws can do 
it, upon a pedestal of privilege. (p. 381)
‘Fiat justitia’, he said,
is a high doctrine. The danger involved is that wage-fixing tribunals may 
raise their conception of justice more rapidly than the price which can 
be allotted from the joint product of the industry to the contributors 
12  Snooks (1991) has no doubt of Shann’s hostility to wage-fixing, and I do not disagree. 
Stone (1991) also recounts Shann’s antagonism to labour market regulation but, like Snooks, 
cites no actual recommendation of the Court’s abolition. This reticence is the more remarkable 
when viewed against the background of the Bruce Government’s having put the issue squarely, 
if unavailingly, on the political agenda.
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of routine service. Prices, even of routine and skilled manual service, 
are ultimately encouragements or discouragements to persistence in 
that service. If sacrosanctity and increase of wages go hand in hand, 
more may be attracted into the callings so blessed than can be found 
regular employment in them. Fluctuating wages have a social function 
to perform in minimising unemployment and sending labour to Sydney 
or the bush. (p. 385)
In the same year that Shann’s Economic History appeared, the historian W 
K Hancock published Australia (Hancock 1930). Over the subsequent decades, 
this attracted much favourable attention. His commentary on arbitration in 
many ways mirrored Shann’s, though it was rather more nuanced.13 Hancock 
wrote of the interdependence of minimum wages and tariff protection:
The Australian conception of ‘fair and reasonable’ is ethical, like the 
mediaeval idea of the just price. To those who object that such a standard 
13  Hancock had worked under Shann’s leadership at the University of Western Australia and 
held Shann in high regard. He records that ‘Edward Shann’s pioneer book was “twenty years 
a-growing”’ (Hancock 1954, p. 76).
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may conflict with economic possibilities, the courts reply that Australia 
is ‘not quite so bankrupt in resources of material or of mind or of will’ 
as to be unable to provide for workers ‘the bare necessaries of life in a 
supposedly civilised community’. … Manufacturers must learn to seek 
economy through efficiency, rather than efficiency through parsimony; 
they must make economic facts conform to the idea of justice. If an 
industry is unable to achieve this, it must die—unless the State chooses 
to intervene in order to prolong its existence. With this saving clause the 
argument completes its circle; it has led back to Protection. Does this 
mean that the distinctive ethics of Australian democracy are dependent, 
after all, upon its distinctive economics?
The Australians have always disliked scientific economics and (still 
more) scientific economists. They are fond of ideals and impatient of 
technique. … The mechanism of international prices, which signals the 
world’s need from one country to another and invites the nations to 
produce more of this commodity and less of that, belongs to an entirely 
different order. It knows no rights, but only necessities. The Australians 
have never felt disposed to submit to these necessities. They have insisted 
that their Governments must struggle to soften them or elude them or 
master them. (pp. 85–86)
Hancock spelt out his misgivings about the basic wage:
Since 1913, the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration 
has followed the practice of restating the wage of 1907 in terms of the 
changed purchasing power of money, as indicated by the Statistician’s 
price-index numbers. This restated wage is called the Harvester 
Equivalent. … In so far as we really use the basic wage as a measuring 
rod, we have created, to all intents and purposes, our own original iron 
law of wages. It is a monstrous achievement.
‘Fair and reasonable’, ‘fair and average’, ‘normal needs’—all these 
phrases are intelligible only as they are relevant to conditions of 
time and place. They depend, and must depend, on custom. But is 
the reward of labour for ever to be governed by the custom of 1907? 
In 1919–20 Australia sought to free herself from the dead hand of 
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the past by modernising her definition of needs. One result of this 
attempt was to place new emphasis on something which the Courts 
had always realised and sometimes stated—the futility of considering 
needs without considering also the capacity of industry to satisfy them. 
Some economists have suggested that the wage-fixing authorities should 
frankly accept ‘capacity to pay’ as the chief criterion. But this criterion, 
too, has its economic critics. Nor will Labour accept it. Capacity to pay 
fluctuates both upwards and downwards, and Labour plays for safety. 
The rigid standard of wages may increase unemployment in bad times 
and rob the workers of their fair share in the enjoyment of good times; 
but it is something definite and tangible, a rallying-point in the class 
struggle, a trench to man against the attacking forces of capitalism. If 
Australia were an exhausted country of dwindling resources this would 
be good tactics. But the tactics seem hardly suitable in a vigorous new 
country which has not yet reached its ‘optimum’ population. What 
America began to enjoy a few years after the war—a steady rise in wages 
unaccompanied by a corresponding rise in prices—would seem to the 
Australians a fantastic miracle. Australia’s policy might seem to have 
W K Hancock
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been specially designed to persuade the Australian workman of what 
is nevertheless untrue—that he has no interest in low costs. For, to 
outward seeming, he has no real interest in low prices. If his efficiency 
helps to reduce prices, he is rewarded by a scaling-down of his wages. 
This is the anti-climax of Labour’s struggles; the burlesque conclusion 
of that practical Australian logic which has so persistently elaborated its 
generous postulate of justice. (pp. 184–186)
It is a reasonable conjecture that the conservative Leslie Melville 
(trained as an actuary) would have endorsed Shann’s and Hancock’s criticisms 
of wage regulation. But as a group, the economists were concerned more 
with understanding the effects of wage policy and influencing the tribunals’ 
decisions than with challenging their existence.
A comprehensive analysis of the economics of arbitration was provided 
in Frederic Benham’s The Prosperity of Australia, written while he worked at 
Sydney University and published in 1928 (Benham 1928). Benham does not 
seem to have exerted much practical influence during his Australian sojourn.14 
His long chapter on ‘Wage-regulation’ is, however, of much interest. It can 
be understood as an attempt to understand the interaction of the forces of 
‘the market’ and regulation. Benham seems to have believed that in the long 
run the ‘economic’ forces tended to assert themselves, whereas in the shorter 
period the regulators had more scope to impose their priorities. In neither 
case, however, was the predominance wholly one way. Benham expounded the 
standard neoclassical presumption against market intervention:
A wage is essentially a price. Wages form part of the price-mechanism, 
which plays such an important and useful part in our economic life. 
Interference with the price-mechanism, unless very skilfully carried 
out, is likely to have harmful consequences. If the price of anything is 
raised too high, less will be bought; and if the price of labour is raised 
too high, less labour may be bought. In other words, wage-regulation 
may tend to increase unemployment. Again, differences in wages (in the 
14  Benham did give evidence in the Main Hours case of 1926–27 (see Chapter 7, Subsection 
7.3.2). I have not been able to access the relevant pages of the transcript.
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absence of regulation) provide incentives to effort and divert the flow 
of labour towards those occupations and industries where it is relatively 
most needed. Here also wage-regulation clearly has its dangers. (p. 170)
In practice, the conflict between market and regulators was softened by 
the weight that the regulators, ‘consciously or unconsciously’, had given to 
economic considerations. There were, nevertheless, two adverse consequences 
of regulated wages:
•	 a greater level of unemployment than would otherwise have 
obtained; and
•	 a compression of wage differences which discouraged the 
acquisition of skill and encouraged young people to enter 
‘dead-end’ but seemingly well-paid jobs.
Benham cites the Royal Commission on National Insurance of 1926 for the 
finding that unemployment was heavier among unskilled and casual workers 
than among the more skilled and claims that the position of the less skilled 
would be still worse but for the employment provided by governments and local 
authorities. He attempts an analysis of the relation between unemployment 
and the wage share in the value of manufacturing production over the period 
and claims (rather unpersuasively) that there is an inverse correlation. He 
accepts that unemployment under arbitration may have been little more than 
it would have been under collective bargaining, ‘although the percentage of 
unemployment has been somewhat higher in Australia than in most countries 
during recent years’ (p. 213).
Benham did not advocate the abolition of wage regulation, but ‘whilst 
wage-tribunals serve a useful purpose in their capacity as arbitrators, preventing 
or settling industrial disputes, yet the fixing of wages, which is an inevitable 
accompaniment of that function, is a very delicate matter’ (p. 234). He made 
several recommendations.
First, there should be no rigid adherence to the ‘cost of living’ principle:
Unless the standard of comfort is altered from time to time this 
principle tends to establish for all time a standard arrived at perhaps 
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many years ago, and then, possibly, upon somewhat meagre evidence. 
… If prosperity increases, then wage-earners have a right to share in that 
increase. In point of fact they do share in it in the long run, whatever 
wage-tribunals do. (Thus, with growing prosperity, hours have been 
reduced during recent years.) But basic wages awarded in accordance 
with a fixed standard make the ‘long run’ longer that it would otherwise 
be. On the other hand, if real wages are maintained at a given level 
whilst prosperity is declining, the result will be to injure wage-earners 
(as a whole) by increasing unemployment … Nor will constant 
alterations of the standard solve the difficulty, unless they are made very 
frequently (sometimes upwards and sometimes downwards), which 
logically amounts to discarding the ‘cost of living’ principle altogether. 
(pp. 234–235)
There was no one single principle to replace the cost of living: ‘The real solution 
is for wage-tribunals to recognise clearly all the factors involved, to form their 
opinions concerning present and probable future conditions, and to award 
those various wages which they consider will produce the best consequences, 
without being bound by any fixed ‘principle’ at all—except that of maximising 
prosperity.’
Second, Benham was critical of ‘capacity to pay’ (such as was 
recommended by the Queensland Economic Commission)15 as a guide to 
wage-setting:
In the long run money wages will tend to vary with average value 
produced per worker. But wage-regulation is concerned mainly with 
the short run. In Australia, especially, considerable fluctuations occur 
from time to time in the value of production per worker. The main 
risk of these variations from the general trend—the bulk of the gain in 
‘good’ years and of the loss in ‘bad’ years—is borne by owners. It is part 
of their function, and they are better prepared for such variations than 
are wage-earners. (pp. 235–236)
15  See Subsection 13.1.3 below.
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Moreover, the idea of a uniform ‘capacity to pay’ was misconceived. Capacity 
varied geographically, between industries and between firms:
The conception of a rigid minimum or basic wage, applying to all 
industries, districts, and workers should be definitely abandoned. … The 
Queensland model of distinguishing between industries of ‘more than 
average’, ‘average’ and ‘less than average’, prosperity, might be generally 
adopted. Fine distinctions between industries and districts would not 
be practicable, but greater plasticity than at present is possible. Thus 
some workers would be attracted away from the less prosperous and 
towards the more prosperous industries (and districts). (p. 237)
Third, the compression of relativities should be resisted:
As between occupations, a ‘margin for skill’ sufficient to attract adequate 
members [sic] to enter each particular ‘skilled’ occupation should be 
awarded. If at any time there was a marked shortage of workers in a 
particular occupation, wages in that occupation might be somewhat 
raised. (The fact that workers in one occupation, but in industries 
of differing prosperity, would be receiving different rates would tend 
to promote desirable movements from less productive towards more 
productive industries.) (p. 238)
No attempt should be made to reduce wage inequality by wage regulation. If 
inequality was a problem, it should be tackled by public finance.
Fourth, firmer attempts should be made to induce payment by results 
where practicable. Resistance to it might be diminished by a scheme of 
unemployment insurance.
The foregoing is a selective summary of Benham’s chapter. Overall, it can 
be seen as a blend of a theoretical preference for free markets and a pragmatic 
recognition of the practical role of wage regulation. Benham’s reasoning was 
unsympathetic to the concept of the basic wage in the sense of a more or 
less uniform foundation wage spread across industries and occupations. He 
explicitly rejected the principle that industries that could not pay the basic 
wage should be allowed to fail. He did not explore the process by which skill 
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differentials had been squeezed over the past two decades, but he was opposed 
to the result (without actually adducing evidence of ill-effects). Benham’s 
analysis was the most thorough attempt to that time to set wage fixation in 
an economic context. It is intriguing that it attracted so little notice. Benham 
(who left Australia in 1930) seems never to have gained entry to the select club 
of influential economists led by Copland, Giblin, Brigden, Mills, Melville, 
and Shann.
13.1.2 The British economic Mission and employer opinion
Early in 1929, a critical commentary on the wage-fixing system was offered 
by a group of British businessmen, selected by the British Government to visit 
Australia at the request of the Commonwealth Government (British Economic 
Mission 1929). The Australian Government’s request was due in part to 
the limited success of policies adopted in the 1920s to raise the population 
through immigration and development. It also reflected the government’s 
hostility to existing industrial arrangements, which culminated later in 1929 
in its attempt to abolish federal arbitration (save for the maritime industries).
I refer in Subsection 13.1.5 to the Mission’s criticism of the relation 
between wage-setting and the tariff. That criticism, of course, entered into 
its broader assessment of the wage-fixing system. But the Mission also saw 
the system as seriously flawed in other respects. It reported a widespread and 
shared discontent:
In every capital city of Australia we have had the advantage of meeting 
the leaders of the Trade Union movement. We have been much struck 
by the strength of that movement, reinforced as it doubtless is by the 
homogeneity of the people and by the active and intelligent interest 
which they take in all matters affecting their welfare. We have had 
frank and interesting discussions with the leaders of the movement; 
and we have found that practically on every occasion the subject of the 
Arbitration Acts and of the Courts established thereunder has come up 
during the course of these discussions. By workmen’s representatives, 
not less emphatically than by representatives of the employers, it has 
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been consistently represented to us that the Arbitration Acts are not 
achieving their purpose and that a system designed to arrive by judicial 
decisions at fair and prompt settlement of industrial disputes such as 
could be freely accepted by both sides must be held to have failed. (p. 
17)
The reasons for these discontents were: a view that the arbitral system 
imported the antagonisms between the parties that were a characteristic of 
litigation; the delays inherent in the process of assembling and presenting 
evidence; the expense and the absorption of time in arbitration; and the 
complexities of simultaneous operation of federal and State tribunals. The 
parties consulted believed, moreover, ‘that the subject matter of the questions 
which are brought before the Courts is not of a nature with which judicial 
tribunals, necessarily unversed in the practical problems of industry or in 
the economic questions to which they give rise, are best fitted to deal’. The 
Mission endorsed these complaints:
The indictment of the system of the Arbitration Courts which we 
have heard is a heavy one; and we feel that it is well founded on many 
grounds, and particularly on the ground that the system has tended 
to consolidate employers and employees into two opposing camps, 
and has lessened the inducement to either side to resort to round table 
conferences for that frank and confidential discussion of difficulties 
in the light of mutual understanding and sympathy which is the best 
means of arriving at fair and workable industrial agreements.
This was an early instance of the oft-repeated fallacy of contrasting a 
real-world ‘dirty’ arbitration system with an idealised and unlikely world of 
mutual understanding and co-operation.16
The Mission also condemned the adjustment of the basic wage to the 
cost of living:
Further, a system of wage fixation resting upon a basic money wage 
which rises or falls with a varying index figure of the cost of living is 
16  Of course, Higgins and others committed a similar fallacy when they contrasted the grubby 
realities of union-employer conflict with the new province for law and order.
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open to the gravest criticism, as tending to deprive employees of any 
interest in the prosperity of the industry with which they are connected. 
Let us assume that by better, more energetic, and more willing work on 
the part of all concerned from the highest to the lowest, the output of 
Australian industries were increased with no increase in overhead cost. 
The natural economic effect would be that prices all round would fall 
and that consumption and profits would rise; but as the cost of living 
would fall the basic wage would also fall, and with it all wages fixed by 
the Arbitration Courts in relation to the basic wage with margins for 
special skill and the like. Thus the system is such as to give the worker 
in industry no interest in a cheaper cost of living, and no inducement 
to that increased efficiency which would tend to bring it about. In such 
a case as we have imagined it would be only right that wages should 
rise and that the workmen should share in the increased prosperity 
so largely attributable to them. It is only if all concerned in industry 
genuinely feel that their own fortunes are bound up with its success or 
failure that that solidarity in industry which is essential to its prosperity 
can be achieved. (p. 18)
The unargued presumptions that prices varied inversely with productivity17 
and that the worker within a workplace would be motivated by this correlation 
to greater on-the-job effort require little comment.
The Mission’s report mirrored employer opinion in Australia. Plowman 
(1989) recounts that as economic conditions deteriorated in the later 1920s, 
employer demands for the abolition of arbitration intensified. In 1928, a 
Conference of the Central Council of Employers’ Associations resolved:
That this conference is of the opinion that compulsory arbitration has 
largely failed, and that it has not achieved the purpose for which it was 
introduced. Having this view, we consider that it should be abolished. 
(Plowman 1989, p. 76)
These sentiments, Plowman reports, were shared by other employer bodies. 
According to the Employers’ Review, arbitration was the ‘major cause of 
17  A presumption also made by W K Hancock (see above).
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depression in general; it reduces output since wages are paid to employees 
irrespective of their worth; it causes high unemployment, high tariffs, high 
production costs, industrial chaos and industrial conflict in particular’ 
(Plowman 1989, p. 77).
Plowman also describes a transformation of employer views over the 
1930s. Employers became strong advocates of the system. In December 1938, 
the Employers’ Review declared:
We Australians, employers and employees alike, are a type—we should 
know how to work together, and if differences do arrive, we have an 
Arbitration Court to settle them. In our arbitration system we have 
machinery for settling disputes. This machinery has been built up over 
the past 30 years. It has stood the test of the Great War and the Great 
Depression. (Plowman 1989, p. 80) (See also Hagan 1981, p. 67)
13.1.3 Capacity to pay
By the time that economists began to talk about wage policy—about 1923—
they were broadly aware of the significant fall in real wages between about 
1917 and 1920 and the enormous increase of 1921–22. These changes were 
due mainly to a lack of synchronisation of wage and price movements. Prices 
rose rapidly after 1916, and although the tribunals took account of this, 
they were for various reasons slow in doing so; and so money wages lagged 
behind prices. Then in the early 1920s, wages went on rising quite fast, as 
they were adjusted to earlier price movements, although prices were actually 
falling. Copland, in 1923, gave a paper to ANZAAS, which was substantially 
reproduced in the Economic Journal (Copland 1924). It was concerned mainly 
with the business decline in 1920–22. Copland attributed this to two factors: 
widely divergent movements of retail and wholesale prices and the poor 
timing of wage movements. Because retail prices fell much less than wholesale 
prices, the adjustment of wages to retail prices meant that for many producers 
there was a wage-price squeeze. And the slow adjustment of wages to price 
movements meant that real wages had fallen during the period of rising prices 
and risen when prices were falling. Copland concluded that the cost of living 
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was a bad criterion for wage adjustment. ‘Arbitration’, he said, ‘has been a 
costly experiment for Australia, but failure to apply a principle soundly should 
not, as many suppose, warrant the condemnation of that principle. The 
productivity of industry is the final source of wages, and arbitration cannot be 
successful if it ignores this factor’ (p. 45).
We now use the term ‘productivity’ to describe something like real 
output per worker or per hour worked (with or without allowance for other 
factor inputs). That is not what Copland meant. He was talking about value 
added per worker, measured in money (not real) terms. This was the main 
determinant of businesses’ capacity to pay their workers. Unless wages were 
raised or reduced at a similar rate, the tribunals were either imposing increased 
burdens on business or depriving workers of wages that business could afford 
to pay. To put the point differently, their objective should be to stabilise the 
wage share of value added. (Copland did not use that language.)
Copland’s reasoning assumed, tacitly, that the prices paid by employers 
for their non-labour inputs and the prices that they received for their output 
were given extraneously. There was no consideration of the possibility that 
business might offset increases by raising their prices, because prices were 
taken as given. This assumption is explicable by two of the characteristics 
of the economy at the time. One was its high dependence on foreign trade, 
the other Australia’s adherence to a fixed exchange rate with its main trading 
partner—the United Kingdom.
Copland’s views caught the attention of the President of the Queensland 
Court of Industrial Arbitration.18 The Queensland basic wage (more correctly, 
basic wages) and the principles upon which Queensland award wages were set 
were already rather different from those of the Commonwealth Court. Wages 
under State awards were significantly above the Commonwealth standards. 
The President instigated an Economic Commission on the Queensland Basic 
Wage. Copland was asked to serve on it, but was unavailable. The members 
18  T W McCawley was a judge of the Supreme Court and part-time President of the Industrial 
Court. He had published an article in the International Labour Review (McCawley 1922).
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were Sutcliffe (as chairman), Mills, and Brigden.19 The topics referred to the 
Commission included ‘the productivity of Queensland year by year from 
1913 to 1924 and the estimated productivity for 1925’; ‘real wages compared 
with productivity for the same periods’; ‘to what extent it is practicable in 
adjusting wages to have regard to productivity’; ‘whether an increase in wages 
would be likely to affect adversely the growth of any, and what, Queensland 
industries’; and ‘such other matters of an economic nature as in the opinion 
of the Commission may be of assistance to the Court in determining the basic 
wage’ (Economic Commission on the Queensland Basic Wage 1925). The 
Commission reported that
the capacity of all industries to pay wages depends primarily upon their 
net aggregate production. The only possible measure of this is value. 
The aggregate value is found from the value of production and the price 
of a unit. … The aggregate value of production then may vary from two 
separate sets of causes—those which affect volume of output, and those 
which affect price. (pp. 15–16)
The Commission produced a complex formula of ‘capacity to pay’.20 Its 
basic purpose was to measure changes in the value of production per head in 
Queensland.21 The cause of complexity was the lack of current data. Hence 
the index took into account both the data of the previous year’s production 
(primary and secondary, but not tertiary) and an estimate of the current year’s 
production, based mainly on factors affecting the value of rural production. 
The Commission recommended to the Court that it apply the formula with 
19  The Commission was appointed on 30 December 1924, assembled in Brisbane on 19 
January 1925, and reported on 21 February. Brigden observed a few months later that this 
was ‘the first occasion when professional economists had been made use of in Australia’, and 
although he had welcomed the opportunity to participate, it was ‘not the business of University 
teachers to spend their vacation in this manner’ (University of Tasmania 1925, p. 22).
20  The formula was trenchantly criticised by H B Higgins, partly on the ground of its 
complexity but also because ‘it is, in essence, an attempt to make the worker share in the 
losses as in the gains of the industries generally; of industries in which they are not consulted 
or concerned as owners’ (Higgins 2001, pp. 184–185).
21  The equation of capacity to pay with value of production per head was criticised by Gifford 
(1928, pp. 51 and 53), who said that other factors also affected the willingness of employers 
to employ labour at given wages.
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discretion, having regard to (1) the desirability of curbing fluctuations in 
wages and (2) changes in the level of unemployment.
The Commission was critical of the Commonwealth Court’s adherence 
to the Harvester standard 16 years after its adoption:
In effect the rough measure of capacity to pay determined by Mr Justice 
Higgins in 1907 has been stereotyped, and the level of wages in that 
year has determined the level of wages ever since. It is true that the 
conditions of employment have improved; hours have been reduced, 
and the wages of juniors have been increased, but the basic wage has 
tended to remain rigid. (p. 27)
Brigden subsequently was more forthright:
It was no wonder that the Federal Arbitration Court was the most 
criticised institution in Australia; the wonder was that it had succeeded at 
all. When to its defective powers under the Constitution, its inability to 
prevent conflicts before they became inter-State, its inability to enforce 
its awards, was added a weak personnel and a vicious principle of wage 
regulation, it was not surprising to find chaos. In the circumstances, 
the principle of compulsory arbitration seemed to have survived every 
possible obstacle. (University of Tasmania 1925, p. 28)
Very little came of this early venture into the economic analysis of 
capacity to pay. In Queensland, factors militating against the adoption of the 
Commission’s proposals were the complexity of the formula and the death of 
the President before they could be put into effect. More generally, retention of 
‘old’ ways, especially Harvester, was probably due largely to the much greater 
stability of retail prices after the turmoil of 1917–22.22
Sutcliffe (1925) expressed a further objection to the gearing of wages 
to the cost of living: that it deprived workers of all incentive to contribute to 
22  A point of interest is the similarity of the underlying reasoning to that used 35 years 
later by Eric Russell and Wilfred Salter, who gave evidence for the ACTU in the 1959 basic 
wage case. Russell and Salter advocated wage adjustment for prices and physical productivity, 
corrected for movements in the terms of trade. There was the same implicit objective of 
holding constant the wage share of the national income.
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greater production, because they neither gained nor suffered from changes in 
the fortunes of the industries that employed them. In Queensland, there were 
broad differentiations between industries, with wage levels under State awards 
related to their prosperity (though not to any assessment of the workers’ 
efforts), and this may have informed Sutcliffe’s contention. The view that he 
put became a familiar one. As we have seen, it was an opinion expressed by 
the British Economic Mission, probably mirroring comments heard during its 
consultations; and W K Hancock (see above) offered a similar view.
13.1.4 The tariff
The issue whether Australia would be free trade or protectionist, left open at 
federation, was resolved by 1906 in favour of protection. The Tariff Board 
was established in 1921 to recommend the granting or withholding of 
protection.23 There was an interrelation between the tariff and wage policy, 
because protection affected the attainable real wage. It did this partly by its 
(uncertain) effects on the productivity of the economy and partly by creating 
possibilities of income transference between unprotected exporters and the 
protected industries.
In the early numbers of The Economic Record, which began in 1925, 
there was an important debate, involving Brigden, Benham and Giblin. 
Brigden (1925) confronted full-on the question whether the tariff was, in the 
round, beneficial. (He did not discuss specific tariffs.) An affirmative answer, 
of course, flew in the face of economic orthodoxy. Brigden had no sympathy 
with the arguments that had been used by protectionists in Australia. They 
had all of the flaws that had been identified by standard economics. Moreover, 
Brigden was alive to the exploitation of consumers by manufacturers and 
labour raising prices and wages behind the tariff wall. Nevertheless, he asked 
whether, in relation to the benefits and costs of protection, ‘the intuition of 
the protectionists is sounder than their logic, and that they may be right to a 
degree in spite of it’? (p. 32)
23  For political aspects of tariff-setting in the 1920s, see Hagan (1981, pp. 27–28).
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His answer was ‘yes’. He took into account the objective of a larger 
population and the presumed facts of diminishing returns in agriculture and 
increasing returns in manufacturing. Because the last two mainly take the 
form of externalities, they are inadequately factored into decisions taken at 
the microeconomic level. (Brigden did not use the language of externalities, 
but the idea is implicit in his argument.) Without intervention, the expansion 
of agriculture, where diminishing returns prevailed, would go too far and 
the growth of manufacturing, where there were increasing returns, would be 
unduly retarded. Just as free trade was appropriate to the circumstances of 
Britain in the 19th century, protection was right for Australia in the 20th. Free 
trade, in Britain’s case, and protection, in Australia’s, countered the effects of 
diminishing returns in agriculture.
It would be unfair to say that Benham (1926) merely asserted the 
conventional arguments for free trade. Probably his main ammunition was a 
denial of diminishing returns in agriculture. He talked about the past and likely 
future reductions in labour requirements for producing increasing volumes 
of agricultural output. He made the point that the growth of cities in the 
19th century was made possible by the increased productivity of agriculture. 
Benham also made a good deal of the statistical evidence that in New South 
Wales, under free trade in the latter decades of the 19th century, manufacturing 
had grown faster than in protectionist Victoria.
Brigden (1927), in his rejoinder to Benham, talked particularly about 
the distributive effects of combining population growth with free trade. The 
principal distributional contest was between labour and land. Capital and 
management, being the most mobile of factors, would be affected least of all.
Labour has been protected at the expense of land ownership. It is true 
that Protection has caused a rise in city and urban site values, and that 
the net result is difficult to measure. The argument is as usual one of 
tendency, and I merely allege that Protection has relieved the demand 
for land in general and increased the demand for labour. Thereby it has 
reduced the strength of land ownership and increased the bargaining 
power of labour. (pp 108–109)
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Giblin (1927), then Government Statistician in Hobart, joined the 
fray. One of his main points was that the statistics used by Benham, though 
published in such worthy places as the Commonwealth Yearbook, were worse 
than useless. For example, the ‘evidence’ that manufacturing had grown 
faster in New South Wales than in Victoria was spurious. ‘Mr Benham’, said 
Giblin, ‘reaches conclusions so opposed to common sense that one is rather 
surprised at his accepting them without a close scrutiny of the meaning of the 
figures on which they are based’ (p. 148). But, really, recourse to statistics was 
unnecessary:
Professor Brigden’s assumption seems to me axiomatic, though it may 
not have been wise to tie the red rag of ‘diminishing returns’ to it. If 
100,000 farmers are making a living in a given State, and 20,000 more 
with the same average capital and ability are added to them, it seems 
clear that in general they will not make so good a living; otherwise the 
first 100,000 are proved to be fools, which is contrary to hypothesis. 
That is all that is required for Mr Brigden’s argument, and it hardly 
seems open to question. (p. 151)
Moreover, Benham had failed to account for the public assistance to agriculture 
by way of railways and roads: ‘This point is vital, and makes further discussion 
unnecessary so far as Mr Brigden’s argument is concerned’ (p 151).
Late in 1927, the Prime Minister, S M Bruce, asked a group of people 
to undertake an inquiry into the tariff. He initially approached E C Dyason, 
a stockbroker, Giblin, and C H Wickens, the Commonwealth Statistician. 
Subsequently, Brigden and Copland were added. In his foreword to the 
Report, published in 1929, Bruce wrote:
They not only agreed to undertake the work, but they insisted that 
they should do so on a purely voluntary basis. The report is a free 
gift to the Australian people. Some indication of the measure and the 
quality of this rare act of public service is to be found in the fact that 
their investigations and the preparation of their report have kept the 
Committee continuously and heavily engaged for over eighteen months. 
(Brigden et al. 1929, p. viii)
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The Brigden Report, as it is generally known, was a significant 
contribution, not only to Australian but to wider economic thinking. It 
was, of course, more detailed and contained many more elaborations and 
qualifications than the original Brigden article. But the basic conclusion was 
the same: Australia could not have supported the population of the day at the 
then-existing standard of living without the tariff. The committee said:
We have to recognise in the tariff as a whole, in spite of its undoubted 
extravagances, a potent instrument in maintaining at a given standard 
of living a larger population than would have been otherwise possible. It 
seems certain that without the tariff we could not have offered the same 
field for immigration, and would not have been able to maintain our 
growth of population. (p. 84)
The tariff did more than divert resources from the export industries 
into the sheltered industries. It also caused a redistribution of income between 
the two sectors. And it provided scope for the raising of real wages in the 
sheltered industries. Australia’s standard of living was high, primarily because 
of the productivity of its primary industries. The tariff helped to sustain their 
productivity by restraining their growth. But it also caused some of the benefits 
of rural productivity to be transferred. In that context, wage regulation played 
a part:
The standard of wages is high, therefore, primarily because the income 
per head is high. But it can be, and is, made a little higher than naturally 
it would be, by pressure of various kinds upon other incomes. There is 
room for such pressure … There are maximum and minimum payments 
which can be made for labour, neither of which can be established 
with certainty, and between which there is room for variation. Free 
competition is liable to reduce wages to the minimum, and regulation 
can compel the maximum payments, provided the by-products of 
regulation have not absorbed too much of the income available. (p. 96)
The view that emerges, then, is that the tariff, as well as protecting 
real income against the threat of diminishing returns in the major export 
industries, also facilitated transference of income from which wage-earners in 
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the sheltered industries benefited. It would be wrong to suppose that Brigden 
and colleagues saw the arbitration tribunals as playing a large part in the overall 
scheme of maintaining real income and redistributing it. But they played 
some part, and the thinking that the tariff debate generated almost certainly 
contributed to the economists’ prescriptions for wages in the Depression. 
These were intended to put the transference process into reverse.
These were ‘big picture’ analyses of the tariff. At a more pragmatic level, 
there was an issue as to the interaction of tariffs and wage increases. The Tariff 
Board itself, in the later 1920s, was the principal source of alarm about this 
issue. In its 1926 report, the Board said:
As a result of the investigation into the iron and steel industry … the 
Tariff Board was so impressed with the critical nature of the industrial 
position into which Australia was drifting, and indeed has drifted, that 
a suggestion was advanced that the recommendations for increases in 
the Tariff which were absolutely essential to the maintenance of the 
industry should be granted only on condition that assurances were 
obtained from the various industrial unions connected with the 
industry that no further demands would be made for wage increases 
or any other action taken which would have the result of defeating the 
effect of any increase in duties recommended. It was pointed out that 
that the principal applicant employers had given guarantees that the 
prices would not be raised, and that the merchants had also agreed not 
to make any alteration in their selling prices in the event of the requests 
being granted. It was suggested by the Board that the same assurances 
should be obtained from the industrial unions. Immediately following 
upon the increases in the Tariff in regard to woollen piece goods … 
with a view to relieving certain sections of the industry which were 
suffering detriment from external competition, the industrial union 
embracing the operations in the industry lodged an application before 
the Federal Arbitration Court for heavy increases in their wages and 
modified working conditions. The recommendations of the Tariff 
Board were made on evidence tendered to it in order to assist certain 
of the different woollen mills in a time of depression, and no provision 
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was made for an alteration in the existing conditions governing wages. 
The representatives of the union who appeared before the Board in 
the woollen piece goods investigation, gave no indication that it was 
contemplated, in the event of a favourable recommendation being 
made and Parliament granting such, that the costs of production would 
be raised by higher wages and different conditions.
This action of the Textile Workers Union seems to have been influenced 
by the judgment of Mr Justice Powers, wherein it was laid down that 
his Court could take no cognisance of the capacity of an industry to 
pay certain wages, but would fix what wages it thought necessary, and 
the industry would then have recourse to the Tariff Board, which had 
been created by the Federal Parliament to make recommendations 
for the granting of whatever protection was necessary. In this case the 
various unions appeared before the Tariff Board to assist the employers 
in obtaining necessary increases in order to make it possible to work the 
mills at a profit instead of at a loss, and then immediately approached 
the Arbitration Court for their share in these increases.
In this way a precedent is created for passing back and forth between the 
Federal Arbitration Court and the Tariff Board for increments in wages 
and duties, which can only result in an ever increasing wage rate, and an 
ever ascending Tariff. This course must ultimately defeat itself, and by 
constantly raising the cost of living bring about an industrial paralysis.
From considerations such as the foregoing the Tariff Board is strongly 
of opinion that the industrial unions of the Commonwealth should be 
induced to realise the critical position into which the Commonwealth 
is drifting and the absolute necessity for preventing the wages gap from 
becoming still wider between the United Kingdom, the continent of 
Europe, and the Commonwealth, otherwise, the Tariff Board, placed 
as it is in the position to take a comprehensive and intimate view of all 
Australian industry, can see nothing but economic disaster ahead, and 
that at no very distant date. (Tariff Board 1926, pp. 13–14)
In its 1927 report, the Board again discussed this problem. Commenting 
on ‘the abuse of protection’, it wrote:
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The Board is profoundly convinced that if Australian industry is to be 
maintained and safeguarded, it is absolutely essential that the leaders of 
industrial unions should recognise the serious menace of rising costs of 
production which the Board has indicated. The Board wishes it to be 
understood that it is not desirous of taking any side in the industrial 
disputes … but it cannot be blind to the fact that simultaneously with 











with the object of enabling such industries to exist, applications had 
been lodged and Arbitration Courts—Federal and State—had been 
and were being asked to grant not only increased wages but further 
improved conditions and shorter hours, and State Governments were 
introducing legislation at the time which further added to the already 
high cost of production. (Tariff Board 1927, p. 21)
The Board, in its next annual report, said that it was ‘again evident 
that requests for increased wages and improved conditions of employment are 
not always based upon sound economic principles, and there is an apparent 
need for co-operation between the authorities fixing the rates of wages and 
conditions of employment and the framers of the tariff ’ (Tariff Board 1928, 
p. 16). The Board deprecated the ‘acknowledged hostility between organised 
employers and organised employees’. It would be ‘a good thing for both 
organisations and for Australian industry if each organisation would exclude 
from its membership all members whose militancy makes for strife and bad 
feeling’ (p. 18).
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In 1929, the British Economic Mission joined in the criticism of the 
misuse of the tariff:
But all measures designed for the increase of Australia’s wealth 
production and power of absorbing new population tend to be defeated 
if there are strong forces within her which operate so to raise her costs 
of production that she cannot sell her products in the markets of the 
world, and is restricted within the limitations of her home market. Here 
we approach the most vexed, and the most important of all Australian 
questions, that of the combined effect of the protective Customs tariff 
and of the legislative enactments, both of the Commonwealth and of 
the States, which we will call, for brevity, the Arbitration Acts. … [W]e 
have been strongly disposed to the view that the combined operation 
of the tariff and of the Arbitration Acts has raised costs to a level 
which has laid an excessive and possibly even a dangerous load upon 
the unsheltered primary industries, which, having to sell in the world’s 
markets, cannot pass on the burden to other sections of the Australian 
community, and, consequently, as between the various States, upon 
those, notably Western Australia, South Australia and Tasmania, which 
are poor in manufactures and are principally concerned with primary 
production. … We have felt much force in the oft-repeated complaint 
that successive increases in the tariff which affect prices and the cost of 
living, following upon, or being followed by, successive advances in the 
cost of labour as the result of decisions under the Arbitration Acts have 
involved Australia in a vicious circle of ever ascending costs and prices, 
and that this condition of affairs is crippling Australia’s progress and 
her power of supporting increased population. There lies no task before 
the Australian people more urgent than that of in some way breaking 
the vicious circle and of bringing down costs of production, as is being 
done in other industrial countries of the world, without lowering the 
standard of living of the workers as measured not by money but by real 
wages, which are the reward of labour in the form of goods and services. 
(British Economic Mission 1929, pp. 13–14)
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In 1929, the Tariff Board played a somewhat different tune. It was 
impressed by ‘reports from different sources that there is a growing spirit 
of co-operation between employers and employees and a more ready 
acknowledgement that the interests of the two sections are so closely allied 
that only by mutual consideration can the objective of both, or either, be 
attained’ (Tariff Board 1929, p. 12). There was a return to the former line of 
comment in 1930, when the Board stated that ‘labour costs are seriously higher 
in Australia than in many other countries’. It was ‘impossible to escape the 
conviction that the costs of production in some industries could be materially 
reduced if there were greater co-operation between employers and employees 
to secure increased output’ (Tariff Board 1930, p. 17). This may well have 
been an allusion to the vexed question of piecework.
Thereafter, the Board gave less emphasis to the problems of labour 
relations and labour costs. In 1935, it cited League of Nations statistics 
indicating a considerable fall in labour costs in Australia relative to those of 
the United Kingdom (Tariff Board 1935, p. 19). In its report for 1937, it said:
The outlook is much more hopeful at present than it has been for years. 
… During the late twenties, wages, interest and costs generally were 
rising and prices of products of protected industry were getting more 
and more out of step with world prices. The Tariff Board year by year 
sounded this warning, pointing out that this spiral rise in costs and 
prices must have a reaction ultimately. The position in this regard is 
markedly better today. (Tariff Board 1938, p. 25)
The Board again compared labour costs in Australia and the United Kingdom, 
using nominal wage data for Australia and Bowley’s wage index for Britain. 
Between 1929 and 1937, wages had fallen by 15.2 per cent in Australia and 
had risen by 0.5 per cent in the United Kingdom. The Australian data pre-
dated the 1937 basic wage increase. ‘It is not easy’, said the Board, ‘to forecast 
the full effect of the increase, but from the point of view of its possible effect 
on the competitive position of local industries, it is not likely to be serious’ 
(Tariff Board 1938, p. 26). In its 1938–39 report, the Board extended to 1938 
the comparison of Australian and British wages: Australian wages had since 
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1929 fallen by 9.8 per cent, while British wages had risen by 3.8 per cent 
(Tariff Board 1939, p. 16).
It appears that the debate about the tariff-wages issue, which had been 
so prominent in the later 1920s, was submerged by the Depression and did 
not revive thereafter.
13.1.5 The Depression
At onset of the Great Depression, Australia lacked any bureaucratic infrastructure 
for economic advice that could assist governments in understanding the problem 
and in devising measures to deal with it.24 Policy focused initially on two concerns: 
government finance and the funding of a rising foreign-account deficit. The Labor 
Government, which had been elected in mid-1929 on the specific issue of preserving 
the arbitration system, sought help from Britain, and this resulted in the visit of 
Sir Otto Niemeyer (Deputy Governor of the Bank of England) and Sir Theodore 
Gregory (a monetary economist at the London School of Economics and a member 
of the MacMillan Committee). Their advice was rigidly orthodox. They were 
preoccupied with the maintenance of confidence on the part of foreign lenders and 
saw this as requiring strict adherence to the existing exchange rate and rigorously 
balanced government budgets. Niemeyer and Gregory had little impact on policy. 
The Labor Government, however, was torn by conflict over the adoption of the kinds 
of measures proposed by the mainstream Australian economists, the less orthodox 
24  There were at least two reasons. One was the scarcity of trained economists. The other was 
the recruitment practices of the Public Services. On the latter, W K Hancock commented: 
‘Democratic sentiment applauds the sound argument that every office boy should have a 
chance to become a manager, and perverts it into a practical rule that no one shall become a 
manager who has not been an office boy. Australian Governments insist generally upon the 
rule that everybody must enter the public service at the age of sixteen or thereabouts. At the 
same time, by means of an excellent system of scholarships, they cunningly entice the cleverest 
boys to the Universities. When they have been enticed thither, these boys discover (unless they 
have entered upon a strictly technical training) that there is nothing for them to do except 
teach. So they return to school and encourage other clever boys to win scholarships. In this 
way the State has most ingeniously contrived that its system of democratic education shall 
not embarrass the public services by introducing into them resplendent talents. There has, it 
is true, been considerable reform in recent years. Merit is gaining rapidly on mere seniority. 
Yet it would be very easy to prove that the lack of trained economic forethought is responsible 
for some of the most costly failures of state enterprise in Australia’ (Hancock 1930, p. 142).
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measures espoused by the Treasurer, E G Theodore, and the extreme policies 
pursued by the New South Wales Government of J T Lang.
There was a policy vacuum. The Australian economists—mainly 
academics or ex-academics—proceeded to fill it. In doing so, they devised 
policies reflective of local circumstances that stepped around the advice of 
Niemeyer and Gregory. The scope for their doing so was increased by the 
sharing of decision-making between the Commonwealth and the States, partly 
by reason of the paralysis of the Labor Government, but also because of the 
role played by the Loan Council25 and because important areas of policy were 
then State-based.
Among the economists there was a remarkable level of agreement. At the 
centre of their thinking were the realities of an enormous fall in the incomes of 
exporters (especially wool and wheat growers) and the inevitability of an overall 
reduction in real expenditure due both to the adverse movement of the terms 
of trade and a drying up of foreign credit. The objective of their advice was to 
limit the fall in real spending to the amount that was inescapable with the fall 
in the terms of trade and the collapse of foreign borrowing, roundly estimated 
at 10 per cent. If this were achieved, there would be a fall in the standard 
of living, but employment would be protected. The economists judged that 
this best-available outcome required an even distribution of the loss across all 
sectors of the economy, rather than its concentration upon the export sectors. 
As we have seen, Copland delivered this message to the Court in 1930.
The intellectual foundation of the economists’ view about distributing 
the burden seems to have been described, rather tentatively, by Giblin (1930a) 
in his inaugural lecture at The University of Melbourne as Ritchie Professor, 
given in April 1930. This may well have been the first statement, anywhere, of 
the multiplier. But whereas the Keynesian multiplier, expounded first by R F 
Kahn and adopted by Keynes in The General Theory, turned on an imbalance 
of saving and investment, Giblin’s concern was with the adjustment of income 
25  A Commonwealth-State instrumentality established in the 1920s to coordinate and 
control government borrowing.
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to a level at which imports would equal the lower level of exports. At that 
stage, the apparent loss of export income was about £50 million. With about 
one-third of every pound of expenditure going on imports, Giblin’s reasoning 
led him to predict a fall of income of £150 million. He went on:
The matter is obscure. I confess I do not see my way clearly through 
the tangle of price reactions that must follow the loss of income. I will 
only say that my somewhat muddled belief is that the tendency will be 
broadly to this result, to the extent that the Australian standard of living 
fails to adjust itself to the diminished income; but that if the loss is 
evenly spread through the community, it may be very nearly confined to 
the first direct loss of £50 million, and there need be no serious addition 
to unemployment. (pp 11–12)
Spreading the sacrifice became a fundamental plank in the economists’ 
program. And this included a cut in real wages.
Giblin’s Letters to John Smith (Giblin 1930b), published by the 
Melbourne Herald in July 1930, were an attempt to ‘sell’ this line of thought 
to the general public. At least one man in every six, he estimated, must be 
working in export industries. Then there were all the industries which had to 
compete with imports, which were also unsheltered.
So that it is clear that a big part of our industry must be unsheltered for 
many years to come. We must keep this unsheltered industry going. But 
if we raise wages in sheltered industry, we make it impossible to grow as 
much wheat and wool or mine as much zinc and lead, and we shall not 
have exports enough to pay our interest and pay for necessary imports. 
That is the mess we are in now, with unemployment widespread and 
growing on every side. And we have not seen the worst of it yet. (p. 7)
‘We have’, said Giblin, ‘been living as a people on more than we earned 
by a big margin. In future we are going to earn less (unless we work harder) 
because other people do not want our wool and wheat so much as they did 
in the last few years and they don’t lend us so much money to help out what 
we can earn ourselves’ (p. 10). He attempted some arithmetic, based on the 
Statistician’s wage data, which seemed to show that the total wage bill exceeded 
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the sum available for payment of wages, even before the crisis. The only possible 
explanation was ‘that a great many people not working under a regular award 
must be getting considerably less than the average of organised labour. These 
will include wage-earners on farms, and all kinds of people working on their 
own accounts and particularly the farmer on one-man and two-man farms’ 
(pp. 15–16). The sensible thing was ‘to recognise that wage rates in organised 
labour have been rather above their fair share of the wealth produced in the 
country. With the fall in the wealth produced, they must come down’ (p.17). 
The wages of organised labour could no longer be sustained by the earnings of 
unsheltered industry, and the inevitable result was unemployment of workers 
in the sheltered industries. This was now a reality (p. 21).
I have discussed at length, in Chapter 9, Copland’s evidence to the 
Court, which substantially reflected the contentions agreed upon by the 
L F Gliblin
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mainstream of Australian economists. It would be wrong to say that the Court 
simply adopted Copland’s arguments: the decision is quite wide-ranging 
and, for the time, sophisticated.26 Copland’s evidence, nevertheless, served to 
confirm the Court’s determination to reduce wages and lent some precision to 
its perception of the amount of the required reduction.
About a year later, the Wallace Bruce Committee reviewed the effect of 
wage reductions. Its report (Wallace Bruce Committee 1932) was prepared 
by a committee comprising two Under-Treasurers and the economists Giblin, 
Melville, Mills, and Shann. The falling-off in rural purchasing power had, the 
Committee said, spread unemployment throughout the community:
The restoration of employment, as opposed to temporary stimulants, 
is to be found in bringing into harmony the costs and prices of export 
industry. This adjustment must involve, for the time, a general lowering 
of standards in agreement with our loss of real income. … With the 
present trend of overseas prices, the cut in costs required to restore the 
balance if this way alone were followed, would involve reductions in 
nominal wages and interest rates of the order of 50 per cent. The attempt 
to do this would threaten social and financial stability. To attempt to 
restore export prices simply by raising the exchange would end in loss 
of control of the currency and general collapse. There is, however, a 
probability that a solution can be found by using each method as far as 
is safe and practicable. The gap between export costs and prices is about 
20 per cent. Some of this might be covered by direct cutting of costs, 
some by raising the exchange and some gained by increased efficiency 
throughout industry. The re-absorption of all the unemployed is 
unsustainable until prosperity is regained over a large part of the world. 
In the meantime the problem of relieving unemployment is pressing. 
But it is essential that the method of restoring equilibrium between 
costs and prices should be steadily pursued along with measures of 
alleviation, and that the latter should be framed so as not to impede but 
to form the basis of future prosperity.’ (pp. 39–41)
26  A view that I share with Schedvin (1970, p. 215).
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The policy of cutting real wages by 10 per cent had not been given a fair 
trial. Workers under federal awards had been subject to the full reduction, but 
many other workers had not. Nominal wages had been reduced on the average 
by about 12 per cent since 1928. The average, however, covered a dispersion 
from about 3 per cent under State awards in New South Wales to over 30 
per cent under federal awards in South Australia. Some salaries had not been 
reduced; others had been reduced by over 30 per cent (p. 56). The Committee 
called for a general application of the cut. It recognised that wage reductions 
would lead to price reductions and hence to further wage reductions, so that 
the total reduction in nominal wages would be much more than 10 per cent. 
This process would be mitigated by appreciation of the exchange rate (p. 67).
J M Keynes never visited Australia. But he made two interventions into 
the Australian debate. One was in May 1932, when he wrote an article for 
the Melbourne Herald, which was reproduced in other newspapers (Keynes 
1982). This was a commentary on the Wallace Bruce Report. (Keynes had 
not actually seen it and his comments were based on second-hand reports.) 
The general thrust of his article was that Australia had already done as much 
as it was sensible to do, that more ‘strong action’ might worsen the situation 
and that it was best simply to await a world recovery, especially a recovery of 
prices. In relation to wages, he lent his support to the somewhat unorthodox 
view that wage cuts were a dubious policy, for while they reduced costs they 
also reduced purchasing power. ‘I understand’, he said
that the reductions of money wages so far effected have been unequal. 
It is of the essence of what has been happening in Australia that there 
should be equality of sacrifice, and it would seem obvious that New 
South Wales should be brought into line with the rest of the country. 
… But a policy of a further general reduction in money wages would be 
a double-edged weapon. It would tend to curtail purchasing power and, 
consequently, to aggravate rather than assist the problem of the Budget. 
I do not clearly see in what way it would help the general situation unless 
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it were to expand the physical volume of exports, and I should have 
supposed that in present circumstances it would have no considerable 
effect in that direction. So far as internal production and consumption 
are concerned, sales receipts would fall off by just about as much as 
costs had been cut. The Experts recognise that it is impracticable to 
reduce costs and debts by a further 40 per cent. But I go much further 
than this. I do not believe that unemployment would be remedied by 
measures of this kind even if they could be put into force. (pp. 96–97)
The years 1931–35 were the period when Keynes was moving from the 
ideas articulated in his Treatise on Money to those of The General Theory. It is 
well known that he discussed his emerging theories widely within Cambridge. 
E R Walker, a Sydney graduate, took his PhD at Cambridge and in 1933 
published a book, Australia in the World Depression, based on his PhD thesis. 
It contains a useful factual account of what happened before and during the 
early years of the Depression. But it also struggles with the question whether 
the policies adopted in Australia could be reconciled with the ideas being 
advanced by Keynes. The unions, in the 1930–31 wage case, had put the 
argument that a wage cut would be of no help, because there would be a 
more or less equivalent reduction of purchasing power. This argument was 
encouraged by Irvine. The Court itself rejected it, arguing that purchasing 
power would not be reduced, but would be shifted from workers to capitalists, 
who would spend their added purchasing power on their own consumption or 
on investment. ‘Mr Keynes’ theories’, said Walker,
encourage scepticism as regards the view that someone’s loss is necessarily 
somebody else’s gain. If attempts to share the loss by cutting wages lead 
only to the reduction of consumers’ incomes by the same amount as 
the cost of production is reduced, the factors determining the general 
level of unemployment will not have been affected at all. Of course, the 
view that general wage reductions may be neutral in their effect upon 
the business cycle is in many quarters regarded as fallacious. Indeed, it 
is only with its adoption by Mr Keynes that it has gained respectability 
among English economists. (Walker 1933, p.167)
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If Keynes were right, the only measures that could reduce unemployment were 
those that would alter the balance between investment and saving. There was 
no reason to suppose that wage cuts would do that.27
But the Keynesian analysis, in its simplest form, relates to a closed 
economy. The Australian economy was open and the Depression was 
imposed on it from abroad. Given time, it might adjust by shifting resources 
out of the export industries into import replacement. In the shorter term, a 
collapse of the export industries, with the consequent drying up of exporters’ 
spending, would be equivalent in its effects to a reduction of investment. 
The economists’ advocacy of wage reductions had to do, not so much with 
shifting income between workers and employers, but with keeping exporters 
in business. They would do this by restoring the previous relativity between 
domestic and external prices. The same effect could be achieved by exchange 
rate adjustment. The economists did advocate a depreciation of the Australian 
pound. They were unwilling to rely wholly on it because of the possible effect 
on foreign confidence. Hence they favoured a mixture of wage reductions 
and external depreciation. Keynes’ article in the Herald recognised that wage 
reductions were meant to maintain export production. He opposed further 
reductions because of a practical judgment that they would have no effect on 
exports.
Keynes’ second intervention was less direct. It was in The General Theory 
itself. There is a passage in which Keynes rejects the idea of managing the 
money wage level with a view to altering real wages and thereby employment. 
The equilibrium level of employment was a product of the level of investment, 
and the equilibrium real wage was a product of the level of employment, 
27  In 1935, Arthur Smithies—just returned from research in Harvard and a teaching post 
at Michigan University to join the Bureau of Census and Statistics—published an article 
(Smithies 1935) exploring ‘from the “orthodox” point of view’ the question whether a wage 
reduction would increase employment. (The answer was equivocal.) This was a highly 
theoretical article. Smithies simply assumed that the wage reduction was in real terms. He also 
assumed that the economy was closed. In a note published in 1936, Walker said that Smithies, 
by the artificiality of his assumptions, ‘clearly forfeits all claim to deal with wages policy in the 
real world’ (Walker 1936, p. 100). Smithies (1936) published a rejoinder.
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and not vice versa. A successful attempt to fix real wages would cause violent 
fluctuations of employment and prices:
If, as in Australia, an attempt were made to fix real wages by legislation, 
then there would be a certain level of employment corresponding to 
that level of real wages; and the actual level of employment would, in a 
closed system, oscillate violently between that level and no employment 
at all, according as the rate of investment was or was not below the 
rate compatible with that level; whilst prices would be in unstable 
equilibrium when investment was at the critical level, racing to zero 
whenever investment was below it, and to infinity whenever it was 
above it. … In the actual case of Australia, the escape was found, partly 
of course in the inevitable inefficacy of the legislation to achieve its 
object, and partly in Australia not being a closed system, so that the 
level of money-wages was itself a determinant of the level of foreign 
investment and hence of total investment, whilst the terms of trade were 
an important influence on real wages. (Keynes 1936, pp. 269–270)
Keynes may have heard the 1933 Marshall Lectures, wherein Copland 
reported that the wage-reduction strategy had failed to reduce real wages at 
all, despite a massive reduction in money wages. Keynes went on to say that 
he was ‘now of the opinion that the maintenance of a stable general level of 
money-wages is, on a balance of considerations, the most advisable policy for 
a closed system; whilst the same conclusion will hold good for an open system, 
provided that equilibrium with the rest of the world can be secured by means 
of fluctuating exchanges’ (p. 270). Australia’s experiment with a managed wage 
reduction may well have had an important effect on Keynes’ thinking.
13.1.6 Recovery
In the last five years or so before World War II, the apparent interest of 
the economists in wage fixation diminished. This, no doubt, was a result 
of a general decline in the necessity for economic management as external 
influences became more benign. The principal exception was the concern of 
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the ‘Melbourne group’ in 1937 to raise wages so as to avert an investment 
boom. This concern was articulated for them by Reddaway, whose evidence to 
the basic wage case is described in Chapter 12. I do not repeat that account, 
but note the following implications of Reddaway’s analysis:
•	 It entailed a clear perception of the Arbitration Court as an 
instrument and arbiter of macroeconomic policy. The same 
perception, of course, was apparent in Copland’s evidence in 
1930. Like Copland, Reddaway saw the policy as operating 
via the modification of distributive shares. By reallocating 
income between rent and profits, on the one hand, and wages, 
on the other, the Court would moderate the expansionary 
forces then evident in the economy.
•	 There was a presumption that good policy required wage 
restraint in depressed times and generosity when conditions 
were better. This presumption was generally accepted by the 
Court and created difficulties after World War II, when it 
was translated into an environment of full employment and 
inflation.
•	 Reddaway spoke of the need to increase the real wage, failing 
to comment on the Court’s ability to control real wages 
and seemingly taking no heed of Keynes’ remarks about 
the consequences of attempting to fix real wages and the 
advisability of stabilising money wages.
I return to Reddaway’s prescription of a wage increase to stem an 
incipient boom in Subsection 13.2.4 below.
13.1.7 Retrospectives
This subsection recounts four appraisals of the Court’s role and performance 
in managing wage policy in the 1930s.
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The first was by Copland who, in one of his 1933 Marshall Lectures 
(Copland 1934), gave the following summary of the Court’s contribution to 
anti-Depression policy:
The Government of the day had been elected on a pledge to preserve the 
Court. This was interpreted by the electorate as a pledge to preserve the 
standard of living. Despite important amendments to the Arbitration 
Act, the Government was powerless to prevent the Court from ordering 
a reduction in wages, if economic conditions appeared to necessitate 
such a reduction. The Government did in fact intervene in the case, 
and was represented by counsel. This was the limit to its authority, and 
the Court, after hearing evidence that covered the whole economic 
position of the country, decided to reduce the basic wage by 10 per 
cent in addition to the normal adjustments of the wage to quarterly 
decreases in the cost of living. The award of the Court was a survey of 
the general economic situation at the end of 1930, and it is of more 
than passing interest to note that the first pronouncement on the crisis 
from a responsible authority was this award of the Arbitration Court. 
(p. 89)
In another lecture, Copland noted that the benefit of the Court’s decision 
was diminished by the failure of State arbitration authorities to follow its lead. 
Nevertheless, the system as a whole facilitated a reduction of money wages 
that, in the economists’ view, was an essential element in the overall economic 
program. Copland contrasted the Australian experience favourably with that 
of Great Britain, where wage reductions had been much more difficult to 
achieve.
The second assessment, by A G B Fisher in 1934, was somewhat similar 
to Copland’s:
The system of wage regulation which has played such an important 
part in Australian economic life for many years has frequently been 
criticised both inside and outside Australia on the ground that it 
introduced elements of rigidity which did make difficult, if not 
impossible, rapid adjustment to any change in the foundations of the 
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Australian economy. The Australian wage structure is still certainly far 
from displaying that delicacy and elasticity which did delight the hearts 
of those who admire the free working of a flexible economic system, but 
the history of recent years has shown clearly that the fears of critics were 
exaggerated, for prompt adjustments have been made at least as easily 
in Australia as in most other parts of the world … Throughout the 
period, however, the downward movement of retail prices was roughly 
parallel to the movement of wages, so that apart from the increased risks 
of unemployment real wages have apparently moved very little. (Fisher 
1934, p. 760)
Third, we have the opinion of Reddaway. By early 1938, he was back at 
Clare College, Cambridge. He published an article reviewing in some detail 
the Court’s policies over the period 1927–37. His broad conclusion was that 
the Court’s ability to conduct a wage policy (including wage reductions) had 
been a valuable ingredient of the overall policy mix:
[I]s there any advantage in having machinery for fixing the general 
level of wages, instead of leaving it to emerge from a large number of 
sectional decisions? The experience of this period surely shows that such 
a system is very valuable. The employment market in a country such 
as Australia does not, and never will, bear much resemblance to the 
text-book version with its perfect competition, equality of opportunity, 
automatic adjustments, and so on. Without some general system of 
regulation it is doubtful whether money wages could ever have been 
reduced sufficiently to preserve the exporter and encourage new 
manufactures; it is quite certain that the cuts would have fallen most 
unequally on different sections of the community. The trade unions in 
sheltered industries would have been able to resist the full cut, relying 
on the ability of the employers to charge relatively high prices at least for 
a time; if the unsheltered industries were to be maintained despite these 
relatively high prices for the things they bought, then the standards of 
the people engaged in them would have had to be cut still further. To 
secure the general fall in costs that was vitally necessary, a general system 
of regulation was almost indispensable. (Reddaway 1938, pp. 334–335)
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Reddaway asked the question: ‘What principle or principles should 
the Court apply in determining its policy?’ The Court itself had reached 
the conclusion ‘that its main criterion must be, in some sense, the state of 
industry, and not the attractive but elusive idea of the “needs” of the worker, 
with or without his traditional wife and three children’. ‘This’, said Reddaway, 
‘is obviously sound’ (pp. 335–336). But it was difficult to give precise content 
to the criterion of capacity to pay. The Court, to a large extent, had equated it 
with unemployment:
The Court’s procedure is to use the extent of unemployment as the 
main guide in judging whether the wage prescribed in the past was 
appropriate to the circumstances of the time, and then to investigate 
whether there have been any material changes in those circumstances 
such as would justify a revision of the wage. This is clearly the only 
possible method, but it is still full of difficulties. Unemployment is 
a complex phenomenon which is influenced by other things beside 
wage policy; the Court recognised this when it granted a rise in 1934 
although the level of unemployment was then above ‘normal’. It was 
obvious that no practicable wage policy could remove the abnormal 
unemployment overnight, and the Court assessed ‘the unemployment 
situation’ dynamically in terms of a rate of progress rather than statically 
by the absolute level. On a comprehensive view of the situation it 
decided that a higher wage would be compatible with further reduction 
of unemployment at a reasonable rate. (p. 336)
Inasmuch as this comment gives the impression that the unemployment 
percentages were the principal focus of the Court’s attention, it is an 
exaggeration. The judges were, of course, mindful of a firm link between the 
prosperity of employers and their capacity to employ. They were, however, 
concerned very much with evidence about the profitability of industry and its 
vulnerability to increased costs. Employers who adduced such evidence could 
be confident of careful (and often sympathetic) attention, provided that the 
evidence had the appropriate degree of generality. The Court, in the 1930s, 
was impatient with those employers who debated general wage changes by 
detailing the circumstances of specific industries.
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Reddaway accepted that wage reductions had been necessary in the 
Depression. They provided relief to exporters, and facilitated expansion of 
secondary industries by improving their capacity to compete with imports. In 
economic logic, exchange depreciation was an alternative, but the scope for 
this was limited:
At that time the virtues of exchange depreciation were not recognised; it 
was associated in men’s minds with the German inflation and regarded 
as a mere nostrum. Australia did use it, the rate on London rising to 130 
in January 1931, and then being reduced to 125 in December. To have 
raised it further—say to 150—might have created a first-class panic. 
The political aspect also cannot be ignored. A Labour Government was 
in power, which would make the adoption of an unorthodox policy 
appear all the more dangerous to the leaders of industry and owners of 
capital, whose ‘confidence’ is unfortunately so essential. It would have 
been regarded as an expedient to shirk the real issue … (p. 331)
To Reddaway, the Depression experience proved the value of an 
institution able to influence the general behaviour of wages. It was important 
to have a mechanism capable of delivering lower money wages at a time of 
rapidly falling prices:
Without some general system of regulation it is doubtful whether 
money wages could ever have been reduced sufficiently to preserve 
the exporter and encourage new manufactures; it is quite certain that 
the cuts would have fallen most unequally on different sections of 
the community. The trade unions in sheltered industries would have 
been able to resist the full cut, relying on the ability of the employers 
to charge relatively high prices at least for a time; if the unsheltered 
industries were to be maintained despite these relatively high prices for 
the things they bought, then the standards of the people engaged in 
them would have had to be cut still further. To secure the general fall 
in costs that was vitally necessary, a general system of regulation was 
almost indispensable. (p. 334)
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Reddaway discussed the system of automatic adjustments. ‘At first sight’, he 
said,
this might appear anomalous if the wage is to be based on capacity 
to pay (depending largely on external circumstances) and not on the 
worker’s needs. But it is at least arguable that the adjustment will produce 
good results, so long as the wage itself is reviewed fairly frequently. If 
circumstances remain stable, the two systems are identical; if they are 
changing rapidly, as during the war or at the onset of the depression, 
then the automatic adjustments will generally be in the right direction, 
and will be better than nothing until the situation can be reviewed. 
Moreover the system has the very important support of tradition. (p. 
337)
The ‘anomaly’ of maintaining automatic adjustments alongside a 
‘capacity-to-pay’ criterion formed an important part of the Court’s reasoning 
when it jettisoned the adjustment system in 1953. There is no evidence that, 
in the 1930s, it saw the price index as a temporary, if inexact, indicator of 
capacity to pay. The most accurate interpretation, I believe, is that in making 
a decision about the basic wage it relied primarily on the contemporaneous 
state of the economy and industries, with perhaps some attempt to anticipate 
conditions in the medium-term future. Having set the wage, it sought, for 
reasons of equity, to preserve its real value until the next review. Maintenance 
of the real wage was seen to be most important for the low-paid. At no time 
did the Court exhibit a like concern about the real value of margins.
Finally, I note briefly the opinion of W R Maclaurin, an American 
scholar who had visited Australia in 1934–35:
Although the labor movement has not accepted the Court’s arguments 
in favour of wage reductions in the depression as valid, the discussion by 
the Court in 1931 of the necessity for wage reductions in view of the fall 
in the national income appears to have been of very considerable value in 
promoting an understanding of the economic situation of the country 
among a large section of the electorate. From the beginning of the 
depression the Court has taken more notice of fluctuations in economic 
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conditions than almost any other official or semi-official body in the 
country. … In the regulation of minimum wages we could profit perhaps 
by Australian experience. Here again, however, it would seem desirable 
to experiment first with a ‘basic’ wage designed to provide a ‘fair and 
reasonable’ standard of living and leave the provision of margins for skill 
to the play of market forces. So far as the method of adjusting the basic 
wage is concerned, I am inclined to think that the Australian system of 
automatic regional cost-of-living adjustments checked periodically by 
reference to general economic conditions is the most practical method 
of administering a national minimum wage. The understanding of 
general economic conditions shown by the Commonwealth Court in 
recent years indicates that a properly administered minimum wage may 
add a valuable element of flexibility and control in the business cycle. 
(Maclaurin 1938, pp. 74 and 81)28
Between these four economists, then, there was a consensus as to the 
value of a regulatory institution able to influence wages in the direction 
indicated by the state of the economy. By the late 1930s, so far as I am aware, 
there was no Australian economist arguing a contrary view.
13.1.8 Conclusion
Wage policy was one topic to which the economists who exerted significant 
influence over policy before World War II gave their attention. To the best 
of my knowledge, Australia was unique in the part that wage policy played 
in economic discourse. This, of course, is attributable to the unique role 
of arbitration in this country. The economists had a stylised conception of 
the Federal Court—one that exaggerated its control of affairs. The Court’s 
willingness to listen to the economists was no doubt due partly to its own lack 
of economic expertise: it was entirely composed of lawyers. The explicit and 
28  In a footnote (p. 81), Maclaurin wrote: ‘Professor Copland has written to me that the 
new principle of a prosperity “loading” adopted by the Court in 1937 was worked out largely 
at the suggestion of the Australian economists. “Apart from the basic economic conditions 
having justified a rise in wages,” Copland writes, “the Court thought an extra amount should 
be given to workers in order that expansion and investment might be dampened down”’.
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implicit affirmations of the economists about the significance of wage policy 
could only have added to the Court’s sense of its own importance.
The economists, of course, did not have the field entirely to themselves. 
In this section we have noted criticisms of the system by ‘practical’ men—
those associated with the Tariff Board and the British Economic Mission. But 
it was the economists who struggled to unravel the more intricate cause-and-
effect relations between wage-setting and economic performance.
13.2 economIc appraIsal
13.2.1 Introduction
The background information provided in Chapter 1 affords evidence, 
admittedly imperfect, of two notable features of this period: a slow growth of 
productivity and a modest growth in real wages. Economists would generally 
expect the latter to flow from the former, though noting various reasons why 
they might to some extent diverge, including the terms of trade and foreign 
borrowing and a range of influences which might cause changes in the share of 
national income accruing to wage-earners. Because of Australia’s exposure to 
foreign trade and, until 1931, the rigidity of the exchange rate between sterling 
and the Australian pound, there were significant possibilities of variation in 
income shares. Such variations might or might not affect employment. To 
the extent that the Court controlled money wages, it might be able to effect 
changes in the overall claim of labour on the national income. The available 
statistics, summarised in Chapter 1, suggest that real wages fell substantially 
in the years of World War I and immediately afterwards but increased 
dramatically in 1920–21. Subsequent changes were subdued. In this study 
we have explored the interaction between the Court’s policies and economic 
conditions. Nevertheless, the question as to how, in the long term, those 
policies affected income shares, productivity growth, prices, and employment 
is largely conjectural.
The various issues involved in an assessment of the system’s performance 
cannot be divorced from the environment in which it operated. If there had 
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been no intervention by the government or one of its agencies in the functioning 
of the labour market, would the worst aspects of the market inherited from the 
19th century, and characterised by the term ‘sweating’, have solved themselves? 
And would trade unions have recovered from the setbacks of the 1890s and 
expanded their membership sufficiently to exercise a significant effect over 
the terms of employment? The two questions are obviously interrelated. 
The original Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904 was an 
attempt to move on two fronts: to encourage the formation of unions and 
employers’ associations so that employment terms would be negotiated rather 
than set by take-it-or-leave-it offers of employers; and to provide a mechanism 
whereby disputes between the negotiators could be determined and whereby 
employees lacking bargaining power could be protected. State laws had similar 
objectives, and all provided for authorities able to exercise legal power over 
terms of employment. The mechanisms varied. But federal and State laws all 
recognised and encouraged trade unions as representatives of labour.
Some of the founders of arbitration may well have envisaged the tribunals 
as industrial firemen, intervening to douse specific conflagrations and then 
retiring from the scene to allow the forces of the market and of bargaining 
to resume their normal determinative course. Others undoubtedly foresaw a 
wider role than this. That wider role may or may not have been inevitable, but 
it certainly came to pass. At least two reasons can be identified.
First, as we have noted, the creation and operation of tribunals went 
hand in hand with an expanded role for unions. The law assisted the growth 
of unions by providing mechanisms for their registration and for resolving 
issues as to their coverage. Even more important than this was the removal 
of the employers’ option to refuse to deal with unions. If a union had a legal 
right to represent the employer’s workers, the employer could not act as if 
it did not exist. An employer who refused to deal with the union could be 
forced to appear (directly or through an association) before a tribunal and be 
subject to an award which set standards that must be observed. In practice, 
most employers came to terms with this reality, and a high proportion of the 
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content of awards was settled by agreement. The growth of unionism and 
the expansion of the tribunals’ role were closely linked. Employers’ attitudes 
to tribunal regulation went through phases, as we have seen. In the 1920s, 
there was strong resentment of regulation; by the late 1930s, employers were 
strongly supportive of the tribunals (especially the Commonwealth Court).
Second, the members of tribunals—especially those of the Court type—
had a natural inclination toward consistency. They saw inconsistent decisions 
both as unfair and as likely causes of disputation. Acceptance of prior decisions 
led into pattern-setting. Arbitrators, in some though not all cases, made their 
decisions on the basis that the standards being set were likely to be observed 
more widely. The federal basic wage emerged from this process. In respect of 
other issues, including working hours and margins, there were recognised key 
decisions. The federal legislature, beginning in 1921, encouraged this process 
by reserving some issues to full benches.29 These attributes of the system caused 
the emergence, not of absolute uniformity, but of widely prevailing standards.
It is difficult, then, to engage with critics who assert that Australia’s 
economic development would have been better if no arbitration system had 
existed. Before assessing such a contention one would need to know:
•	 how the institutions of the labour market, especially trade 
unions, would have developed in the absence of the tribunal 
system. Would collective bargaining arrangements have 
evolved; what form would they have taken; and how wide 
would their coverage have been?
•	 the form, the scope, and the effectiveness of legal protections 
that would have been instituted for workers judged to be 
disadvantaged in the labour market.
It is pointless to respond to these implicit questions by describing some ideal 
set of arrangements or postulating a benign labour market. The pertinent 
question is what would have happened, not what should have happened.
29  It might have gone further by providing for appeals, but this did not occur until the 1950s.
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We must, therefore, retreat to a different and less ambitious kind of 
question. Take as given the position that arbitration occupied in the labour 
market. How well did the tribunals, and especially the Federal Court, exercise 
their powers? In the previous chapters, we have described their actions as a 
form of economic and distributive regulation. There are, of course, other 
aspects to be considered—notably the preservation of industrial peace—in an 
overall evaluation of the tribunals’ performance. These, however, are not the 
subject of this study.
13.2.2 The Higgins era
Higgins, broadly supported by Powers, adopted the concept of a minimum 
wage as the foundation of the regulated wage structure. A similar principle 
was accepted by the State tribunal in New South Wales and, a little later, in 
South Australia; later still, in Queensland and Western Australia. Wages boards 
in Victoria and Tasmania applied it in a less explicit manner. By 1920, the 
basic wage had become sufficiently recognised as a component of Australian 
wages for Prime Minister Hughes refer to it in an election policy speech and 
to appoint an inquiry into its adequacy and mode of adjustment. In the 
preceding years, the application of the basic wage concept had been strained 
by wartime inflation and deficient methods of wage adjustment. And in the 
federal jurisdiction, there was no general basic wage but rather one that varied 
from award to award according to when the award was made and who made 
it. The Harvester standard was recognised. Aided by Higgins’ doctrine that 
it was ‘sacrosanct’, and not subject to any test of economy-wide or industry-
level capacity to pay, it acquired a somewhat mystical character; but it was 
not extensively enforced because of the absence of a general basic wage, the 
infrequency of award making, and the unsystematic responses to price levels. 
There was little appreciation of the concept of a wage structure. Rewards for 
skill varied inversely, in real terms, to the rate of inflation, although Higgins 
during the war did advert to the need to restore proportional relativities in 
more normal times and in 1921 began to do that.
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The embryonic wage policy consisted of decided cases wherein some 
principles or rules gradually crystallised. Apart from those pertaining to the 
basic wage, the most important were:
•	 the non-adjustment for inflation of margins for skill and other 
attributes of the work;
•	 in the federal jurisdiction, adherence to the norm of a 48-
hour working week; and
•	 the principle that females should receive less than males. 
Though explicitly defended in terms of unequal need, the 
differentiation was not confined to the basic wage.
It is difficult to identify the benefits to wage-earners, the cost to employers 
or the economic effects more generally of the advent of arbitration. Figure 
2.7 in Chapter 2 suggests that the period of World War I saw rather violent 
fluctuations in overall real wages. The Court failed to enforce a basic wage that 
matched the Harvester standard. As we have seen, the wage-fixing practices of 
the time were ill-adapted to the circumstances of imported inflation.
The end of the Higgins era was marked by a complex set of events. 
Foremost among these were a depression and a consequent transition from 
inflation to deflation. Sticky money wages, at a time of falling prices, caused 
a dramatic increase in real wages to a level well above that of 1914. There is 
little evidence that the arbitration tribunals were alive to this process while it 
was occurring. (Indeed, there is little reference to it in later pronouncements.) 
Higgins showed some disposition to move to more generous labour standards, 
including reduction of working hours and increased margins. Other members 
of the Court, however, resisted these concessions. The Court, including 
Higgins, would not countenance the kind of increase needed to give effect 
to the Piddington basic wage. It justified its stance primarily by reference to 
alleged defects in Piddington’s letters patent, but was also conscious of the 
contemporary depression. The general pattern, then, was that the Court 
acquiesced in the rise in real wages caused by the conjuncture of falling prices 
and sticky money wages, but would not impose yet additional increases in 
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workers’ benefits. To call this ‘wage policy’ is going too far: confusion was 
too rife. But it may be that the experience was the genesis of more coherent 
practices.
13.2.3 The 1920s
An early sign of a more orderly approach—facilitated by the tailing-off of the 
postwar depression and the inflation—was Powers’ efforts to introduce a more 
systematic method of fixing the basic wage. Automatic adjustments would 
reduce the scope for large ‘chance’ variations in the real basic wage such as had 
occurred over the previous decade. Powers’ 3s was an attempt to appease the 
trade unions at a time when they hoped to continue benefiting from a long 
lag between (falling) prices and wages. Powers’ action in getting approval of 
his policy from a Full Bench of the Court and subsequently having the Court 
enunciate a set of principles consolidated the change of direction. It was at this 
time that it became meaningful to speak of the basic wage, notwithstanding 
variations in practice with respect to locations and the application of the price 
index.
Powers’ rejection of the Piddington basic wage, together with his reversal 
of Higgins’ initial attempts to restore pre-war skill relativities and to introduce 
a general 44-hour week, indicated a sense that the Court was constrained by 
economic conditions, even if the contention that the Royal Commission was 
the victim of faulty letters patent was casuistry.
For the rest of Powers’ tenure (until 1926), the Court’s tendency to 
focus on the particular industries to which its awards related, few of which 
manifested high prosperity, led to continuing caution.
The reconstituted Court faced, as its first significant task, a review of 
the working week. Division within the Bench produced a hybrid outcome, 
with the practical effect that the transition from the 48-hour to the 44-hour 
standard week was a protracted process, spread across 12 years. The decision 
left the Court free to raise the bar against extension of the 44-hour week as 
economic conditions deteriorated. By 1928, it was doing just that; and in the 
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celebrated Timber Workers’ case, it actually reverted from 44 hours (granted in 
1921) to 48. The Court’s hesitancy about reducing the working week stood 
in contrast to the situation in two of the States, where 44 hours were enforced 
by legislation.
There was no generalised attempt to restore skill relativities, reflecting 
the Court’s view that most industries had little capacity to absorb extra imposts. 
But the Court did award—often by consent—margins to sub-tradesmen 
grades to which previously the basic wage alone applied. It is not possible to 
quantify the aggregate effect of these less conspicuous wage increases, but the 
members of the Court sometimes referred to them in rebutting suggestions of 
undue parsimony.
The principal criticism that has been levelled at the Court’s policies in 
the 1920s is that they (along with those of State tribunals) entailed a real wage 
level that was too high for the contemporary economy. Evidence for this is 
found in an unemployment level that was high by pre-war standards. It appears 
from the data that nominal wages rose strongly between 1920 and 1922 and 
that, with retail prices falling, there was a large increase in real wages—an 
increase that was, to a large extent, unintended. In contemporary discussion, 
the reality of this increase was not fully appreciated. The basic wage standard 
remained—save for Powers’ 3s—at the 1907 level. Surely, it might be (and 
often was) said, the Australian economy could at least maintain this historic 
standard. This was to overlook several salient facts:
•	 The Harvester standard, when introduced, did constitute 
a substantial increase in the wage for unskilled workers, at 
any rate in the private sector. Higgins spoke of a 27 per cent 
increase. This implied a prior wage of 5s 6d per day, which was 
probably below the prevailing standard. Six shillings, implying 
a Harvester increase of 17 per cent, was more realistic.
•	 The application of Harvester was initially narrow. The 
extension of the basic wage and like wages under State awards 
and determinations was spread over a decade or more.
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•	 During that period, the impact of the basic wage was mitigated 
by the failure of the tribunals to preserve its real value. That 
failure was reflected in Hughes’ decision of 1919 to appoint a 
Royal Commission.
•	 With the fall in prices of 1921–22, the basic wage—by then 
applicable to much of the workforce—came into line with 
Harvester, augmented by Powers’ 3s.
It is a mistake, then, to think of the advent of the Harvester basic wage as a 
1907 event. It was a process spread across 15 years; and the requirement to 
meet the standard was a burden not fully imposed on industry until the 1920s.
The impact of the basic wage on the general wage level was offset, to a 
degree, by squeezing the real value of margins. But overall, the Nominal Wage 
Index, though beginning only in 1914, indicates a substantial and not reversed 
rise in real wages in the early 1920s. The contention that wages in the 1920s 
were too high for full employment, therefore, is not at odds with the wage and 
price data. Before attributing to wage policy any particular share of blame for 
semi-depressed conditions, however, it would be necessary to analyse many 
other contributors, including the failure of agriculture to support adequately 
the additional settlers committed to it, the poor performance of some of the 
infrastructure projects of the period, adherence to a near-fixed exchange rate 
with sterling (which returned to the gold standard in 1925), and the lack of 
qualified advice in the formulation of government economic policy.
In the later 1920s, the Court was increasingly concerned about the 
condition of industries and became reluctant to impose further burdens on 
them.
13.2.4 Depression and recovery
During 1930, the Federal Court made clear its growing belief that the 
intensifying depression would necessitate wage reductions over and above 
those associated with falling retail prices. It was therefore willing to be coopted 
into the professional economists’ plans, which included real wage reduction 
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among a suite of measures to deal with the crisis. As Copland noted in 1933, 
the Court moved independently of government in formulating its response 
to the crisis. Its decision of January 1931 came at a time of policy disorder, 
and may well have been crucial to the economists’ capacity to get acceptance 
of their program. The Court’s policy of holding down working standards was 
sustained for several years. Its main elements were the 10 per cent reduction 
in the real basic wage, a 10 per cent cut in nominal margins and a freeze 
on reductions in working hours. In other words, it sought to make labour 
cheaper; and it pursued this policy to offset the adverse effects on industries—
especially primary industries—of reduced export prices and the cessation 
of foreign lending to Australian governments. The Court’s policies were 
significantly counteracted by those of State tribunals (constrained in some 
cases by legislation).
It is an intriguing question whether any alternative wage policy would 
have made much or any difference to the severity of the Depression, as measured 
(for example) by unemployment. By 1934, Beeby, at least, was entertaining 
serious doubt about the effectiveness of the 10 per cent cut. Money wages and 
prices fell by 25 to 30 per cent. The fall in money wages was associated with the 
automatic adjustment system and explicit decisions of tribunals. Reductions 
in wages and prices reinforced each other, and we cannot say how far prices 
would have fallen if money wages had somehow been held constant. There 
is now a general acceptance that the process of price deflation has depressing 
effects, in terms of real output. From the viewpoint of 1930–31, this would 
have been a reason to rely on exchange depreciation, rather than wage cuts. 
That apart, there were two problems in wage reductions:
•	 the difficulty of converting general wage reductions into lower 
real wages—one of the major points made by Keynes. Of 
course, it was possible to reduce a real wage if it covered a 
limited field. The federal basic wage did fall in real terms. But, 
overall, hourly real wages were not reduced.
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•	 a low macroeconomic elasticity of demand for labour due to 
(1) the adverse effect on the demand for output associated 
with reduced purchasing power in the workers’ hands and 
(2) a psychological reluctance of capitalists to contemplate 
the added investment that might have offset diminished 
consumption.
Notwithstanding these points, it must surely have been true that the 
general lowering of the price level (including wages) restored somewhat the 
relativity of domestic to external prices and that this helped sustain primary 
producers who would otherwise have gone to the wall. Keynes implied that 
this policy had been taken to its practical limit, and possibly too far. He may 
well have been right.
With the exception of the 1937 basic wage case, the wage policy of the 
later 1930s was less one of economic strategy than one of gradual improvement 
of working standards, featuring higher margins and increased leisure. It was 
hardly conceivable that the degree of restraint that characterised the early 
1930s would be sustained. There is no reason to doubt that the judges of the 
Court, and their State counterparts, genuinely wished to preside over a rising 
standard of living for labour; but if they had not done so, the authority of the 
tribunals might well have been undermined. There were labour leaders, such as 
Crofts and Clarey, who believed in arbitration but had to contend with more 
militant officials who favoured the extraction of benefits by direct action. The 
judges were well aware of this tension and would have been conscious of the 
necessity of providing to the moderates evidence that their support for the 
system was not misplaced.
The 1937 case stood apart from other cases of the later 1930s by 
reason of the attention given to economic strategy. This was at the behest 
of the Melbourne group of economists, represented by Reddaway. As the 
employers’ anonymous expert pointed out, Reddaway’s evidence contained 
an endorsement of the thesis that higher real wages operated as a brake on 
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economic activity. The unions were prepared to praise this advice because in 
1937 it seemed to favour higher wages, whereas in the cases of 1930–34 they 
had strenuously resisted it. The Court respected Reddaway and was happy to 
cite his advice as a factor influencing its decision. Reddaway may, indeed, have 
exercised some influence over the size and timing of the wage increase. But 
as the employers plainly realised, it was quite unlikely that the unions would 
have left the Court empty-handed even if no economic advice were proffered 
to it. The 1934 decision had not fully reversed the 10 per cent cut in the basic 
wage; and it was clearly expedient for the Court to demonstrate that, just as 
bad times had called for a wage reduction, increases would be available when 
better times arrived.
Reddaway’s prescription—blessed and possibly instigated by Copland—
of an enhanced wage increase to restrain an impending investment boom 
presumed that making a major input of production more costly would deter 
entrepreneurs and investors from undertaking projects which might otherwise 
have gone ahead. The hypothesis seems to be common sense. But there are 
problems. One is that the proponents of the idea offered no empirical analysis 
of its practical importance. Given that Reddaway was talking of adding a 
shilling or two to the wage increase that would otherwise be granted on equity 
grounds, we may wonder whether the effect would have been noticeable. A 
second problem is that the deterrent effect might have been outweighed by 
decisions to adopt more capital-intensive processes in response to the higher 
cost of labour. A third problem is that raising real wages was likely to stimulate 
consumption, which may in turn have engendered more investment. A fourth 
is that—as the employers’ anonymous expert pointed out—any impact of the 
kind that Reddaway suggested was likely to be submerged by the effects of 
fluctuations in the prices received for major rural exports, especially wool. 
Overall, it is difficult to accord much weight to the speculation. This, of 
course, is a criticism of only part of Reddaway’s evidence. His comments on 
foreign borrowing, railway finances, and rural debt were pertinent.
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13.3 conclusIon
The legislation required the members of the Court to be lawyers.30 None was a 
trained economist.31 Did they deliver outcomes that were economically sound?
The Court’s primary concerns, in the early years of arbitration, of averting 
industrial disputation and imposing just wages and conditions naturally gave 
rise to situations in which the judges had to consider the capacity of employers 
to bear the standards that unions wished them to impose. To a large extent, 
that issue was posed in microeconomic terms: what were the resources at the 
disposal of the particular employers to provide benefits to their employees? 
The transition from this kind of question to a more comprehensive analysis 
was gradual, subtle, and never complete. But there were landmarks. One was 
the rejection of the Piddington basic wage, based on a realisation that such 
a wage was beyond the capacity of industry as a whole to bear. A second 
was the reform of basic wage setting instigated by Powers in 1922–23, which 
reinforced the perception of the basic wage as an economy-wide standard. The 
Main Hours case of 1926–27 raised explicitly the question whether industry 
at large should be required to sustain the shorter working week: the Court, by 
majority, answered that question in the negative. Probably the most important 
landmark was the 1931 basic wage decision, which entailed the Court’s 
assessment—with Copland’s assistance—that a general wage reduction would 
assist primary producers (who were not major employers of labour) and curb 
the growth in unemployment. The basic wage cases of 1932, 1933, and 1934 
were about the degree (if any) to which the overall economy had recovered. 
Finally, the arguments in the 1937 basic wage hearing were, to a significant 
30  An exception was the Conciliation Commissioners. Stewart and Coneybeer were the only 
persons appointed to this office.
31  Dethridge pointed out that he had studied economics while pursuing his law degree. (He 
did not identify his teachers.) He said that he and his colleagues were not ‘economic tyros’. 
Beeby had presented a paper (published in the Economic Journal)—see Subsection 13.1.1 
above—to the economics section of the British Association when it met in Sydney in 1914. 
His comments from the Bench and in some of his decisions suggest that he had confidence in 
his own ability to cope with economic reasoning.
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degree, macroeconomic, raising for consideration the Court’s ability to regulate 
the economy by wage-setting.
Many of the Court’s decisions can be criticised and some of its reasoning 
questioned. Overall, however, the history of wage-setting is one of learning 
by doing. Much progress was made. It may or may not be the case that better 
economic outcomes would have been produced by an atomistic labour market 
wherein wages and conditions were matters of individual contract, steered by the 
forces of competition. That was not an available option. Arbitration operated 
in a world of institutions and economic power wielded by large employers, 
employers’ associations and unions. In such a world, without arbitration, 
outcomes would have reflected relative industrial strength. It would be foolish 
to deny that industrial might played a role in the determination of wages 
and conditions, despite the presence of arbitrators. Yet the arbitrators also 
exercised an autonomous role, tempering bargaining strength and intruding 
notions of fairness and policy. They were important contributors to the texture 
of Australian society.
Anderson, George (1928), ‘The Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration 
Act 1928’, Economic Record, vol. 4, pp. 279–301.
Anderson, George (1929), Fixation of Wages in Australia, Macmillan in 
association with MUP, Melbourne.
Anderson, George (1931), ‘Wage Reductions in Australia. National 
Emergency’, Economic Record, vol. 7, pp. 117–121.
Anderson, George (1939), ‘Industrial Tribunals and Standards of Living’, in 
Eggleston, F W, Walker, E Ronald, Anderson, George and Nimmow J F, 
Australian Standards of Living: Studies, issued by the Australian Institute 
of International Affairs, MUP in association with OUP, London, pp. 
65–112.
Austin, A G (1965), The Webbs’ Australian Diary 1898, Pitman, Melbourne.
Australian Government Commission of Inquiry into Poverty (1975), Ronald F 
Henderson Chairman, First Main Report, Commonwealth of Australia.
Aves, Ernest (1908), Report to the Secretary of State for the Home Department 
on the Wages Boards and Industrial Conciliation Acts of Australia and New 
Zealand, Cd 4167.
Beeby, George S (1915), ‘The Artificial Regulation of Wages in Australia’, 
Economic Journal, vol. 25, pp. 321–328.
Beever, Alan (1985), The Forty-Hour Week Movement in Australia 1930–48, 
Working Papers in Economic History ANU, No. 35.
Benham, F C (1926), ‘The Australian Tariff and the Standard of Living: A 
Reply’, Economic Record, vol. 2, pp. 21–42.
References
712 Australian Wage Policy
Benham, Frederic C (1928), The Prosperity of Australia: An Economic Analysis, 
King & Son, London.
Board of Trade (NSW) (1918), Bulletin of the New South Wales Board of Trade: 
Living Wage (Adult Males).
Brigden, J B (1925), ‘The Australian Tariff and the Standard of Living’, 
Economic Record, vol. 1, pp. 29–46.
Brigden, J B (1927), ‘The Australian Tariff and the Standard of Living: A 
Rejoinder’, Economic Record, vol. 3, pp. 102–116.
Brigden, J B, Copland, D B, Dyason, E C, Giblin, L F and Wickens, C H 
(1929), The Australian Tariff: An Economic Enquiry, MUP in association 
with Macmillan, Melbourne.
British Economic Mission (1929), Report of the British Economic Mission to 
Australia : Nominated by His Majesty’s Government in Great Britain at the 
Request of His Majesty’s Government in the Commonwealth of Australia, 
Government Printer, Canberra.
Burns, E M (1926), Wages and the State: A Comparative Study of the Problems 
of State Wage Regulation, P S King & Son, London.
Butlin, N G (1962), Australian Domestic Product, Investment and Foreign 
Borrowing 1861–1938/39, CUP, Cambridge.
Butlin, N G (1970), ‘Some Perspectives of Australian Economic Development, 
1890–1965’, in Forster, C (ed.), Australian Economic Development in the 
Twentieth Century, Allen & Unwin, London, pp. 266–327.
Cain, Neville (1985), Keynes and Australian Policy in 1932, ANU Working 
Papers in Economic History No. 58.
Cain, Neville (1987a), Australian Economic Advice in 1930: Liberal and Radical 
Alternatives, ANU Working Papers in Economic History No. 78.
Cain, Neville (1987b), The Australian Economists and Controversy over 
Depression Policy, 1930-early 1931, ANU Working Papers in Economic 
History No. 79.
713Keith Hancock
Cameron, R J, (1953), ‘The Role of the Arbitration Court’, Historical Studies 
of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 6, 1953–55, pp. 204–214.
Clark, Victor S (1906), The Labour Movement in Australasia, Burt Franklin, 
New York, reprinted 1970.
Clark, Victor S (1909), ‘Present State of Labor Legislation in Australia and 
New Zealand’, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, vol. 33, pp. 440–447.
Coghlan, T A (1969), Labour and Industry in Australia, 4 volumes, Macmillan, 
Melbourne.
Cole, G D H (1928), The Payment of Wages: A Study in Payment by Results 
under the Wage-system, Allen & Unwin, London.
Coleman, John and Baum, Gregory (1991), Rerum Novarum: One Hundred 
Years of Catholic Social Teaching, Concilium: SCM Press, Philadelphia.
Coleman, William, Cornish, Selwyn and Hagger, Alf (2006), Giblin’s Platoon: 
The Trials and Triumphs of the Economist in Australian Public Life, ANU 
E Press, Canberra.
Compendium of Living Wage Declarations and Reports Made by the NSW Board 
of Trade (1921), Government Printer, Sydney.
Copland, D B (1924), ‘The Economic Situation in Australia, 1918–23’, 
Economic Journal, vol. 34, pp. 33–51.
Copland, D B (1930), ‘The Australian Problem’, Economic Journal, vol. 40, 
pp. 638–649.
Copland, Douglas (1934), Australia in the World Crisis 1929–1933, The 
Marshall Lectures October and November 1933, CUP, Cambridge.
Copland, Sir Douglas (1950), Developments in Economic Thought 1924–1950, 
address given in May 1950 to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the 
foundation of the Victorian Branch of the Economic Society and the 
School of Commerce at the University of Melbourne.
714 Australian Wage Policy
Copland, D B and Foenander, O deR (1932), ‘Agricultural Wages in Australia’, 
International Labour Review, vol. 25, pp. 765–786.
Dabscheck, Braham (1983), Arbitrator at Work: Sir William Raymond Kelly 
and the Regulation of Australian Industrial Relations, Allen & Unwin, 
Sydney.
Davey, Patricia Ruth (1975), Wages Boards in Victoria 1896–1920, PhD thesis, 
University of Melbourne.
Douglas, Paul H (1923), ‘Wages Regulation and Children’s Maintenance in 
Australia’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 37, pp. 643–686.
Economic Commission on the Queensland Basic Wage (1925), Report, 
Government Printer, Brisbane.
Eggleston, F W (1915), ‘The Australian Democracy and its Economic 
Problems’, Economic Journal, vol. 25, pp. 347–359.
Fahey, Charles and Lack, John (2007), ‘Harvester Men and Women: The 
Making of the Harvester Decision’, in Kimber, Julie and Love, Peter 
(eds), The Time of Their Lives: The Eight Hour Day and Working Life, 
Australian Society for the Study of Labour History, Melbourne.
Finnimore, Christine (1995), A Woman of Difference: Augusta Zadow and the 
1894 Factories Act, WorkCover Corporation, Adelaide.
Fisher, Allan G B (1934), ‘Crisis and Readjustment in Australia’, Journal of 
Political Economy, vol. 42, pp. 753–782.
Foenander, O de R (1934), Review of Irvine, R F (1934), The Midas Touch, 
Hassal Press, Adelaide, in Economic Record, vol. 10, pp. 131–132.
Foenander, O de R (1937), Towards Industrial Peace in Australia, MUP, 
Melbourne.
Fogarty, Michael (1961), The Just Wage, Chapman, London.
Forster, Colin (1964), Industrial Development in Australia 1920–1930, 
Australian National University.
715Keith Hancock
Forster, Colin (1985), Unemployment and the Australian Economic Recovery of 
the 1930s, ANU Working Papers in Economic History No. 45.
Forster, Colin (1987), The Economy, Wages and the Foundation of Arbitration, 
ANU Working Papers in Economic History, No. 83.
Giblin, L F (1927), ‘The Australian Tariff and the Standard of Living: A Note 
on Mr Benham’s Statistics’, Economic Record, vol. 3, pp. 148–156.
Giblin, L F (1930a), Australia, 1930: An Inaugural Lecture, MUP, Melbourne.
Giblin, L F (1930b), Letters to John Smith (a series of articles in the Melbourne 
Herald, July 1930, reprinted by the Herald).
Giblin, L F (1931), Wages and Prices, Labour Report, No. 21, 1930, pp. 163–
180.
Gifford, J L K (1928), Economic Statistics for Australian Arbitration Courts, 
Macmillan in association with MUP, Melbourne.
Goodwin, Crauford D W (1966), Economic Enquiry in Australia, Duke 
University Press, Durham.
Graham, Morris (1995), A B Piddington: The Last Radical Liberal, University 
of New South Wales Press, Kensington.
Gregory, R, Ho, V and McDermott, L (1985), Sharing the Burden: The 
Australian Labour Market During the 1930s, ANU Working Papers in 
Economic History, No. 47.
Gregory, R G and Butlin, N G (eds) (1988), Recovery from the Depression: 
Australia and the World Economy in the 1930s, CUP, Cambridge and 
Melbourne.
Gregory, R G (1988), ‘Overview’, in Gregory, R G and Butlin, N G (eds) 
(1988), Recovery from the Depression: Australia and the World Economy in 
the 1930s, op. cit., Chapter 1.
Hagan, Jim (1981), The History of the ACTU, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne.
716 Australian Wage Policy
Haig, Bryan (2001), ‘New Estimates of Australian GDP: 1861–1948/49’, 
Australian Economic History Review, vol. 41, pp. 1–34.
Hammond, M B (1913), ‘Judicial Interpretation of the Minimum Wage in 
Australia’, American Economic Review, vol. 3, pp. 259–286.
Hammond, M B (1914–15), ‘Wages Boards in Australia: I. Victoria’, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, vol. 29, pp. 98–148.
Hancock, Keith (1972), ‘Forty Years On’, Australian Economic History Review, 
vol. 12, pp. 71–79.
Hancock, Keith and Moore, Kathryn (1972), ‘The Occupational Wage 
Structure in Australia Since 1914’, British Journal of Industrial Relations, 
vol. 10, pp. 107–122.
Hancock, K J (1979a), ‘The First Half-Century of Australian Wage Policy—
Part I’, Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 21, pp. 1–19.
Hancock, K J (1979b), ‘The First Half-Century of Australian Wage Policy—
Part II’, Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 21, pp. 129–160.
Hancock, Keith (2004), ‘Economists and Australian Wage Policy before World 
War II’, Australian Journal of Labour Economics, vol. 7, pp. 411–438.
Hancock, W K (1930), Australia, Ernest Benn, London.
Hancock, W K (1954), Country and Calling, Faber and Faber, London.
Harley, Bill (2004), ‘Managing Industrial Conflict’, in Isaac, Joe and Macintyre, 
Stuart (eds), The New Province for Law and Order, CUP, Cambridge and 
Port Melbourne, pp. 316–352.
Heagney, Muriel A (1935), Are Women Taking Men’s Jobs; A Survey of Women’s 
Work in Victoria, with Special Regard to Equal Status, Equal Pay, and 
Equality of Opportunity, Hilton & Veitch, Melbourne.
Heaton, H (1921) ‘The Basic Wage Principle in Australian Wages Regulation’, 
Economic Journal, vol. 31, pp. 309–319.
717Keith Hancock
Heaton, H (1925), Modern Economic History: With Special Reference to 
Australia, WEA in cooperation with Macmillan, Melbourne.
Henderson, R F, Harcourt, A and Harper, R J A (1970), People in Poverty: A 
Melbourne Survey, Cheshire, Melbourne.
Heyward, E J R (1936), ‘The Tasmanian Wages Board System’, Economic 
Record, vol. 12, pp. 108–114.
Higgins, Henry Bournes (1922), A New Province for Law and Order, WEA, 
Sydney.
Higgins, H B (2001), ‘Industrial Arbitration’, Australian Bulletin of Labour, 
vol. 27, pp. 177–191.
The Industrial Unrest and the Living Wage (1913), with an Introduction by 
the Rev William Temple, MA, The Collegium with P S King & Son, 
London.
Keynes, J M (1936), The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, 
MacMillan, London.
Keynes, J M (1982), ‘The Report of the Australian Experts’, in Moggridge, 
Donald (ed.), The Collected Writings of J M Keynes, vol. XXI, Macmillan 
& CUP for the Royal Economic Society, pp. 94–100.
Kirby, Michael and Creighton, Breen (2004), ‘The Law of Conciliation and 
Arbitration’, in Isaac, Joe and Macintyre, Stuart (eds), The New Province 
for Law and Order, Cambridge and Port Melbourne, pp. 98–138.
La Nauze, J A (1949), Political Economy in Australia: Historical Studies, MUP, 
Melbourne.
Lee, Jenny (1987), ‘A Redivision of Labour: Victoria’s Wages Boards in Action, 
1896–1908’, Historical Studies, vol. 22, pp. 352–372.
Macarthy, P G (1968), ‘Victorian Wages Boards: Their Origins and the 
Doctrine of the Living Wage’, Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 10, 
pp. 116–134.
718 Australian Wage Policy
Macarthy, P G (1969), ‘Justice Higgins and the Harvester Judgment’, Australian 
Economic History Review, vol. 9, pp. 17–38.
Macintyre, Stuart (2004), ‘Arbitration in Action’, in Isaac, Joe and Macintyre, 
Stuart (eds), The New Province for Law and Order, CUP, Cambridge and 
Port Melbourne, pp. 55–97.
Macintyre, S and Mitchell, R (eds) (1989), Foundations of Arbitration, OUP, 
Melbourne.
McCawley, T W (1922), ‘Industrial Arbitration in Queensland’, International 
Labour Review, vol. 5, pp. 385–409).
McFarlane, Bruce (1964), Professor Irvine’s Economics in Australian Labour 
History, Australian Society for the Study of Labour History.
Maclaurin, W R (1938), ‘Recent Experience with Compulsory Arbitration in 
Australia’, American Economic Review, vol. 28, pp. 65–81.
McLean, Ian W and Pincus, Jonathan J (1983), ‘Did Australian Living 
Standards Stagnate Between 1890 and 1940?’, The Journal of Economic 
History, vol. 43, pp. 193–202.
Maddock, R and McLean, I W (1987), ‘The Australian Economy in the Very 
Long Run’, in Maddock, R and McLean, I W (eds), The Australian 
Economy in The Long Run, CUP, Melbourne, pp. 5–29.
Marshall, Alfred (1961), Principles of Economics, vol. 1, Ninth (Variorum) 
Edition with Annotations by C W Guillebaud, Macmillan for the Royal 
Economic Society, London and New York.
Meredith, D and Dyster, B (1999), Australia in the Global Economy, CUP, 
New York.
Merrett, David and Ville, Simon (2011), ‘Tariffs, Subsidies, and Profits: A 
Reassessment of Structural Change in Australia 1901–39’, Australian 
Economic History Review, vol. 51, pp. 46–70.
Millmow, Alex (2003), ‘W Brian Reddaway—Keynes’ Emissary to Australia’, 
Economic Record, vol. 79, pp. 136–138.
719Keith Hancock
Mills, R C (1929), ‘Some Economic Factors in Industrial Relations’, Economic 
Record, vol. 5, pp. 34–53.
New Protection—Explanatory Memorandum in Regard to (1907), 
Commonwealth Parliamentary Papers 1907–8, vol. II.
Nyland, Chris (1987), ‘Work Time in the 1920s’, Australian Economic History 
Review, vol. 27, pp. 37–55.
Palgrave’s Dictionary of Political Economy (1906), Macmillan, London.
Phelps Brown, E H (1959), The Growth of British Industrial Relations: A Study 
from the Standpoint of 1906–14, Macmillan, London.
Piddington, A B (1921), The Next Step: A Family Basic Income, Macmillan, 
Melbourne.
Plowman, David H (1989), Holding the Line: Compulsory Arbitration and 
National Employer Co-ordination in Australia, CUP, Cambridge and 
Melbourne.
Portus, G V (1953), Happy Highways, MUP, Carlton.
Pribram, K (1928), ‘The Regulation of Minimum Wages as an International 
Problem’, International Labour Review, vol. 17, pp. 317–331.
Rankin, Mary Theresa (1916), Arbitration and Conciliation in Australasia: The 
Legal Wage in Victoria & New Zealand, Allen & Unwin, London.
Reddaway, W B (1938), ‘Australian Wage Policy, 1927–1937’, International 
Labour Review, vol. 37, pp. 314–337.
Ricardo, David (1962), On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, 
vol. I, in Sraffa, Piero (ed) with the collaboration of Dobb, M H, CUP, 
London.
Rickard, John (1984), The Rebel as Judge, Allen & Unwin, Sydney.
Rimmer, Malcolm (2004), ‘Unions and Arbitration’, in Isaac, Joe and 
Macintyre, Stuart (eds), The New Province for Law and Order, CUP, 
Cambridge and Port Melbourne, pp. 275–315.
720 Australian Wage Policy
Rowe, J W F (1928), Wages in Practice and Theory, Routledge, London.
Royal Commission on the Basic Wage (1920), Report, Parliament of the 
Commonwealth of Australia.
Royal Commission on the Basic Wage (1921), Report, Parliament of the 
Commonwealth of Australia.
Russell, F A A (1915), ‘Industrial Arbitration in New South Wales’, Economic 
Journal, vol. 25, pp. 329–346.
Ryan, John A (1906), A Living Wage, Macmillan, London.
Sawkins, D T (1933), The Living Wage in Australia, MUP, Melbourne.
Schedvin, C B (1970), Australia and the Great Depression, Sydney University 
Press, Sydney.
Sells, Dorothy McD (1924), ‘The Development of State Wage Regulation in 
Australia and New Zealand’, International Labour Review, vol. 10, pp. 
607–629, 779–799, 962–1004.
Shanahan, M (1999), ‘Australian Labour Market Institutions through Time: A 
Perspective from the New Institutional Economics’, Australian Economic 
History Review, vol. 39, pp. 213–238.
Shann, E O G (1930), An Economic History of Australia, CUP, Cambridge.
Shann, E O G and Copland, D B (eds) (1931), The Crisis in Australian Finance 
1929 to 1931: Documents on Budgetary and Economic Policy, Angus & 
Robertson, Sydney.
Sheldon, Peter (2007), ‘State-level Basic Wages in Australia during the 
Depression, 1929–35: Institutions and Politics over Marhets, Australian 
Economic History Review, vol. 47, pp. 249–277.
Smithies, A (1935), ‘Wages Policy in the Depression’, Economic Record, vol. 
11, pp. 249–268.
Smithies, A (1936), ‘Rejoinder’, Economic Record, vol. 12, pp. 101–102.
721Keith Hancock
Snooks, G D (1991), ‘Bond or Free? The Life, Work, and Times of Edward 
Shann, 1884–1935’, in Siddique, M A B (ed.), A Decade of Shann 
Memorial Lectures 1981–90 & the Australian Economy, University of 
Western Australia, pp. 15–33.
Snowden, Philip (1913), The Living Wage, Hodder and Stoughton. (Dating 
based on internal evidence).
Stone, J O N (1991), ‘1929 and All That …’, in Siddique, M A B (ed.), A 
Decade of Shann Memorial Lectures 1981–90 & the Australian Economy, 
University of Western Australia, pp. 129–163.
Sutcliffe, J T (1925), ‘Wages and Production’, Economic Record, vol. 1, pp. 
63–72.
Sutcliffe, J T (1926), National Dividend: An Enquiry into the Amount of the 
National Dividend of Australia and the manner of its Distribution, MUP 
in association with Macmillan.
Tariff Board (1926), Annual Report for the Year Ended 30th June, 1926, 
Parliamentary Papers 1926–27–28, vol. IV, p. 1605.
Tariff Board (1927), Annual Report for the Year Ended 30th June, 1927, 
Parliamentary Papers 1926–27–28, vol. IV, p. 1621.
Tariff Board (1928), Annual Report for the Year Ended 30th June, 1928, 
Parliamentary Papers 1926–27–28, vol. IV, p. 1647.
Tariff Board (1929), Annual Report for the Year Ended 30th June, 1929, 
Parliamentary Papers 1929, vol. II, p. 2509.
Tariff Board (1930), Annual Report for the Year Ended 30th June, 1930, 
Parliamentary Papers 1929–30–31, vol. III, p. 1215.
Tariff Board (1935), Annual Report for the Year Ended 30th June, 1935, 
Parliamentary Papers 1934–35–36–37, vol. II, p. 1355.
Tariff Board (1938), Annual Report for the Year Ended 30th June, 1937, 
Parliamentary Papers 1937–38–39–40, vol. II, p. 998.
722 Australian Wage Policy
Tariff Board (1939), Annual Report for Year 1938–39, Parliamentary Papers 
1934–35–36–37, vol. II, p. 1027.
University of Tasmania (1925), Employment Relations and the Basic Wage: 
Lectures and Papers Published in Connection with the Pitt Cobbett 
Foundation, Hobart.
Walker, E R (1933), Australia in the World Depression, King & Son, London.
Walker, E R (1936), Unemployment Policy with Special Reference to Australia, 
Angus & Robertson, Sydney.
Wallace Bruce Committee (1932), ‘Report by the Wallace Bruce Committee, 
a Preliminary Survey of the Economic Problem for the Premiers’ 
Conference, April 1932’, in The Australian Price Structure, 1932, with an 
Introduction by E O G Shann and D B Copland, Angus & Robertson, 
Sydney, 1933, pp. 38–78.
Whillier, R J (1977), The Piddington Commission 1920 Enquiry into the Basic 
Wage, University of Adelaide BA Honours thesis held in the Barr Smith 
Library.
Wilson, Roland (1937), Prices, Quantities and Values, Economic Society of 
Australia and New Zealand, Melbourne.
Wilson, Roland (1947), Facts and Fancies of Productivity, Economic Society of 
Australia and New Zealand, Melbourne.
Withers, Glenn (1987), ‘Labour’, in Maddock, Rodney and McLean, Ian W 




Age, The  5–6, 653
Alison, C A  414–415
Anderson, George  61, 68, 81, 87, 
90, 95, 100, 113–114, 169–
170, 190, 209, 242, 462–463
anonymous expert (1937) 564–568,  
707–708
Arthur, J A  69
Attorney–General  66, 177, 188, 
306, 369, 382, 462, 463
Aumont, Smith  74–75
Australian Council of Trade Unions 
(ACTU)  323, 374, 644, 672
Australian Railways’ Union 
v Victorian Railways 
Commissioners  332
Aves, Ernest  8, 655
B
Beeby, Justice and Chief Justice G S  
187, 282, 283, 296–297, 299, 
300, 305, 306–323 (passim), 
326, 331, 332, 333, 335, 336, 
339, 340, 359–650 (passim), 
654, 655, 706, 709
below-award payments  28, 501
Benham, Frederic  284, 313–314, 
662, 663–666, 673–675
Board of Industry (SA)  242, 486, 
506, 510, 533, 535–536, 573, 
594
Board of Trade (NSW)  10, 105, 
110, 116, 119, 166, 187, 242, 
289
Booth, Charles  58
Brigden, J B  240, 343–344, 511, 
534–535, 541, 564, 657, 666, 
671–672, 673–677
British Economic Mission  190, 482, 
666–669, 673, 680, 698
Brown, President Jethro  87, 95, 
113–115, 166, 170, 510
Bruce, S M  342, 675
Bult, George  79
Burns, Evelyn M  3, 5, 8, 57, 62, 
104, 112, 113
Butlin, N G  15–20, 22, 44–48, 
190–193, 336–338, 340, 
345–347, 572
This book is available as a free fully-searchable pdf from
www.adelaide.edu.au/press
724 Australian Wage Policy
C
capacity to pay  82, 278, 482, 552, 
661, 664–665, 669–673, 696, 
701, 709–710
Carlyle, A J  60
Carolan, P J  370, 371, 374–375, 
411, 503
censuses  10–12, 25–26, 48, 105, 
111, 127, 139, 161, 338, 582
Central Council of Employers’ 
Associations  668
Chapple, J F  427, 432
child endowment  35, 140, 142, 
148, 280, 281, 289–290, 461, 
472, 491
Chomley, A C a’B  426, 427, 442
Clarey, P J  482, 495, 498–499, 
507–508, 536–537, 575, 707
Clark, Victor S  655
Clyde Engineering Company v 
Cowburn  189
Cole, G D H  327–328, 470, 474
Coleman, W, Cornish, S and 
Hagger, A  342–343, 657
Commonwealth Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act 1904  43, 67, 
104, 113, 178, 190, 699
Commonwealth Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act 1928, section 
28D  190, 363, 364, 365
Commonwealth Grants Commission 
574, 655
Commonwealth Statistician  10, 20, 
24, 26, 28, 49, 88–91, 94, 99, 
101, 103, 105, 108, 111, 113, 
117, 123–124, 127, 133–134, 
138, 145, 171, 201, 205, 207, 
216, 221, 223, 237, 241, 288, 
307, 357, 370, 377, 459, 473, 
484, 574, 587, 644, 656, 675
Conciliation Committees  332, 365, 
367
Coneybeer, Conciliation 
Commissioner E H  332, 600, 
638, 709
Copland, D B  340, 343, 344, 364, 
370, 375, 377–398, 399, 402, 
407, 409, 412, 414, 415, 416, 
418, 421, 422, 423, 428, 429, 
430, 432, 433, 435, 437, 442–
443, 446, 449, 452, 459, 460, 
469, 470, 475, 538, 549, 551, 
556–558, 560, 564, 567, 582, 
583, 654, 657, 666, 669–670, 
675, 683, 685–686, 690, 691, 
692, 697, 706, 708, 709
Corke, F H  447–449, 453
Court of Arbitration (WA)  242, 
306, 533, 594
Court of Industrial Appeals (SA)  
112
Court of Industrial Arbitration (Qld) 
170, 242, 670
Crofts, Charles  214, 215, 230, 306, 
307, 374, 378, 382, 384, 386, 
387, 389, 393, 394, 398, 399, 
402, 412, 415, 416, 424, 426, 
427, 428, 429, 430, 432, 436, 
437, 438, 439, 440, 441–447, 
449–450, 469–470, 472–473, 
477, 486, 496–497, 504, 510, 
525, 534, 541, 549–550, 
573–574, 576, 580–581, 707
Cussen, Mr Justice L F B  169
Custom Tariff Act 1906  64, 66
725Keith Hancock
D
Dabscheck, Braham  8
Davey, P R  7–9, 82
Deakin, Alfred  5, 7, 65–67, 80
deflation  29, 233, 385–386, 393–
398, 403–407, 417–418, 422, 
459, 538, 702, 706
Derham, F P  286, 470, 507, 564
Dethridge, Chief Justice G J  187, 
215–216, 280–281, 283, 
284–285, 290–296, 298–300, 
303–304, 305 306–321 
(passim), 325–327, 331, 332, 
359–650 (passim), 709
Dilke, Charles  5
Divini Redemptoris  58
Douglas, C H  426, 442, 458, 474, 
539, 550
Douglas, Paul  656
Drake-Brockman, Justice E A  187, 
188, 282, 283, 285, 323, 326, 
331–333,  359–650 (passim)
Dupree, G  425
Dyason, E C  344, 378, 394, 460, 
538, 675
Dyster, B  14–15
e
Economic Commission on the 
Queensland Basic Wage  307, 
512, 664, 670–671
Economic Research Act 1929  342
Economic Research, Bureau of  342
Edmonds, Mr Justice  108
Eggleston, F W  654–655
equation of leisure  309, 641–643
Excise Tariff Act 1906  63, 67–68, 
84, 171
F
Factories Act 1894 (SA)  8
Factories and Shops Act 1934 (Vic)  
537, 592
Fahey, Charles and Lack, John  64
Fair Wages Resolution  58
family size  23, 79, 85, 100, 112, 
116–117, 140, 147, 280–281
female wages and conditions  36–37, 
38, 114, 161–171, 176, 177, 
270–277, 317, 323–327, 449, 
509–510, 519, 527, 549, 
576–579, 613, 649–650, 702
Finnimore, Christine  8
Fisher, A G B  692–693
Foenander, O de R  188–189, 190, 
323, 332, 364, 654
Forster, Colin  19, 193, 211, 338
Forty-four Hours Week Act 1925 
(NSW)  210
Foster, A W  124, 307, 474
Fraser, A M  382, 383, 400–401, 
416, 421, 449–453
g
Garde, J B  80
Gavan Duffy, Frank (later Mr 
Justice) 69–74, 82, 84, 152, 
187, 262, 264–265
Giblin, L F  20, 137, 240, 343, 344, 
376, 418, 473, 475, 481, 488, 
538, 540, 550, 551, 567, 657, 
666, 673, 675, 683–685, 686
726 Australian Wage Policy
Gibson, H C  28, 122, 207, 208, 
212, 229, 371–373, 375, 
383–385, 424, 430–431, 433, 
473, 489, 615
Gifford, J L K  24, 206, 671
Goodall, H W  152
Gordon, Mr Justice  112
Graham, Morris  109, 118, 123, 
140, 142, 290
Grant, C H  559
Grayndler, E  408, 434–435
Gregory, R G  339, 341, 346
Gregory, R, Ho, V and McDermott, 
L  540
Gregory, T E  344, 427, 460, 682, 
683
Griffith, Samuel  62
Gunn, J A L  412–414, 432
H
Hagan, Jim  188, 265, 323, 644, 
669, 673
Haig, Bryan  15–22, 44–47, 190–
193, 336–337, 346, 572
Hammond, M B  5, 6–7, 655
Hancock, Keith  44, 340, 342, 343, 
540, 550
Hancock, K and Moore, K  262
Hancock, W K  342, 659–662, 668, 
673, 682
Harvester case  33, 44, 63, 64–85, 
99–100, 111, 124, 133, 181, 
223, 362, 514, 549
Harvester standard  28, 64, 84–85, 
90, 99, 102, 105, 112, 118, 
123, 132, 134, 143, 147, 153, 
211–212, 223, 224, 227, 229, 
230–232, 234, 236–237, 278, 
281, 287–288, 431, 446–447, 
491, 498, 525, 533, 580, 597, 
672, 701, 702, 704
Heagney, Muriel  577–579
Healy, J  400, 402
Heaton, Herbert  654
Henderson, R F  148
Heydon, Mr Justice C G  64, 89, 95, 
99, 104–111, 113, 114, 116, 
144
Higgins, Mr Justice Henry Bournes  
7, 10, 41, 43, 44, 48, 54, 
55–183 (passim), 213, 
217–218, 220, 223–226, 229, 
236, 243–247, 252, 254, 256, 
262–263, 265, 266, 270, 272, 
276, 278, 280, 290–291, 301, 
304, 318, 324, 326, 360, 368, 
415, 446–447, 456, 461, 485, 
497, 513–514, 522, 548, 597, 
60–606, 610, 621, 635, 645, 
667, 671–672, 701–704
High Court of Australia  10, 43, 68, 
123, 144, 180–189, 235, 248, 
269, 305, 332–333, 440, 466, 
633, 658
highest function rule  154
high wages doctrine  300, 327–328, 
359, 363, 403, 422, 437–438, 
476, 621, 654
Hobson, J A  383–384, 415, 419, 
442, 470, 474, 476, 584
holidays  (see leave )
Holloway, E J  318–319
Home, W J  562
hours of work  17, 22–23, 37–38, 
171–181, 189–190, 209–210, 
727Keith Hancock
212–214, 244, 262–270, 274, 
276–277, 304–318, 320–322, 
325–326, 327, 332, 336, 341, 
357–358, 365–369, 412, 479, 
524, 526–531, 593, 603, 604, 
628–645, 702, 703–704, 706
household budget  (see also Royal 
Commission on the Basic 
Wage) 73–79, 96–97, 105–
107
House of Lords, Select Committee  
3–4
Hughes, W M  44, 119, 120–121, 
134, 138, 141, 142, 144, 146, 
436, 656, 701, 705
I
Industrial Arbitration Act 1912 (SA)  
113
Industrial Commission (NSW)  242, 
289, 290, 529, 579, 593
Industrial Unrest and the Living Wage, 
The  5, 60–61
industry allowance  243, 249, 
256–257, 258–259, 335, 650
inflation  29, 52, 108–109, 118, 
154, 211, 233, 288, 344–345, 
392, 405, 418, 420, 459–460, 
691, 695, 701, 702, 703
International Labour Organisation 
(ILO)  61, 644
interstate competition  535, 543, 
545, 588–591
Irvine, R F  402–412, 417, 423, 
429, 432, 436, 442–444, 447, 
455, 459, 460, 470, 473–475, 
540, 653, 655, 688
Isaacs, Mr Justice Isaac  43, 163
J
Jewell, T  425
K
Kelly, Acting President and President 
Raymond  510, 535–536
Keynes, J M  376, 413, 417–418, 
420, 474, 476, 488, 501–502, 
541, 550, 683, 687–690, 691, 
706, 707
Kirby, Michael and Creighton, Breen 
1, 188
Knibbs, George  94, 105, 108, 
138–139, 141–142, 148, 221, 
307, 431, 656
L
labour standards  195, 211–216, 
279, 328, 702
Lang, J T  345, 412, 532, 683
Latham, J T  188
Lawrence, Captain  215–216
leave  17, 39, 79, 172–173, 175, 
180, 181, 182, 212, 307, 368, 
506, 527, 530, 625, 645–649
Lee, Jenny  2, 162
Leo XIII, Pope  57
living wage  3, 9, 10, 35–36, 55–64, 
83, 84–85, 86, 96, 98, 99, 
101, 102–104, 104–119, 151, 
154, 212, 214, 218, 223, 225, 
227, 229, 242, 245, 246, 264, 
265, 282, 289, 290, 356, 419, 
728 Australian Wage Policy
490, 511, 513, 532, 533, 536, 
573, 576, 594
Lloyd Thomas, Reverend J M  5
Lukin, Justice L O  187, 235, 281–
284, 285, 287, 301–302, 305, 
306–322 (passim), 326, 331, 
359, 362, 368–369, 642–643
Lyne, William  65
M
Macarthy, P G  64, 76
Macintyre, Stuart  10, 43
Macintyre, Stuart and Mitchell, R  2
Maddock, R and McLean, I W  13, 
14
Maher, T C  123, 371, 374, 398–
399
Main Hours case 1926–27  214, 266, 
304, 306–314, 318, 322, 367, 
368, 641, 662, 709
Mann, L R  339, 499–501, 540, 
556–558
Marshall, Alfred  58–59, 460, 
655–656
Martin, C E  419–420
Martin, Russell  124
Massey, Gordon  389–398, 412, 
421–424, 429, 444
McCawley, Mr Justice T W  670
McFarlane, Bruce  402, 653
McKay, George  80, 82
McKay, H V  68–78, 152–153, 171, 
181, 362, 600
McLaurin, W R  334–335
McLean, Ian  W and Pincus, 
Jonathan J  22–23 
Meagher, L C  445–447, 449
Meeker, Royal  126, 137
Melville, Leslie  343, 382, 423, 470, 
560, 564, 662, 666, 686
Menzies, R G  230, 369
Meredith, D  14–15
Merrett, D and Ville, S  191, 346
Mills, R C  343, 437, 511, 653, 666, 
671, 686
Mundy, C E  335, 430, 487–488
Myhill, W C  252, 502–503
N
New Protection  65–66
Niemeyer, Otto  344, 460, 682–683
nominal wages  26–28, 30,34, 
49–50, 52, 148, 196–197, 
199–200, 335, 348–350, 519, 
628, 681, 686–687, 704
Nyland, Chris  209, 304, 317
O
O’Connor, Mr Justice R E  43, 68
O’Mara, Judge Thomas  240, 332, 
335, 638–643
Ord, Harrison  6
Osborne, Ethel  130, 177, 325
over-award payments  28, 335, 607
P
Parkinson, H W  418, 419
Payment by Results  (see piecework)
Peace Treaty 1919  61, 266, 309
Peacock, Alexander  6, 7
Pescia, C  424, 425
Piddington, A B  (see also Royal 
729Keith Hancock
Commission on the Basic 
Wage) 112, 123, 125, 132–
142, 146, 147, 148, 217, 220, 
222, 281, 289, 290, 532  
piecework  216, 302, 314, 318, 
319–323, 365, 531, 579, 609, 
681
Piper, Justice H B  332, 622, 625, 
626, 638–639, 640–641, 
642–643
Pius XI, Pope  58
Plowman, David  10, 188, 668–669
population  10–13, 14, 16–17, 161, 
193–194, 661, 666, 673–676, 
680
Portus, G V  415–417, 460
poverty line  136, 148–149,
Powers’ 3s  207, 233, 235, 281–285, 
286, 288, 301, 359, 361, 362, 
364, 365, 370, 375, 380, 382, 
483, 488, 489, 492, 499, 502, 
515, 518, 519, 525, 546, 580, 
581, 600, 703, 704, 705
Powers, Mr Justice Charles  43, 44, 
85–278 (passim), 279, 280, 
281, 284, 285, 288, 291, 295, 
296, 305, 310, 368, 447, 461, 
523, 621, 678, 701, 703, 709
price indices  10–13, 14, 16–17, 28, 
29, 33, 34, 51–52, 88–95, 
97, 113, 117, 133–134, 143, 
196–198, 201–209, 232–234, 
237–238, 242, 286–287, 288, 
350–351, 355, 360, 371–375, 
379, 380, 382, 424, 430–431, 
446, 465, 472–473, 481, 
484, 488–489, 491–492, 499, 
505–508, 515, 520, 537, 539, 
540, 543, 544, 548, 549, 
560, 573–574, 580, 581–582, 
587, 588–589, 591, 592, 660, 
667–668, 696, 703
productivity  15–24, 31–33, 44–45, 
211, 215–216, 221, 236, 279, 
308–310, 312–314, 327–328, 
437–439, 441, 455–459, 
481–482, 498–499, 511–512, 
562, 569, 583, 585, 668, 
670–673, 676, 698
Q
Quick, Deputy President John  187–
188, 231–232, 233–235, 236, 
249–250, 252–253, 255–257, 
259–260, 265, 266, 268, 270, 
273, 275, 278, 286, 297–298, 
303, 447, 521, 599, 615, 622
R
Rankin, Theresa  61, 655
real wages  22–23, 29–31, 31–33, 
34–35, 52–53, 88, 109, 148, 
197–199, 211, 214–215, 221, 
223, 237, 278, 351–352, 374, 
380, 386, 391–393, 395, 
418–419, 422, 426, 456, 460, 
468, 469, 488, 518, 519, 532, 
539–541, 546, 555–556, 569, 
571, 594, 658, 664, 669, 676, 
680, 684, 687, 689–690, 691, 
693, 698, 702, 704–708
Rerum Novarum  57, 62
Ricardo, David  56
Rich, Mr Justice George Edward  
730 Australian Wage Policy
187, 262, 264, 265
Riordan, W J  424
Rowe, J W F  327
Rowntree, Seebohm  58, 64, 116, 
165, 167, 309
Royal Commission on the 
Basic Wage (Piddington 
Commission)  29, 85, 100, 
103–104, 118–149, 178, 196, 
201–202, 205, 207–208, 212, 
217–222, 224, 277–278, 
280–281, 286, 288, 289, 307, 
370, 371, 461, 494, 542, 
547–548, 549, 580, 656, 702, 
703, 705, 709
Rules of Practice (1923)  267–268, 
285
Russell, Eric  672
Russell, F A A  104–105, 417–418, 
460, 654–655
Ryan, John A  57–58
s
Salter, Wilfred  672
Sawkins, D T  55, 63–64, 105, 135, 
290
Schedvin, C B  340, 342–343, 346, 
540, 686
Schutt, William  69–72, 76–77, 80, 
83
Sells, Dorothy  655
Shann, E O G  343–345, 538, 
653–654, 658–659, 666, 686
Sheldon, Peter  532, 533, 537, 540
Smart, William  59
Smith, Adam  55
Smith, Constance  61
Smithies, Arthur  689
Snowden, Philip  58, 59, 60
Starke, Mr Justice Hayden  43, 59, 
60,143, 159, 160, 168, 169, 
178, 239, 243, 245
Stewart, A M  188, 709
Stuckey, R R  574, 575
Sutcliffe, J T  24, 89, 92, 110, 123, 
132, 133, 134, 139, 141, 142, 
201, 216, 228, 229, 235, 240, 
286, 307, 311, 313, 511, 562, 
564, 656, 670–673
sweating  3–9, 58, 61, 63, 64, 293, 
467, 501, 654, 655, 699
Syme, David  5, 653
T
tariff  64–67, 68, 70, 84, 171, 194, 
273, 302, 310, 342, 344, 345, 
346, 379, 409, 447, 452, 503, 
527, 563, 567, 596, 600, 605, 
610, 611, 659, 666, 669, 673, 
675–682, 698
Tariff Board  310, 600, 611, 673, 
677–679, 681–682, 698
terms of trade  14, 336, 341, 342, 
407, 412, 435, 454, 475, 559, 
569, 672, 683, 690, 698
Trevelyan, C G P  425
U
unemployment  24–26, 47–48,147, 
181, 195–196, 222, 226, 241, 
264, 279, 294, 318, 319–320, 
336, 338–340, 342, 359–360, 
380, 381, 388, 391, 394, 396, 
731Keith Hancock
400, 403, 404, 409, 413, 414, 
421, 424, 432–433, 437, 438, 
439, 440, 441, 450–451, 453, 
456, 457–458, 462, 468–469, 
471, 479, 483, 484, 488, 490, 
492, 499–500, 501, 515, 
517–518, 521, 534–535, 536, 
538, 541, 549, 555, 557–558, 
569, 572, 582, 593, 605, 640, 
645–646, 658–659, 661, 
662–664, 668–669, 671–672, 
683–685, 686, 687–688, 694, 
704, 706–707, 709
W
wage relativities  52–54, 199,200, 
290–292, 290–296, 298, 348–
350 519, 525–526, 595–596, 
602, 605, 607, 627
wages boards  1, 2, 5–10, 61, 64, 
65–66, 81–84, 112–113, 114, 
151–154, 169, 174, 219, 240–
241, 242, 247–248, 252–253, 
269–270, 477, 485, 491, 498, 
503–504, 510, 536–537, 592, 
655, 701
Walker, E R  340, 688–689
Wallace Bruce Committee  686
Wall Street collapse  341
Webb, Beatrice  166–167, 655
Webb, Deputy President N A  183, 
187–188, 213–214, 231–232, 
233–234, 235, 236–237, 239, 
240, 241–242, 250–252, 253, 
254–255, 258–259–262, 265, 
266, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 
276–277, 301–302, 323–325, 
362, 600
Webb, Sidney  64, 655
Whillier, R J  118–122, 123, 124–
125, 138, 141, 147
Wickens, C H  207–208, 216, 307, 
370–376, 378, 400, 426, 430, 
675
Wicksteed, Philip H  61
Williams, A E  424
Wilson, Roland  20–23, 31–33
Withers, Glenn  13
Wood, G L  343, 394, 418, 470, 
551
working hours  (see hours of work)
Wright, S C G  505–506, 509–510, 
545, 551, 559–564, 575, 641
Z
Zigliaria, Cardinal  57

